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ABSTRACT 
 
The current thesis intends to assess whether the post-Saddam reform in the Iraq 
criminal justice system is in line with international human rights standards, and 
particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to 
which Iraq is a state party. The aspects of reform on which the present research 
focuses are the rights of the accused person during the pre-trial phase -  the right to be 
freed from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right of access to a counsel and an 
interpreter, and the right to be free from self-incrimination. Doctrinal legal research 
was adopted in the conduct of this research, and both primary and secondary data 
sources were assessed. The assessed data were drawn from scholarly works and other 
publications, as well as regional and international standards and Iraqi legislation.  
 
The key findings unearthed by the current study are that even with the many welcome 
reforms to the Iraqi justice system over the last ten years, certain weaknesses remain. 
The criminal justice system in post-Saddam Iraq has failed to attain full compliance 
with the obligations of due process required by international law. Basic rights of 
accused persons, as enshrined in international standards, are far from being fully 
available to accused persons in Iraq. The research found a considerable gap between 
the law and international due process. A culture of violence, torture and impunity still 
prevails, particularly in the prosecution process, which means that the rule of law in 
Iraq is not fully applied. There is a wide gulf between the legislative framework and 
everyday working practice.  
 
The current research concludes that the threat to the freedoms and liberties of Iraqis 
involves both the theoretical weakness of law and the routine maltreatment of 
individuals.  It thus urgently advocates further reform of the justice system. The thesis 
also contains proposals for further work which needs to be done in order to ensure 
that the new Iraqi criminal justice system accords with the standard rules of due 
process.  Above all, the study demonstrates that recognition of the primacy of the rule 
of law is crucial if the challenges confronting the Iraqi justice system are to be met. 
Little research has been conducted to explore whether the post-2003 reforms to due 
process have succeeded or failed, and the present research aims to fill an important 
gap in our understanding. 
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1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Two days before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the then President George W. 
Bush declared that, 
 “Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a 
message for them: in free Iraq there will be no more executions of dissidents, no 
more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of 
your liberation is near […] Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people 
are deserving and capable of human liberty, and when the dictator has departed, 
they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-
governing nation.  The United States with other countries will work to advance 
liberty and peace in that region.”1 
 
The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime is undeniably one of the most striking 
events in the history of modern Iraq. Having claimed the existence and threat of 
weapons of mass destruction as justification for the invasion of Iraq, the United 
States’ rationale for the removal of the regime was to transform the country into an 
exemplary model of democracy and protection of human rights in the Middle East.
2
  
 
Following the downfall of the regime in 2003, Iraq’s transition to the rule of law has 
involved, among many things, moving forward in respecting human rights and 
improving justice. This thesis considers the criminal justice system reformation that 
has been one of the most pressing goals for entrenching the rule of law. With regard 
to assessing reforms to criminal proceedings, an unbiased approach is needed to 
examine whether post Saddam Iraq has been fully brought in the line with the 
standards of international human rights law. Of particular relevance, it focuses on the 
most urgent procedural safeguards during the pretrial stage of the criminal justice 
process. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 BBC News Channel, Tuesday, 18 March, 2003, 02:23 GMT, available at  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2859269.stm>  accessed 15 August 2013. 
2
 Ibid. 
2 
 
1.1. The procedural safeguards for persons subject to criminal proceedings 
 
The procedural safeguards for the person undergoing criminal proceedings are 
universally recognized as an essential part of human rights protection that must be 
protected by sufficient means under national and international rules.
3
 At the same 
time, these rules which are relevant to the protection of citizens against a crime, and 
by which offenders can be promptly brought to justice, are of particular significance 
and play a vital role in the development of all human rights. It is commonly agreed 
that the criminal process in a criminal justice system must be conducted on the basis 
of striking a balance so as to ensure respecting the basic rights of accused persons on 
the one hand and protecting society on the other (Packer calls this the Crime Control 
Model and the Due Process Model).
4
  
 
In this respect, the pre 2003 Iraqi criminal justice system suffered a systemic failure 
with regard to striking a balance between human rights protection for the person who 
is under criminal proceedings and the capacity of the state in the fight against crime.
5
  
In the aftermath of the invasion, Professor Bodansky wrote that “it would be silly to 
deny that there are deep problems with the Iraqi judicial system.”6 Recently, in 
compliance with the rule of law and tackling the long-term accumulated problems 
within the justice system, efforts have been made to put an end to human rights 
violations and bring the system in line with international standards.
7
 For the purpose 
                                                 
3
 These safeguards are enshrined in following most important international and regional instruments:  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948, UNGA Res 217 A(III).  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (adopted 
10 December 1984 by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46, entered into force 26 June1987).  
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 
December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010). 
UN General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (9 December 1988). 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981 entered into force 21 October 
1986). 
American Convention on Human Right (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978).  
European Convention on Human Rights, (adopted 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953). 
4
 Herbert L. Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Process” (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1-60. 
5
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations/Comments: Iraq’ (Sixty-first session, 
19/11/1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.84. 
6
 Daniel Bodansky, “Establishing the Rule of Law” (2004-2005) Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 119, 133. 
7
 These projects have based on auspices of the International Community together with local knowledge 
and practice. They operated for the purpose of establishing the rule of law and rebuilding post-Saddam 
3 
 
of tracing the development of the present criminal justice system with regard to the 
development of human rights protection in criminal proceedings, it is particularly 
important to distinguish between two eras in Iraq’s history:   
    
1.1.1. Human rights protection in the criminal process in the period 1968-2003 
 
It is self-evident that, for ordinary Iraqis, the violation of human rights in criminal 
proceedings was at its highest level throughout the duration of Saddam’s Ba’ath 
regime. Throughout this era the criminal justice system was seen as a tool in the hands 
of official authority for the punishment of its enemies.
8
 The violations of human rights 
during the Ba’ath regime were facilitated by law. Iraqi law was designed to protect 
the regime.
9
 At that time, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council under the 
command of Saddam Hussein was the major legislative body in the country.  
 
What followed was that the regime through successive amendments to the Iraqi Penal 
Code 111 of 1969 increased the penalty for political offences to capital punishment.
10
 
Due to the control exercised by Ba’ath Party members over the justice sector, together 
with a lack of the rule of law, the justice system became an effective means of serving 
the purposes of the regime. Ba’ath Party members had authority to put persons under 
detention for a period that reached 3 years without judicial review.
11
 With their 
options decreased by the dictation on the executive, judges played a role in supporting 
those in power.
12
 Those in power could simply issue imperative commands to the 
                                                                                                                                            
Iraq, particularly solving various tensions in the justice sector including legislature, judges, due process 
procedures, police and centres of detention and penal institutions. See Cyndi Banks, “Reconstructing 
Justice in Iraq: Promoting the Rule of Law in a Post-conflict State” (2010) Hague Journal on the Rule 
of Law 156. 
8
 According to Amnesty International, “Those suspected of any involvement in opposition activities 
can expect to be arrested without a warrant; held in secret detention, without access to family and 
lawyers; be brutally tortured and face execution” Amnesty International, Iraq: Victims of Systematic 
Repression, report (Index: MDE 14/010/1999 24 November 1999) available at  
< http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9cd10.html> accessed 18 March 2012. 
9
 Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Iraqi Penal Code 111 of 1969, published in the Official Gazette issue 
1778 of 15 September 1969. The official English translation of the Code is available online at the 
homepage of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-
independence/> accessed 28 January 2014.  }يقارعلا تابوقعلا نوناق{  
10
 Ibid; see also Amnesty International, Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression (n 8). 
11
 Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 74 of 1994 published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 3571 on 4 July 1974. The unofficial English translation of the decrees of the Revolutionary 
Command Council is provided by the present author.  }لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{ 
12
 Ash U. Bali, “Justice under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq” 
(2005) 30 Yale Journal of International Law 451. 
4 
 
agents of justice, even by telephone. Overseas experts who took part in the process of 
the system’s reform in 2003 found that “the majority of the judiciary was corrupted by 
the system of Ba’ath party ‘telephone justice’ and endemic bribery.”13 The Judiciary 
was under the control of the executive authority and any court decision could be 
overridden by the executive branch. 
14
 At that time, international human rights groups 
and the Special Rapporteur regularly reported that “the courts are subject to the 
executive branch”15 
 
In addition to the above, the rules of human rights in the area of criminal proceedings 
were grossly violated. This was contrary to due process under international human 
rights law where an accused person, regardless of the seriousness of the charge must 
be provided with sufficient rights and is considered innocent until proven otherwise 
after a fair hearing.
16
 The resort to arbitrary and excessive deprivation of liberty was a 
widespread phenomenon.
17
 Corruption prevailed in the judicial system.
18
 Torture 
                                                 
13
 Daniel L. Rubini, Justice in Waiting: Developing Rule of Law in Iraq, Paper presented to Barnes 
Symposium held at the University of South Carolina Law School at February 2-3 2007, 14. 
14
 See, for example, following  laws and decrees that in wide cases authorised judicial authority for 
civil government officials together with power of detention against individuals: 
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council 463 of 1989 published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3266 of 31 July 1989}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{; 
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council 705 of 1981 published in the Official Gazette, issue 
2834 of 15 June 1981}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council 848 of 1987 published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3177  of 23 November 1987}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council 696 of 1987 published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3167 of 14 September 1987}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council 26 of 5 January 1971 published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 1560 of 18 January 1971}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
The Law of the Ministry of Justice No. 101 of 1977, Article 35 } يغلملا لدعلا ةرازو نوناق{; 
The Iraqi Code of Criminal Proceedings, Article 137, published in the Official Gazette, issue 2004 of 
31 May 1971. The official English translation is available online at the homepage of the Global Justice 
Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 28 January 
2014}يقارعلا ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{; The Customs Act No. 23 of 1984, Article 237, published in 
the Official Gazette, issue 2985 of 19 March 1984}كرامجلا نوناق{; see also, American Bar Association, 
Iraq legal development project, judicial reform index for Iraq (2006-2007, the United States of 
America) 7; United States Department of State, The Future of Iraq Project (2005, Working Group on 
Transitional Justice in Iraq) 21. 
15
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Iraq, Max van der Stoel’ (14 October 1999) A/54/466, para. 39. 
16
 Gafgen v Germany App no 22978/05 (ECtHR, 1 June 2010), (2011) 52 EHRR 1. 
17
 The right to liberty was violated through law provisions. Such provisions provided the Executive 
authorities with a wide power of deprivation of liberty against individuals and that was an explicit 
violence against the independence of the judiciary. Under these provisions, the release on bail of 
detainees was not allowed in many offences such as murder, embezzlement, theft, bribery, smuggling 
and some economic crimes, and handling of stolen goods or handling a vehicle derived from a felony. 
See (n 14); see also, 
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 8 of 1983, published in the Official Gazette, issue 
2921 of 24 January 1983}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
5 
 
became a systemic phenomenon, widely used to obtain information and to extort 
evidence for the purpose of securing a conviction at trial.
19
 It was likely that a person 
under investigation would confess to crimes which they had not committed. In 2001, 
Amnesty International reported that “Torture became the norm and had a brutalizing 
effect on Iraqi society, and it created a “confession culture.”20 In the initial stages of 
the process of reconstructing justice in 2003, various torture centres located inside 
institutions of justice were identified, such as at Abu Ghraib prison.
21
 Professor 
Banks, who participated in post-Saddam reform, noted that confessions in the Iraqi 
justice system were deemed “the only practical way to secure a conviction.” 22  
 
The accused person, inter alia, had no opportunity to obtain a fair hearing throughout 
the criminal proceedings because “the laws failed to protect rights of defendants 
recognized under international human rights standards.”23 These infringements were 
due not only to the routine breach of provisions for human rights in practice: but also 
to legal provisions which often facilitated these violations. Abhorrent laws and other 
                                                                                                                                            
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 157 of 1996 published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 3651 on 6 January 1997 {}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق ;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 137 of 1996 published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 3647 on 9 December 1996}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 1333 of 1984 published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 3024 on 17 December 1984}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 1630 of 1981 published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 2864 on 28 December 1981}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 38 of 1993 published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3448 on 8 March 1993}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No 76 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3517 on 4 July 1994}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{; see also United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(CHR), ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. 
Max van der Stoel’ (15 February 1995) E/CN.4/1995/56, para.32. In this report the Commission, 
expressed “its strong condemnation of the massive violations of human rights […] the widespread 
routine practice of systematic torture; enforced or involuntary disappearances; routinely practised 
arbitrary arrests and detention.”  
18
 Daniel Bodansky, (n 6). 
19
 Joseph T. Thai, “Constitution Excluded Confessions: Applying America’s Lessons to a Democratic 
Iraq” (2005) Oklahoma Law Review 39; Daniel L. Rubini, Justice in Waiting: Developing Rule of Law 
in Iraq (National Security Report, July 2009) 46 available at  
<http://www.roa.org/site/DocServer/0907_NSR.pdf?docID=17781> accessed 2 April 2011. 
20
 Amnesty International, Iraq: Systematic torture of political prisoners (Index: MDE 14/008/2001, 
August 2001); see also Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (Index: MDE 14/001/2013, 
March 2013) 12. 
21
 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office, The Annual Report on Human Rights (2003 London) 
available at 
 <http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/human-rights-report-2003.pdf> 
accessed 27 July 2013. 
22
 Cyndi Banks, (n 7) 167. 
23
 Michael M. Farhang, “Reconstructing Justice: The Coalition Provisional Authority took Giant Steps 
to Guarantee Iraq a Functioning Criminal Justice System” (2004) Los Angeles Lawyer 46. 
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decrees with the force of law directly contradicted binding obligations under 
international human rights law, particularly those which are relevant to torture and 
other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. For example 
Iraqi law, as will be examined later in this thesis, allowed using confession against the 
accused person even if it resulted from torture or other invalid means during the 
investigation.
24
 The various legal provisions were used to breach the right to liberty,
25
 
the right to remain silent was undermined by the provisions of law,
26
 and the right of 
access to a lawyer was not sufficiently secured.
27
 Along with these violations there 
were rules that conferred immunity from criminal proceedings for officials.
28
 Worse, 
there were a number of statutes, as well as decrees carrying the force of law, which 
imposed the death penalty for many offences, such as political crimes, smuggling or 
possession of foreign currency not obtained through government exchanges.
29
 Also 
the extremity of the cruel, inhuman, and degrading physical punishments, was rarely 
before witnessed by the international community when the judicial authorities used 
amputation.
30
 As a result of this, the atrocity was not only seen in widely resorting to 
                                                 
24
 See Chapter Six, particularly our comment on Article 218 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure; 
see also Michael J. Frank, “Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Criminal Court 
of Iraq” (2006) 18 Florida Journal of International Law 3. 
25
 Decrees of the Revolutionary Command Council, (n 17) }لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{; see also the 
decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No 5 of 17 January 1998, published in the Official 
Gazette, issue 3706 of 26/01/1998, according to it the fine penalty had been replaced by detention for a 
period of between 24 hours and 3 months. }لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{ 
26
 See Chapter Six, my analysis of provisions of the right to remain silent; see also Michael M. 
Farhang, (n 23). 
27
 See Chapter Five, my analysis of provisions of access to a lawyer; see also Michael M. Farhang, (n 
23). 
28
 Article 136 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure }يقارعلا ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{; Decrees of 
the Revolutionary Command Council No 1042, published in the Official Gazette, issue 2727 of 27 
August 1979; No 749, published in the Official Gazette, issue 3117 of 29 September 1986. 
}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{  
29
  For example, Law No. 107 of 1974 published in the Official Gazette, issue 2390 of 22 August 1974; 
Law No.66 of 1971 published in the Official Gazette, issue 1989 of 20 April 1971; 
Law No. 111 of 1978 published in the Official Gazette, issue 2659of 19 Jun1978;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 95 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 3521 of 1 August 1994}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{; 
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 59 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette issue 
3514 of 13 June 1994}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{; see also UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report 
on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ 
(n 17) para. 25. 
30
 For example Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 13 of 1992, published in the 
Official Gazette issue 3389 of 20 January 1992}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 9 of 1993, published in the Official Gazette issue 
3457 of 10 May 1993}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 114 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette 
issue 3526 of 5 September 1994}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 118 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette 
issue 3526 of 5 September 1994}لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{;  
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the death penalty but also the most serious of these punishments included the severing 
of an ear or a hand at this time.
31
    
 
Consequently, it can confidently be submitted that the power of authority which had 
been given under Iraqi law allowed the rights of persons facing criminal proceedings 
to be violated, particularly with regard to basic rights such as the right to liberty, 
access to a lawyer and to remain silent. The presumption of innocence had been 
undermined by a systemic failure. This stems from a lack of adequate due process and 
judicial review which undermined the integrity and reputation of the system.
32
 Even 
where there were some procedural safeguards embedded to some degree in the legal 
framework these were not applied.
33
 Generally, the due process standard was 
provided only on paper; it was uncertain or difficult to obtain during every day legal 
practice. The fact was there were thousands of torture victims but it was very rare to 
see cases in which officials engaged in such practices were being brought to justice.
34
    
 
Given that the justice system was controlled by a dictatorial regime like that of 
Saddam, the above background may not cause surprise. Such regimes reject the notion 
that legislation should aim to protect the rights of human beings even if those rights 
are enshrined in international treaties.
35
 This political outlook had a deleterious effect 
on the legal system and promoted a culture of violence, protecting those of its own 
authorities who engaged in repression of fellow citizens.
36
 The justification for such 
ideology, in the opinion of the present author, is that it might have been believed, 
                                                                                                                                            
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 16 of 1995, published in the Official Gazette issue 
3552 of 27 February 1995.  }لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{  
31
 With regard to these forms of punishment, other details will be given during discussion of the reform 
of substantive criminal law in Chapter Two. 
32
 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1994 - Iraq, 1 January 1994, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9f850.html> accessed 5 November 2013; United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Iraq, Max van der Stoel (n 15), para. 39. 
33
 For example, torture and forcing an accused person to speak were prohibited under Iraqi law. 
However, allowing to use a confession against the accused person even if resulted from torture 
undermined these provisions; see Joseph T. Thai, (n 19); Daniel L. Rubini, (n 19) 46.  
34
 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Saddam Hussein: crimes and human rights abuses, report 
(London, November 2002) 5 available at <http://www.google.co.uk> accessed 2 October 2010. 
35
 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by 
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ (n 17) para. 32. 
36
 Under Iraqi law, the Officials were above human rights when they guaranteed impunity against the 
prosecution. See Article 136 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure; Decrees of the Revolutionary 
Command Council Nos. 1042, 749, and 3117 (n 28).  }يقارعلا ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{  
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erroneously, that the sacrifice of individual liberties was necessary for the suppression 
of crime and the maintenance of public order; whereas in reality fighting crime 
became an excuse for abandoning many safeguards given to the accused person.  
 
In light of the aforesaid, it becomes clear that the criminal justice system during the 
Ba’ath regime era failed to provide the minimum protection in the form of procedural 
safeguards for the benefit of accused persons in criminal proceedings. The outcome of 
this failure was a gulf between binding commitments under international human rights 
law and the Iraqi criminal justice system. This state of affairs adversely affected Iraq’s 
position in the international community. Thus, if the Iraqi people wish their country to 
resume its place in international law and international relations, due attention must be 
given to bringing the system in line with international due process, and this must be 
accompanied by a clean break with the practices of the past. As will be seen below, 
after the removal of the Saddam regime attempts were made to respond to these needs 
in the period which followed. 
 
1.1.2. Human rights protection in the criminal process for the period 2003-present  
 
The second period of human rights in criminal process began when the regime ended 
in 2003. Removal of the regime provided an opportunity for Iraq to go through the 
process of the rule of law so that violations of the past would not be repeated. Since 
that time, in compliance with the rule of law, Iraq has been obliged to take the 
commitments of international due process more seriously. In 2007 for example, the 
Iraqi government in co-operation with the United Nations and the World Bank entered 
into a compact setting up a framework for involving the international community in 
Iraq.
37
 It committed the Iraqi government to preventing human rights violations.
38
  
 
The vision was that the culture of violence must not return, repression would be 
replaced by a culture in which human rights prevail.
39
 Iraq now has an elected 
                                                 
37
 United Nations, The International Compact with Iraq: Mid-Year Progress Report (20 July 2007, 
United Nations in New York); see also Eric De Brabandere, Post-Conflict Administration in 
International Law (2009, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 49. 
38
 United Nations, The International Compact with Iraq: Mid-Year Progress Report, ibid 17. 
39
 The national report has been submitted to the United Nations by the Iraqi government pointed out 
that  “ the Republic of Iraq is committed to achieving progress and prosperity as soon as possible, in 
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government and a democratic system unique to the Middle East, “founded on respect 
for pluralism and democratic principles.”40 It now also has a permanent 
Constitution.
41
 Since the collapse of the Ba’ath regime, urgent steps have been taken 
to protect human rights and to prevent any violation of the accused person’s rights 
during criminal proceedings. As will be shown in detail, an important step in 
addressing the deficiencies of the system was the modification of the substantive and 
procedural criminal laws on which the Iraqi criminal justice system was founded.
42
 
 
Many Iraqi and foreign institutions have been engaged in new projects for reforming 
the Iraqi criminal justice system.
43
 These projects were conducted by agencies such as 
the UN Development Program, the United Nations Office for Projects Services, the 
United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and the Criminal Justice, Institute 
for International Law and Human Rights, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development Assistance and Training, Office of Inspector General, the Iraqi Justice 
Integration Project, The Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labour, National Security Presidential Directive, the Iraq Reconstruction 
Management Office, US Army Civil Affairs, The Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, American Bar Association, United States 
Institute of Peace,
 
National Democratic Institute,
 
Department of Justice, European 
Union and other international entities.
44
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
order to free the Iraqi people from the deprivation caused by three decades of war, economic sanctions 
and deteriorating security… Strengthen efforts to bring domestic human rights legislation into line with 
international human rights law” United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRQ/1, 18 January 
2010, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Seventh session, 
Geneva, 8-19 February 2010, report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (A) of the annex to 
Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, para.42 and p. 26. 
40
 United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRQ/1, 18 January 2010, Human Rights Council, 
ibid, para.5. 
41
 Detail will be provided in Chapter Two particularly, in the discussions on the Iraqi Permanent 
Constitution 2005, Article 19.  
42
 Detail will be provided in Chapter Two below. 
43
 International Community spent millions of dollars on these programs which were funded by the 
different international actors such as, World Bank, Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and other donor entities. See Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, report to 
Congress (June 2009, Congressional Research Service) 20 available at < 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125947.pdf> accessed 27 July 2013; United States 
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, US 
Embassy in Baghdad, Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs (October,2005) Report Number ISP-IQO-
06-0; Cyndi Banks, (n 7)156. 
44
 Ibid. 
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These efforts which aimed to achieve the rule of law in post-Saddam Iraq, among 
other things, focused on: 
a. Law reform: 
• Drafting of a new Constitution  
• Reforming criminal law and procedure  
• Economic and Commercial frameworks  
 
b. Institutional reform:  
 
• Vetting and illustration - the De-Ba’athification 
• Courts and related institutions including police 
• Encouraging civil society, NGOs 
• Army45 
• Human Rights education 
• Government officials 
 
c. Accountability:  
 
• The Special Tribunal - trials of Saddam Hussein and other members of his 
Ba'ath Party  
• Separate from the regular justice system, tied to dealing with the past 
 
d. Entrenching human rights: 
• In the Constitution 
• Creation of institutions eg. Ministry of Human Rights and Higher Commission 
for Human Rights 
• Encouraging civil society, NGOs 
• In practice - training 
• Human Rights education 
• UN office and human rights 
 
e. Other measures: These deal with the past, the idea is that they will help Iraq move 
forward towards the rule of law: 
• Reparations 
• Reconciliation Commission 
• Memorisation 
 
On the basis of these programs, the substantive and procedural criminal laws have 
been modified to give the accused person additional due process rights.
46
 These 
modifications have removed offensive portions and inserted fundamental due process 
                                                 
45
 Bremer sacked the whole former Army without De-Ba'athification Commission. See CPA Order 
Number 2 on 23 May 2003; regarding how the decision was made see James Pfiffner, “US Blunders in 
Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army” (2010) Intelligence and National Security 82. 
46
 Michael M. Farhang, (n 23) 49. 
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to protect the accused person in accordance with binding obligations under 
international law.   
 
The critical issue with regard to these efforts of reform is whether they have achieved 
their goal in bringing the system in line with binding obligations under international 
human rights law. Due to limitations of time and scope, it is impossible for the thesis 
to assess all these reforms but focuses on those that are most relevant to pretrial rights. 
As already explained, this work endeavours to deal with the right to be free from 
arbitrary arrest and detention; the right of access to free legal assistance and 
interpreter, and the right to be free from self-incrimination. Reform impacting on 
these particular rights will therefore be examined, without neglecting the overall 
context within which it takes place.  
 
Why does this thesis focus on the three identified rights? First and foremost, these 
rights in Iraq have received considerable attention from the international community. 
There has been a great deal of effort designed to enhance protection in this area in the 
post-Saddam era. However, there is a lack of debate about the recent reforms in this 
area and this comprises the originality of this thesis. The second reason is the 
importance of these rights. There is no doubt; they have a cross-cutting impact on the 
criminal justice system and other rights depend on their protection. Thirdly, 
individuals are in a particularly vulnerable position during the pre-trial stage. An 
additional benefit is that focusing on these critical and cross-cutting rights allows us a 
unique and invaluable window into the realities of the Iraqi criminal justice system. 
Thusly, these three pre-trial rights constitute a unique viewpoint for assessing some 
vital post conflict reforms in the criminal justice system.  
 
This thesis purports an evaluation of these three safeguards along with their reform, 
considered in light of recent developments of procedural safeguards in international 
due process. In cases where reform has been judged as failing to achieve its purpose, 
the aim of the research will be to propose means to bringing the system in line with 
the binding obligations under international law. The thesis endeavours to solve the 
problem through giving an account of the failures and prescribing possible further 
steps by which any incompatibility between the reformed Iraqi criminal justice system 
and international due process can be properly redressed.    
12 
 
1.2. Iraqi obligations under relevant international human rights law 
 
 The fulfillment of obligations under international law is one of the most important 
elements of the rule of law.
47
 As the UN Human Rights Committee pointed out, every 
State is under a duty to respect its international obligations.
48
 Thusly, a State based on 
the rule of law must provide its citizens this protection under international law, 
particularly the obligations imposed under international human rights law. Abiding by 
human rights under international law has inspired some countries not only to bring 
legal provisions in line with international human rights standards but to also 
incorporate ratified treaties into national legislation.
49
  
 
It is true to say that international human rights law had little influence on the Iraqi 
justice system throughout the rule of Saddam. Despite the fact the regime even bound 
itself to several treaties, it did not respect these obligations. The treaties were signed 
so as not to appear as an unequivocal violator of human rights in the eyes of the 
international community. The regime did not heed its basic obligation under the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.  
Post-Saddam, however, Iraq pledges to continue making efforts to implement binding 
obligations under international human rights law in order to distance from the ethos of 
the previous regime.
50
 In the area of pre-trial rights, Iraq is a State Party to the 
ICCPR, and has also recently become a State Party to an important UN treaty; the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UN CAT). Both of these conventions are significantly concerned with 
the human rights of persons subject to criminal proceedings. Besides treaties, other 
non-treaty agreements provide universal guidelines regarding due process rights. 
 
                                                 
47
 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011, Penguin Books) 110. 
48
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations/Comments: Iraq’ (n 5) paras.2 and 7. 
49
 Human Right Act 1998 in the United Kingdome, for example, provides for direct applicability of the 
ECHR into the national legal system; Similarly, according to Article 19 of the Constitution 2008, 
Kosovo accepted direct applicability and superiority into the domestic legal system for not only human 
rights treaties but also for all ratified international treaties; the discussion about the Iraq practice of 
treaties implementation will be provided in the Chapter Two. 
50
 See (n 39); see also United Nations, The International Compact with Iraq: Mid-Year Progress 
Report (n 37). 
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1.2.1. Obligations under the ICCPR  
 
In recent history, the most influential protection of human rights at the international 
level has been found in the ICCPR, which was adopted in 1966 and came into force in 
1976. The ICCPR obliges a State party to ensure that its law and practice comply with 
its obligations under the treaty.
51
 Within the scope of the present thesis, the context of 
the ICCPR together with interpretations of its provisions in case law by the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee’s general 
comments, make clear all the binding obligations of the States parties with regard to 
the minimum protection of human rights during criminal proceedings and to the 
prevention of all kinds of violations at the hands of authority.
52
 Of particular 
relevance, these rights which the present thesis focuses on - the right to liberty, third 
party access rights (the right of access to a lawyer and an interpreter) and the right to 
be free from self-incrimination - are given effective protection, as will be analysed 
against the ICCPR throughout the proceeding chapters.  
 
The right to liberty, in addition to the provisions of Article 9 of the ICCPR, is 
considered also under case law and the Committee’s general comments.53 Access to a 
lawyer is one of the most important rights to a person accused under provisions of a 
                                                 
51
 ICCPR, Article 2.  
52
 The HRC is a monitoring body that is established by the ICCPR. It comprises 18 experts who have 
the competence to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR by States parties. There are four 
monitoring functions of the Committee: providing guidance on interpretation of the ICCPR via general 
comments on Articles; the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR gives the Committee power to consider 
complaints of individuals against human rights violations by States parties to the Protocol; examination 
of States party’s reports and the Committee has competence to consider petition that it may be made 
against one state party by another. For more detail see the official website of United Nations, Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights at  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx> accessed 28 July 2013. 
53
 ICCPR, Article 9 states that: 
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law.  
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall 
be promptly informed of any charges against him.  
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in 
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial 
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.  
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and 
order his release if the detention is not lawful.  
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.” 
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fair trial in accordance with Article 14(3) (b) (d) of the ICCPR. It may be argued here 
that the above cited Article considers the trial stage whereas, this thesis focuses on 
pre-trial proceedings. In this regard, from the outset, it must be made clear that in 
order to strengthen respect for human rights throughout criminal proceedings, 
significant rights of accused persons during pre-trial stage can be found under the 
provisions of this Article. This crucial point is expanded on in the jurisprudence of 
international human rights instruments’ bodies.  
 
The fact is that the text of the ICCPR under provisions of a fair trial in accordance 
with Article 14(3) entitles minimum guarantees only for a person against whom there 
is a criminal charge has been brought.
54
 Thus, textually, these guarantees are not 
equally applicable to a person who is under criminal proceedings and he has not been 
actually charged with a criminal offence. What follows is that it is unclear under 
international rules as what does the notion of ‘criminal charge’ mean, and hence under 
these provisions of a fair trial, it is ambiguous as to whether these guarantees exist for 
a person under pre-trial investigation at the outset of criminal proceedings or not.  
 
Given the above explanations, however, this does not mean that these rights only exist 
during trial stage and after formal criminal charge with a criminal offence. Some of 
these rights are equally essential at pre-trial stage from arrest stage. As will be explain 
further in subsequent chapters,
55
 it is clearly mentioned under the jurisprudence of 
international instruments’ bodies that some of the rights set out under the provision of 
a fair trial at trial phase are equally applicable to a person who is under criminal 
                                                 
54
 ICCPR, Article 14(3) states that: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly 
and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;  
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with 
counsel of his own choosing;  
(c) To be tried without undue delay;  
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance 
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in 
any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;  
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;  
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in 
court;  
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.” 
55
 In Chapter Five and Six. 
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proceedings in the pre-trial investigation stage from the outset of proceedings. Access 
to a lawyer, for example, justify above claim. 
 
As a result, it can be observed that the right of a suspect to access to legal assistance 
at the pre-trial stage is not explicitly found in the ICCPR. However, according to the 
HRC the right of access to a lawyer, without addressing the notion of criminal charge, 
is also exist at pre-trial stages of criminal proceedings from arrest stage. On this 
specific issue, as will be discussed elsewhere in this work by reference to actual cases 
and general comments, guidance can be obtained from the jurisprudence of the HRC 
and the Committee’s general comments that clearly interpreted these rights under the 
provisions of a fair hearing in a comprehensive sense to involve the pre-trial 
investigation stage and before any formal criminal charges.
56
 
 
The jurisprudence of ECtHR is illustrative in this respect and interprets the notion of 
criminal charge in very wide scope.
57
 It is recognized by the ECtHR that some 
provisions of Article 6 of the ECHR should apply not only from the time of formal 
charge being brought against the accused person but from the outset of criminal 
proceedings being taken place by the police. For the purpose of these provisions under 
Article 6, the Court defined a ‘charge’ as “the official notification given to an 
individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a 
criminal offence.”58 As a result, Article 6 of the ECHR, which corresponds literally to 
that of Article 14 of the ICCPR, lays some provisions for all stages of criminal 
proceedings and specifically emphasised its applicability to the ‘decisive’ pre-trial 
stage of criminal proceedings and covers the criminal proceedings even before the 
formal charge is made from the moment that “he is substantially affected by the steps 
taken against him as a suspect.”59 
                                                 
56
 The right of access to a lawyer will be discussed at length in Chapter Five. 
57
 Deweer v Belgium App no. 6903/75 (ECtHR, 27 February 1980), (1979-80) 2 EHRR 439 para 42; 
see also Stefan Trechsel and Sarah J. Summers, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2006, Oxford 
University Press) 32; Robin C A White and Clare Ovey, The European Convention On Human Rights 
(5
th
 ed., Oxford University Press) 246. 
58
 Eckle v Germany App no 8113/78 (ECtHR, 15 July 1982), (1983) 5 EHRR 1 para 73.  
59
 The ECtHR states that “even if the primary purpose of Article 6, as far as criminal proceedings are 
concerned, is to ensure a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any criminal charge”, it does 
not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial proceedings…the initial stages of police 
interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal 
proceedings.” Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008), (2009) 49 EHRR 19 
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The right to have an interpreter free of charge at pre-trial stage is equally not 
expressly mentioned in the ICCPR. The provision made mention free interpreter at 
court but is silent about pre-trial stage.
60
 However, according to the international 
bodies, a person under criminal investigation particularly at pre-trial stage has right to 
have free access to interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language of 
proceedings.
61
 Likewise, in the determination of any criminal charge, the provisions 
of the ICCPR in Article 14(3) (g) states that an accused person has the right to be free 
from self-incrimination, which means the right of any person is protected under the 
provisions of ICCPR in Article 14(3) (g) and can also be applied to persons under 
criminal investigation from the outset of proceedings.
62
  
 
Iraq adopted the ICCPR for almost forty years but in sequence - first signed in 1969, 
ratified in 1970, and by 1976 came into force.
63
 Iraq is one of the state parties that 
have made no reservations to their application of the ICCPR. However, Iraq engaged 
with neither the First nor Second Optional Protocols of the UN ICCPR.
64
  
 
As will be reiterated throughout this thesis, some of these provisions under the 
ICCPR, even those related to providing protection for human rights in criminal 
proceedings, the Iraq criminal justice system fell short of international obligations in 
multi-faceted ways. It will be argued that the systematic daily violation of the human 
rights of accused persons was one of the major reasons behind the deterioration of the 
human rights situation in Iraq. These violations were condemned by international 
                                                                                                                                            
paras 50, 52; David Harris et al., The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2
nd
 ed., 2010, 
Oxford University Press) 306. 
60
 Article 14(3)(f) provides that “To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court.” 
61
 The right of access to an interpreter will be discussed at length in Chapter Five. 
62
 14(3)(g) provides the right of a person to “Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to 
confess guilt.” 
63
 Iraq ratified the ICCPR by Law 193 of 1970, published in the Official Gazette, issue 1926 of 7 
October 1970, entered into force on 23 March 1976.  
}ةيسايسلاو ةيندملا قوقحلاب نيصاخلا نييلودلا نيدهعلل قارعلا مامضنا نوناق{ 
In this respect, Chapter Two will provide some discussion on how the ratified international treaties are 
being implemented and whether they applicable as domestic law in term of Iraqi law or not.    
64
 See the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted 
by the General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 
March 1976. It provides an individual whose rights have been violated to submit a written complain to 
the HRC for consideration. See also the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Adopted by the General Assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989 
and entered into force on 11 July 1991. It bans the capital punishment. 
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reports from reputable institutions on various occasions.
65
 The system relied heavily 
on the death penalty to deter crime.
66
 What made the situation worse was that the 
system was widely reliant on confession to secure conviction, even in capital offense 
cases.
67
 In addition, because Iraq was not party to the First Optional Protocol of the 
UN ICCPR, victims whose human rights were abused by the public authority, having 
exhausted national remedies, could neither send their cases to the Human Rights 
Committee (the HRC) nor resort to it in order to redress the damages incurred.  
 
The adoption of propositions aimed at progress towards the rule of law in Iraq is of 
particular importance. With respect to dealing with human rights of accused persons 
in the scope of this research during the pre-trial stage, the research will focus 
particularly on the programmes instigated since 2003 which were intended to bring 
about such reforms of the criminal justice system as would bring it into conformity 
with the binding obligations of international law and rule of law. Therefore, one 
should ask whether the growing willingness to reform over the last ten years has 
adequately fulfilled the task of achieving effective due process in accordance with 
international standards in the sphere of human rights, most notably with regard to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iraq is a party. 
 
1.2.2. Other relevant UN international instruments binding upon Iraq 
 
Particular attention has been paid by the United Nations to combating one of the most 
serious violations of human rights, which is the infliction of torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment. On this basis, the General Assembly on 9 December 1975 
adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
68
 The 
                                                 
65
 Human Rights Reports of the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Iraq (UNAMI), and other international NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
dating to between 2004 and 2013. 
66
 Statistics issued by the government show that there were 338 executions of convicted persons during 
the years 2009- 2012. See the Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of 
Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Rights Report (2012, Baghdad) 47. 
 يونسلا ريرقتلا{عاضولأ زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا- }ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو  
67
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report: 2012 (Baghdad, June 2013) 14. 
68
 UN General Assembly Res 30/3452 ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (9 December 
1975).   
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“Torture Declaration” was the starting-point for further endeavours to draw up a draft 
of international human rights treaty on this subject.
69
 These endeavours resulted in the 
UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UN CAT) in 1984 (it came into force in 1987).  
 
By virtue of Article 17 of the Convention a mechanism to monitor the implementation 
by the State parties was established: the Committee against Torture (CAT). The 
Committee role is to examine the implementation of treaty obligations by State 
parties.
70
 For this purpose, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted an 
Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention which establishes a system of the 
international investigation against torture.
71
 In performing this duty a Subcommittee 
on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment has been established on which the duty to visit places of detention in the 
States Parties and support compliance with the convention is entrusted.
72
  
 
The growing willingness to affect legal reform in Iraq apparently lies behind a recent 
development, the signing and ratification by the government of the Convention in July 
of 2011. As a consequence, it is important to bear in mind that various steps are 
required in order to implement binding obligations under the Convention. In the first 
place, special attention must be given to the adoption in absolute form of the 
provisions of the Convention with regard to domestic law, along with the 
criminalisation of various acts prohibited under the Convention;
73
 the establishment of 
appropriate mechanisms of inquiry to investigate any alleged occurrence of ill 
                                                 
69
 Hans Danelius, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,  Audiovisual Library of International Law (United Nation 2008) at  
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html> accessed 30 July 2013.   
70
 The Committee can undertake its role through a number of duets listed by the Convention that:   
“ (i)To receive, study and comment on periodic reports from the States parties on the measures they 
have taken to give effect to their undertakings under the Convention (article 19); 
(ii)To initiate an investigation when there is reliable information which appears to contain well-
founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State party (article 
20); 
(iii)To receive and examine complaints by one State party of violations of the Convention by another 
State party (article 21); and 
(iv)To receive and examine applications by individuals claiming to be victims of a violation of the 
Convention by a State party (article 22).” 
71
 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Adopted on 18 December 2002 at the fifty-seventh session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations by resolution A/RES/57/199, entered into force on 22 June 2006. 
72
 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Article 2. 
73
 UN CAT, Articles 2, 4, 5, and 8. 
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treatment in the institutions of the criminal justice system;
74
 the promulgation of the 
culture of human rights;
75
 the improvement of the capacity of members of the public 
authority to deal properly with criminal proceedings in the light of international 
norms;
76
 ensuring that evidence obtained by invalid means should be inadmissible,
77
 
and assisting the victim with free and effective remedy against any violation or ill 
treatment.
78
  
 
In this thesis there will be scrutiny of the relevant obligations under the ratified 
international treaties to ascertain whether they have been implemented at the domestic 
level. In the context of this thesis, it may safely be assumed that if failure to meet 
these obligations under the Convention is judged it will lead to the conclusion that the 
reforms fail to protect a person accused against being a victim of the criminal justice 
system. In recognition of this assumption, an attempt will be made in this thesis to 
ascertain whether or not the human rights examined under the reformed Iraq criminal 
justice system are in accordance with the obligations of international law. 
 
1.2.3. Non-treaty obligations 
 
In addition to the legal obligation under international binding instruments, there is a 
complementary protection for a person facing criminal proceedings.
79
 It is important 
that protections loophole under international binding law in any aspect of 
international due process could be resolved by customary international law. Soft law 
also provides extra international commitments. Over time, even if it does not have the 
legal power of treaties could address particular issues in the sphere of international 
human rights.
80
 Since these instruments could provide the Iraqi legal system with 
                                                 
74
 UN CAT, Articles 12, 13. 
75
 UN CAT, Article 10. 
76
 UN CAT, Articles 10, 11. 
77
 UN CAT, Article 15. 
78
 UN CAT, Article 14. 
79
 Article 5(2) of the ICCPR states that “There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of 
the fundamental human rights recognised or existing in any state party to the present Covenant 
pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not 
recognise such rights or that it recognises them to a lesser extent.” 
80
 Soft law includes numerous declarations, resolutions, decisions, and principles adopted by the UN 
General Assembly and other political bodies dealing with human rights, to guide states to comply with 
existing international standards. See for example Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 
December 1948, UNGA Res 217 A(III); UN General Assembly Res 34/169 ‘Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials’ (17 December 1979); UN General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of 
20 
 
practical guidance for adherence to international standards of human rights some 
relevant soft law instruments will be adopted in the next chapters.  
  
1.3. Thesis statement and research questions 
 
As earlier examined, since the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in 2003, many Iraqi and 
foreign institutions have been working to reform the Iraqi criminal justice system. As 
a result, there is a widespread belief in Iraq that the reformed criminal justice system 
is now in accordance with international human rights standards. This thesis seeks to 
test the correctness of the proposition that the reformed Iraqi criminal justice system 
accords with international standards in the human rights area, notably the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iraq is a party. The 
study will focus on three pre-trial rights; the right to liberty, third part access rights 
and the right to be free from self-incrimination. The author explores Iraqi law with an 
open mind to test the proposition; without setting out to prove that the suspect’s rights 
are violated in Iraq. Nevertheless, the research leads the author to the clear conclusion 
that the reformed criminal justice system has failed to fully protect rights in the three 
identified areas. The author, having identified the weaknesses and fault lines, 
examines the reasons why these exist and proposes concrete steps for further work to 
be done, including areas of law reform and training of criminal justice personnel. In 
this, he draws from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as a 
kind of ‘best practice’ for guiding the Iraqi criminal justice system in the area of pre-
trial rights. 
 
Research in this area is necessary to assess whether the efforts to reform the Iraqi 
criminal justice system have met the objective standards of the ICCPR, which is 
                                                                                                                                            
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (9 
December 1988); UN General Assembly Res 30/3452 ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (9 
December 1975); UN General Assembly Res 48/134 ‘Principles Relating to the Status of National 
Institutions (The Paris Principles)’ (20 December 1993); UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 
1990 adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders in 1990; UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 
September 1990). 
 
 
21 
 
binding on Iraq as a State Party. The duty of every State to respect its international 
obligations is a fundamental principle in International Law and International 
Relations, and if Iraq is properly to retake its place in the international community it 
must pay heed to the standards it is expected to abide by. Further research in this area 
is essential for the future trajectory of Iraq. The rule of law is critical to the future of 
Iraq as it moves further and further away from the time of the Ba’ath regime.81 The 
author argues that there must be a clean break with the practices of the past if Iraq is 
to move forward, and argues that fundamental and effective reform of the criminal 
justice system will lay the foundations for an Iraq based on the rule of law and respect 
for humanity.  
  
In light of recent efforts with regard to the reform of the Iraqi criminal justice system, 
the question which follows is this: has the desired objective for which the efforts of 
reform in the context of the post-Saddam Iraq have been exerted since 2003, brought 
the reformed criminal justice system in line with international norms? To put it a little 
differently, the thesis considers the question: does the Iraqi criminal justice system, 
having been reformed over the last ten years, meet the objective standards of 
applicable international law? Another question, which then follows, is that if it is the 
case that these efforts of reform have not been successful, what are the reasons behind 
the failure and what measures could be proposed to redress the defective areas in 
order to bring those procedural rights into conformity with international perspectives? 
 
The scope of this work is limited to examining the three identified rights during the 
pre-trial criminal process. As mentioned previously, it would not be true to say that 
the reform encompassed only the three rights considered here. It is, however, not 
practical to attempt to investigate all the reforms comprehensively.
82
 Rather, the 
discussion will focus on the extent to which the three identified guarantees of accused 
persons in the criminal procedure system comply with the substantive commitments 
of Iraq under international law.  
 
 
                                                 
81
 The rule of law is discussed at length in Chapter Two. 
82
 See the discussions on why does this thesis focus on the three identified rights in p 10-11.   
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1.4. Methodology  
 
The study tests claims about the success of the reforms by examining the new Iraqi 
criminal justice against binding international standards in the realm of procedural 
safeguards for accused persons in pre-trial proceedings. To achieve its aims, it is 
reliant on rigorous doctrinal legal research. It adopts the standard legal analysis, of a 
‘black letter nature’. It also evaluates the studies of scholars and publications that are 
relevant to the topic, such as books and journals. The work examines primary sources, 
such as Iraq’s legislation, and subjects them to analytical study. Where the author 
refers to Arabic language materials, he relies on the official, unofficial, or own 
translation. The Iraqi laws on which the present author is reliant are available in 
English versions under official translation. With regard to the Criminal Procedure 
Code No. 23 of 197, the Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, the Public Prosecutor Law No 
159 of 1979, and the Judicial Organization Law No.160 of 1979 the present research 
will adopt a copy of the official English translation that is available online at the 
homepage of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI), carried out by the Iraqi 
government under the auspices of the United Nations in 2009.
83
  With regard to the 
Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, the research will adopt a copy of the official 
English translation that is available online at the homepage of the Iraqi government.
84
    
Additionally, the primary sources on which the work basically relies are international 
rules, particularly the ICCPR, which is binding on Iraq as a State Party. For the 
purpose of identifying the potential gap between them, critical analysis methods of the 
Iraqi criminal justice system and the international standards of the Covenant (the 
ICCPR) and the guidance of the Human Right Committee are adopted throughout the 
work.  
 
In the context of Iraqi sources, the author has faced difficulties in acquiring the 
appropriate sources and in discovering documents whereby the research can be 
substantiated. However, the research uses many national documents, domestic case-
law and data obtained through private efforts from various governmental and non- 
governmental resources.  
                                                 
83
 Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) قارعلا-   لماشلا ةلادعلا  عورشم, available at <http://gjpi.org/central-
activities/judicial-independence/ > accessed 1 March 2012. 
84
 The homepage of the Iraqi government, available at <http://www.cabinet.iq/default.aspx> accessed 
20 November 2013.  
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For tracking the development of Iraqi criminal justice and human rights reform in law 
and practice, the study essentially relies on international sources, such as the reports 
which have been drafted and carried out by reputable international organisations and  
human rights groups, for example, UN special reports, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, and non-government organizations such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. It is also important that, from the removal of Saddam’s regime 
until the present time, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Baghdad (UNAMI) has regularly operated extensive fieldwork with regard to pre-trial 
detention, which has involved gaining access to places of detention, monitoring the 
proceedings and conducting personal interviews. These empirical resources have been 
greatly relied upon in the current research for the substantiation of the facts of daily 
practice in the post-Saddam criminal justice system. In addition, some of the 
methodology relies on multiple projects implemented by the international community 
in its efforts to reassert the rule of law in Iraq. 
 
The study takes advantage of the experience of other domestic legal systems around 
the world, and other legal codes with relevance to the protection of human rights in 
criminal proceedings, and in particular the Model Codes for Post Conflict Criminal 
Justice, which have been developed and drafted by the United States Institute of Peace 
and the Irish Centre for Human Rights in cooperation with the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime.
85
 In this thesis, the research seeks to inspire solutions to problems relating to 
Iraqi law rather than on the analysis of the traditions of these various systems and 
national rules. It may be helpful to learn lessons by studying the experiences of those 
legal systems with regard to their dealing with pre-trial human rights; at the same 
time, those provisions that are by their nature inconsistent with the Iraqi legal system 
can be avoided and the research will not deal with them. The aim here is to examine 
with an open mind the defects in the post-Saddam reformed criminal justice system 
by giving relevant examples of other countries’ systems with regard to procedural pre-
                                                 
85
 Vivienne O’Connor & Colette Rausch (eds.), Model Code for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, Model 
Criminal Code Vol. I (2007, United States, Institute of Peace Press). 
Vivienne O’Connor & Colette Rausch (eds.), Model Code for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, Model 
Code of Criminal Procedure Vol. II (2008, United States, Institute of Peace Press). 
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trial safeguards. In this way the aim of the research, to examine the post-Saddam 
reform, can best be served and also any deficiencies in the Iraqi procedures can be 
addressed to bring the reformed Iraqi justice system in line with international 
standards. 
 
Any attempt to estimate the degree to which Iraqi post-2003 justice complies with its 
international obligations will necessarily involve an interpretation of the legal text of 
the ICCPR. In this, the work of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
is critical. Accordingly, this research mainly relies on HRC’s jurisprudence and 
general comments. The HRC is regarded as setting a global standard for the protection 
of human rights and it is also a highly experienced interpreter of the rules of 
international law. These rules therefore provide a benchmark for measuring the extent 
to which the reformed Iraqi system fulfills its obligations under international law. It is 
the present author’s hope that these methods will help in solving the stated problem 
with regard to the pre-trial human rights of the accused person and also in reaching 
the minimum standard.  
 
In addition, the study relies on case law collocated from other international resources, 
particularly the jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR). It 
thus benefits from a rich store of case law dealing with the protection of pre-trial 
human rights. The on-going development of procedural safeguards under Strasbourg 
case-law can be invested and deployed as a guideline for Iraqis in order to identify 
fault lines and redress the weaknesses in the system and thus lay a foundation for 
further reforms to be carried out in the near future.  
 
1.5. Structure of the work 
 
The study comprises eight chapters. It starts with the present brief introductory 
chapter, which considers the background of the subject researched in order to justify 
this research. It also presents the statement of the thesis and the methodology adopted.  
 
Chapter Two considers the rule of law reform in Iraq after 2003. In this chapter, the 
concentration is on the reforms which have taken place in the criminal justice system 
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in order to restore the rule of law and respect for human rights. This chapter argues 
that the resolution of the problem of systemic abuse of the three identified human 
rights is dependent not merely on an adequate legal framework but also on the 
adoption of a justice system under the effective rule of law. The chapter discusses in 
depth whether a particular rule or system has moved away from the past to fulfill its 
rightful function of protecting the basic rights of the accused person. It will reveal the 
key improvements with regard to the reform of law; reform of the judicial authority, 
including other actors or sectors linked with the criminal justice field; and reform of 
the system of protecting human rights. The reform programme encompasses more 
than the identified rights considered in the thesis and this necessitates the provision of 
an overall background to the topic prior to the discussion of the core of the thesis, 
which concerns the three identified guarantees of the accused person.  
   
Chapter Three proceeds on the basis that discussion of the three identified rights must 
be preceded by an understanding of the workings of the Iraqi legal system, so that the 
issues examined in the subsequent chapters may be more clearly understood. The 
chapter therefore provides an overview of how the investigative system works in daily 
life. In addition, an attempt will be made to focus on particular issues in light of 
international rules and recent developments of the due process standard. The chapter 
also endeavours to identify those defective areas of the system that directly impinge 
on the aspects of human rights under research. 
Chapter Four discusses whether or not the reforms have led to the prohibition of 
arbitrary arrest and detention. This chapter focuses on testing Iraqi law against the 
standard of international rules in order to illustrate those defective rules which grant 
officials wide discretion to deprive the accused person of liberty prior to any guilt 
been determined by a court.  
 
Chapter Five endeavours to identify basic measures for the protection of the rights of 
a person accused in respect of access to a lawyer and an interpreter. It analyses the 
extent to which the reforms of the post-Saddam criminal justice system have 
contributed to rendering the provisions of Iraqi law and practice compliant with 
international due process and recent developments of safeguards in criminal 
procedure. The chapter focuses on testing the correctness of the claim that in Iraq the 
situation regarding the third party access rights during the initial investigation of the 
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pre-trial stage conflicts in multiple aspects with international standards for the 
protection of human rights. 
   
Chapter Six examines in depth the provisions of reformed Iraqi law and practice 
regarding the right to be free from self-incrimination in the light of international due 
process. It aims to identify those provisions that are noncompliant with binding 
obligations under international law. This chapter explicates the components of the 
right: the right to silence, the right to be safe from ill-treatment and the right to be 
protected against involuntary confession. The chapter examines the possible situations 
in which an accused person has no absolute right to silence; and the possible 
situations in which protection against mistreatment and against self-incrimination is 
denied in order for confessions obtained from the accused to be admissible at a later 
stage during the trial. 
 
This thorough and objective investigation leads the author to the unavoidable 
conclusion about the failure of the post-Saddam Iraqi criminal justice system and its 
reforms in protecting the human rights of a person accused during the pre-trial 
investigation stage. The study concludes that, contrary to basic standards of 
international human rights law, the three identified rights suffer from a lack of 
protection in law and practice within a system which is dysfunctional in its entirety. 
The focus on the three rights reveals the extent of the malaise across the board.  For 
the purpose of achieving the target of study, and having found earlier throughout 
previous chapters that the new reform fails to achieve full compliance with 
obligations under international law, an attempt will be made in Chapter Seven to co-
ordinate the findings.   
 
To this end, it will be devoted to the shattering of the myth of a successful post-
Saddam criminal procedure reform and is divided into two sections. The first section 
will be assigned to an analysis of some of the reasons why the reformed criminal 
justice system has failed and why the violation of suspects continues. The second 
section proposes further reforms so that the discovered shortcomings of justice are 
remedied and a new system is inaugurated which brings post-Saddam Iraq in 
accordance with international due process and with modern conceptions of human 
rights in criminal procedure. It shall be argued that the proposals for further reform 
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must be multi-faceted, involving changes to the law, institutional reform, improved 
education, training, monitoring and various other factors by which compliance with 
the international law of human rights can be ensured.  
 
Chapter Eight will bring the findings of the previous chapters together to form a 
conclusion and will briefly summarize answers to the questions posed by the research, 
thus providing resolution. 
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CHPTER TWO 
THE RULE OF LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN IRAQ 
 
Introduction 
 
As indicated previously, the criminal justice system in Iraq had struggled against an 
entrenched culture of violating human rights both in law and practice.
1
 In 2003, 
Western influences have caused Iraq to change from an authoritarian regime to a 
democratic system. Serious efforts have been made to establish security, to reform the 
justice system, to instigate the mechanisms of oversight and accountability and to 
bring about the trial of criminals from the former regime. Thus, before examining, in 
the following chapters, the three identified guarantees of an accused, the present 
chapter will consider the progress of the reforms that have been made with the aim of 
improving the criminal justice system in post-Saddam Iraq. 
  
A fair and effective justice system is recognized as the cornerstone in the construction 
of a society governed by the rule of law.
2
 It has to be recognized that movement 
forward towards an efficient level of the rule of law in Iraq will require a considerable 
period of time. For the past ten years, the improvement of the justice system has been 
a major project, and various programmes have been suggested or implemented in this 
respect. The reforms made in order to establish human rights within the Iraqi criminal 
justice system will be discussed in the next five sections. The discussion will consider 
the concept of the rule of law itself and its applicability to post-Saddam Iraq. 
Following this, the discussion will move to a closer assessment of the different 
reforms by focussing on: the reform of the law in order to establish due process rights; 
reform of the judicial authority in order to create an independent criminal justice 
system; reform of other bodies linked with the justice system; and reform of non-
judicial mechanisms for ensuring human rights.  
                                                 
1
 Chapter One particularly pages 3, 4, and 5. 
2
 Professor Nachbar has convincingly maintained that “A society cannot be said to be governed by the 
rule of law if criminals are not adequately dealt with or if the state fails to treat those subject to its 
complete control in a humane, rational manner.” Thomas B. Nachbar, “Defining the Rule of Law 
Problem” (2009) 6 The Green Bag 310.   
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2.1. The meaning of the rule of law  
 
Before directly deconstructing the main arguments with regard to Iraqi post-Saddam 
criminal justice reform, it is essential to review what the rule of law means.  
 
The rule of law is a system that provides the rules and rights necessary for the 
organization of the life of the community and the establishment of a just society. It 
provides basic protection against violations of human rights, barriers to justice, 
arbitrary government and anarchy. Due process is one of the most important elements 
of the rule of law.
3
 At the same time, the rule of law is valuable for a person who is 
undergoing criminal proceedings. If the law does not exercise its power over the state 
authorities, any safeguards given to the accused person are likely to be ineffective. In 
the same way, the protection of human rights within the context of the criminal justice 
system is reliant not only on the amendment and reform of laws but also on respect 
for these rights in practice within the justice system. In other words, it is about law 
and practice. It goes beyond the individual instances, and concerns structures and 
systems.  
 
Although scholars agree that the modern notion of the rule of law can be traced back 
to the 19
th
 century,
4
 there is some disagreement regarding its scope and definition.
5
 
                                                 
3
 See Thomas B. Nachbar, ibid 310; Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2011, Penguin Books) 66; Edda 
Kristjánsdóttir et al. (eds.), International Law in Domestic Courts: Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict 
States (2012, Intersentia) 28. 
4
 Professor A.V. Dicey used the term ‘the rule of law’ in 1885 in his influential work, An Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Dicey described the meaning of the rule of law as follows:  
“1. No man is punishable or can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. 
2. No man is above the law, and all are subject to the same law of the realm and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.  
3. There remains yet a third and different sense in which the rule of law or the predominance of the 
legal spirit may be described as a special attribute of English institutions. We may say that the 
Constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles of the Constitution 
(as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us as the result of 
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the court; 
whereas under many foreign Constitution the security (such as it is) given to the rights of individuals 
results, or appears to result, from the general principles of the Constitution.” See Albert V. Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan and co., 1889) 175, 181 
and 183. Available at 
<http://archive.org/stream/introductiontos04dicegoog#page/n110/mode/2up> accessed 9 October 2013.  
5
 Thomas B. Nachbar (n 2) 304; Edda Kristjánsdóttir et al. (eds.), (n 3) 27; Suzannah Linton & Firew 
Kebede Tibe, “Judges and Rule of Law in Times of Political Change or Transition” M. Cherif 
Bassiouni et al. (eds.), The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence: 
Globe Trends (2013, Oxford University Press) 173 at 178.  
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This can be attributed to the existence of different formulations of the concept.
6
 As a 
result there are two distinct categories or modes of the rule of law. The ‘thin’ version 
includes formal conceptions concerning the process of making the law and its 
attributes, such as its need to be clear, certain and predictable. The ‘thick’ version is a 
substantive conception of the rule of law that considers not only the format but also 
the content of the law and of human rights.
7
  
 
Recently, theorists have largely inclined to follow substantive versions of the rule of 
law.
8
 Lord Bingham, for example, stated that, “all persons and authorities within the 
state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws 
publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the 
courts.”9 This definition provides additional principles that replace the ‘thin’ 
interpretation of the rule of law with the ‘thick’ concepts that entail fundamental 
individual human rights but are also concerned with social and economic rights. 
 
In the past two decades, reforming the rule of law in post-conflict societies has 
become a significant project in the international community.
10
 It follows that it is very 
important for the international community to understand the meaning of the rule of 
                                                 
6
 Edda Kristjánsdóttir et al. (eds.), (n 3) 27. 
7
 Cyndi Banks, “Reconstructing Justice in Iraq: Promoting the Rule of Law in A Post-Conflict State” 
(2010) 2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 159; Edda Kristjánsdóttir et al. (eds.), (n 3) 27; Tom 
Bingham, (n 3) 66. 
8
 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (1
st
 ed., 2004, Cambridge 
University Press) 91; Cyndi Banks, ibid; Edda Kristjánsdóttir et al. (eds.), (n 3) 28; Tom Bingham, (n 
3) 37.  
9
 This approach to the substantive version of the rule of law provides general principles: 
“1. The law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable. 
2. Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not 
the exercise of discretion- Law not Discretion (When the law ends the tyranny and arbitrariness starts). 
3. The laws of the land should apply equally to all- Equality before the law, save to the extent that 
objective differences justify differentiation (thus, for example, children should be treated differently).  
4. Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, 
fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such 
powers and not unreasonably.  
5. The law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights (Human rights). 
6. Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil 
disputes that the parties themselves are unable to resolve (access to justice system).   
7. Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair (fair trial-equality of arms, etc.). 
8. Compliance by the state, with its obligations in international as in national law.” See Tom Bingham, 
(n 3) 37. 
10
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Criminal Justice Reform in Post-Conflict States - A 
Guide for Practitioners (2011, Printed in Austria) 2 available at 
      <http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/11-83015_Ebook.pdf> accessed 23 
October 2012; see also Cyndi Banks, (n 7) 156. 
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law. The general problem here is not simply with regard to programmes and projects 
of rebuilding process in post-conflict societies. The international community occupies 
a significant role in implementing these projects to integrate the rule of law into the 
reconstruction process and to move these societies away from the past. Thus, as 
Sannerholm observed, without understanding the concept of the rule of law, what are 
its promoters promoting? The author adds that “Not knowing what to promote, yet 
still doing it, lead to confusion, contradictory result and a conflict of values … [It] is 
not enough to act on the basis of I know it when I see it.”11  
 
However, this argument seems to be inconsistent with the clear model of the rule of 
law that was adopted by the United Nations in 2006. The United Nations in order to 
set a guide for international use, set a template of the rule of law which defined it as 
follows: 
 “[The rule of law] is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of 
law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application 
of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”12 
 
This functioning definition, as Linton and Tibe suggest, involves the aim to restore 
peace and elevate the society to an ideal position.
13
 Hence, the current definition leads 
us to conclude that departing from violent conflict and realizing the above universal 
approach to the rule of law in post-conflict reconstruction requires, among other 
things, the highest standards in several areas, such as the justice system, democracy, 
good governance and human rights along with economic rights and social justice.
14
   
Viewed in the light of the United Nation’s template of the rule of law, the case of Iraq 
reveals a clear contrast between the past era under the Saddam regime and the present 
                                                 
11
 Richard Sannerholm, “Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: Beyond 
the Rule of Law” (2007) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 73. 
12
 UN Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary–General, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616, at 4, para. 6. 
13
 Suzannah Linton & Firew Kebede Tibe, “Judges and Rule of Law in Times of Political Change or 
Transition” (n 5)178. 
14
 See UN Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary–General, 12 October 2011, at 1; UN Secretary-General, United 
Nations Approach to Rule of Law Assistance: Guidance Note (April, 2008). 
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time with regard to the rule of law. In Saddam’s Iraq, it is safe to say that written laws 
and their implementation did not provide even minimal respect for the rule of law. 
The government and its officials were bound only by those that served the purposes of 
the regime, while disregarding all other laws. Their decisions were not amenable to 
legal challenge or internal check. Banks states that, at that time, jurisdiction over all 
serious offences was controlled by multiple security services.
15
 She also observes that 
“even this minimal concept [thin concept of the rule of law] did not exist in Iraq under 
the Saddam regime when, for example, conventional western style law enforcement 
was in the hands of the Iraqi National Police who operated under military 
oversight.”16  
 
However, to judge from the events of the past decade, the United Nation’s conception 
of the rule of law has been difficult to establish. The fact is that there has a piecemeal 
approach to the restoration of the rule of law in the country. The difficulties in 
achieving such an ideal conception of the rule of law can be attributed to the fact that 
it requires a wide variety of actors and holistic reforms,
17
 and its applicability has also 
been challenged at a domestic level.
18
  
 
 The reform process began by taking steps to provide the minimal substantive 
elements of the rule of law. Then the country gradually moved towards further 
reform, although providing the thicker version of the rule of law as defined by the 
United Nations has not yet been possible. The solid version of rule of law can only be 
applied in Iraq when the country has more fully addressed the needs to conform to the 
rule of law. In light of this perspective, improvement in the criminal justice system 
has been a major priority during the last ten years of efforts to realize a holistic vision 
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 Cyndi Banks, (n 7) 159. 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 In favour of the same argument, de Goor & Veen state that “It is precisely such a broad definition, in 
our view, that impedes clear operationalisation, gives too many actors a stake in the game and prevents 
effective management of UN efforts. It also does not explicitly recognise critical linkages between 
justice and security.” See Luc van de Goor and Erwin van Veen, The Heart of Developmental Change: 
Rule of Law Engagements in Situations of Fragility, p 66. Available at  
<http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/the_heart_of_developmental_change_goor_veen.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2013. 
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 The disparity between the universal conception of the rule of law and its real applicability is beyond 
the scope of this research and needs deeper empirical study. Forthcoming pages in the current study 
will, however, provide a closer assessment of the reforms that have been undertaken with regard to due 
process in criminal procedure and the justice system in the endeavour to achieve the rule of law in post-
Saddam Iraq. 
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of reform and to heal the wounds of the past. The following pages of this chapter will 
identify four central components of this reform project.  
 
2.2. Law reform in Iraq  
 
In order to conform to the UN definition, the rule of law requires legislation in which 
rules consistent with international human rights norms are established.
19
 Further, these 
rules must apply equally to the ruler and ruled.
 
 In this regard, efforts have been made 
in post-Saddam Iraq to build a new legal framework to enhance the rule of law. The 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) states that:  
 
“The people of Iraq, striving to reclaim their freedom, which was usurped by the 
previous tyrannical regime, rejecting violence and coercion in all their forms, 
and particularly when used as instruments of governance, have determined that 
they shall hereafter remain a free people governed under the rule of law…”20 
 
 The core protection for the rights of individuals who are under criminal proceedings 
can thus be seen in the new Constitution and the reformed criminal law, which will 
now be discussed. 
 
2.2.1. Constitutional reform 
 
2.2.1.1. Brief history  
 
Coalition forces led by the United States and United Kingdom ended the dictatorship 
of Saddam and his repressive Ba’ath regime on 9 April 2003.21 The Coalition forces 
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 UN Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary–General, 23 August 2004 (n 12) para. 6; see also Cyndi Banks, 
“Reconstructing justice in Iraq: promoting the rule of law in a post-conflict state” (n 7) 161; see also 
United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime, Criminal Justice Reform in Post-Conflict States - A Guide 
for Practitioners ( n 10); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 8).  
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 The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), published in the Official Gazette issue 3981 of May 
2004. The original text is in the Arabic language, and the official translation in English is available 
online at the homepage of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-
activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 27 February 2014. 
 ةلحرملل ةلودلا ةرادا نوناق:ةيلاقتنلاا    
 لكب هاركلااو فنعلل ضفارلا بعشلا اذه .قباسلا يدادبتسلاا ماظنلا اهرداص يتلا هتيرح دادرتسا ىلا يعاسلا يقارعلا بعشلا نا{
}نوناقلا مكح هسوسي ارح ابعش لظي نأ ىلع ممص دق .مكحلا بيلاسأ نم بولسأك امهمادختسا دنع صاخ هجوبو .امهلاكشا  
21
 On the question of whether or not the invasion was legitimate and lawful, see the argument by 
Tomasz Iwanek, “The 2003 Invasion of Iraq: How the System Failed” (2009) Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 89-116. 
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became an occupying power with all of the attendant rights and responsibilities under 
the provisions of international humanitarian law.
22
 In June of the same year, the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established as the civil administration of 
Iraq, which in its turn took the initial steps to re-build the country towards an 
exemplary model of democracy and the protection of human rights in the Middle 
East.
23
 The occupation formally ended on 28 June 2004. At that time, the CPA’s 
tenure ended and the Security Council ruled that the occupation had ended and 
sovereignty was to be restored to Iraqis under the Iraqi Interim Government, 
appointed under the auspices of the United Nations.
24
  
 
The interim government administered the country under the Transitional 
Administrative Law.
25
 Government approval was also given for the multi-national 
forces to remain indefinitely on Iraqi territory. A roadmap for the adoption of a 
permanent Constitution and an elected legislative was provided by the Security 
Council.
26
 In accordance with the plan for free elections under the supervision of the 
United Nations, the Transitional National Assembly was elected in January 2005.
27
 
Their task was to produce the draft permanent Constitution and to form a Transitional 
Government of Iraq. Shortly thereafter, for the first time in Iraq’s modern history, 
there was a free national referendum on the new draft Constitution. This was a major 
                                                 
22
 The obligations of occupying powers have emerged in international humanitarian law, in the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949; see also the Resolution of Security Council 
by which the coalition force was deemed as an occupying power UNSC Res 1483 (2003) UN Doc 
S/RES/1483; see also UNSC Res 1511(2003) UN Doc S/RES/1511. 
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25
 The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) states that “This Law is now established to govern the 
affairs of Iraq during the transitional period until a duly elected government, operating under a 
permanent and legitimate Constitution achieving full democracy, shall come into being.” See (n 20) 
 قيقحتل ايعس مئاد يعرش روتسد لظ يف لمعت ةبختنم ةموكح مايق نيح ىلا ةيلاقتنلاا ةلحرملا للاخ قارعلا نوؤش نوناقلا اذه رقا دقف{
}ةلماك ةيطارقميد  
26
 The Security Council has held that “Endorses the proposed timetable for Iraq’s political transition to 
democratic government including: 
(a) formation of the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq that will assume governing responsibility 
and authority by 30 June 2004; 
(b) convening of a national conference reflecting the diversity of Iraqi society; and 
(c) holding of direct democratic elections by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in no case later than 31 
January 2005, to a Transitional National Assembly, which will, inter alia, have responsibility for 
forming a Transitional Government of Iraq and drafting a permanent Constitution for Iraq leading to a 
Constitutionally elected government by 31 December 2005.” See UNSC Res 1546 (2004), (n 24) para. 
4. 
27
 See UNSC Res 1546 (2004), (n 24), para.7. 
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advance in the trajectory of the rule of law reform and a notable sign of the success of 
transitional justice reforms.  
 
The new Iraqi Constitution, termed the Iraqi Permanent Constitution, came into effect 
on 15 October 2005. In accordance with its provisions, the new, democratically 
elected government replaced the transitional administration.
28
 Iraq was restored to its 
full independence, the multi-national force having completed its departure from the 
country at the end of 2011. The Constitution provides a progressive platform of 
political change towards a parliamentary democratic system. For the purposes of this 
research, it is important to note the strong human rights provisions in the Constitution, 
and these are discussed below.  
    
2.2.1.2. Creating rule of law through the Constitution  
 
The Iraqi Permanent Constitution is a major element in the establishment of a 
sustainable peace.
29
 There are several provisions in the Constitution related to the 
subject of rights. It is prefaced with a declaration that: 
 
 “We, the people of Iraq, who have recently arisen from our stumble, and who 
are looking with confidence to the future through a republican, federal, 
democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved with the determination of our men, 
women, elderly, and youth to respect the rule of law, to establish justice and 
equality, to cast aside the politics of aggression, to pay attention to women and 
their rights, the elderly and their concerns, and children and their affairs, to 
spread the culture of diversity, and to defuse terrorism.” 30 
 
With regard to the rule of law, Article 5 states that, “The law is sovereign. The people 
are the source of authority and legitimacy.”31 Article 6 states “Transfer of authority 
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 The new elected government under Prime Minister Al-Maliki was established in May 2006. 
29
 The Constitution contains a Preamble and six Sections. Section (1) includes the “Fundamental 
Principles;” Section 2 covers the “Rights and Liberties;” Section 3 is devoted to the “Federal Powers;” 
Section 4 addresses the “Powers of the Federal Governments;” Section 5 defines the “Power of the 
Regions;” and Section 6 contains the “Final and Transitional Provisions.” 
30
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005. The official translation in English is available online at the 
homepage of the Iraqi government at <http://www.cabinet.iq/default.aspx> accessed 20 November 
2013. 
زعلا انََدقَع ،يددعت يطارقميد يداحتا يروهمج ٍماظن للاخ نم هلبقتسم ىلإ ةقثب علطتملاو ،هتوبك نم ًاّوت ضهانلا ِقارعلا ُبعش ُنحن{ م
 ِةأرملاب مامتهلااو ،ناودعلا ةسايس ذبنو ،ةاواسملاو لدعلا قيقحتو نوناقلا دعاوق مارتحا ىلع ،انبابشو انخويشو ،انئاسنو انلاجرب
اهقوقحو}باهرلاا ليتف عزنو ،عونتلا ةفاقث ةعاشاو ،هنوؤشو لفطلاو ،همومهو خيشلاو ،  
31
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 5, see ibid. 
}يروتسدلا هتاسسؤم ربعو رشابملا ماعلا يرسلا عارتقلااب اهسرامي ،اهتيعرشو تاطلسلا ردصم بعشلاو ،نوناقلل ةدايسلا{ 
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shall be made peacefully through democratic means”.32 Article 9 states “The Iraqi 
armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi 
people ... subject to the control of the civilian authority ... [They], shall not interfere in 
the political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority.”33 
 
Closely related to the right due process is that, in addition to enhancing the judicial 
mechanism for protecting accused persons, the Constitution lays the foundations for 
the establishment of other mechanisms for protecting human rights. Those 
mechanisms, in general, serve to protect human rights, and can also largely contribute 
to protecting accused persons in the criminal justice system.
34
 Of particular 
importance is the High Commission of Human Rights, as will be discussed later, in 
Section Five of this Chapter. The Constitution contributes significantly to the 
reconstruction of the justice system and criminal justice policy. It contains a variety of 
provisions to prohibit agents of the state from resorting to human rights violations that 
were widespread in the past.
35
 It points out that the right to a defence is sacred, and 
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 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 6, see (n 30 ). 
}روتسدلا اذه يف اهيلع صوصنملا ةيطارقميدلا لئاسولا ربع ًايملس ةطلسلا لوادت متي{ 
33
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 9, see (n 30 ).  
{زوجي لا }ةيسايس زكارم لاغشلإ تاباختنا يف حيشرتلا ... اهدارفاو ةيقارعلا ةحلسملا تاوقلل 
34
 Ibid, Article 102. 
35
 Ibid, Article 19 states that:  
“First: The judiciary is independent and no power is above the judiciary except the law.  
Second: There is no crime or punishment except by law. The punishment shall only be for an act that 
the law considers a crime when perpetrated. A harsher punishment than the applicable punishment at 
the time of the offense may not be imposed.  
Third: Litigation shall be a protected and guaranteed right for all.  
Fourth: The right to a defence shall be sacred and guaranteed in all phases of investigation and the trial.  
Fifth: The accused is innocent until proven guilty in a fair legal trial. The accused may not be tried for 
the same crime for a second time after acquittal unless new evidence is produced.  
Sixth: Every person shall have the right to be treated with justice in judicial and administrative 
proceedings.  
Seventh: The proceedings of a trial are public unless the court decides to make it secret.  
Eighth: Punishment shall be personal.  
Ninth: Laws shall not have retroactive effect unless stipulated otherwise. This exclusion shall not 
include laws on taxes and fees.  
Tenth: Criminal laws shall not have retroactive effect, unless it is to the benefit of the accused.  
Eleventh: The court shall appoint a lawyer at the expense of the state for an accused of a felony or 
misdemeanour who does not have a defence lawyer.  
Twelfth: 
A. Unlawful detention shall be prohibited.  
B. Imprisonment or detention shall be prohibited in places not designed for these purposes, pursuant to 
prison laws covering health and social care, and subject to the authorities of the State.  
Thirteenth: The preliminary investigative documents shall be submitted to the competent judge in a 
period not to exceed twenty-four hours from the time of the arrest of the accused, which may be 
extended only once and for the same period.” See (n 30) 
{  لقتسم ءاضقلا :ًلاواناطلس لا  . نوناقلا ريغل هيلع  
 نم دشا ةبوقع قيبطت زوجي لاو ،ةميرج هفارتقا تقو نوناقلا هدعي يذلا لعفلا ىلع لاإ ةبوقع لاو .صنب لاإ ةبوقع لاو ةميرج لا :ًايناث
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the judiciary is independent.
36
 Analysis of the Constitution’s provisions demonstrates 
that it has a direct influence on the due process rights of persons subject to criminal 
proceedings. It has created a standard which the rules of law have to meet in the new 
democratic system. For the purposes of this research, those due process rights 
mentioned in the Constitution and relevant to the current topic will be considered in 
detail in the coming chapters. The question will then be asked as to whether in both 
the ICCP and in actual practice, these constitutional rights have been protected in a 
way that complies with the provisions of the Constitution and the ICCPR.   
 
In the view of this author, it is not appropriate to compare this new Constitution with 
that of the Saddam era, when Constitutions were established for largely political 
reasons and to mislead the international community, while in reality those rights were 
never enjoyed by Iraqis.
37
 In addition, the Constitutions were established by an 
autocratic Ba’ath Party, out of line with the actual will of the Iraqi people. By 
contrast, the current Constitution was approved by the will of Iraqis through the 
democratic referendum of 2005. It should be clearly understood that the Constitution 
also encompasses the most binding human rights in the ICCPR, and under its 
provisions these are formally granted to Iraqi citizens. However, it would be naïve to 
think that these constitutional provisions in themselves secure the rights of Iraqis. 
These rights need to be observable in practice.  The due process rights contained in 
the words of the Constitution are to be regarded as significant progress. However, 
                                                                                                                                            
 . ةميرجلا باكترا تقو ةذفانلا ةبوقعلا 
 . عيمجلل لوفكمو نوصم قح يضاقتلا :ًاثلاث 
ار . ةمكاحملاو قيقحتلا لحارم عيمج يف لوفكمو سدقم عافدلا قح :ًاعب  
ذا لاإ هنع جارفلاا دعب ىرخأ ةرم اهتاذ ةمهتلا نع مهتملا مكاحي لاو ،ةلداع ةينوناق ةمكاحم يف هتنادإ تبثت ىتح ءيرب مهتملا :ًاسماخ ا
 . ةديدج ةلدا ترهظ 
ف ةلداع ةلماعم لماعي نأ يف قحلا درف لكل :ًاسداس . ةيرادلااو ةيئاضقلا تاءارجلاا ي  
 . ةيرس اهلعج ةمكحملا تررق اذا لاإ ةينلع مكاحملا تاسلج :ًاعباس 
 . ةيصخش ةبوقعلا :ًانماث 
 . موسرلاو بئارضلا نيناوق ءانثتسلاا اذه لمشيلاو ،كلذ فلاخ ىلع صُني مل ام يعجر رثا نيناوقلل سيل :ًاعسات 
ئازجلا نوناقلا يرسي لا : ًارشاع . مهتملل حلصا ناك اذإ لاإ يعجر رثأب ي  
 . ةلودلا ةقفن ىلعو هنع عفادي ٍماحم هل سيل نمل ةحنج وأ ةيانجب مهتملا نع عافدلل ًايماحم ةمكحملا بدتنت :رشع يداح 
 يناث:رشع  
 .زجحلا رظحي ـأ 
لا نوجسلا نيناوقل اقفو كلذل ةصصخملا نكاملاا ريغ يف فيقوتلا وأ سبحلا زوجي لا ـ ب ةيعامتجلااو ةيحصلا ةياعرلاب ةلومشم
 . ةلودلا تاطلسل ةعضاخلاو 
 ةدم للاخ صتخملا يضاقلا ىلع يئادتبلاا قيقحتلا قاروا ضرعت :رشع ثلاثزواجتت لا  ىلع ضبقلا نيح نم ةعاس نيرشعو اعبرا
اهتاذ ةدمللو ةدحاو ةرم لاا اهديدمت زوجيلاو مهتملا}  
36
 Ibid, Article 19, paras. 1 and 4.  
37
 Hatch described the Constitution in the Saddam era as merely hollow words. See Richard O. Hatch, 
Restoring the Rule of Law in Post-War Iraq: Steps, Missteps, and a Call to Maximize International 
Support for Iraqi-led Processes, report (U.S. Army War College, 19 March 2004) 3, available at 
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424378> accessed 3 August 2013. 
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further examination of specific rights is necessary before a final assessment can be 
made, and this examination will occupy the chapters that follow. The words in the 
Constitution can only make a difference when the constitutional rights are fully 
observed in practice and are in line with the international due process.  
 
Like many other constitutions, the Iraqi Permanent Constitution does not deal with the 
relationship between domestic and international law, including international human 
rights law. The Constitution does not make clear whether the international agreements 
are deemed to be a source of legislation or are separate from domestic law. Nor, does 
it make clear whether international treaties take priority over national laws if any 
contradiction emerges between them. In the same way, the Constitutional Court, 
which is also called the Federal Supreme Court, (AlMahkamah AlAthadia AlUlya), 
has not so far debated these issues. This absence of clear provisions with regard to the 
status of international treaties within the new Iraqi legal system has negatively 
affected the domestic application of binding international human rights standards. In 
the case of Iraq, such Constitutional provisions that empower domestic courts directly 
to apply binding international treaties are of particular importance in order to put an 
end to the previous ineffectual attitudes, which resulted in a reluctance to apply 
international law before domestic courts. In this argument, two aspects need to be 
considered. The first level is a theoretical and the second concerns practice.  
 
At a formal level, Iraq is considered as a ‘dualist’ rather than a ‘monist’ country 
regarding the implementation of international treaties. Even if an international treaty 
is ratified by Iraq, it is not possible for it to be directly applied by Iraqi judges or 
accepted as a part of the national law unless the treaty is incorporated into domestic 
law and published in the official gazette. However, national law does not necessarily 
prevail in cases where there is a contradiction between them.
38
 What follows is, 
having been ratified and published in the Official Gazette, the courts can apply the 
ratified international treaties directly as with any other law. Of particular relevance to 
this topic is the fact that human rights under the ICCPR can be invoked and directly 
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applied in criminal proceedings, and there is no valid reason to disregard its 
provisions.  
 
In practice, however, there is a regrettable tendency for Iraqi judges in domestic 
courts to be reluctant to apply these ratified international treaties: they seem to feel 
that only codified laws should be applied in any event.  Although Iraq is a signatory 
of major treaties on human rights, particularly the ICCPR, courts are quite reluctant to 
apply their provisions in practice unless those provisions are codified as domestic law.  
Iraqi judicial culture and practice takes the view that to apply international due 
process would be to employ “the extraneous use of material beyond the provision of 
the Code (ICCP).”39 Hence, the international due process rights are not used in the 
Iraq criminal justice system even if they are entrenched in the treaties to which Iraq is 
signatory. Iraqi judges do not apply them unless they are clearly mentioned under Iraq 
domestic law. This means that, in order to bring the system in line with international 
human rights law, the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure needs to be adjusted in 
accordance with ratified international treaties rather than applying the international 
rules before national courts directly. 
 
In favour of the same argument, Hamoudi wrote that the Iraqi legal tradition with 
regard to the relationship between international treaties and the national law stands as 
a stark anomaly.
40
 He added that there is a regrettable tendency for ratified 
international law not to be directly applied by domestic courts and notes the 
unwillingness of courts to do so. With regard to the hope of resolving this problem in 
post-Saddam Iraq, he comments that “one would expect some level of encouragement 
of national courts to engage international law, and some willingness on the part of the 
courts to do just that. That nothing of the sort has happened […] the courts themselves 
seem quite reluctant to use it in any event.”41  
 
What follows is that the broader resistance of domestic courts to the application of 
international treaties to which Iraq is a party adversely affects due process in the 
criminal justice system. For example, the UN Convention against Torture and Other 
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Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (UN CAT) was ratified 
by Iraq in 2008, but regrettably its provisions are still not applied.
42
  
 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the proposal is that further reform should 
aim to divert the judicial culture from its aforementioned tendencies. For this purpose, 
the Constitution must provide clear provisions by which the international conventions 
prevail over national legislation.  Lessons can also be drawn from other countries, 
such as South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Russian Federation. In these 
countries, newly adopted constitutions have clearly allowed the application of 
international law before domestic courts.
43
 Obviously, providing Iraqis with binding 
rights under international human rights treaties requires further reform, and the 
Constitution should stipulate that Iraqis may invoke human rights under international 
law before the domestic courts. To put it a little differently, further proposed reform 
should make clear that, once Iraq ratifies an internationally recognized treaty, then its 
provisions have to be directly applied before the domestic courts. Furthermore, 
domestic provisions must be deemed as invalid in cases where they conflict with the 
rules of the treaty. The inclusion of such provisions in the Constitution will inspire 
judges to apply the international human rights law in domestic courts. 
 
Another criticism that needs to be made is that, although the Iraqi Constitution is 
meant to be permanent, its shortcomings indicate that it was drafted prematurely and 
in too great a hurry. It is self-evident that a Constitution must delegate certain details 
as it cannot provide for everything. However, what is disconcerting in the view of the 
author is that many crucial issues that were supposed to have been determined by the 
Constitution have been left to legislative authorities. The issues that it has so far 
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neglected to resolve must be resolved by the Constitution itself, rather than being 
delegated to others.
44
  
 
In regard to the present topic, for example, there are important laws that have a direct 
effect on improving human rights which have not yet been enacted. So far, there has 
been no law regulating the work of security services, or defining its duties and powers 
so that they accord with the principles of human rights.
45
 Similarly, there has been no 
law governing the work of judicial organs, especially the Higher Judicial Council and 
the Federal Supreme Court, which were necessitated by Articles 90 and 92 of the 
Constitution.
46
 
 
In the same way, various provisions of the Constitution rely on the interpretation of 
the judicial authority rather than clear statements in the Constitution itself. Several 
authors have drawn attention to these areas of weakness in the Constitution.
47
  
 
There is much to criticize about the Constitution and it is the subject of ongoing 
debate. The Constitutional Review Committee was established in order that it should 
contribute the national debate on how to consolidate the areas of weakness.
48
 Reports 
of screening committee meetings indicate that there have been wide-ranging 
discussions as to what further amendments are necessary, although, regrettably the 
present author has not found any discussions regarding due process and criminal 
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justice reform.
49
 It is necessary to state, however, that although the Constitution is 
widely acknowledged as not having comprehensively satisfied the aspirations of 
Iraqis, it certainly represents, in the present author’s view, an encouraging start to the 
creation of a culture that respects human rights and enhances the rule of law in Iraq. 
The Constitution is an important milestone in Iraq’s journey towards the rule of law. 
 
2.2.1.3. International community efforts 
 
As noted earlier, one of the key features of the Constitution-making process is that it 
was achieved under the direct auspices of the international community. The 
interesting point is that from the beginning of the occupation period until the present 
time, the international community, particularly the U.S. Embassy and United Nations, 
has regularly supported the efforts of the country to restore the rule of law. The 
Constitution-making process clearly demonstrates this support.
50
 The support took 
various forms, including multiple cooperative projects. Technical assistance was 
provided to the Iraqi Constitution Committee in order to facilitate the drafting 
process. International constitutional experts came to Baghdad and gave their 
assistance and shared their expertise.
51
 Also, the committee was provided with 
modern draft Constitutions, together with other relevant documents, as a reference or 
guide for achieving its task.
52
 
 
In addition, many facilities and services were provided for employees, such as 
printing, publishing, copying services and the means of distributing drafts.
53
 With the 
assistance of the media and civil-society organizations, the draft Constitution was 
introduced into the public domain so that its contents could be openly and thoroughly 
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discussed.
54
 Most importantly, international efforts have produced financial resources 
for the creation for the present Constitution. For instance, the United States Institute 
of Peace spent approximately “$10 million directly from the Congress, plus $2.85 
million from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.”55 This was to 
support the process of drafting the Constitution and to secure Iraqi participation in the 
process of dialogue and involvement in discussions of the issues involved.
56
  
 
Similarly, activities relating to the referendum were supported by European 
Commission funds under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program, 
the United Nations Development Group (Iraq Trust Fund) and the World Bank.
57
 In 
accordance with these programmes, 170 domestic observers were trained by a team of 
experts in Jordan. The project was funded and implemented by the European Union, 
whose electoral experts worked with the Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq 
during that time.
58
 These combined efforts subsequently produced the permanent 
Constitution, from which stems a theoretical framework for enhancing the rule of law, 
thus laying the foundations for a new era in Iraq. 
 
2.2.2. Criminal law reform 
 
 The Iraqi criminal justice system was primarily founded on the Iraqi Penal Code No. 
111 of 1969 (IPC) and Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure No. 123 of 1971 (ICCP). It 
must be admitted that these codes were subject to abrupt changes under the Saddam 
regime.
59
 The result was unequivocal noncompliance with international human rights 
law.  
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After the fall of the Saddam regime, criminal law reform occupied an important place 
in advancing the rule of law. The human rights experts who outlined the practical 
steps for rebuilding the rule of law agreed that both codes stood in need of 
amendment in order to be capable of serving the needs of the Iraqi community in the 
new era.
60
  As a result, the first important step in addressing the deficiencies of the 
Iraqi criminal justice system was the modification of the substantive and procedural 
criminal laws. 
       
2.2.2.1. Procedural criminal law reform 
 
As has already been noted, the provisions of pre-existing laws had been manipulated 
in order to protect and serve the purposes of the dictatorial regime. The ICCP had 
failed to protect the human rights of accused persons.
61
 Specifically, it granted 
extensive powers to state officials and ensured their immunity against prosecution.
62
 
Extracting confessions via invalid means during the investigation stage came to be 
systemic in the Iraqi criminal justice system.
63
 Torture and interrogation “were 
synonymous in Iraq.”64 Even though these means were legally prohibited by Article 
333 of the Penal Code, bringing the offender to justice under the provisions of the 
ICCP was not possible without the permission of the executive authority.
65
 Worse 
still, such confessions were not excluded from trial, as will be seen.
66
 Under the 
provisions of Article 218, confessions could be used by courts against the accused 
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person even if the confession resulted from torture or other invalid means employed 
during the investigation. 
 
Some provisions of the Code had maintained to a certain extent the right to be free 
from arbitrary detention by the investigative authority, but these were successively 
eliminated by repressive amendments under the Saddam regime. Pursuant to a series 
of decrees that were passed by the Revolutionary Command Council, these 
amendments prohibited the release on bail of detainees charged with various offences, 
such as murder, embezzlement, theft, bribery, knowingly handling stolen goods, or 
handling a vehicle derived from a felony.
67
 Also, people could be kept in custody or 
investigated according to a decision issued by agencies other than the judicial 
authority.
68
 The ICCP in cases of arrest also failed to indicate the length of the period 
of arrest. There were thus a clear infringements of the rights enshrined in the 
standards of due process and international human rights law, according to which an 
arrested person must promptly be brought before a judicial authority.
69
 
  
The ICCP did not outline clear details regarding the obligation of the arresting officer 
to inform suspects immediately of the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty, or 
details of other rights, such as the right to remain silent. Some observers also noted 
that “Iraq’s pre-existing criminal procedure code also failed to establish unequivocally 
the right to counsel.”70 
 
Despite these criticisms by commentators in post-Saddam Iraq of many pre-existing 
laws, the maintenance, with certain amendments, of the existing code of criminal 
procedure, was the preferred option of the majority of commentators, who rejected the 
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idea of abandoning it entirely and creating a new one.
71
 Accordingly, the old Code has 
continued to govern criminal proceedings, along with revisions undertaken in 
response to the criticisms mentioned. Many due process provisions were inserted into 
the ICCP and many provisions were removed.
72
 These reforms took place during the 
occupation and the transitional period and after to ensure justice and to promote the 
rule of law.
73
  
 
Domestic agencies such as the Iraqi Bar Association, judges, legal professors, 
numerous agencies and donor organizations have taken part in the reforms. These 
projects emphasized the importance of reforming the criminal justice system due to its 
significant role in establishing the rule of law.
74 It will be further argued elsewhere in 
the current work that these activities have had an impact on due process in Iraq. An 
examination of the ways in which these reforms have been applied in practice will 
raise the question of whether or not they have succeeded in bringing the system into 
full compliance with developments under international due process. There will be a 
focus on the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to free legal 
assistance and an interpreter, and the right to freedom from self-incrimination at the 
pre-trial stage.
75
  
 
2.2.2.2. Substantive criminal law reform 
  
A penal code is a strong mechanism for the protection of human rights. Unfortunately, 
the previous regime made amendments to the Iraqi Penal Code 111 of 1969 that 
resulted in the violation of basic human rights. The Code became a tool in the hands 
of the regime for the imposition of its own control. It has been convincingly pointed 
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out that the criminal law was used by the former regime “as a tool of repression in 
violation of internationally recognized human rights.”76 After Saddam’s Ba’ath party 
came to power, these amendments of the Code ordained the death penalty and other 
forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment for many offences.
77
 Some of these 
offences are widely recognized as not deserving of punishment at all, such as offences 
related to demeaning the dignity of the president, or his deputy, or members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council, or the Ba’ath Party, or the National Council or the 
government.
78
 These punishments, because of their harshness, were unacceptable 
internationally, and perhaps even hard for the international community to envisage.
79
 
They included a brutality that testified to the nature of the regime, with practices such 
as amputation of the ear, tattooing of the face and amputation of a hand or a foot.
80
 
                                                 
76
 See CPA’s Order 7, signed 10 June 2003, published in the Official Gazette issue 3978 of 17 August 
2003.The original text is in the English language, and the official translation in Arabic is available in 
the Official Gazette, issue 3978 of 17 August 2003, as follows: 
{ مايق نم ةنيعم ماكحا مادختساب قباسلا ماظنلا تابوقعلا نوناق ةادأك }ايلود اهب فرتعملا ناسنلاا قوقح ريياعم كلذب اكهتنم عمقلل  
77
 See for example: Law No. 107 of 1974 published in the Official Gazette, issue 2390 of 22 
August1974; Law No. 66 of 1971 published in the Official Gazette, issue 1989 of 20 April 1971; Law 
No. 111 of 1978 published in the Official Gazette, issue 2659 of 19 Jun1978; Decrees of the 
Revolutionary Command Council No. 95 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette, issue 3521 of 1 
August 1994; No. 59 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette issue 3514 of 13 June 1994. 
 }لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم تارارقو قب اسلا ماظنلا دهع يف نيناوقلا ضعب ىلا ةراشا{  
78
 The Iraqi Penal Code 111 of 1969, Article 225.   }يقارعلا تابوقعلا نوناق{  
79
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Iraq, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ (15 February 1995) 
E/CN.4/1995/56; UN General Assembly, Res 51/106 ‘Situation of human rights in Iraq’ adopted on the 
report of the Third Committee (Fifty-first session, 3 March 1997) A/51/619/Add.3 and Corr.1, paras. 1, 
9; UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations/Comments: Iraq’ (Sixty-first session, 
19/11/1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.84, para. 12 provided that “The Committee is deeply concerned 
that Iraq has resorted to the imposition of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments, such as 
amputation and branding, which are incompatible with article 7 of the Covenant.”  
See some examples of repressive punishment referred to by United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights: “Revolution Command Council Decrees No. 59 of 4 June 1994 prescribes: amputation of the 
right hand at the wrist for a first offence of theft over 5,000 Iraqi dinars (well under US$ 10 at the 
present real rate of exchange); amputation of the left foot at the ankle for a second offence; and death 
for a third offence. Decree No. 109 of 18 August 1994 prescribes the "tattooing" or "branding" (it 
appears to be branding in practice) with an "X" between the eyebrows of all persons having suffered 
legally prescribed amputations. Decree No. 115 of 25 August 1994 prescribes the cutting off of the 
auricle of one ear of any person guilty of evading military service, deserting military service, or 
sheltering any evader or deserter from military service. Decree Nos. 59, 109 and 115 prescribe cruel 
and unusual punishments in violation of article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In addition, Decrees 109 and 115 
are retroactive in their effects and thus constitute violations of Article 15 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.” United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), ‘Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ (15 
February 1995) E/CN.4/1995/56 paras. 32-44. 
80
 See for example: Decrees of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 13 of 1992, published in the 
Official Gazette issue 3389 of 20 January 1992; No. 9 of 1993, published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3457 of 10 May 1993; No. 114 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette, issue 3526 of 5 September 
1994; No. 95 of 1994, published in the Official Gazette, issue 3521 of 1 August 1994; No. 118 of 1994, 
48 
 
 When this regime was eventually removed, the demands of justice required 
adjustments that would bring the code into line with the new order. The Working 
Group on Transitional Justice reviewed many of the offences and penalties that had 
been authorized by the former regime, and recommended that these should be 
repealed in conformity with the original pre-Saddam penal code.
81
 In accordance with 
this perspective, the punishments for many crimes were changed. Amendments and 
decrees that had been issued to serve the interests of Saddam’s regime were repealed, 
and initially the death penalty was suspended.
82
  
 
These changes met with the approval of international institutions and human rights 
lawyers around the world. For instance, in its memorandum on concerns relating to 
law and order in Iraq, Amnesty International stated that “it welcomes the fact that the 
US and UK governments, in exercising their authority as the occupying powers 
through the CPA, have made use of international human rights standards to inform the 
formation of new legislation and the suspension of certain provisions of Iraqi law 
which were inconsistent with such standards.”83 Gregor and Benson deemed these 
modifications to the Iraqi Penal Code to be a notable elimination of the mechanisms 
used by the regime to violate individual rights through the courts.
84
  
 
It should be borne in mind that the reform of substantive criminal law is not the focus 
of this research, but the author believes that reforms in this area are integral to the 
reform of the criminal justice system and the movement towards the rule of law. The 
reality is that after the Code was enacted in 1969, it became imbued with the values 
and standards of the Saddam regime. Hence, modernization has become necessary 
and the Code should be further reviewed in order to create modern justice system that 
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provides Iraqis with comprehensive human rights and absolute protection against 
criminal violence.  
 
For the purposes of modernizing the Code, the recommendations resulting from the 
author’s research are that it should comply with the guarantees of the new 
Constitution and the obligations imposed by international law. In the same vein, the 
reform must reflect the requirements of the rule of law and confront problems 
inherited from the previous regime, for example, a long culture of immunity from 
prosecution and lack of protection for due process. Thus, fostering the rule of law in 
the criminal justice system requires a series of Articles that entrench its underlying 
principles. 
 
Beyond the above, it may be helpful to suggest that a unique model of substantive 
criminal law can be taken into account for the purpose of modernizing the code. This 
substantive model was formulated by the United States Institute of Peace following 
extensive consultation with experts. It contains detailed provisions intended to assist 
states in post conflict situations to reform defective areas in pre-existing criminal 
law.
85
 
 
2.3. Reform of the Iraqi judicial system  
 
It is clear that the legal safeguards given by the legislature to protect the human rights 
of a person under criminal proceedings are meaningless without a justice mechanism 
for their protection. Hence, the fairness of the legal process and protection of human 
rights is dependent on the fairness of the judicial system, the existence of which is a 
vital part of the state’s obligation to implement the rule of law. There will be no place 
for the rule of law unless there is fairness in the system. To this end, an adequate 
system which can protect the rights of individuals has become a focal point of post-
Saddam reform. In this context, reviewing post-Saddam reform requires discussion of 
the vital issues that follow. 
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2.3.1. The independence of the judiciary 
 
Next to statutory reform, the independence of the judiciary is the most important goal 
in the endeavor to instigate the rule of law. The rule of law is not attainable or 
achievable unless there is independence of the judicial authority, which has the 
capacity to apply the law equally to both ruler and ruled.
86
 Since the independence of 
judicial authority was lost in the era of the previous regime,
87
 steps were taken 
subsequently to enhance the independence of judges. A Higher Judicial Council was 
established and measures were taken to improve the quality of the judiciary through 
developing the competency of individual judges.    
  
2.3.1.1. Establishment of the Higher Judicial Council 
 
The Judicature Act No. 26 of 1963 set out judicial independence as a priority when it 
established a Council of Judges, who were to be entrusted with all judicial matters and 
were to conduct the judicial function independent of the control of the executive 
authority.
88
 During the era of Saddam, the principle of the independence of the 
judiciary was breached, not only by the fact that the provisions of the law were 
frequently ignored in practice but also by the enactment of oppressive laws. The Law 
of the Ministry of Justice No. 101 of 1977 abolished the Council of Judges and 
replaced it with the Justice Council, through which the supervision of judicial affairs 
was entrusted to the executive authority, (that is, the Ba’ath party).89  
 
The current Chairman of the Higher Judicial Council, Judge Almahmuod, rightly 
claims that the abolition of the Council of Judges, followed by the establishment of a 
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Council of Justice under the control of the minister of Justice, represented a seismic 
disruption by which judicial independence was dissolved.
90
 The chairman further 
alludes to the process by which the Ba’ath Party assumed total control over the 
judicial system. Almahmuod emphasizes that the Minister of Justice, as a member of 
the executive authority, was bound by the will of the executive, regardless of any 
conflict with the rights of individuals or the principle of judicial independence.
91
  
 
Thereafter, the Judicature Act No. 26 of 1963 was entirely repealed and replaced by 
the Judicial Organization Law No. 160 of 1979, in which the principle of the 
independence of the judiciary was theoretically inserted.
92
 However, in the same year, 
by the Judicial Supervision law No. 124 of 1979, the task of supervision of judicial 
affairs was entrusted to a committee, which was not independent due to its direct 
relationship with the Ba’athist Minister of Justice.93 Thus, the insertion of the 
principle of the independence of judges was never translated into practice.  
 
As a consequence, the criminal justice system was subject to considerable 
shortcomings, among the worst of which was that judicial independence was 
grievously damaged. It is not easy to elaborate on all the cases of serious violations by 
the Iraqi judiciary under Saddam's regime because this requires further extensive 
research. However, it is sufficient to report that during an interview, one Iraqi judge 
reported that “during the Saddam era, justice wasn’t independent. Before 2003, if a 
judge refused to listen to the suggestions of politicians, Saddam put him in jail [...] 
now; we have to convince people we operate differently, independently.”94 In the 
same vein, Hamoudi reported that one judge was sentenced to two years in prison 
because he declared a particular piece of legislation to be unconstitutional.
95
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Following the collapse of the Ba'ath regime, reform of the judiciary began to take 
place. Order No. 35 of the CPA declared the independence of the judiciary and 
established the Higher Judicial Council (Majlis El-Qada Al-Alla).
96
 The Council is 
now responsible for all judicial matters and is intended to carry out its judicial 
function independent of the control of the Executive. Accordingly, the supervising 
power that was previously entrusted to the executive authority has been removed, 
demarcating judges from governmental control.
97
 Such independence was 
subsequently confirmed by the provisions of the Iraqi Permanent Constitution of 
2005, which stipulates that the judiciary is independent and no power is above the 
judiciary except the law.
98
 What follows is that, according to the new legal 
framework, all aspects of the judiciary, functional, financial and administrative, are to 
be under the control of the judicial authority instead of the executive branch.  
 
Additionally, the independence of the judiciary in Iraq, having been legally enacted 
by the legislature, also relies on the ability to choose members among those who have 
the appropriate judicial qualifications and competency, and who also possess the 
impartiality needed to base their decisions only on the rules of law.
99
 Several issues 
arise from this, all relating to the handling of criminal procedure, which will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
 
2.3.1.2. Judicial qualifications  
 
During the era of Saddam, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for the appointment 
of judges. These were political appointments, and subject to additional considerations, 
such as gender, religion, sect, ethnicity and political affiliation.
100
 It is self-evident 
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that the appointments in this context largely breached international standards.
101
 As 
the American Bar Association noted, the crucial criterion for appointing the judges 
was their loyalty to the regime.
102
 Therefore, in response to the need to build a new 
independent judicial system, it was required that professional qualifications should be 
the primary consideration in choosing the individuals to be appointed as judges. 
According to an assessment by the American Bar Association and the Central East 
European Law Initiative, a person who is eligible to be a judge needs to be selected on 
the basis of “legal qualifications, competence, honesty, impartiality, good character, 
good professional conduct, good reputation, and a “respectable” social background, 
by a process that is considered fair.”103 The assessment added that “this is in contrast 
to the Ba’ath regime era, when loyalty to or membership of the Ba’ath Party was a 
sine qua non condition of appointment, regardless, in many instances, of the 
professional and moral qualities of the appointee.”104  
 
Since 2003, there has been notable support for developing the Iraqi judicial system on 
the part of the international community and NGOs. For example, training programmes 
under the rule of law projects with the support of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) have been inaugurated to improve judicial efficiency and “up until 
January 2011, more than 400 Iraqi judges attended these training courses”.105 
Similarly, in 2006 an independent association of judges was established under the 
support of an Iraqi legal development project run by the American Bar Association. 
This project also included many legal professional programs to improve the 
competency of Iraqi judges.
106
 
 
A further cause for concern that continued after the fall of the former regime is 
discrimination between males and females in employment in the judicial sector. In 
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fact, in 1959, Iraq was among those countries in which a woman could become a 
judge. Then, in 1984 women were entirely prevented from becoming members of the 
Judiciary.
107
 This employment discrimination based on gender in the judiciary 
function is contrary to the Constitution and breaches relevant international rules with 
regard to the principles of equality before the law and the unity of rights and duties.
108
  
 
In post-Saddam Iraq, the limited role of women in the judicial field was an incentive 
for progress in the justice system. Over the last few years, the number of Iraqi women 
who have become judges and prosecutors has increased. According to official statistic 
released in 2009, the number of judges reached 881, of whom 12 are women. In 
addition, there were 50 female prosecutors.
109
 This is widely recognized as a step in 
the right direction, and one that can be developed in future in the interests of 
reforming the system and promoting civil and political rights in Iraq. At the same 
time, it must be admitted that such a limited number of women in the judicial system 
is far from the social ideal. 
 
The ABA has offered specialized training programs for women judges, designed to 
increase their professionalism. These training schemes held in various countries 
outside Iraq have been implemented by specialists whose expertise covers various 
issues in the judicial field, including “judicial independence, international human 
rights law, challenges to women in the legal profession, public trust in the courts and 
media outreach to the public, and comparative investigative procedure.”110 
Furthermore, as well as improving the competency of female judges, in the wider 
context since its establishment in 2005, the European Mission in Iraq has continued to 
work on promoting the rule of law. Its efforts are devoted to enhancing judicial 
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independence and improving the skills of senior officials who work in the criminal 
justice system.
111
 
  
The above discussion provides an overview of the reforms carried out over the past 
decade with regard to the independence of the judiciary. These reforms demonstrate 
that some progress has been achieved. However, an assessment of the independence 
of judicial authority in post-Saddam Iraq cannot be efficiently made in isolation from 
other reputable but less favourable accounts. Over the last ten years there have been 
reports criticizing the judicial authority for its failures.
112
 The post-Saddam legal 
reforms may comply with international principles in theory,
113
 yet the extent to which 
the reform is workable depends on its working in practice as well. In this connection, 
the failure or success of these efforts to reach their intended target cannot be assessed 
in isolation from a discussion of the extent to which the reforms have attained the 
international standard of due process standard with regard to the protection of human 
rights of a person accused during the pre-trial stage. This discussion will be the 
subject of subsequent chapters.   
 
2.3.2. The reform of the criminal courts 
 
The structure of the courts in the Iraqi criminal justice system is as follows:  
 
1. The Investigating Courts (Mahakim Al-Tahqeeq)114  
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2. The Misdemeanor Courts (Mahakim Al-Junah)115 
3.  The Felony Courts (Mahakim Al-Jinayat)116 
4. The Juvenile Court (Mahakim Al-Ahdath)117, and  
5. The Court of Cassation (Mahkamat al-Tamyeez)118  
The above list of courts constitutes the ordinary criminal court system. Alongside this 
ordinary court system, the Ba’athist regime used a number of courts that were known 
as the Revolutionary Courts and the State Security Courts to deal with political 
offences. Also, there were a number of Special Courts to deal with certain ordinary 
offences, such as the smuggling of antiquities. In post- Saddam Iraq, for the purposes 
of rehabilitating the justice system and enhancing the rule of law, these Revolutionary 
Courts, the State Security Courts and all other Special Courts have been abolished, 
and new courts for the same purposes have been established: 
                                                                                                                                            
These courts have a vital role in the investigation of crimes and are responsible for transferring 
offenders to be tried before the competent court, either a misdemeanour or a felony court. According to 
Article 134 A of the ICCP, the jurisdiction of these courts encompasses the minor offences, which are 
to be directly determined there.   
 ،اهل صاخ ضاق نيعي مل ام قيقحتلل ايضاق ةءادبلا ةمكحم يضاق نوكيو ةءادب ةمكحم هيف ناكم لك يف رثكا وا قيقحت ةمكحم لكشت{
}نوناقلا ماكحا قفو قيقحتلاب موقيو     
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2.3.2.1. The marginalization of criminal courts under the Ba’athist regime 
 
2.3.2.1.1. Revolutionary, National Security Courts and other Special Courts 
 
For the purpose of serving the dictatorship and dealing with political offences, courts 
such as the Revolutionary Courts and the Courts for the Security of the State were 
established.  According to the UN Commission on Human Rights, extreme brutality 
was used by these courts against people who were deemed to be disloyal to the 
regime.
119
 Those whom the regime regarded as dissidents were referred to these 
courts, which treated the accused person as a menace to the security of the state and 
deserving of serious retribution.  Amnesty International reported that: 
 
“Political detainees in Iraq are subjected to the most brutal forms of torture. The 
bodies of many of those executed had evident signs of torture, including the gouging 
out of the eyes, when returned to their families. The most common methods of 
physical torture include electric shocks to various parts of the body, pulling out of 
fingernails, long periods of suspension by the limbs, beating with cables, falaqa 
(beating on the soles of the feet), cigarette burns on various parts of the body, and 
piercing of the hands with an electric drill. Psychological torture includes threats of 
bringing in a female relative of the detainee, especially the wife or the mother, and 
raping her in front of the detainee, threats of arresting and harming other members of 
the family, mock executions and being kept in solitary confinement for long periods 
of time.”120 
 
The use of confessions extracted under torture for the purpose of securing convictions 
was a notable feature of these courts. Reports of relevant international organizations 
indicated that “although torture is prohibited by the Iraqi legislations in practice, it is 
used systematically against detainees in Iraqi prisons and detention centres.”121 These 
courts, inter alia, violated fundamental human rights, including the right to a fair trial, 
and were known for their draconian punishments.
122
   
 
                                                 
119
 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by 
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ (n 79), para. 32. 
120
 Amnesty International, Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression, report (24 November 1999) (n 63). 
121
 Amnesty International, Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression, report (24 November 1999) (n 63).  
122
 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by 
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ (n 79), para. 32; see UN General Assembly, UN 
General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (9 December 1988). 
58 
 
In addition to these violations, there were special ad hoc courts that dealt with 
political offences but also exercised jurisdiction over a non-exclusive list of ordinary 
crimes, usurping the functions of the ordinary court system. According to the 
Revolution Command Council Decree 565 of 30 April 1979, these special courts 
could deal with a list of normal crimes such as theft, corruption, currency speculation, 
trafficking and distribution of narcotic drugs, and political crimes. These and other 
crimes could be referred to the Minister of the Interior and the Office of the President 
to be dealt with in accordance with their discretionary authority.
123
  
 
The use of politicized special courts created by the regime to deal with ordinary and 
political offences marginalized the ordinary court system. Mavrommatis rightly 
observed that, “there was no specific need for such courts, as the regular courts would 
appear to have the capacity in all cases.”124 The result was that courts of this kind 
radically undermined the rule of law and adversely affected the functions of 
international human rights law.
125
 For example, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights on several occasions strongly condemned the serious violations condoned by 
these courts, particularly the resort to cruel and bloody punishments. In 1995, It 
reported that “Indeed, it is surely a rarity in the contemporary international 
community that a Government not only boldly pronounces laws which stipulate 
disfigurements of persons within its jurisdiction, but shamelessly announces and 
advertises the existence of these punishments.”126 In the same vein, in 1998, the 
Commission observed that “the judicial system is incapable of dispensing independent 
and impartial justice which takes into account the full rights of the citizen.”127  
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In response to the pressing need for the judicial system to improve its human rights 
record in Iraq, these types of courts were dissolved by the CPA in 2003,
128
 and their 
former areas of jurisdiction were restored to the ordinary criminal courts. In 2005 the 
Iraqi permanent Constitution confirmed that these kinds of courts were totally 
forbidden in the new Iraq justice system and were to be permanently prohibited.
129
 
Their abolition has had a positive effect on the rule of law and human rights in the 
country, and corresponds to “the needs of a modern, democratic society.”130  
 
2.3.2.1.2. Military Courts  
 
There was another type of repressive court, the military courts. These were staffed by 
unqualified lawyers,
131
 and thus the first issue of concern was their competency. They 
exercised jurisdiction over civilian as well as military personnel.
132
 Likewise, they 
exercised jurisdiction over civil and military offences when those accused of such 
offences were the members of the armed forces. The role of the civilian judicial 
system was therefore undermined by the exclusion of military personnel from the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts.  
  
As a result, in order to separate the present system from the practices of the past, the 
post-Saddam Constitution provides that the establishment of military courts must be 
made through enactment of a law and that they can only deal with crimes committed 
by military personnel on military duty. They can enforce only the military penal code 
and only members of the armed forces may come before such courts.
133
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2.3.2.2 Creation of new criminal courts 
 
2.3.2.2.1. The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) 
 
The CCCI was designed to be “the country’s flagship criminal justice institution.” It 
was aimed at the attainment of the rule of law and the development of a properly 
functioning judicial system in Iraq. This court was established in Baghdad in 
accordance with the CPA’s order No.13 (2004).134 The CCCI consists of two 
chambers: an Investigative Court; and a Felony Court.
135
 It is not different from other 
ordinary investigation and criminal courts, but specializes in trying certain types of 
cases: 
a- Terrorism  
b- Organized crime 
c- Government corruption 
d- Acts intended to destabilize democratic institutions or processes 
e- Violence based on race, nationality, ethnicity or religion    
f- Instances in which a criminal defendant may not able to obtain a fair trial in a local 
court. 
 
This court does not function under a separate legal regime. Substantive and 
procedural Iraqi criminal laws are applied without amendment throughout the stages 
of criminal proceedings, from the outset of arrest, pre-trial investigation, trial, 
conviction, punishment and appeals against verdict before the Court of Cassation.
136
 
The purpose behind the creation of the CCCI is “to prepare for implementing the rule 
of law through a system of independent courts.”137 This court is supposed to be a 
model for other Iraqi courts with regards to the protection of human rights. 
Unfortunately, it seems to suffer from numerous shortcomings in this regard.  
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According to Amnesty International, the main problem concerning the court is that it 
issues death sentences.
138
 It may be argued here that if the law imposes the death 
penalty, the court should not be blamed for imposing that sentence. It should be 
stressed here that even if the death penalty is enacted in Iraq law, the judges must 
ensure fair trials and they cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for flawed 
trials. The fact is that, there is criticism regarding a lack of due process and the 
widespread use of invalid evidence to obtain convictions at trial.
139
 In particular, trials 
often rely on confessions to determine guilt even if they may have been extracted by 
invalid means during pre-trial interrogations.
140
 Human Rights Watch, in a report 
released in 2008, stated that it had attended more than 70 investigative hearings and 
several trials, and met with Iraqi judges, lawyers, defendants and other officials. The 
report concluded that the CCCI fell far short of international standards of due process. 
The report called on the government to take immediate steps to protect detainees from 
the risk of torture and other abuses, and to ensure the availability of a defence for 
detainees. It recommended that hearings and trials should take place within an 
acceptable period of time and should not be subject to extensive delay.  
 
In view of evaluation of the CCCI by means of human rights reports, it might 
reasonably have been claimed that its establishment is a notable achievements, insofar 
as primary goal of the establishment of the court, as set forth in CPA’s Order 13, was 
to create a better model with regard to establishing respect for due process. Thus, after 
it had been establishment in Baghdad, the model of this specialized court has been 
extended to other provinces in Iraq over the last three years, in order to demonstrate 
that a fair trial can be capably conducted by the criminal justice system. However, 
there are human rights reports from reputable sources that challenge this optimistic 
assessment.
141
 According to these reports, the CCCI has not only failed in practice to 
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be “the country’s flagship criminal justice institution”142 it has also failed to meet the 
minimum standards to which is bound under international rules. This assessment is in 
accord with the author’s own research, from which it is concluded that the purposes 
motivating the establishment of these courts have not been achieved and can only be 
attained through further reforms. These measures must be aimed at achieving 
international due process standards.    
 
2.3.2.2.2. The Iraqi High Tribunal for Crimes against Humanity 
 
 After the fall of Saddam’s regime in May 2003, the first step in rebuilding the rule of 
law in Iraq was to deal with the Ba’ath party’s violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.
143
 For this purpose, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) in July 2003 delegated the function of legislation with regard to the 
court statute to the appointed Iraqi Governing Council. The Council, pursuant to the 
order of the CPA No (48), established the Iraqi Special Tribunal on 9 December 
2003.
144
 There were certain reasons for the necessity of a domestic special court, 
rather than some other kind of criminal tribunal. The most notable reason was the 
difficulty of establishing an ad hoc tribunal by the Security Council. At that time, 
France, Russia, and China, all permanent members of the UN Security Council, made 
clear their intention to veto any attempt to create such a court.
145
 Likewise, resorting 
to the ICC to deal with the crimes of Iraq’s former leader was not an available option, 
since the Statute of Rome contains a ‘non-retroactivity’ clause that prohibits the court 
from dealing with crimes that occurred before June 2002 (i.e., before the court’s 
creation).  
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In any case, Iraq had not ratified the treaty, and the Statute of Rome provides that the 
jurisdiction of the court extends only to crimes committed in states that were 
signatories of the treaty.
146
 Moreover, the Bush Administration wished to absolve 
itself of responsibility and embarrassments for a flawed trial, and so allowed Iraqis to 
conduct the criminal prosecutions.
147
 In addition, a domestic prosecution through a 
national court within the Iraqi judicial system was the option preferred by Iraqis for 
bestowing the death penalty on Saddam and other former leaders. It was decided 
finally that the improved judicial capacity of the domestic court system made it the 
best option for the process of dealing with the crimes of the previous regime. The 
prosecutions subsequently became a controversial topic among legal experts and 
scholars, who have argued about many aspects of them.
148
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There is considerable criticism with regard to the legitimacy of the tribunal that was 
established.
149
 It has been suggested that, although the Iraqi Governing Council had 
established the court, the authority really stemmed from the occupying powers. It was 
said that the CPA surpassed the limitations of its authority under international 
humanitarian law.
150
 However, one may argue that the new Constitution in 2005 
confirmed the role of the court.
151
 Later, a law passed by the newly elected Iraqi 
Parliament renamed the court as the Iraqi High Criminal Court (Almahkamah Aljnia 
aliraqia Alulya).
152
 Newton convincingly stated that, “in view of the revalidation of 
the Statute by Iraqi authorities following the return to full sovereignty, an analysis of 
its formation under the umbrella of the Coalition Provisional Authority becomes a 
moot point.”153 The argument is that it is now to be regarded as legitimate, having 
been approved by the democratically elected representatives of Iraq. 
 
There has been widespread criticism about the due process standards of the 
proceedings of the IST.
154
 These criticisms point to significant fair trial issues, 
including the use of retroactive laws, the vagueness of the definition of domestic 
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crimes, the qualifications of the defence counsel, judicial independence and 
impartiality, and evidential problems. However, in view of the present author, there 
have also been some positive aspects. The point that is relevant to the current study is 
that this Court played a role changing the society by enhancing the rule of law in Iraq. 
One of the significant pillars of the rule of law was embodied in Saddam’s trial, in 
that it demonstrated that no one is above the law, including dictators. Besides being 
held accountable, a suspect must in all circumstance be given rights that are enshrined 
in law. In this respect, it can at least be claimed that the work of the tribunal, even 
with its flaws, represented an improvement on the old system.  
   
The High Iraqi Criminal Court Law states that it is a requirement to “ensure that a 
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with this 
Statute and the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the 
accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”155 The law has 
given complete independence to investigative judges as entities separate even from 
the Court itself and they are not to subjected to inquiries or requests or orders from 
any government agency. Similarly, the texts also show the independence of the 
prosecution. The law sets out guarantees to be available throughout all stages of the 
criminal proceedings, guarantees not previously found in Iraqi law. Article (19) of the 
law confirms that safeguards meeting international standards must be given to 
suspects in order to ensure a fair trial.  
 
These guarantees conform to the rights established by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the Statutes of international criminal tribunals.
156
 Some of the guarantees given 
under the Law of the High Iraqi Criminal Court were contained in the ICCP. Others 
were either not contained in the ICCP or have a wider scope than those in it, for 
example, the right of the accused person to legal assistance, access to free translation 
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services and the prohibition of interrogations undertaken when no lawyer is present. It 
has rightly been stated that, “With respect to the procedures and guarantees of the 
rights of the defence, the IST is more favourable than existing Iraqi laws on criminal 
procedure under the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law.”157  
 
It is clear from the account given above that the event of holding a former dictator to 
account before an Iraqi court, using Iraqi laws and procedures, played a part in 
repairing the justice system, even though the trial was flawed. On the other hand, a 
clear lesson that Iraqis learned from the trials is that the due process must exist not 
only in theoretical legal frameworks but also in practice. Iraqis received support from 
the wider international community regarding the principle of accountability. 
Inequities were condemned, and the trials educated the public in the necessity to 
improve the local justice system so as to confront any violations caused by the 
government in the future.  This experience has been widely recognized as invaluable 
for progress towards the rule of law in a just society. Despite the criticisms of the 
process, the trials of the Ba’ath Party and its leader at the IST marked an important 
milestone. 
 
2.3.3. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court 
 
Under the previous regime there was no judicial entity empowered to review the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations or to determine issues arising from the 
application of laws and the interpretation of legal texts. There was a written 
Constitution but no Constitutional Court. After the demise of the Ba’ath regime in 
2003, the Federal Supreme Court (AlMahkamah AlAthadia AlUlya) was established 
with the task of overseeing the constitutionality of laws, resolutions, regulations and 
instructions issued by the legislative and executive powers.
158
 This was to ensure the 
principle of the separation of powers and to ensure respect for the Constitution and the 
enforcement of the rule of law.
159
 Its aim was also to prevent human rights and public 
freedom being breached by the legislature. According to the Iraqi Permanent 
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Constitution 2005, decisions of the Court are final, i.e., not subject to appeal in any 
way and binding for all.
160
 Concerning the formation of the Court, Article 92 of the 
Constitution states that  
“The Federal Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of judges, experts in 
Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars, whose number, the method of their 
selection, and the work of the Court shall be determined by a law enacted by a 
two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives.”161 
 
What can be derived from an analysis of this Article is that the Constitution only 
identified the general framework for the composition of this Court, leaving the door 
open for parliament to decide on the configuration of the court by enacting the law 
mentioned under the provisions of the Article. It must be admitted that this vagueness 
regarding the establishment of the Court is a notable reason why the law has not yet 
been enacted. The Constitution identified the general framework for the composition 
of this Court, but without stipulating specific numbers of judges, experts in Islamic 
jurisprudence and jurists. This is not to say that the current (pre- 2005) formation of 
the Court is inefficient but, as has already been noted, leaving these important issues 
to be resolved by legislative authorities has adversely affected Iraq’s journey forwards 
sustainable peace and the rule of law.  
 
The main cause for concern is that the Constitution did not specify the status of the 
experts in Islamic jurisprudence in terms of their right to participate in the decisions 
issued by the court and their right to vote, nor did it decree that they should have only 
a consultative role. What follows from this lack of clarity is that the inclusion of 
experts in Islamic jurisprudence in the judiciary and allowing them to vote, as Islamic 
political parties in the current parliament have demanded, would create various 
problems. For example, selecting those experts from both the Sunni and the Shi’ite 
community means that there will be a jurisprudential dispute over any issue placed 
before the Court. In such a case of jurisprudential disagreement, the work of the Court 
would be problematic. It would open the door for the intrusion of endless religious 
debate into the work of the Court. This would be the case even when all the disputants 
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belonged to the same religion. Iraq, however is religiously pluralistic, and many 
citizens belong to religions other than Islam. Thus, clerics from the Christian, Sabean, 
Yazidi and other minorities should all have representation in the Court. As a result, 
unsettled disputes inside parliament regarding the religious aspects are a primary 
reason why the law mentioned under Article 92 has not yet been enacted.  
 
The Federal Supreme Court, at the present time, consists of 9 judges without expertise 
in Islamic jurisprudence and legal scholarship. Among other areas of authority, the 
Court exercises judicial control over the constitutionality of laws to ensure the 
protection of rights and freedoms.
162
 In this context, the procedural rules of the 
Federal Supreme Court give individuals whose rights may have been violated by 
unconstitutional rules the right to lodge a complaint before the Court and to ask for 
these rules to be quashed on the basis of unconstitutionality. This is similar to the 
right provided in many legal systems, and is included in the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
163
  
 
It is important to note that disputing the Constitutionality of laws before the Court can 
take place even if there is no case of litigation before the ordinary courts.
164
  
 
According to the rules of procedure for the Federal Supreme Court, lower courts may, 
during the consideration of any case of litigation, spontaneously request the Federal 
Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of a law, legislative decision, 
regulation or instructions relating to the case.
165
 Since the formation of the Federal 
Supreme Court, its work has played a major role in public life and it has become a 
protective tool for the rights and freedoms of Iraqi citizens against the exercise of 
unconstitutional legislations. This protection was the essential ground for the 
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establishment of the court.
166
 It is worthwhile to give an example here. In 2011, the 
Investigating Court, (Mahakimt Al-Tahqeeq), requested from the Higher Judicial 
Council a statement of opinion about a decision issued by the Director General of 
Customs, who had arrested a number of persons on the basis of the Customs Act.
167
 
The lower court asked the Federal Supreme Court to consider Article 237 of the 
Customs Act. This authorized the Directorate of Customs General, or any person 
acting on his behalf, to detain individuals in certain cases. This seemed contrary to 
Article 37 of the Iraqi Permanent Constitution, according to which the power of arrest 
is granted only to the judicial authority. The Federal Supreme Court in its turn 
decided that the customs law in question was unconstitutional.
168
  
 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that although the Federal Supreme Court is a 
recent development, it has potential to protect the constitutional rights of individuals. 
Recent cases brought before the court clearly demonstrate that it can play a prominent 
role in protecting the human rights encompassed by the Constitution.  
 
In view of the above, the author concludes that the creation of a court whose task is to 
guard and preserve constitutional rights reflects a collective concern to provide further 
safeguarding of rights. It further reflects a genuine concern for another important step 
towards fostering the rule of law and eradicating the violation of human rights in the 
new democratic Iraq. However, in assessing whether the court has achieved the 
purposes for which it was established, further research on the impact of the Federal 
Supreme Court is necessary, and this is outside the scope of the present research. 
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2.4. Reform of other institutions within the Iraqi criminal justice system  
 
The public prosecution service and the police force are substantive elements of the 
criminal justice system, and they played a major part in the past regime’s repression 
and violation of citizens’ rights. Therefore, justice today cannot be achieved without 
their reform and efforts to enhance the rule of law in the post-Saddam criminal justice 
system must involve scrutiny of these significant institutions. 
 
2.4.1. Reform of the Department of Public Prosecution  
 
The Department of Public Prosecution was established in accordance with the Public 
Prosecutors Law No.159 of 1979 in order to represent the public interest. According 
to the law, it is tasked with a significant duty during the pre-trial investigation stage, 
which is to “Lodge the criminal case to be investigated by investigative judge [...] and 
observing the criminal case throughout the proceedings.”169  
 
The important reform relating to the Department of Public Prosecution is that, having 
previously been a branch of the executive authority under the Ministry of Justice, it 
has now become linked to the Higher Judicial Council.
170
 The implications of this are 
that public prosecutors they are not regarded as judges, although all the reforms that 
have been indicated relating to judges with regard to autonomy and independence, 
administrative and financial resources, infrastructures and equipment, and 
professionalism or the qualification and training of personnel similarly apply to the 
members of the public prosecution department. This is clearly an important step 
forward for the reform of the justice system in Iraq.  
 
However, as this research reveals, there are many shortcomings in the pre-
investigative system that is part of the function of the public prosecution. The tension 
between the public prosecution and the investigative system in Iraq will be shown in 
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detail in the next chapter, which focuses on one of the criticisms of the present Iraqi 
investigative system. The next chapter will show that impartiality, independence and 
competency are undermined, in some cases, because the public prosecution, which is 
empowered to instigate the initial public charge against the suspect, may also 
undertake the investigation of criminal offences. This represents a conflict of 
interests. 
 
2.4.2. Police reform  
 
The police force is an executive branch and is under the leadership of the Ministry of 
the Interior. The police are responsible for the safety of the Iraqi public and their 
protection against crime. After 2003, the CPA disbanded the army and yet allowed the 
Ministry of Interior, and thus the police, to remain in service.
171
 Subsequently, the 
police force rapidly grew in numbers and its reform received wide support in a 
coordinated and collaborative effort between national and international institutions.
172
  
 
Different programmes have been initiated to promote comprehensive reform and to 
strengthen Iraq’s police.173 The first core aspect of reform included increasing the 
number of additional police forces. Other aspects of reform included the advancement 
of training programmes by the Coalition and by the ‘embedding’ of international 
officials in Iraq, particularly those of the UNDP, UNAMI and the European Union 
Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX).
174
 With the assistance of 
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professional teams, Iraqi police received multi-faceted training.
175
 In 2009, it was 
reported that these major efforts to improve the police force had resulted in some 
improvements across the country.
176
 However, armed violence is still a notable 
challenge to the police in their work of establishing security in Iraq.
177
  
 
Another core aspect of reforms to the policing system is related to human rights. It is 
of vital importance that those who plan programmes to enhance the rule of law in 
post-conflict States should include plans to develop the capacity of the Ministry of 
Interior regarding the accountability of the officials involved in abuses.
178
 Experts 
from the United States Institute of Peace, in their observations of the reforms to the 
Iraq police system, expressed the view that “holding employees accountable for their 
actions is an important step toward institutionalizing capacity within the ministry.”179 
The reform effort in post-Saddam Iraq has given attention to the decisive role of the 
police in terms of the criminal justice system and in the administration of justice. In 
2008, an inspection commission created by the Ministry of Interior was entrusted to 
the task of investigating alleged violations of human rights during detention.
180
 In 
2009, the United States Institute of Peace reported details regarding investigations 
conducted by the committee into allegations of abuse of human rights.
181
 It must be 
borne in mind that the disclosure of such details within domestic reports is of 
particular significance in providing transparency, improving public confidence in the 
system and raising awareness of human rights issues. 
 
It is widely recognized that some progress has been made, but there is also an 
awareness that the reforms have not been fully successful in practice. According to 
reputable reports, as will be elaborated throughout this work, the abuse of human 
rights at the hands of the police is still a systemic problem, and it arises, in part, from 
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flaws within the Iraqi criminal justice system.
182
 These reports have described forms 
police misbehaviour, including abuse of power, corruption and sectarianism, all of 
which have had a negative impact on human rights.
183
 In resolving this problem, 
police reform needs to respond both to the needs of law enforcement and the need to 
safeguard the human rights of citizens. It is also important, as the UNAMI 
recommended in 2013, to “Establish an independent oversight body, such as an 
ombudsman or police disciplinary tribunal, to investigate allegations of abuse of 
authority or breach of professional standards by police.”184  
 
An assessment of current reforms from the point of view of international due process 
reveals that these varied programmes have not yet succeeded in establishing a police 
force that is fully consistent with the modern notions of the role of police in society 
and the holistic needs of citizens. This is because the reforms have failed to focus on a 
central cause for concern, which is the role of the police during the investigation 
stage. Problems in this area have remained outside the scope of the reforms. The 
tension between the police and the investigative system in Iraq will be discussed later 
in the next chapter, and the discussion will consider situations in which the 
investigation of criminal offences is sometimes undertaken by police, rather than 
investigating judges or judicial investigators. 
 
2.5. Human rights reform in Iraq  
 
 
Entrenching respect for human rights in the post- Saddam era is another aspect of the 
reform of the Iraqi criminal justice system. At the time of writing, the High 
Commission for Human Rights, an independent mechanism for human rights 
protection has been recently established. Furthermore, recent reform has involved 
several other mechanisms for the supervision and protection of human rights in Iraq. 
Clearly these are positive steps towards improving justice and combatting human 
rights violations in order to bring the system in line with international standards. 
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 A number of the reform mechanisms will now be examined in order to determine the 
degree of progress achieved within the new system and also to assess whether these 
mechanisms have served the task for which they were established.  
 
2.5.1. The creation of the High Commission for Human Rights  
 
The new Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005 declared the creation of an independent 
mechanism for human rights monitoring, and its establishment was to be delegated to 
the Council of Representatives.
185
 In response, Law No. 53 was enacted for the High 
Commission for Human Rights in 2008. This law is concerned with the important task 
of activating and strengthening the principles of human rights in Iraq. Its approach is 
largely influenced from the basic principles underpinning the national commissions 
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1993, the so-called “Paris 
Principles,” which have become a reference for the establishment and functioning of 
national institutions for human rights.
186
 The law identifies the main objectives of the 
High Commission’s work on human rights in Iraq as to investigate human rights 
violations, with the aim of bringing the perpetrators to justice; to establish and 
maintain a prevailing culture of human rights; to monitor national legislations and 
assess their compliance with human rights principles;
187
and to monitor the 
implementation of international conventions on human rights.
188
 
 
The drafting of Law No. 53 involved two years of dialogue between the Council of 
Representatives and the government, civil society, the United Nations and 
international organizations. To date, the Commission has not fully launched its work. 
The commission was determined by the Constitution 2005 and yet it was not until 
2008 that a law was enacted to prescribe the functions of the commission, three years 
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having elapsed since its formation was called for. Thereafter, a further three years 
elapsed before the members of the commission were chosen in 2012. Political and 
financial obstacles are a primary reason why it was marked by a difficult birth, eight 
years after its conception. Problems dating from the early history of the Commission 
led many to the conclusion that the reform had failed to serve the task it embarked 
upon. However, in more recent years there have been greater efforts to bring this 
important institution to fruition.  
 
The Commission commenced its operations and had its budget endorsed only in 2013. 
It is now vital that sufficient resources and all relevant facilities should be provided to 
the Commission in order to enable it to carry out its functions adequately. The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has called for further efforts to 
empower the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights and to reduce interference by 
political blocs.
189
 The report of the UNAMI in 2013 also makes recommendations in 
this regard, with Pillay further adding that “I urge the Government of Iraq to do 
everything possible to implement the recommendations made in this report.”190 
 
In the view of the present author, no institution is more crucial for establishing an 
independent mechanism to promote and protect human rights. The international 
community that has been in partnership with Iraqis to enhance the rule of law has also 
expressed willingness to provide assistance in relation to the issues of the 
Commission. The Country Director of UNDP suggested that:  
“Independent Human Rights Commission will be critical for the development of 
an effective and sustainable national human rights protection system in a 
democratic Iraq [...] going forward, there are a number of strategic opportunities 
that we need to build upon together [...] adhere to Law 53.”191  
 
 The Universal Periodic Review considers the establishment of the Commission as an 
important step forwards in human rights protection and made recommendations in this 
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regard.
192
 The UNAMI has supported the government in preparing to draft the law by 
supplying guidance, capable recommendations and advice on precise human rights 
issues; it went so far as to take part in the selection of commissioners.
193
 Along with 
the international community’s efforts, the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
has emphasized the need to support the Iraqi government in establishing the High 
Human Rights Commission as soon as possible, and has expressed the “hope that the 
process of selecting the commissioners will be completed soon so that the commission 
can begin its important work.”194  
 
After the appointment of the members of the Commission in 2012, the international 
community continued to give its support to the new measures. In 2012 the Institute for 
International Law and Human Rights conducted a project, the objective of which was 
to assist the Commission to design appropriate “regulations, procedures, and protocols 
that dictate the function of the Commission in the future.”195 Furthermore, under the 
auspices of the UNAMI, the Commissioners have received training on practical skills 
in different countries.
196
  
 
 The creation the Commission as part of the post- Saddam reform programme has 
been an important achievement with regard to human rights in Iraq. At the same time, 
it should be said it is still too early to comment on the quality of the Commission’s 
work in practice, and to judge its impact on Iraqi society. It is a strong mandate; much 
support is needed to make a difference. For this purpose, the UNAMI’s 
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recommendations are of the utmost significance in strengthening this body, so that it 
operates in accordance with the international standards and Paris Principles.
197
  
  
2.5.2. The Council of Representatives (Parliament) 
 
In the new democratic Constitutional Iraq, Parliament is a group of elected 
representatives of the people who have been given the power to act on behalf of Iraqis 
through the development of policies and decision-making on issues of national 
importance. Parliament is entrusted with the responsibility for making the laws that 
govern society, and for the supervision of the government in order to ensure 
responsible governance. It therefore represents the interests of the people in general, 
and acts as a bridge between the people and the government. Its role in the protection 
of human rights has arisen as a consequence of its original purpose, the enactment of 
laws, as well as through its role in monitoring the government. For these purposes, the 
Iraqi Council of Representatives established the Parliamentary Human Rights 
Commission in 2006.  
 
The Parliamentary Human Rights Commission is another important mechanism for 
the protection of human rights. Its task is to defend human rights and to identify 
potential shortcomings in the existing legal rules so as to ensure effective safeguards 
against their violation. Its role is also to suggest to parliament further necessary laws 
regarding human rights, including laws to protect the rights of women and the rights 
of suspects, and laws to ensure religious freedom and minority rights. In addition, it 
has the duty of monitoring government agencies in order to ascertain the extent of 
their commitment to human rights. It also receives complaints, observations, and the 
reports of fact-finding committees concerning alleged violations of human rights. Its 
task is then to find the appropriate solution to these problems. From what is 
mentioned above, it is clear that this Commission is another national human rights 
body that plays a central role in improving the justice system in post-Saddam Iraq. 
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2.5.3. Creation of the Ministry of Human Rights   
 
One of the most important new institutions is the Ministry of Human Rights, which 
was formed on 3 September 2003.
198
 This branch of government has been entrusted 
with observing and investigating, in conjunction with other bodies, issues related to 
human rights across the country in order to prevent their violation. As will be shown 
during the course of this research, the Ministry has submitted important reports over a 
ten year period regarding arbitrary government actions and alleged violations in the 
field of justice, particularly those occurring in detention facilities and prisons.
199
 
 
Nevertheless, the ministry’s work has encountered a number of obstacles.200 In 2010, 
US Department of State reported that “Limited resources and poor co-operation from 
other ministries limited the ministry’s effectiveness.”201  
 
These limitations must be taken into account in any assessment of its effectiveness. It 
must also be borne in mind that the Ministry of Human rights is a part of the Iraqi 
government, and this affects its supposedly independent nature. Although this body of 
government has made significant progress in implementing its task through various 
activities related to human rights, particularly in the criminal justice system, the 
author takes the view that this Ministry should be terminated after the full 
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establishment of the High Commission of Human Rights. The justification for this 
view is that the Commission has greater autonomy. It would achieve its duties more 
effectively as it is better able to remain free from governmental influence.  
 
2.5.4. Encouraging civil society and NGOs 
 
In Iraq, although there were several laws regarding civil society,
202
 independent 
NGOs did not exist during the Saddam era.
 
 After the removal of the regime, the 
reforming parties considered the role of these organizations to be ineffectual.
203
 An 
attempt to resolve the problem started remarkably soon after the fall of the regime, 
with the issue of the Order of Non-Government Organization No. 45 of 2003, by 
which a large number of these Non-Government Organizations were to be created for 
the purpose of working in the field of human rights. Then, in 2010, on the basis of the 
Constitution, the Council of Representatives adopted a new law, the Law of Non-
Governmental Organizations No. 12, which replaced the CPA’s Order.204 As the 
International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law explains, the new law enabled NGOs to 
work more openly, both domestically and with the international community. They 
attained more freedom in their mode of operation, with less restrictions by 
government inspections.
205
  
 
Thus far, these non- governmental organizations have had a significant influence on 
the new system with regard to defending human rights in a more realistic way, and 
they have provided reports on human rights to United Nations bodies and other 
international institutions.
206
 The evidence of the success of these institutions in 
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serving the function for which they were intended can clearly be seen in the details of 
these reports. Their alternative reports, so-called shadow reports, are submitted along 
with official government reports to the International Community, and describe the 
human rights situation in the country. This procedure appears to be succeeding, for 
the present, in providing a more accurate portrayal of human rights in the country.
207
 
Hence, the law is an important advocacy device for protecting human rights and it is 
said that “The law is generally considered as one of the best and most liberal NGO 
laws in the region.”208 
 
Civil society organizations have been engaged with international donors and with the 
UN in a process of helping the Iraqi people “to foster a culture based on the rule of 
law and respect of human rights.”209 For example, a two-year project was launched 
under the auspices of the UNAMI in April 2009, during which experts from the 
Centre for Human Rights Law at the University of Nottingham in Britain, provided 
many programmes.
210
 They held training sessions for representatives of Iraqi civil 
society organizations on how to submit reports about the situation of human rights to 
the relevant United Nations bodies.
211
 Innovative projects for developing civil 
organizations have also been implemented by the United Nations Development Group 
Iraq Trust Fund.
212
  
 
Despite the more accurate depiction of the human rights situation, there is a gap in the 
law addressing the NGOs’ capacities and resources, along with a failure to fully 
empower them to play an active role in bringing to court complaints against human 
rights violations.   
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2.5.5. Other mechanisms for monitoring human rights 
 
The United Nations has an important role to play in supervising and controlling the 
implementation of international conventions in general, and agreements relating to 
international law of human rights in particular. What has been seen with regard to the 
international monitoring of fair trials and due process in Iraq reveals that the 
monitoring mechanism of international human rights law has fulfilled its function in 
highlighting the human rights situation. The treaty bodies have come to play a clear 
role in this respect. For example, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has 
received complaints regarding some alleged incidents of arbitrary arrest and detention 
in Iraq and reached decisions on these cases.
213
 The Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers has looked at the situation in Iraq and 
commented on certain issues there.
214
 
 
The most obvious example of the role of the UN with regard to the regular empirical 
evaluation of human rights in Iraq is demonstrated by the UNAMI. The UNAMI’s 
office in Iraq, over the last ten years, has played a notable role in investigating and 
monitoring human rights violations in the country. It assists the government in 
undertaking various activities to promote human rights in post-Saddam Iraq. 
Throughout the forthcoming chapters reference will be made to the findings of the 
many reports submitted by the UNAMI.  
 
 In view of the above account, it is surprising to discover that Iraq has had no 
engagement with the Human Rights Committee (the HRC) since its last report in 
1998. There are reasons for this lapse, some of which involve the Iraqi government, 
while others involve the Committee itself.  
 
The failure of Iraq to submit reports to the Committee may have been the main reason 
why Iraq has had no recent engagement with it. The Committee depends on the 
                                                 
213
 The Working Group was established by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1991 in order to 
consider alleged cases of violations of the right to liberty, including arbitrary arrest and detention, to be 
investigated according to international rules. Regarding its work in relation to Iraq, see UN Human 
Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’ (A/HRC/16/47/Add.1, 2 March 
2011) 70.  
214
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy: addendum: situation in specific countries or 
territories’ (27 March 2006) E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.1, 52.  
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reports of State parties for the implementation of its role in monitoring the human 
rights situation. For this purpose, under Article 40 of the Covenant, there is a binding 
obligation for State parties to provide regular reports to the Committee.
215
 In this 
respect, the assumption is that Iraq has breached its obligations under Article 40, even 
taking into account the difficult conditions endured by the country, which have 
hindered the performance of the Human Rights Committee’s monitoring functions 
since 1998. These adverse conditions cannot fully justify such failure, particularly 
during recent years, when the wider situation and national security have significantly 
improved. Consequently, it can reasonably be claimed that the main reason for the 
absence of engagement with the HRC since the last report in 1998 is the failure of the 
Iraqi government to implement its binding obligations under international human 
rights law to provide these reports.  
 
The Committee’s function of monitoring the human rights situation relies on the 
receipt and assessment of complaints referred to it by individuals or by other States, 
which indicate that the State concerned is in violation of rights protected under the 
Covenant.
216
 Iraq is not party to the First Optional Protocols of the UN ICCPR, and 
hence the victims whose human rights were abused by the public authority, having 
exhausted national remedies, cannot send petitions to the Committee seeking redress. 
This leads to the clear conclusion that one of the reasons behind the absence of recent 
engagement in Iraq with the UN Human Rights Committee is that the country has not 
yet acceded to the First Optional Protocols of the UN ICCPR.  The reform process in 
Iraq has suffered because insufficient attention has been given the lack of engagement 
with the HRC over a long period (since 1998). In the view of the present author this 
shortcoming needs to be addressed in the near future.   
 
The Committee performs its functions with regard to monitoring the situation of 
human rights in the states of the parties concerned by relying on various special 
procedures (such as the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, mentioned earlier).
217
  
                                                 
215
 See the ICCPR, Article 40. 
216
 Ibid, Article 41; see also the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR. 
217
 The Committee decided in 2001 that “a State’s record under the Covenant could be examined at the 
Committee’s discretion in the absence of a report, and if necessary in the absence of a delegation from 
a State party” See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human rights, 
Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, (May 2005, printed at the United Nations, 
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Regardless of whether or not a report is submitted by Iraqis, the Committee should in 
any case deal with the engagement of Iraq vis-à-vis the human rights situation in the 
country.  
 
The issue of concern is that, the Committee’s reports have indicated that the Iraqi 
government has made no contact and hence there was negligence on the part of the 
government with regards to its lack of engagement with the committee. The 
government has consistently failed to submit the reports that were requested.
218
 This 
accumulating problem was compounded by the committee’s failure to exert its power 
to address the situation. This is not to say that the UN took a passive role. On the 
contrary, it made a difference in Iraq, particularly with regard to the work carried out 
by the UNAMI. However, the Iraqi government’s renewal of contact with the 
Committee would impact positively on improving the human rights situation in the 
country.  
 
Let us now consider another improvement that has been recently carried out by way 
of reform in post-Saddam Iraq. For the first time, Iraq has engaged with the Universal 
Periodic Review, an international mechanism for monitoring human rights and the 
rule of law.
219
 It should be noted that under UN General Assembly Resolution No 
60/251, the Human Rights Council was established on 15 March 2006 to replace the 
Commission on Human Rights.
220
 Under the same Resolution the UPR has been 
created to be under the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council. By virtue of the 
Universal Periodic Review, the commitments of all member States of the UN 
regarding respect for human rights are to be reviewed and evaluated every four years.  
Each state is subject to review by the UN member states. The members ask questions 
and make recommendations to the Government of that state in an interactive dialogue. 
A “Statement of Results” is then issued, which adopts a list of recommendations and 
shows which of these recommendations have received the consent of the State 
concerned.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Geneva) 2, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf> 
accessed 30 September 2013. 
218
 UN General Assembly ‘Report of Human Rights Committee’ Official Records Sixty-second session 
2007 Supplement No. 40 (A/62/40) 17.  
219
 Ibid, para. 5(e). 
220
 UN General Assembly Res 60/251 ‘Human Right Council’ (3 April 2006) para. 1.   
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The reviews of the States are seen by some as a constructive means to address 
violations and to engage the public at the international level, and as an opportunity for 
governments to disclose their plans to improve the situation of human rights based on 
recommendations made by international community.
221
 The implementation of 
commitments that have been formulated by the international community under the 
Universal Periodic Review is the responsibility of governments themselves, but the 
review mechanism has some powers to intervene if the state fails to improve the 
situation.
222
 The Universal Periodic Review is issued every four years, the progress of 
each a country in the implementation of the recommendations is considered and the 
Council deals with cases of non-cooperation by the relevant States. The legal 
framework of the Universal Periodic Review ensures that the parties involved play an 
active role in implementing the recommendations, through advocacy and technical 
support.
223
 In addition, the Council’s Universal Periodic Review may help to 
coordinate financial and technical support for the process of implementing the 
recommendations.
224
 
 
Iraq appeared before the Human Rights Council as part of the Universal Periodic 
Review in February 2010. During this review, both the official and shadow reports, 
from the Ministry of Human Rights and NGOs concerning human rights (including 
the rights of accused persons) were presented.
225
 The review emphasized that in 
recent years there have been many positive and comprehensive developments in the 
field of human rights, based on the new Constitution and other aspects of the National 
Agenda, along with binding obligations under international rules and the conventions 
ratified by Iraq.  
                                                 
221
 Ibid; see also Sara Wyatt, United Nations Universal Periodic Review, Guide to the UPR, available 
at <http://www.ifex.org/campaigns/tools_resources_upr/> accessed 30 March 2012. 
222
 Ibid. 
223
 Human Rights Council, ‘Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ 
(Resolution 5/1), Annex 1. 
224
 Ibid. 
225
 United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRQ/1, 18 January 2010, Human Rights 
Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review,(n 192); see also, United Nations General 
Assembly, A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRQ/2, 1 December 2009, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review, Seventh session, Geneva, 8-19 February 2010, Compilation Prepared by 
the  Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15 (B) of the 
annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1; see also United Nations General Assembly 
A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRQ/3, 1 December 2009, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review, Seventh session, Geneva, 8-19 February 2010, Summary Prepared by the Office of 
the High Commission for Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15 (C) of the annex to Human 
Rights Council Resolution 5/1.  
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The 2010 review illustrates the international community’s belief that political, 
economic, social and cultural rights in Iraq should be embedded in legislation and 
policies and other practices that define the individual’s relationship with the 
government. The report of the review included a total of 176 recommendations. Nine 
of these recommendations emphasized the requirement for Iraq to become a party to 
international agreements and additional urgent protocols. Seven of the 
recommendations discussed the need to harmonize the new Iraqi Constitution with 
binding obligations under international treaties and international law. Twenty- six of 
these recommendations involved respect for the right to life and the abolition of the 
death penalty. Twelve focused on offering invitations to special reporters. Nine 
highlighted prevention of torture and improvement of the justice system and 
conditions of detention, (these being particularly relevant to the present research). 
Twelve included recommendations for fair trial guarantees and independence of the 
judiciary. Four of the recommendations emphasized the need to combat the culture of 
impunity and also included some recommendations with regard to human trafficking. 
Finally, one recommendation concerned the need to combat terrorism. The numbers 
of recommendations accepted by the Iraqi delegation was 135, while 27 
recommendations were rejected, almost all of which focused on the abolition of the 
death penalty.
226
  
 
Iraq nonetheless pledged to continue to make further efforts in other areas: to promote 
human rights in the cultural practices of Iraqi society; to attempt to incorporate these 
efforts into national legislation; and to continue its efforts to include in its national 
law the provisions contained in human rights treaties ratified by Iraqi. It further 
pledged to strive to investigate thoroughly all violations of human rights, especially 
allegations of torture; to strive to amend of national legislation in order to eliminate 
the death penalty; and to reduce the limitations imposed by national legislation, 
including those which gave impunity to the perpetrators of the crime of torture, who 
should be subjected to deterrent punishments.
227
   
                                                 
226
 Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, Iraq (16 February 2010) available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Highlights16February2010am.aspx> ; see also  
< http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/IQsession7.aspx> accessed 31 March 2012. 
227
 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review regarding 
Iraq is submitted to the UN General Assembly, (n 112) 23.  
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After the completion of the Universal Periodic Review, on Iraq, the government 
began to work expeditiously for the implementation of these recommendations. With 
that aim in mind, it was decided to hold a national conference and to invite reporters 
from the UN to visit Iraq in order to prepare a national plan to follow up the 
recommendations of the international community contained in the UPR.
228
 The 
international community was to finance projects in Iraq, to be conducted by the 
United Nations Office for Project Services. In addition to funding, the objective was 
to bring the UPR into the public consciousness and to encourage citizens’ 
participation in the UPR projects. These projects are intended to encourage in a 
variety of ways the building of Iraqi civil society organizations. In particular, they are 
seen as encouraging the efforts of NGOs to conduct their task of creating an improved 
civil rights environment in Iraq.  
 
Analysis and evaluation 
 
It has been argued in this chapter that, under Saddam’s regime, the rule of law was 
devastated by repression, corrupt policy and war, and that consequently the most vital 
task in the post-Saddam era Iraq is to rebuild a new society and to embed the rule of 
law as defined by the UN, thus distancing the country from its past. The chapter 
reviewed the many efforts made to match the benchmarks for the rule of law and for 
international human rights. It has considered the reforms that have been made 
regarding the criminal justice system, in the form of structural changes, (such as 
creating new bodies and institutions), and the reform, repeal and adoption of new 
laws. The discussion focused on human rights during criminal proceedings. It has 
demonstrated that improvements in the justice system are of paramount importance 
and that without them a successful transition from dictatorship to the rule of law will 
fail to take place.  
                                                 
228
 Wijdan Salim, Minister for Human Rights of Iraq, said that “a national conference would be held to 
discuss a draft road map for the implementation of the recommendations approved by Iraq ... the 
Government approach was moving towards rooting the rule of law and respect and protection of human 
rights through a number of measures based on human rights principles and included in the Constitution. 
The Governmental system had now become strong and capable enough to protect people from torture 
and involuntary disappearance and the Government had improved a number of procedural reforms.” 
quoted from the Minister’s speech before the Human Rights Council on 11 June 2010; at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents /Pages/ Display News .aspx?NewsID=10144&LangID=E> 
accessed 1 February 2012. 
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After the removal of the regime, fundamental reforms were made to the criminal 
justice system, and these have had a positive effect on the rule of law and the 
protection of human rights. The argument has focused on what has been made to 
entrench the rule of law in the area of human rights and criminal justice system. The 
argument has focused whether these reforms have been a complete success. The 
discussion leads us to the clear conclusion that, in contrast to the situation under the 
former regime, in which rights were not only violated, but were also enabled by the 
law, now respect for the human rights of the person under criminal proceedings is 
embodied in the Constitution. The new Iraqi Constitution theoretically provides 
guarantees for human rights. Steps have been taken to improve the judicial system in 
both its organization and its personnel, so that it is based on the rule of law, a 
condition that should be the objective aim of all good governance. In a major 
development, a notable attempt has been made to establish an independent judicial 
authority, and structural improvements have been applied to the courts and other 
criminal justice institutions. 
 
Most notably, the Federal Supreme Court (AlMahkamah AlAthadia AlUlya) has been 
created. This court plays a significant role in maintaining the rights of individuals by 
opposing legislation that conflicts with Constitutional human rights and freedoms, and 
by fostering a culture of law by creating a balance among the various state authorities. 
In addition, improvements have been made to the Department of Public Prosecution, 
investigating agencies and law enforcement bodies, such as the police. Attempts have 
also been made to address the systematic lack of protection for human rights in Iraq.  
The post-2003 reforms included the establishment of international and national 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights. At the national level these institutions 
have been established in order to support and promote a culture of human rights and 
to protect and deal with any violations of these rights. Most notable among these are 
the Ministry of Human Rights, the Commission on Human Rights of the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives, the High Commission for Human Rights, together with support 
for civil society and non-governmental organisations. At the international level, 
human rights organizations now closely monitor the human rights situation, and Iraq 
is also subject to regular reviews by UN member states under the auspices of the UN 
Human Rights Council. 
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In summary, the legal human rights of a person currently facing the criminal justice 
system are much more secure than in the days of the former regime. Returning, 
however, to the initial question as to whether the rule of law as defined by the UN has 
been achieved in Iraq, it is the author’s view that, despite the efforts made, the 
reforms to the new justice system have not fully achieved their aim. The arguments 
related to the new Constitution have revealed that, even if it is a significant move in 
the right direction, further changes are necessary if it is to assume a fully effective 
role in the new life of the country. It remains to be seen whether discussion and theory 
can be translated into the reality.  
 
There is also doubt as to whether the reforms have comprehensively redressed all the 
shortcomings of the legal framework and the structure of the courts. Further reform 
will be necessary for the improvement of justice in this respect. Similarly, debates 
concerning the accountability of the former regime have revealed further inadequacies 
in the reforms. Although the policy of holding the former regime to account is 
essential to the rule of law, the fairness of the trials themselves has been widely 
criticized by the international community, on the grounds that building a new nation is 
required to be on the basis of the rule of law rather on moving from one form of 
injustice to another. Furthermore, there are shortcomings in the investigative system 
and its personnel which require attention, but which are beyond the scope of these 
reforms. These will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
Finally, in spite of the fact that ambitious national and international projects have 
been implemented to establish mechanisms for monitoring and dealing with violations 
of human rights, serious obstacles stand in the path of improvement. The situation has 
been exacerbated by the fact that, although the Iraqi Permanent Constitution enabled 
the creation of the High Commission for Human Rights in 2005 as an independent 
mechanism for monitoring human rights violations, the Commission’s functions have 
been subject to long delay and many obstacles. 
 
Attempts to evaluate the success of reforms inevitably result in mixed conclusions. 
The scale of the problems facing the reform project in the context of a society 
undergoing major change needs to be acknowledged. The effectiveness of the reforms 
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is best measured by a consideration of specific questions regarding the extent to 
which these efforts have reflected international human rights standards. This research 
therefore will pursue this analysis in the following chapters by scrutinizing three pre- 
trial rights. These three rights are the right to liberty, third party access rights, and the 
right to be free from self-incrimination. They will be closely studied in terms of law 
and practice in order to establish whether international standards of justice have been 
attained in these areas.  
 
 90 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE REFORMED INVESTIGATIVE SYSTEM IN IRAQ 
 
Introduction 
 
The current study focuses on three rights during the pre-trial investigation stage, and a 
review of the investigative system in Iraq is necessary for an understanding of how 
that system works. Because the investigative system has a significant impact on the 
rights of persons under criminal investigation, an explanation of its workings will be 
necessary so as to form a basis for the analysis in subsequent chapters of these three 
identified rights of the accused person at the pre-trial stage. 
 
In the preceding chapter, the operation of criminal justice institutions - the police, 
public prosecutors, and investigating judges- all of which have been reformed, were 
assessed. The claim here is that, even though these reforms are deemed to be a step in 
the right direction, they fall significantly short. The present chapter endeavours to 
identify some of the deficiencies that have been overlooked by previous reviews of 
the processes of legal reform, and also to identify whether the system works in 
accordance with international human rights standards that are binding on Iraq. This is 
done with the aim of identifying opportunities for improvement in relation to the 
requirements of the UN’s broad definition of the rule of law.  
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview 
of procedural law in pre-trial investigations. The second section examines the role of 
the actors in the pre-trial criminal investigation within the Iraqi criminal justice 
system. Subsequent sections consider the determining of the end of the investigation 
stage and the general requirements for referring a case to trial. The concluding part 
reviews the entire Iraqi pre-trial investigation process. 
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3.1. Overview of pre-trial investigation 
 
According to the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure (ICCP), when a crime is allegedly 
committed criminal proceedings are initiated through the submission of an oral or 
written complaint, or by reports from several possible parties.
1
 It is stated that:   
 
“Criminal proceedings are initiated by means of an oral or written complaint 
submitted to an investigative judge, a [judicial] investigator, a policeman in 
charge of a police station, or any crime scene officer by an injured party, any 
person taking his place in law, or any person who knows that the crime has taken 
place. In addition any one of those listed can notify the Public Prosecution unless 
the law says otherwise. In the event of a witnessed offence the complaint may be 
submitted to whichever police officers or sub-officers are present.”2 
 
 
The public prosecution, victims or their representatives, or public officials may report 
the crime, as can any other persons who witness or become aware of an offence.
3
 
These witnesses may be exposed to legal liability if they do not report their 
knowledge of the offence to the authorities.
4
 A complaint or a report of an offence is 
reviewed by an investigating judge or judicial investigator. The investigating judge or 
judicial investigator instructs the police to initiate an investigation.
5
 Investigations 
undertaken by police conducted under supervision of the public prosecutor consist of 
several procedures.
6
 These include collecting evidence by such means as recording 
statements of the complainant and collecting relevant items in order to gather efficient 
                                                 
1
 See (Chart 1) bellow that includes overview of the process of pre-trial investigation stage. 
2
 ICCP, Article 1. The official English translation is available online at the homepage of the Global 
Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 28 
January 2014. 
ا يضاق ىلا مدقت ةيريرحت وا ةيوفش ىوكشب ةيئازجلا ىوعدلا كرحت{ نم يا وا ةطرشلا زكرم يف لوؤسم يا وا ققحملا وا قيقحتل
 وا اهعوقوب ملع صخش يا وا انوناق هماقم موقي نم وا ةميرجلا نم ررضتملا نم يئاضقلا طبضلا ءاضعارابخأب  نم مهنم يا ىلا مدقي
وهشملا مرجلا ةلاح يف ىوكشلا ميدقت زوجيو .كلذ فلاخ ىلع نوناقلا صني مل ام ماعلا ءاعدلاا طابض نم ارضاح نوكي نم ىلا د
}اهيضوفمو ةطرشلا 
3
 ICCP Articles 1, 47(a), 48; Article 2 of the Law of Public Prosecutor No 159 of 1979, published in 
the Official Gazette, issue 2716 on 16 January 1980. The official English translation of the law is 
available online at the homepage of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-
activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 28 January 2014. 
4
 Article 243 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969. The official English translation of the Code is 
available online at the homepage of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-
activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 28 January 2014. 
5
 ICCP, Article 49(a). 
6
 Police officers also, as will be discussed in the next pages, have power of investigation in accordance 
with situations under Articles 50 and 52 of the ICCP. 
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information about the alleged crime.
7
 These procedures are required to be recorded 
and brought to the investigating judge.
8
 
 
 All of the information gathered by the police and the public prosecutor must be 
reported without delay to the investigating judge in a “dossier.” The case will be 
verified by the investigating judge who, after checking the collected information and 
evidence, will determine whether to proceed or, if there is insufficient evidence that a 
criminal offence has occurred, to terminate the proceedings. In the case of the former, 
investigative measures can be taken by the investigating judge or other parties under 
his direction and control (police officers and judicial investigators). Initially, it is not 
necessary to open the investigation against a specific person. Given that an offence 
has been committed it is not necessary to identify offender at this early stage of the 
proceedings. In cases where a specific person is suspect, the investigating judge may 
either issue a summons to the person under investigation as a suspect, or order an 
arrest warrant if there is probative evidence to reinforce the suspicion against the 
person who is being complained about.
9
 All steps that are taken during the 
investigation must be recorded in the “dossier”. 
 
During this procedure, the person under investigation, otherwise known as the 
‘accused,’ is held at, or is required to report to, a police station. This process can be 
voluntary or through the implementation of an arrest warrant by the police. The 
investigator in police station takes the accused’s statement regarding the accusation.10 
As will be discussed later in this thesis, access to legal assistance at police station 
remains an obstacle in practice, particularly in the case of more vulnerable citizens.
11
  
 
Upon completion of the initial investigations, the whole dossier is submitted to a 
competent investigating judge. The accused is brought before the investigating judge, 
in the presence of a lawyer.
12
 If the accused cannot afford a lawyer, then the 
investigating judge will assign a lawyer at public expense.
13
 During this phase of the 
                                                 
7
 ICCP, Article 43. 
8
 ICCP, Article 43. 
9
 ICCP, Articles 87, 92. 
10
 ICCP, Article 97. 
11
 See discussions about right of access to a lawyer in Chapter Five.  
12
 ICCP, Article 123. 
13
 ICCP, Article 123. 
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proceedings, investigating judge decides whether to release the accused, with or 
without bail.
14
 The accused could be released on bail based on a collateral term 
decided by the judge. Bail conditions, however, are determined by the gravity and the 
circumstances of the accusation.
15
 Alternatively, the judge may order the detention of 
the accused for a period not exceeding fifteen days (this time frame may be reviewed 
fortnightly).
16
 The judge also determines the decisions that are deemed necessary to 
complete the investigation. 
 
It should be noted that Iraqi law authorizes mandatory investigation only in felony 
cases, such as murder and manslaughter, and misdemeanour offences, such as traffic 
offences. In minor offences (infractions), the investigation is discretionary, unless the 
judge decides that there should be compensation or a return of assets.
17
 Accordingly, 
the ICCP states, “the investigative judge must make an immediate decision on 
infraction cases in which there is no claim for compensation or return of property, 
without taking a decision to transfer the case to the Court of Misdemeanour.”18 In this 
matter, it seems Iraqi law empowers the same agency to be investigator, accuser and 
judge.  
 
It must be recognised that, when the role of an investigating judge shifts to that of a 
judge in the actual trial of the same case he has already dealt with, this situation is not 
in line with the principle of impartiality and independence of the judiciary under the 
Iraqi Permanent Constitution and international law.
19
 The function of investigation 
and prosecution must be independent of the authority that decides the matter on its 
                                                 
14
 ICCP, Articles 109, 110. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 ICCP, Article 134; According to the Iraqi Penal Code, Article 27 an infraction is “an offence 
punishable by one of the following penalties: Detention for a period of between 24 hours and 3 
months.”  
 اهيلع بقاعملا ةميرجلا يه ةفلاخملا{ىدحإب نيرشعو عبرا ةدمل طيسبلا سبحلا :نيتيلاتلا نيتبوقعلا }رهشا ةثلاث ىلا ةعاس  
18
 ICCP, Article 134.  
 ارارق ذختي نا نود لاملا درب وا ،ضيوعتلاب بلط اهيف عقي مل يتلا تافلاخملا مئارج يف اروف لصفي نا ،قيقحتلا يضاق ىلع{اهتلاحإب 
}حنجلا ةمكحم ىلع 
19
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 19(6) “Every individual has the right to be treated in 
a just manner in all judicial and administrative procedures.” The official translation in English is 
available online at the homepage of the Iraqi government at <http://www.cabinet.iq/default.aspx> 
accessed 20 November 2013.  }ةيرادلااو ةيئاضقلا تاءارجلاا يف ةلداع ةلماعم لماعي نأ يف قحلا درف لكل{  
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merits.
20
 The HRC recognises that “judges must not harbour preconceptions about the 
matter put before them.”21 This is therefore a problem.22 
 
At the end of the pre-trial investigation stage, the investigating judge hears the 
accused, the allegation of the complainant and the testimony of the witness or 
witnesses, and examines the experts’ reports.23 If there is insufficient evidence to send 
the accused to trial, the judge releases the accused person.
24
 Otherwise, if the 
investigating judge finds there is a prima facie evidence to send the case to trial, the 
accused will be referred to a competent court, either a felony court or a misdemeanour 
court.
25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Arvo O. Karttunen v Finland UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (387/1989) 23 
October 1992 para 7.2.   
21
 Ibid. 
22
 It should be noted that in France, another country following the civil law model, the French Code of 
Criminal Procedure guarantees “a separation between those authorities responsible for prosecuting and 
those responsible for judging.” The French Code of Criminal Procedure, preliminary Article, inserted 
by Law n° 2000-516 of 15 June 2000 Article 1 Official Journal of 16 June 2000; see also Article 49 of 
French Code of Criminal Procedure in which the investigating judge is explicitly prohibited from 
judging the case, which he already dealt with as investigating judge, it states “he may not take part in 
the trial of the criminal cases he dealt with in his capacity as investigating judge, under penalty of 
nullity.”    
23
 ICCP, Articles 47, 58, 69. 
24
 ICCP, Article 130.  
25
 Ibid. 
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(1) A complaint is filed
26
    
 
 
 
                                                                                       
                                          (2) Gathering of evidence and police investigations
27
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(3) The investigating judge 
28
                                        proceeding terminated  
   
 
 
                                                                                         
 
  
                                                                                    Start of judicial process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) Finally, an investigating judge’s hearing (decides whether to send a case to trial or 
to close it.
29
 
                                                                                   
 
 
                 (Chart 1) overview of the process of the pre-trial investigation  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 The criminal case is opened by reporting a crime or a complaint, from the victim, law enforcement 
officials or public prosecutor or others. 
27
 Police and civilian support staff investigate criminal offences under the supervision of the public 
prosecutor and then pass the information and evidence to the investigating judge. Police officers also 
have power of investigation in accordance with situations under Articles 50 and 52 of the ICCP.   
28
 The investigating judge verifies the case either to terminate proceedings or to complete the 
investigations that should be carried out under his control. 
29
 Finally, an investigating judge’s hearing takes place inside his office at the Investigation Court. 
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3.2. The relevant investigative authorities 
 
Criminal investigations in Iraq during the pre-trial stage are mainly conducted by 
investigating judges, who are granted wide authority commensurate with such a 
significant duty. This is in contrast to the lesser authority given to the public 
prosecutor, who nonetheless has exceptional powers to conduct investigations at a 
crime scene.
30
 Also, under the direction of the investigating judge, the police have a 
crucial role in undertaking investigative measures at the earliest stage of the 
proceedings and later under the order of the investigating judge. In addition, the ICCP 
enables police to act without the direction of the investigating judge in urgent cases.
31
 
There are also judicial investigators who conduct investigations under the control and 
direction of the investigating judge.
32
   
 
3.2.1. Investigations conducted by the Police 
 
Once an offence occurs, the law enables police officers or civilian support staff to 
gather evidence under the supervision of the public prosecutor and the control of the 
investigating judge.
33
 Crime scene officers carry out evidence collection at this stage 
and must report all information to the investigating judge promptly.
34
 The ICCP 
includes general references to the procedures that need to be carried out by police in 
order to fulfil their duty prior to the start of judicial involvement, without prescribing 
particular actions appropriate to this stage of the proceedings. What can be derived 
from the words of the ICCP is that crime scene officers are to use all possible means 
to preserve evidence of an offence.
35
 In some cases, particularly in cases where the 
offence is of a flagrante delicto character, they have broad powers of questioning, 
                                                 
30
 The Public Prosecutors Law, Article 3. 
31
 ICCP, Articles 50, 52. 
32
 ICCP, Article 51. 
33
 ICCP, Article 40; The supervision of law enforcement officials is not feasible on the basis that there 
are no provisions in Iraqi law by which disciplinary sanctions can be imposed by the public prosecutor 
or the investigating judge against law enforcement officers in cases of neglect of duty.   
34
 ICCP, Article 41. 
35
 ICCP, Article 42 stated that “Crime scene officers are required to use all possible means to preserve 
evidence of an offence” 
}ةميرجلا ةلدا ىلع ةظفاحملا لفكت يتلا لئاسولا عيمج اوذختي نا يئاضقلا طبضلا ءاضعا ىلع{ 
 97 
 
arrest and search for the purpose of combatting crime and bringing offenders to 
justice.
36
  
 
In case the offence is not flagrante delicto, these broad powers under Iraqi law are 
normally delegated to the judicial authority (the judicial authority at the pre-trial stage 
consists of an investigating judge and a judicial investigator), which has responsibility 
for conducting investigations in the second stage of proceedings after collection of 
evidence by a crime scene officer.
37
 In particular, the innovations of 2005 introduced 
under the Iraqi Permanent Constitution clearly confirm that the judicial authority is 
the sole authority entitled to direct the investigation and to prescribe detention.
38
 The 
Constitution states that 
“Every individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty. Deprivation or 
restriction of these rights is prohibited except in accordance with the law and 
based on a decision issued by a competent judicial authority.”
39
  
 
“A. Unlawful detention shall be prohibited. B. Imprisonment or detention shall 
be prohibited in places not designed for these purposes, pursuant to prison laws 
covering health and social care, and subject to the authorities of the State.”
40
 
 
 “No person may be kept in custody or investigated except according to a judicial 
decision”
41
 
 
However, unlike the situation under the Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, the role of 
the police in pre-trial criminal investigations under the ICCP demonstrates that they 
not only have the powers to collect evidence about alleged and discovered offences; 
they are also empowered to investigate cases.
42
 When a crime is reported they are 
empowered to investigate cases at initial stage of proceedings before bringing a 
person under investigation before investigating judge.
43
 Thus, under the ICCP the 
                                                 
36
 ICCP, Articles 49, 43. Police powers of arrest will be discussed at length in Chapter Four; ICCP, 
Articles 43, 44, 103. 
37
 Law enforcement officials are given more power, such as questioning, an arrest and searching of 
persons, in cases where the offence is flagrante delicto. See ICCP, Articles 43, 44, 102. 
38
 Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Articles 37(b). 
39
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 15; see also the ICCP, Article 92.  
 نم رداص رارق ىلع ًءانبو ،نوناقلل ًاقفو لاإ اهدييقت وأ قوقحلا هذه نم نامرحلا زوجيلاو ،ةيرحلاو نملأاو ةايحلا يف قحلا درف لكل{
}ةصتخم ةيئاضق ةهج 
40
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 19 (12).  
لاا ريغ يف فيقوتلا وأ سبحلا زوجي لا ـ ب .زجحلا رظحي ـأ{ ةيحصلا ةياعرلاب ةلومشملا نوجسلا نيناوقل اقفو كلذل ةصصخملا نكام
}ةلودلا تاطلسل ةعضاخلاو ةيعامتجلااو 
41
 Ibid, Article 37.  {}يئاضق رارق بجومب لاا هعم قيقحتلا وأ دحا فيقوت زوجي لا  
42
 ICCP, Articles 49, 50, 52; also see power of police regarding an arrest under Articles, 41, 102 and 
103. 
43
 Ibid. 
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police officers serve as one of the three criminal investigation authorities during the 
pre-trial stage, the other two authorities being the judicial investigator and the 
investigating judge. The question is whether such power of investigation given to 
police officers is in line with the principles of human rights.  
 
In this respect, it is clear that the investigation of criminal cases in many jurisdictions 
is delegated to the police. However this practice seems to be particularly prevalent in 
countries operating a common law system. In the context of Iraq, responsibility for 
the investigation of criminal cases lies with the investigating judges or with [judicial] 
investigators. The ICCP provides that “The initial investigation shall be conducted by 
investigative judges or by [judicial] investigators acting under the supervision of 
investigative judges.”44 Despite this, the power of police officers including arrest, 
search and questioning has caused a clear effect on individuals’ rights.  
 
The ICCP differs from the Codes of other civil law countries in providing the police 
with wide powers in this area. For example, in many Arab countries under 
inquisitorial systems, such as Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, in which the task of 
investigation is given either to investigating judges or public prosecutors, the police 
are barred by explicit rules from interrogating the accused person under any 
circumstances.  They do not have the authority to do so even if they are delegated by 
the investigative authority to conduct some acts of investigation in specific 
situations.
45
 As a general rule, the, restriction of freedom outside flagrante delicto by 
arresting, searching, and detaining individuals is prohibited at this stage of 
proceedings and a crime scene officer must use only limited powers in collecting 
information.  
 
Egyptian law, for example, empowers police officers to restrict the freedom of 
persons under investigation by means of temporary detention (less than 24 hours) in 
order to prevent them from absconding prior to the involvement of the investigative 
authority and the acquisition of a warrant of arrest.
46
 Even these legal provisions, 
which provide a very limited power of arrest, were deemed unconstitutional when the 
                                                 
44
 ICCP, 51.  }قيقحتلا ةاضق فارشا تحت نوققحملا كلذكو قيقحتلا ةاضق يئادتبلاا قيقحتلا ىلوتي{  
45
 The Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 70; the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Article 55. The Bahraini Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 85. 
46 The Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 35. 
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Egyptian Court of Cassation, pursuant of its duty to review unconstitutional legal 
texts, decided that this sort of temporary detention outside the scope of flagrante 
delicto was contrary to the Article 41 of the Egyptian Constitution, and that those 
provisions were therefore unconstitutional.
47
  
 
In Iraq the ICCP empowers police officers even outside the scope of flagrante delicto 
to conduct the investigation without the need to obtain permission from the judicial 
investigator or the investigating judge or even to notify them of the matter.
48
 As such, 
the provisions of Article 50 give police officers, including those who have no 
investigator’s qualification, the authority to conduct the investigation and to question 
the accused person: this in turn undermines the provisions of Article 51 of the ICCP.   
 
The fact is that despite Article 51 of the ICCP classifies investigation as a judicial 
function; police officers are empowered to conduct investigations and to question the 
accused person at an early stage of proceedings before judicial process. At the same 
time, the police can compel a person under investigation to come to a police station, 
or to be held there, pending the completion of investigation proceedings, without a 
warrant being issued by an investigating judge. Confessions of accused persons which 
are often happen at this stage of the proceedings are much relied upon to base 
convictions.
49
 
 
Article 50 empowers a police officer to undertake the investigative function into any 
offence in cases if “he considers that referring the informant to an investigative judge 
or [judicial] investigator would delay necessary action and result in evidence of the 
offence being destroyed or lost, the course of the investigation being impaired or the 
                                                 
47
 The Egyptian Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Niked), Case number 3294/63 on 15 February 1995; 
Ahmad Lutfi Alsaid, Procedural Legitimacy and Human Rights (2004, Law School, University of 
Mansoura) 114.   ةروصنملا ةعماج  قوقحلا ةيلك( ناسنلاا قوقحو ةيئارجلاا ةيعرشلا ,ديسلا يفطل دمحأ{4002 ص )002}  
48
 ICCP, Articles 50. 
49
 Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Tamyeez AlAthadia), Case number 505, General Commission on 
24/5/2010}ةيداحتلاا زييمتلا ةمكحم{; Central Criminal Court, (Almahkama Aljnia Almrkzya aliraqia) 
Baghdad, Second Branch, Case number 891 of 2009. Referred to by Amnesty International, Iraq: A 
Decade of Abuses (Index: MDE 14/001/2013, March 2013) 55, 56.   }ةيزكرملا ةيئانجلا ةمكحملا{  
Central Criminal Court, (Almahkama Aljnia Almrkzya aliraqia) Baghdad, Third Branch, Case number 
2082 of 2012. Referred to by Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (Index: MDE 
14/001/2013, March 2013) 55, 56.  }ةيزكرملا ةيئانجلا ةمكحملا{ Similarly, about past practice during Saddam 
era see Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Tamyeez), Case number 641/Cassation/ 78 on 30/5/1978. 
}زييمتلا ةمكحم{ 
 100 
 
suspect fleeing.”50 In addition, the second paragraph of Article 50 authorizes police 
officers to conduct investigations into any offence in cases where an authorisation has 
been issued by the investigating judge or judicial investigator; and a person under 
investigation may also be subject to the police force throughout pre-trial detention 
when a police officer delegated by the investigating judge conducts a particular action 
on the latter’s behalf.51 In these cases, the investigation conducted by the police has 
the same legality as the inquiry of a judicial authority. This gives law enforcement 
officials the powers to arrest, search, and question accused persons without 
authorization, even though such power lies outside their jurisdiction.
52
 
 
These broad circumstances are used by police to arrest, search and question persons 
under investigation even without prior direction from an investigating judge.
53
 Some 
authors have pointed out that, according to the accounts of investigating judges, law 
enforcement officials in the new justice system are, as in the past, able in practice to 
invoke any excuse to conduct the investigation, even without being previously 
delegated by the investigating authority.
54
 Investigating judge Al-Zaidi reported that 
in practice the police commonly conduct criminal investigations and that this 
exception under Article 50 has become the norm, rather than the exception.
55
 
 
It is worth mentioning here that this situation in the Iraqi system is created by 
legislation, which elevates police officers to the rank of judicial investigators and 
                                                 
50
 ICCP, Article 50(a). 
ا نا دقتعا اذا وا ققحملا وا قيقحتلا يضاق نم رما هيلا ردص اذا ةميرج ةيا يف قيقحتلاب ةطرشلا زكرم يف لوؤسملا موقي{ ربخملا ةلاح
} مهتملا بره وا قيقحتلا ريسب رارضلاا وا ةميرجلا ملاعم عايض ىلا يدؤي امم تاءارجلاا هب رخؤت ققحملا وا يضاقلا ىلع 
51
 Similarly see ICCP, Article 52(1). 
52
 From a brief study of the laws of Arab states adhering to the civil law system, it seems unique to Iraq 
that such a wide power is given to the law enforcement officials in criminal proceedings. (See Egyptian 
Code of Criminal Procedure 1950, Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure, Jordan Code of Criminal 
Procedure, Lebanon Criminal Proceedings Code 1950, United Arab Emirates Criminal Procedure Code 
1992, Oman Criminal Procedure Code 1999, Bahraini Code of Criminal Procedure 2002).  
53
 ICCP, Article 50. 
54
 Ahmed Alaa Eldin Hussein, Aides of A Judicial Investigator, Published research on the official page 
of the Iraqi judiciary <http://www.iraqja.iq/view.1885> accessed 4 November 2013;  
 ص , ةيداحتلاا ةيئاضقلا ةطلسلل ةيمسرلا ةحفصلا ىلع روشنم ثحب ,يئاضقلا ققحملا ناوعا ,نيسح نيدلا ءلاع دمحا{9,00}  
Kadhim Abd Jassim al-Zaidi, “The Role of the Police in Criminal Investigation” Iraqi Newspaper 
Justice Al-Adala (Baghdad, 27 September 2007) 0333, available at 
<http://www.aladalanews.net/index.php?show=news&action=article&id=30521> accessed 21 
November 2013. 
  ةيقارعلا ةلادعلا ةديرج ,يئانجلا قيقحتلا يف ةطرشلا رود ,يديزلا مساج دبع مظاك{43 ( لوليا4003 )0333}  
55
 Ibid. 
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allows them to conduct investigation in accordance with Article 51 of the ICCP.
56
 In 
this instance, it is assumed that a police officer is acting as a judicial investigator 
under the ultimate control of the investigating and became under the management of 
the courts, while other police officers are under the administration of the Ministry of 
Interior. The cause for concern with regard to Article 50 of the ICCP is that a police 
officer is empowered to investigate criminal cases without an order or instruction 
from a judicial authority or ranked to the status of a judicial investigator.
57
 
 
In this context, it can be argued that the criminal investigation is one of the core 
functions in a legal system. Thus, persons capable of conducting criminal 
investigations must have the minimum level of educational qualification and training. 
The task also requires expertise, a background knowledge of law and forensic science, 
and an awareness of ethical standards and human rights.
58
 The provisions under 
Article 50 seem to neglect these requirements, as they give an investigative capacity 
to police officers who are not elevated to the position of judicial investigator as 
required by Article 51 of the ICCP and who have not undergone the training 
necessary for the conduct of a criminal investigation.  
 
Of course, police officers in many countries conduct criminal investigations; however, 
the circumstances in Iraq are different. In Iraq, the police handling criminal 
                                                 
56
 ICCP, Article 51 states that:  
“E. The [judicial] investigator shall be appointed by order from the Ministry of Justice, provided he 
possesses a recognized qualification in law or holds a recognized diploma from the legal department of 
the technical institutes. Police officers and sub-officers
 
and legal officers of the Ministry of Justice may 
be granted the powers of a [judicial] investigator by order from the Minister of Justice.
 
 
F. No [judicial] investigator may perform the functions of his office for the first time unless he has 
passed a special course of the Judicial Institute of no less than three months if he obtained a recognized 
law degree or no less than a full calendar year if he holds a recognized diploma from the legal 
department of the technical institutes and he has sworn the following oath before the President of the 
Court of Appeal: ‘I swear by Almighty God that I shall perform the functions of my office with justice 
and shall apply the law faithfully” pursuant to CPA Memorandum 12, Section 7 published in the 
Official Gazette, issue 3985 of 1 July 2004 , the term Minister of Justice in this Article is replaced with 
the High Judicial Council. The original text is in the English language, and the official translation in 
Arabic is available in the Official Gazette, issue 3985 of 1 July 2004. 
د{- هش ىلع لاصاح وا اهب فرتعم نوناقلا يف ةداهش ىلع لاصاح نوكي نا ىلع لدعلا ريزو نم رمأب ققحملا نيعي ةرادلاا مولبد ةدا
 نم رمأب ققحم ةطلس نيينوناقلا نم لدعلا ةرازو يفظومو اهيضوفمو ةطرشلا طابض حنم زوجيو ،ةينفلا دهاعملا ةئيه نم ةينوناقلا
و .لدعلا ريزو-رهشا ةثلاث نع اهتدم لقت لا يئاضقلا دهعملا يف ةصاخ ةرود هزايتجا دعب لاا ةرم لولأ هتفيظو لامعا ققحملا سرامي لا 
 ةينوناقلا ةرادلاا يف مولبد ةداهش ىلع لاصاح ناك اذا ةلماك ةيميوقت ةنس نع لقت لاو اهب فرتعم نوناقلا يف ةداهش ىلع لاصاح ناك اذا
 نيناوقلا قبطاو لدعلاب يتفيظو لامعا يدؤا نا للهاب مسقا" ةيتلاا نيميلا فانئتسلاا ةمكحم سيئر ماما هفلحو ةينفلا دهاعملا ةئيه نم
ةنامأب}"  
57
 ICCP, Article 50.  
58
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Standards and 
Practice for the Police Expanded Pocket Book on Human Rights for the Police (United Nations, New 
York and Geneva 2004). 
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investigations are inadequately supervised and their investigations are marked by the 
failure to maintain even minimal standards. The Iraqi justice system has over a long 
period struggled to meet the necessary standards regarding the protection of citizens’ 
rights. Human rights reports have shown that police personnel in Iraq use coercive 
means (torture) to obtain evidence of criminal offences, and that courts do not, as they 
should, reject their admissibility.
59
  
 
In annual reports compiled by the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, it has been 
conceded that the Iraqi police use coercive means to obtain testimonial evidence from 
accused persons.
60
 Moreover, these reports highlighted the negative consequences of 
police investigative powers upon citizens’ human rights.  Many cases of police ill-
treatment or torture in the course of investigations have been reported.
61
 The loophole 
in the legal framework has been exploited, and the fact is that procedural safeguards 
are often violated by the police during the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings. 
This view was echoed by the UN Human Rights Office in Baghdad. UNAMI (2012) 
drew Iraq authorities’ attention to the implications of Article 50 in relation to the 
protection of accused persons’ rights. It stated that a “part of the problem is Article 50 
… investigation should be undertaken by judicial officers directly who are properly 
educated and experienced”62  
 
In the light of this situation, the author’s proposal to the Iraqi legislature is that the 
function of investigation should be entrusted solely to competent criminal justice 
personnel from the judicial authority – the judicial investigator and the investigating 
judge. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the reform of criminal justice 
system recognises three rights under consideration only in judicial process when a 
person under investigation is brought before judicial authority. In contrast, these 
                                                 
59
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Bagdad, January 2011) 18; Reports of International NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International; the Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the 
Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Rights Reports يونسلا ريرقتلا  زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ
 ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو زاجتحلاا-  - dating to between 2004 and 2013. 
60
 The Annual Report of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Report,  يونسلا ريرقتلا  ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ  
(Baghdad, 2008) 74; see also Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (n 49) 42, 37. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, January 2012) 5. 
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rights are equally overlooked during investigations carried out by police officers at 
time of arrest or in the police station.  
  
This study further suggests a review of the clause under Article 50, which seems to 
pose the challenges observed above. Iraq police should not be empowered to act alone 
in obtaining evidence against persons under criminal investigation. The suggestion is 
made with a view to curtailing or reducing brutality and excessive use of power on the 
part of the police.  
 
In a similar vein, the mechanisms of the initial investigation proceedings need to be 
overhauled and criminal investigations need to be carried out by a competent judicial 
authority. In essence, the powers of law enforcement officers in relation to criminal 
investigation should be closely monitored and restricted. Arguably, one of the ways 
through which the three due process rights of an accused person can be safeguarded is 
by ensuring that criminal investigation proceedings are handled by competent judicial 
investigators and investigating judges, rather than by police officers. It is also 
important that police power efficiently controlled and supervised by judicial 
authority.
63
 
 
3.2.2. Public prosecution  
 
It was explained in Chapter Two that the public prosecutor was previously 
subordinate to the executive authority and did not enjoy equal rights with judges, 
including the right to payment. A process of reform was started in 2003 to bring the 
Iraqi system in line with the international human rights obligations. The consequences 
of this reform with regard to public prosecutors are that members of the public 
prosecutors’ service became fully freed from the influence of the executive authority 
and enjoy the same privileges as professional judges. In other words, in post-Saddam 
Iraq, having become members of the judiciary they enjoy the same level of autonomy 
and rights as judges.
64
 However, the outcome of this change does not impact on their 
role in criminal procedure.   
 
                                                 
63
 The Annual Report of Prisons and Detention Facilities, 2008, (n 60) 74 
64
 See Chapter Two. 
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From the outset it should be noted that one of the important characteristics of the 
office of public prosecutor is to defend the interests of justice and to act as the 
guardian of society. Accordingly, whenever a crime has been committed the function 
of the public prosecutor within the criminal justice system is to present the complaint 
against the perpetrator.
65
 In this regard, it is for the public prosecutor to decide, in the 
light of his responsibility to serve the public interest, whether or not to submit the 
complaint. Additionally, in accordance with Article 7 of the Public Prosecutor Law, it 
is the duty of the public prosecutor to consider and follow-up citizens’ complaints and 
to present them to a court on behalf of society.  
 
It must be understood that, although lodging suits of general rights and following up 
citizens’ complaints are the functions of public prosecutors, this does not mean that 
they constantly act against accused persons throughout the criminal proceedings and 
seek conviction at the trial stage. Conversely, their first responsibility in the Iraqi 
criminal system is to serve the interests of society and to secure justice either by 
assuring a conviction or by supporting the accused person.  Given that they act on 
behalf of society, it is not surprising that, in accordance with their own findings in the 
case, they sometimes oppose the findings of judges and support the accused person, 
either before the Investigating Court (the judicial investigator and the investigating 
judge) or during trial. This is possible if there are insufficient grounds for the 
accusation. Hence they may decline the accusation and demand from the court the 
release of the accused in the interests of justice; or alternatively they may incline to 
demand that the courts take appropriate action against the accused person. In such 
instances, if the response of the court is negative they may decide to initiate their own 
action by appealing against the decision of the court.   
 
The above is not a complete account of the role of the public prosecutor in the 
criminal justice system. Even though the public prosecutor is not the investigative 
authority and has no role with regard to referring accused persons to trial, since this 
belongs to the jurisdiction of the investigating judges after the final pre-trial 
investigation, he is given a significant role in criminal proceedings at the pre-trial 
stage. At the initial stage of the proceedings the criminal inquiries are conducted 
                                                 
65
 The Public Prosecutors Law, Article 2; ICCP, Article 1. 
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under his monitorship.
66
 Likewise, the duty of law enforcement officials when a crime 
is suspected and during the evidence collection stage is carried out under his 
supervision.
67
  
 
During the preliminary investigation of criminal cases under Iraqi law, the public 
prosecutor does not normally exercise the task of  investigation, since the latter is 
under the jurisdiction of the investigating judge, but he may do so on an exceptional 
basis, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Public Prosecution Law.
68
 
Also, the role of the public prosecutor is limited according to the inquisitorial nature 
of the Iraqi criminal justice system to overseeing the work of the investigators and 
monitoring the decisions taken by the investigating judge.  
 
In this context, it should be asked whether or not Article 3 of the Public Prosecutor 
Law, which enables the public prosecution to carry out an exceptional investigation, is 
compliant with the inquisitorial nature of the Iraqi criminal justice system.  
 
In view of its shortcomings, Article 3 of the Public Prosecutor Law needs to be 
annulled or to undergo corrective measures. It is self-evident that a complainant who 
is empowered to accuse by submitting a complaint and initiating criminal proceedings 
should be disqualified from carrying out an investigation, owing to a conflict of 
interests. On the one hand, the power of investigation given to the public prosecutor at 
the crime scene terminates with the arrival of the investigating judge.  For this reason, 
such power is limited. On the other hand, for the public prosecutor to discharge his 
role properly, there should be separation between the powers of accusation and those 
of investigation. In particular, it must be remembered that, according to the provisions 
of Article 3, the investigating judge may request the public prosecutor to continue the 
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 The Public Prosecutors Law, Article 2. 
67
 ICCP, Article 40; the Public Prosecutors Law, Article 35(3). 
68
 The Public Prosecutors Law, Article 3 states that “Members of the Public Prosecution shall exercise 
the power of an investigative judge, in his absence at the crime scene, but this power shall be removed 
upon the arrival of the competent investigative judge, unless he is asked to continue in part or whole 
the investigation he has started.” The official translation in English is available online at the homepage 
of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> 
accessed 27 February 2014. 
 يضاق روضح دنع ،هنع ةيحلاصلا كلت لوزتو ،هبايغ دنع ،ثداحلا ناكم يف قيقحتلا يضاق ةيحلاص ،ماعلا ءاعدلاا وضع سرامي{
}هب مايقلا ىلوت اميف اضعب وا لاك قيقحتلا ةلصاوم هيلا بلطي مل ام ،صتخملا قيقحتلا 
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process of investigation.
69
 It could be argued that an investigation being conducted by 
the public prosecutor, even under exceptional circumstances, raises doubts about the 
fairness of the proceedings. To say otherwise would be to deny the prosecutor’s 
responsibility to act as a complainant on behalf of the whole Iraqi people, his function 
as a member of a supervisory body and his duty with regard to monitoring the 
legitimacy of the proceedings. 
 
Initiation of the complaint against the accused person at the initial stage of 
proceedings presents a conflict of interest with the task of investigation. This is 
because the investigation must seek the truth through the collection of evidence both 
for and against the accused person. By contrast, the complainant usually looks for 
evidence against the person accused. Hence, the cause for concern in the present 
context is that combining the authorities of investigation and accusation in a single 
agency is likely to damage the impartiality required from the investigating authority. 
 
Consequently, in the view of the present author, Article 3 of the Public Prosecutor 
Law is not practical. Iraqi law is certainly at fault with regard to the provision enacted 
under Article 3 of the Public Prosecutors Law, which empowers the public prosecutor 
rather than the investigating judge to conduct the investigation, and it is particularly at 
fault with regard to the provisions which empower the public prosecutor to continue 
the investigation process when requested by the investigating judge. It follows that a 
change in the law is necessary in order to reform such a defect and to avoid the 
conflict between the function of public prosecution and the function of conducting 
investigations, particularly given the existence of an investigating judge who is the 
competent authority of investigation.  
 
3.2.3. The investigating judge and the judicial investigator  
 
In the Iraqi criminal justice system the duty of conducting an investigation is vested in 
the investigating judge, whose role dominates the pre-trial stage. In this respect, the 
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Iraqi legal tradition is like most countries with a civil law system, in that the 
investigating judge represents the interests of justice.
70
  
 
Once a criminal offence has been committed, there is a duty on the part of the 
investigating judge to evaluate the available information and facts collected by police 
and the public prosecutor in order to initiate a formal investigation. The initiation of 
the investigation should be predicated on the assumption that there is a reasonable 
suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed.  
 
For the purpose of fulfilling the duty to trace all relevant evidence, the investigating 
judge, after initiating the investigation, is empowered to interrogate an accused 
person, to question victims or other persons, to hear the testimony of witnesses, to 
consider forensic or other non-testimonial evidence and to use other coercive powers 
such as those of arrest, detention, seizure, and search. These processes lead to the 
creation of a dossier and finally to a decision as whether or not to take the case 
forward and send the accused person to trial.
71
 
 
 At this stage of judicial proceedings, in order to combat excessive use of pre-trial 
detention, it may well be that, as under the provisions of French law, the functions of 
investigating and detaining the person under investigation must be independent of 
each other. In the Iraqi criminal process, as in the French Criminal Procedure Code, 
there are two phases of the pre-trial investigation, the police phase and the judicial 
phase. In the police phase, the latter have a significant role in conducting inquiries in 
order to obtain the evidence necessary to determine the truth. The judicial phase 
determines whether the case will be referred to trial or closed. However, in contrast to 
Iraqi law, during the judicial inquiry stage of the French system, the investigative 
judge conducting the investigation is not empowered to detain a suspect. Rather, the 
investigating judge needs to refer this order to be determined by another judge, called 
“the liberty and custody judge”, and only this judge is empowered to make the 
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decision about pre-trial detention, and does so in the light of the requirements of each 
case, and at his own discretion.
72
  
 
Law 2000-516 of 15 June 2000, Article 48 of the French Criminal Procedure Code 
added a significant reform to the pre-trial investigation stage through the creation in 
France of a Liberty and Custody judge, (JLD). The parliamentary report on the reform 
emphasized that  
“The JLD was created precisely to add a second pair of eyes to the procedure, 
including incriminating and exculpatory elements, and not just to perform a 
simple juridical verification with respect to the criteria for remanding into 
detention.”73 
 
 According to Human Rights Watch the French model of “the liberty and custody 
judge” as part of the investigation process constitutes “an important improvement and 
a critical safeguard against arbitrary detention.”74 
 
In the light of the present research, it can be asserted that this French innovation 
would be a useful addition to the Iraqi investigative system. Even though it is true that 
an investigating judge and a judge who has been delegated the duty to decide on the 
matter of detention belong to the same institution, transferring the power of detention 
to a specialist judge would result in increased respect for the concept of the 
presumption of innocence. This improves the safeguards of a person under 
investigation and renders the competent authority of detention independent of both the 
prosecution and the investigation authority, allowing the question of detention to be 
decided with all the necessary discretion and circumspection.  
 
Most importantly, Article 51 of the ICCP provides that “the initial investigation shall 
be conducted by investigative judges or by [judicial] investigators acting under the 
supervision of investigative judges.” In light of this provision, it could be deemed a 
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defect in the Iraqi criminal justice system that, in practice, law enforcement officials 
are often given a broad authority to conduct preliminary proceedings at the 
investigation stage. This is defective because, according to the provisions described, 
the authority of the police to conduct an investigation is given only in exceptional 
circumstances. The correct procedure according to the ICCP is that the investigating 
judge has the primary duty to conduct the investigation, although judicial 
investigators under his control are also given this authority at the pre-trial stage.   
 
It could be stated here that the cause for concern in the current Iraqi criminal justice 
system is the lack of procedural safeguards for a person under arrest during police 
questioning. Thus, the first concern must be that significant safeguards are in place 
during questioning conducted by police. The second concern is that the practice of 
investigations conducted by police is widespread, whereas it should be uncommon 
and permitted only in exceptional situations. Over the last ten years, independent 
reports on human rights have described widespread violence against persons under 
police investigation, and it has become apparent that supervision from the judicial 
authority and public prosecutors has not been adequate in this respect. Consequently, 
the provision of a sufficient number of judicial investigators, along with a number of 
extra procedural safeguards, are of particular importance for dealing with violence 
against individuals during the initial stage of the proceedings of the criminal justice 
system. 
 
It may be necessary to adopt such reforms due to the fact that, whereas before 2003 
judicial investigators were appointed by the government, now the Higher Judicial 
Council selects them from among those who have an appropriate competency. Thus 
direct monitoring and control of judicial investigators during the performance of their 
duties can be exerted by investigating judges, since the judicial staff are under the 
management of the courts, while the police are under the administration of the 
Ministry of Interior and in practice not under the direct control of investigating 
judges. In other words, police officers who are empowered to conducts criminal 
proceedings in some instances are less supervised and controlled by investigating 
judges from investigations of judicial investigators. 
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In addition, in post- Saddam Iraq, the Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005 designates 
the judiciary as the sole authority enabled to deal with freedoms and liberties. 
Therefore, the investigating judge and judicial investigators, to whom the system has 
granted a broad power of investigation, should be the guarantors of the individual’s 
rights when acting on behalf of the judiciary during the pre-trial stage.
75
 It follows 
that, in order to protect human rights at the initial stage of the proceedings, the 
investigating judge must entrust the power of investigation solely to highly qualified 
judicial investigators, rather than to police officers.  
 
In the same way, in the view of the present author, the legislature should remove the 
exceptional powers of the police that enable them to conduct investigations at the 
initial stage of the proceedings without order from the judicial authority. These 
powers in practice have been abused and employed to obtain confessions under 
duress, and this in turn has undermined confidence in law enforcement.
76
 Hence, it is 
suggested that if, under exceptional circumstances, some limited power is given to the 
police to conduct proceedings, then due process and adequate judicial control should 
govern those proceedings. In addition, the questioning of a person under investigation 
should not be carried out by police but only by the judicial authority, since the 
questioning may result in a confession that adversely impacts on that person’s 
position during the next stages of proceedings.
77
     
 
3.3. The decision to refer a case to trial 
 
Following the completion of the investigation, the evidence for or against the person 
under investigation is collected, and the pre-trial investigation stage is terminated by 
order of the investigating judge, who then decides whether to refer the accused person 
for trial or to close the case. The most important issues relevant to procedural 
safeguards are described below.   
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3.3.1. Discretion to refer a case for trial 
 
Pre-trial investigations having been completed, investigating judge should order the 
case to be referred to trial if there is sufficient prima facie evidence that the person 
under investigation is involved in the crime. In such cases, sending the accused person 
before a public trial is not discretionary, and the investigating judge has no option but 
to refer the accused person to trial.  However, it is the view of the present author that, 
although the Iraqi legal system has in principle adopted the practice of a mandatory 
referral to trial, the principle is in reality less firm than it seems.  This is due to the 
fact that even when the investigating judge is satisfied, on a prima facie basis, of the 
involvement in the crime of the person under investigation, in some cases the referral 
to public trial does not take place.   
 
For example, the investigating judge can determine not to refer a case for trial owing 
to the provision of impunity, because the government, as will be seen in other 
chapters,
78
 can place influence on the decisions of investigating judges in this regard.   
The investigating judge can determine not to refer a case for trial for various reasons.   
For example, it might be decided that the case will not be sent for trial on the grounds 
that the victim has granted forgiveness to the person accused, or has received 
compensation
79
; or it may simply be that the evidence to charge the person is deemed 
to be insufficient, particularly in the case of less serious crimes; or it may be that 
during the investigation the accused person has been sufficiently cooperative in 
providing evidence against other offenders involved in the committed crime.
80
  
 
Because of the seriousness of the decision not to refer a case for trial, there is a 
statutory duty upon the investigating judge to give a reasoned justification for it.
81
 By 
virtue of Article 265(a) of the ICCP, Iraqi law also provides supervisory oversight of 
the decision to close the case, and the decision issued can be subjected to an appeal 
before the Felony Court, either by the victim or by the public prosecutor.   
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It is worth noting that, under Iraqi law, when the decision not to refer a case for trial is 
made, the accused person must be released immediately if he was under detention, 
and the case against him must be closed.
82
 Such a decision has several implications.  
The most notable of these is that, under the provisions of the ICCP any future actions 
and measures against the accused person by the authorities are prohibited. However, if 
the discontinuance of the proceedings was due to insufficient or inadequate evidence, 
the case can be reopened again if sufficient and reasonable new evidence is presented 
within two years of the date of the closure of the case.
83
 In the view of the present 
author, this provision, which makes the closure of the case provisional and subject to 
re-opening if sufficient new evidence is presented within two years, meets the 
requirements of justice while safeguarding the rights of accused persons.   
  
3.3.2. The right to be informed about an order to transfer a case for trial 
 
Article 14(3) (a) of the ICCPR, provides that a suspect is entitled “to be informed 
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of 
the charge against him”84 
 
This right is very important for a person under investigation whether he is in detention 
or not. For the purpose of an effective defence, the accused must be notified in writing 
and verbally about the reality of the charge against him. Under international rules, the 
right is of particular significance for a fair hearing.
85
 The right to have adequate time 
and facilities for the preparation of a defence should not be assessed in isolation from 
this right of notification.
86
 The latter is also protected under the rules of the 
international criminal courts, which require the accused to be informed about it “in a 
language which he understands.”87 Most national systems similarly, respect this right. 
As an example, the French Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly grants this 
guarantee in Article 183.   
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However, this is not the case in Iraqi law. Under the provisions of the ICCP, there is 
no statutory duty upon the authorities to inform an accused of the decision of transfer 
for trial. In this respect the Code only provides that 
 
“A decision of transfer should list the name of the accused, his age, profession, 
place of residence and the offence of which he is accused as well as the time, 
date and location of its occurrence and the Article of the law which applies, the 
name of the victim and the evidence obtained, along with the date of issue of the 
decision, signed by the investigative judge and stamped by the court.”88 
 
However, under the provisions of the Public Prosecutor Law, “The investigative judge 
must brief the appointed or assigned member of the Public Prosecution on his 
decisions within 3 days of the date of issuance.”89 It should be emphasized that such a 
guarantee under international standards provides an important statutory safeguard, by 
means of which the accused can be notified promptly and in full detail, verbally and 
in writing, of the decision to transfer his case to trial. The accused person’s 
communication with the defence lawyer needs to be similarly protected so as to 
enable an adequate defence of the accused person or to prepare an appeal against the 
decision.  
 
3.3.3. Form of referral order for trial  
 
As mentioned above, an investigating judge is empowered at the end of the 
investigation stage to refer a case to trial. It is self-evident that protection against an 
arbitrary transmission for trial requires that persons under investigation should have 
the opportunity to obtain more information on the process of sending their case to 
trial. In this respect, the procedures under international human rights standards ensure 
that the nature and cause of the charge are comprehensively brought to the knowledge 
of an accused person. The specific requirements of this provision involve notifying 
the accused of the reasons for the prosecution. In this connection the HRC states that:  
 
“The right of all persons charged with a criminal offence to be informed 
promptly and in detail in a language which they understand of the nature and 
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cause of criminal charges brought against them, enshrined in paragraph 3(a), is 
the first of the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings of Article 14.”90 
 
In the opinion of the Committee:  
 
“This right must arise when in the course of an investigation a court or an 
authority of the prosecution decides to take procedural steps against a person 
suspected of a crime or publicly names him as such. The specific requirements of 
subparagraph 3 (a) may be met by stating the charge either orally or in writing, 
provided that the information indicates both the law and the alleged facts on 
which it is based.”91 
 
Other international documents and international bodies impose the duty to formulate 
the appropriate form of an indictment. For example, the indictments of international 
criminal procedures provide comprehensive details including “the nature of the 
charge’ is the precise legal qualification of the offence and the ‘cause of the charge’ 
refers to the underlying facts.”92 
 
To be consistent with international standards, national laws on criminal procedure 
must prevent unwarranted or abusive orders of referral for trial, and therefore 
sufficient reasons must be cited, and the process must be authorized by a competent 
legal authority. This is of particular importance in order for a defendant to be able to 
appeal these reasons before the competent court. In most civil law countries, the 
accused must be informed of such reasons. The French Code of Criminal Procedure, 
for example, explicitly respects this guarantee. It states that  
 
“The orders made by the investigating judge in accordance with the present 
section include the surname, first names, date and place of birth, domicile and 
profession of the person under judicial examination. They state the legal 
qualification of the actions he is charged with and state precisely the grounds for 
which there is or is not sufficient evidence against him.”93   
Iraqi law, however, differs in this respect. There is no statutory duty that obliges the 
investigating judge to set out his reasons when ordering the referral to trial of a person 
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under investigation. A different approach is taken when, on the contrary, the accused 
is not sent to trial at the end of the pre-trial investigation: here, the reasons for closing 
the case must be given.
94
 It is suggested that the precise grounds for sending a case to 
trial should be cited in the order of referral for trial, so as to provide greater protection 
against unwarranted or abusive orders, this being particularly necessary in cases 
where the decision is subsequently subject to an appeal. 
  
3.3.4. The right to appeal against the order of referral for trial  
 
Iraqi law provides an accused person with the right to appeal a decision to send the 
accused for trial. This right is secured under the provisions of the ICCP.
95
 By virtue of 
these provisions the application for an appeal against an order of referral for trial must 
be submitted within thirty days from the day following the date of the issue of the 
order.
96
 The accused or the defence lawyer acting on his behalf can appeal the order. 
Application of appeal must be submitted before the Felony Court, which reviews the 
case file without the presence of the defendant or his legal representation. As a result, 
the review of the investigating judge's decision before the three judges of the Felony 
Court may be considered sufficient safeguard for protecting the accused person 
against arbitrary referral of his case to trial, as well as satisfying the requirements of 
justice.  
 
3.4. Evaluation under international human rights law 
 
International human rights law does not place express obligations on a state regarding 
the way in which its investigative system should be structured, nor does it offer much 
guidance in this respect.
97
 However, generally speaking, respecting the obligations of 
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international human rights law requires that a state must provide an investigative 
system under which compliance with a minimum standard of justice can be 
guaranteed. A functioning justice system in any country is an indispensable aspect of 
the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law. In dealing with post-
conflict reform, the broad UN definition of the rule of law affirmed such a fact. 
Indeed, it should be noted that an effective legal mechanism to ensure justice in 
criminal proceedings and civil claims is a key factor in establishing the rule of law in 
post-conflict settings.
98
 From the perspective of the UN’s functional definition of the 
rule of law, a justice system is only acceptable to the international community when it 
avoids arbitrariness and is capable of providing a minimum standard of justice and 
certain due process rights.
99
 The established legal systems exhibit different 
approaches regarding the structure of the investigation phase of criminal proceedings. 
Some jurisdictions have adopted the civil law style of proceedings (the inquisitorial 
model) and others the common law style (the adversarial model).  
 
Iraq adopted an inquisitorial criminal justice system and empowered investigating 
judges to conduct the pre-trial investigation stage and to determine the submission of 
the case to trial. The Iraqi system has undergone various attempts at reinforcement, 
carried out with the assistance of international organizations such as the UNDP and 
the USIP. With respect to the investigative system, these reforms focused upon 
training those who were to be responsible for conducting the process and building the 
institutions. These efforts, however, have been at the expense of legal reform. 
 
The defective areas, which have been indicated in the previous pages, have been 
overlooked during these reforms and have not been given sufficient attention. 
Consequently, certain critical problems within the investigative system have not been 
identified by those reviewing the system under the process of reform after 2003, and 
so these problems remain unsolved.  This conclusion can be demonstrated by a review 
of the functions of the three main actors involved in criminal procedure at the pre-trial 
stage, with reference to the international human rights rules binding on Iraq. 
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3.4.1. Police 
 
In the Iraqi investigative system, the power to carry out criminal investigation at the 
pre-trial stage lies with the investigating judge and judicial investigators (see Article 
51 of the ICCP). However, according to the ICCP, police officers are also empowered 
to carry out investigation proceedings, either with or without authorization from 
investigating judges or judicial investigators.
100
  
 
 Empowering Iraq police to conduct investigations, particularly without an order of 
judicial authority adversely affects the due process rights of persons under 
investigation. To begin with, the problem is one of legal qualification.  Article 51 of 
the ICCP provides that police officers are deemed to have the necessary expertise to 
be granted the rank of judicial investigator when they have successfully completed a 
training programme.
101
 However, it is possible that the investigation is conducted by 
someone without the rank of judicial investigator, as is the case under Article 50 of 
the ICCP, which means losing confidence in the justice system. This is because 
authority has been vested in public officials who are incapable of conducting this 
crucial function due to a lack of expertise and basic qualifications.
102
 
 
As already has been shown that another problem associated with police investigations 
is the lack of supervision from the judicial authority. Consequently, in practice, 
persons accused in the hands of the police during the pre-trial stage of the 
investigation are often abused and intimidated.  An array of reports has shown that the 
police have been used as instruments of repression rather than of justice, and are 
linked with corrupt practices and discriminatory treatment.
103
 Jane Stromseth et al. 
have pointed out that “more often, existing police forces are poorly trained and 
disciplined, distrusted by the public, and often notorious for criminal activity and 
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abuse of human right.”104 In the same context, the Independent Commission on the 
Security Forces of Iraq has confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior is crippled by 
corruption and sectarianism, and poses the main obstacle to developing an effective 
police force in Iraq.
105
 
 
The limited number of judicial investigators capable of carrying out criminal 
investigations remains an issue in Iraq. Even though the quantity of competent police 
officers could be an explanatory factor, the limited number of competent judicial 
investigators should not mean that criminal proceedings are conducted by those with 
inadequate qualifications and expertise, to the detriment of professional standards and 
human rights.  
 
Furthermore, the Iraq justice system has not put in place an independent mechanism 
to check police misconduct during investigations. According to reputable human 
rights reports, all the allegations of abuse and denial of due process involve persons 
held in police detention and subjected to excessive police powers during the initial 
investigation.
106
   
 
 In order to move towards a possible solution it should be recognised that police 
investigations are highly undesirable and need to be kept to a minimum. The 
investigations should only be carried out by qualified investigators under the firm 
control of the investigating judge and at the earliest opportunity. Criminal proceedings 
should not be conducted by the police except when the latter are equipped with the 
necessary minimum of professional skills in law, human rights, and technical 
knowledge, and their conduct in criminal investigations must be in keeping with 
recognized international guidelines.
107
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It is worth mentioning here that improved respect for human rights during police 
inquiries would represent an important move forward with regard to the UN’s 
conception of the rule of law. All procedural safeguards given to a person facing 
criminal proceedings before an investigating judge must also be given to those 
undergoing police investigations. The human rights standards guaranteed by the 
ICCPR require that the rights of due process should be available “as soon as a suspect 
is questioned by the police at a police station, and categorically requires it once the 
suspect is arrested or detained ... and perhaps even earlier.”108 The fact is that, as will 
be seen in next chapters, the reforms to the rights of due process are applied only 
when the accused person is under judicial authority, while the due process rights 
related to police investigation are neglected and overlooked. In particular, there is no 
obligation to provide an audio/video tape recording during questioning at police 
station or to provide a lawyer. Despite the lack of procedural due process at this stage 
of proceedings, observers note that statements given to the police have been regarded 
the core evidence that used by courts to base convictions in numerous cases.
109
  
 
In conclusion, the important elements of reform that need to be undertaken in order to 
validate police involvement in inquiries are those that provide basic respect for human 
rights, ensure the attainment of adequate professional skills and guarantee police 
accountability in regard to malpractice against individuals and breach of procedural 
rules. In all cases, police investigations should be subject to an actual and effective 
supervision. Finally, the ICCP must define clearly the limits to the powers of the 
police when they are carrying out inquiries. In particular, they are to be prohibited 
from conducting interviews with a person under investigation and their arrest powers 
limited to cases of flagrant delicto, and there must be real remedies in the event of 
abuse of persons under investigation. 
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3.4.2. The public prosecutor 
 
International human rights law considers the independence and impartiality of the 
prosecutor to be one of the fundamental pillars of justice and indispensable for the 
maintenance of due process in criminal justice systems and the rule of law. There are 
many significant aspects to the duties of public prosecution authorities in criminal 
proceedings.
110
 However, it is likely that under international rules and practice of the 
HRC it is unclear whether it is possible for the public prosecutor to be a complainant 
against an accused person and to be the investigator at the same time. 
 
In any case, the scope of Article 3 of the Public Prosecutor Law is the cause of 
concern.  If a public prosecutor responsible for formulating the complaint is also able, 
in certain situations, to conduct the investigation, then the impartiality of the 
proceedings may be affected due to a conflict of interests.
111
 The impartiality of the 
investigation may be open to doubt because the prosecutor who has the authority to 
lodge a complaint in the public interest will be seeking incriminating evidence, 
whereas an investigator must seek every kind of evidence, both for and against the 
person under investigation.  As a result, in the view of the present author, Article 3 of 
the Public Prosecutor Law is not practical and it needs to be repealed.  
 
It has been observed that under international law there are no explicit provisions that 
are relevant to the fair conduct of the proceedings during pre-trial stage. It is to be 
recommended that the fair conduct of proceedings during the pre-trial proceedings 
should be under the protection of international human rights law and brought into line 
with the practice of international bodies.
112
 Similar provisions that are relevant to the 
fair conduct of the judicial proceedings during trial, as described in Article 14 of the 
ICCPR, could be brought to bear on the current problem and applied at the pre-trial 
                                                 
110
 UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 1990 adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on 
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111
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stage of the proceedings.
113
 By this means the impartiality of the proceedings and the 
provisions for a fair trial would be reinforced.  It is illustrative here to mention the 
practice of the ECtHR. The latter states that 
 
“Even if the primary purpose of Article 6, as far as criminal proceedings are 
concerned, is to ensure a fair trial by a “tribunal” competent to determine “any 
criminal charge”, it does not follow that the Article has no application to pre-trial 
proceedings…the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the 
prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings”114 
 
This practice of the ECtHR could be used as a model for protecting the impartiality of 
the proceedings during the pre-trial stage, and on the modelled on the same procedural 
rights, which are important to the fair conduct of judicial proceedings, could be 
provided in all criminal proceedings, as well as in the proceedings of the pre-trial 
phase. 
 
3.4.3. The investigating judge 
 
Let us now consider some problematic issues regarding Iraqi investigating judges. In 
the Iraqi system, the investigating judge undertakes many functions, such as 
investigation, detention and referral of the accused person to trial, and is involved in 
the final judgment in less serious crimes. These functions have conflicting interests, 
and it is possible that the investigating judge could be influenced by his initial 
judgment when deciding whether to detain the suspect and commit him to trial. The 
Human Rights Committee, however, held that, in the interests of a fair hearing, 
“impartiality of the court implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions about 
the matter put before them.”115 In contradiction of this principle, the Iraqi legal 
system, under Article 134 of the ICCP, empowers the investigating judge to judge a 
person accused of infractions.
116
 It seems fair to say that, even in less complicated 
                                                 
113
 The HRC stated, “in order to safeguard the rights of the accused under paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 
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cases, the judgment will be biased, the judge having already acted as an investigating 
judge in the same case.
117
 This is a shortcoming that needs to be redressed due to its 
adverse effects on the right to a fair trial clearly guaranteed under the rules of 
international human rights law.
118
  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned previously, wide powers and a combination of functions 
are invested in the investigating judge in the pre-trial investigations. Amongst these 
different judicial functions or powers are those permitting him to investigate, to detain 
and to refer an accused person to trial. Thus the question arises as to whether the 
impartiality of the investigating judge may be undermined as a result of this 
combination of functions. This issue of concern is relevant not only to the Iraqi legal 
system but also to other countries with civil law jurisdictions in which the 
investigating judge holds  the same status as in Iraq. International human rights law is 
silent regarding this question. However, there is good reason to suppose that 
difficulties will arise when any agency combines various functions of the kind in 
question while under a duty to maintain its independence throughout the stages of the 
investigation proceedings. Heller expresses the same view when he states that 
 
“An investigative judge faced with the decision to detain a suspect he has personally 
investigated cannot be expected to have no preconceptions about the correct choice; 
allowing the suspect to go free would be tantamount to admitting that his investigation 
was inadequate ... such a conflict of interest is incompatible with the appearance of 
impartiality, which Article 14 expressly forbids ... the investigative judge can both 
interrogate and detain creates an unacceptable risk that he will use the threat of 
detention to coerce a suspect into confessing.”119 
 
 
Independence, competency and impartiality will be damaged when the same agency 
or authority undertakes these different functions of the investigatory system. This may 
be the reason why the French system upholds the separation of the agencies that 
conduct the criminal proceedings as being necessary for the attainment of both the 
welfare of the suspect and the interests of justice. In the French system of civil law, 
                                                 
117
 Case law confirmed this point on many occasions, for example: De Cubber v Belgium App no 
9186/80 (ECtHR, 26 October 1984), (1985) 7 EHRR 236 para 23; for more detail, see the comment on 
the European Court of Human Rights decision in Fey v Austria by Stefan Trechsel & Sarah J. 
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Criminal Proceedings (n 114) 69. 
119
 See Kevin Jon Heller, (n 108) 275.     
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the investigating judge who is responsible for conducting the investigation is separate 
from the judge who is responsible for the decision concerning detention.
120
  
 
In the Iraqi legal system, the investigative judge is authorized both to investigate the 
case and to decide whether to transmit it to the competent criminal court at the end of 
the investigation stage. There are clearly grounds for recommending to the Iraqi 
legislature that the authority to refer the accused to trial, particularly in more serious 
cases, should be invested in specialist judges.
121
  
 
 With regard to the order of referral for trial, the discussion has shown that there is a 
discrepancy between Iraqi law and binding international rules. The procedure for 
ordering a referral for trial should be adjusted in order to meet international standards, 
and there should be a statutory duty upon the investigating judge to explain in clear 
language the reasons for ordering the case to be sent to trial. When the reasons for the 
order to send the case to trial have been clearly stated, the accused should be notified 
in an appropriate manner.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY IN THE REFORMED IRAQI CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
Previous chapters have ascertained that since 2003, major efforts have been made to 
reform the post-Saddam justice system in Iraq. This chapter argues that even though 
these changes in the new Iraqi system were expected to have adequately covered the 
right to liberty, the law and its implementation may still be as in the past - inconsistent 
with international due process. In any case, the answer to this claim can only be 
determined through the measuring of the post-Saddam criminal justice system against 
international due process rights. The main concerns lie with inadequate provisions 
that give law enforcement officials wide discretion to deprive a person of his liberty 
prior to any guilt being determined by the court. Remedying the defective measures of 
arrest and detention is of crucial importance in order to bring the new Iraqi system in 
line with binding international human rights law.  
 
Thusly, the question to be addressed here is whether the post-Saddam reforms in law 
and working practice secure the basic measures necessary to protect human rights 
during the denial of the suspect’s liberty in the course of arrest and detention. In order 
to achieve this objective the first section of this chapter endeavours to set out 
international human rights standards. This will pave the way for dealing with 
inadequacies in the national rules and the critical issues, in the context of proceedings 
of arrest and detention, which will be identified in the subsequent two sections. 
Section two considers the inadequacy of procedural safeguards in the reformed Iraqi 
criminal justice system regarding protection of the right to liberty. This comes in two 
subsections: the process of arrest and the process of detention. Section three draws the 
previous discussion together by applying the international human rights rules and 
clarifies any disparity between these rules and the situation in Iraq. 
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4.1. International rules 
 
Understanding international rules in light of case-law is necessary for pinpointing the 
defective areas in the Iraq reformed justice system to see where it fails to comply. In 
this regard, the ICCPR confers what the essential rights are for a person who is under 
criminal process. The right to liberty is contained in the provisions of Article 9 which 
states “...No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.” By virtue of this Article, 
several human rights are available to a suspect during the process of deprivation of 
liberty, which could be underlined as follows: 
 
4.1.1. Prevention of arbitrary arrest or detention  
 
Within the concept of “lawful arrest or detention” in the ICCPR, there is an obligation 
imposed on every State party to enact effective legal provisions to protect the rights of 
individuals from arbitrary arrest or detention. In the view of the jurisprudence of the 
HRC, national legal texts must clearly include all given guarantees in light of the 
provisions of Article 9 of the ICCPR, and any violation must be redressed.
1
 Through 
the notion of “liberty and security”, this Article secures for everyone, even outside the 
context of formal deprivation of liberty, both safety against harm to the body and 
freedom of the body against confinement.
2
  
 
                                                 
1
 It has been stated that “the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory or 
subjected to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and 
enforceable remedy when a violation has been established”, Aboussedra v Libyan Arab Jamahirya UN 
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allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant”, Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26/05/2004) “The nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant” adopted on 29 March 2004. 
2
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Communication No (1069/2002) 29 October 2003 para 9.5; Delgado Páez v Colombia UN Human 
Rights Committee Communication No (195/1985) 23 August 1990 paras 5.4, 5.6; Mariam Sankara et 
al v Burkina Faso UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1159/2003) 28 March 2006 para 
12.3; Carlos Dias v Angola UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (711/1996) 20 March 
2000 para 8.3; see also UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (107th session, 
Geneva, 11-28 March 2013) “Article 9: Liberty and security of person” para. 2, 3.  
 126 
 
In Conteris v Uruguay, the HRC recognised that the manner of an arrest may violate 
the rights of persons deprived of liberty under Article 9(1).
3
 A similar interpretation of 
this provision can be derived from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, when it 
determined in the case of Bozano v France the security of a person during the process 
of arrest is protected under the rules of the convention.
4
 Hence, the scope of 
protection is extended to encompass the right to liberty and is applicable to the right 
of security as well, so as to keep an arrested person safe against abuse.  
 
The right to liberty is not absolute but at the same time, arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
is prohibited. State parties have duties to provide adequate legal rules against 
wrongful deprivation of liberty and appropriate measures should be taken in national 
law to redress any violation in this regard.
5
 Exercising powers of arrest or detention 
without the adopted adequate provisions may constitute a violation of the binding 
international provisions that protect the liberty of persons.
6
 The HRC recognised that 
“the arrest or detention that lacks any legal basis is arbitrary … they must be carried 
out with respect for the rule of law.”7 However, the previous statement does not mean 
that national law must handle every event since some degree of discretion is given to 
the domestic authority in carrying out the deprivation of liberty, as long as it is carried 
out in good faith and on an objective basis.
8
 Also, under the provisions of Article 4 of 
the ICCPR, the right to liberty may be derogated in emergency situations when it is 
necessary to protect the nation.
9
 Applicable laws could be subjected to temporary 
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 Z and others v the United Kingdom (n 4) para 103; A and other v the United Kingdom App no 
39692/09, 40713/09 & 41008/09, (ECtHR, 15 March 2012) para 60; Bozano v France App no 9990/82 
(ECtHR, 18 December 1986), (1987) 9 EHRR 297 para 55. 
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 Similarly see Article 15 of the ECHR. 
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derogation under specified conditions.
10
 For these reasons, the surrounding 
circumstances may play a vital role in rendering the conduct of an arrest in 
accordance with or contrary to Article 9.  
 
The prohibition of arbitrariness requires that deprivation of liberty must be 
predictable, reasonable and appropriate. As a consequence, the deprivation of liberty 
may be deemed unlawful under international standards even if it is in compliance with 
national law.
11
 The HRC held that “Arbitrariness is not to be equated with ‘against the 
law’, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, 
injustice and lack of predictability.”12 Bearing in mind that the permissible reasons for 
depriving a person of liberty are not elaborated on by international rules, however, 
these reasons must comply with the required necessity.
13
 The HRC has identified 
proportionality along with predictability as basic principles to conduct any procedure 
of arrest or detention. It clarified that “the grounds and procedures prescribed by law 
must not be unreasonably or unnecessarily destructive of the right to liberty of 
person.”14  
 
Added to that, the scope of discretionary power given to the authorities must be 
clearly mentioned by law and must be subjected to independent judicial oversight. 
Any vagueness in this regard may render the arrest arbitrary and unlawful.
15
 The HRC 
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UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1629/2007) 10 May 2010 para 7.3. 
15
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8, (Sixteenth session, 1982) “Right to Liberty and 
Security of Persons: (Article 9)” adopted on 30/06/1982, para.1; see also Olsson v Sweden App no 
10465/83 (ECtHR, 24 March 1988), (1989) 11 EHRR 259 para 61(c) which states “A law which 
confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the 
scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard 
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held that “interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the 
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, 
reasonable in the particular circumstances.”16 As a result, the restricting of liberty 
must not exceed what is prescribed by law. At the same time, proportionality should 
be an essential ingredient of domestic procedural rules.  
 
Furthermore, an arrest should not be conducted unless an official authority on a 
reasonable suspicion establishes it.
17
 Under international rules, the conduct of an 
arrest is forbidden, except where there is reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed an offence, necessary to prevent committing an offence or to prevent 
fleeing after having committed an offence.
18
 The requirement of reasonable suspicion 
is a notable safeguard by which people are protected against arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty. In the view of the HRC, the deprivation of liberty must not only compliance 
with domestic rules but also “reasonable in all the circumstances”19  
 
In case law, attention has been concentrated on the circumstance at the moment of 
arrest as a vital resource to determine the objective test of reasonableness of 
deprivation of liberty. In the case of Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK the European 
Court found that the arrest should be based on rational information or facts regardless 
of whether the person who made the arrest acted in genuine and honest faith, and 
whether the person arrested is an offender or not.
20
 Hence, the reasonable suspicion 
leading to arrest is greater than merely honest belief. The suspicion might be 
considered unreasonable regardless of what was in the mind of the police at the 
moment of arrest. A subjective test in this regard leaves wide opportunity to breach 
the right to liberty under the excuse that the person arrested may have committed the 
offence. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference.” 
16
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988) “Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies” U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994), para. 4.  
17
 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v the United Kingdom App no 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86 (ECtHR, 
30 August 1990), (1991) 13 EHRR 157 para 33. 
18
 Similarly see ECHR, Article 5(1) (c) that explicitly states this right in its text.  
19
 Hugo Van Alphen v The Netherlands UN Human Rights Committee, (n 12) para 5.8. 
20
 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v the United Kingdom, (n 17) para 33; see also Helen Fenwick, Civil 
Liberties and Human Rights (4
th 
ed., 2007, Routledge - Cavendish Publishing) 1152. 
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On the basis of existing case-law it is right to conclude that what might justify an 
arrest in some cases is not always deemed so in others, since the circumstances vary 
between cases.
21
 In the case of Feraru v Moldova it was held that “What may be 
regarded as ‘reasonable’ will however depend upon all the circumstances.”22 
Therefore, in serious offences like crimes of terrorism such as in the case of Fox, the 
reasonableness of suspicion may be satisfied, even if the grounds for arrest might be 
built on information from secret sources for security reasons. The justification lies in 
the special nature of threats that such crimes pose against society. It has been held that 
the procedural safeguards should not be applied in such a manner as to put 
disproportionate difficulties in the way of the public authority in taking effective 
measures to counter serious crimes.
23
 However, this does not mean violating 
substantive due process.  It is about striking the right balance. The same argument 
could be applied to the requirements of the approach to serious crimes. In cases of 
serious crime, where the measure of reasonable grounds for arrest may be more 
flexible, it is crucial for upholding the right to liberty that this flexibility doesn’t 
supersede the bounds of what is reasonable.
24
  
 
The normal requirements of reasonable suspicion at the time of arrest by police 
neither need to establish that an offence has actually occurred, nor the precise nature 
of the offence. This is acceptable as long as there are reasonable reasons for taking a 
person into custody.
25
 It is not relevant whether the suspect is eventually charged or 
not.
26
 In addition, the amount of required reasonable suspicion in the process of arrest 
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 Murray v the United Kingdom App no 14310/88 (ECtHR, 28 October 1994), (1995) 19 EHRR 193 
para 55; O’Hara v the United Kingdom App no 37555/97 (ECtHR, 16 October 2001), (2002) 34 EHRR 
32 paras 44, 50; see also, Ben Emmerson & Andrew Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice 
(1
st
 ed., 2001, London Sweet& Maxwell) 181. 
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 Feraru v Moldova App no 55792/08 (ECtHR, 24 January 2012) para 50. 
23
 Ahmet Özkan and Others v Turkey App no 21689/93 (ECtHR, 6 April 2004) para 390; İpek and 
Others v Turkey App no 17019/02, 30070/02 (ECtHR, 3 February 2009) para 30; see also Bedri 
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European Convention on Human Rights (2000, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 218. 
24
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25
 Borisenko v Hungary UN Human Rights Committee, (n 13) para 7.2; see also O’Hara v the United 
Kingdom, (n 21) paras 34 & 36, in this case the suspicion against the applicant who had been arrested 
on suspicion of terrorist murder, was based on specific information that he was involved in the crime of 
murder and the purpose of the detention was to confirm or dispel that suspicion. The Court thus agreed 
with the domestic courts’ assessment regarding the legality of the arrest and detention, and deemed that 
the procedures comply within the provision of the convention, Article (5); see also Steve Foster, 
Human Rights and Civil Liberties (2003, Person Education Limited) 75. 
26
 Murray v the United Kingdom, (n 21) para 55; O’Hara v the United Kingdom, (n 21); see also Ben 
Emmerson & Andrew Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (n 21) 181. 
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is less than required to charge the suspect or to justify conviction at the end.
27
 It is 
important to keep in mind that, the deprivation of liberty to collect more information 
as the ultimate purpose is prohibited.
28
 To do otherwise would mean affording too 
much power in the hands of the investigator to arrest on the vague grounds that “we 
are investigating.” What follows is that police can investigate without depriving the 
liberty of a person and that the suspect should be released if it appears during the 
inquiry that he is neither responsible, nor has committed the criminal offence for 
which he has been arrested. 
 
4.1.2. Right of a suspect to be informed about the reasons of an arrest 
 
Under international rules even though an arrest is based lawfully on reasonable 
grounds, it should be conducted in accordance with other requirements in order to be 
valid. Notably, an arrested person must be informed at the time of arrest, the reasons 
for the arrest.
29
 This guarantee should be satisfied by the official who conducts the 
proceedings, through using understandable language for this purpose. Several issues 
need to be considered here: whether this information should be given to the suspect 
directly at the moment of arrest or at a specific time. In addition, we need to consider 
whether there is a minimum amount of information to be given in this regard or not, 
and whether or not the notification should be in writing.  
 
The practice of the HRC makes clear that the amount of information should include 
the general legal basis of the arrest, and must be given immediately upon arrest.
30
 The 
purpose is to enable the suspect to be aware of the exact reason for arrest, in order to 
challenge the lawfulness of the accusation and detention at the earliest opportunity.
31
 
The HRC thus held that “One major purpose of requiring that all arrested persons be 
                                                 
27
 Brogan v the United Kingdom App no 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85 (ECtHR, 29 
November 1988), (1989) 11 EHRR 117. 
28
 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v the United Kingdom, (n 17); see also Cebotari v Moldova App no 
35615/06 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007) para 48; İpek and Others v Turkey, (n 23) para 30. 
29
 The ICCPR, Article 9(2) stipulates that “anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of 
arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.”  
Similarly ECHR, Article 5(2) stipulates that “everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a 
language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.”  
30
 Drescher Caldas v Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (43/1979) 21 July 
1983 para 13.2. 
31
 Stephen Grosz et al., Human Rights (2000, Sweet & Maxwell) 210; see also Wilson v The 
Philippines UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (868/1999) 30 October 2003 para 7.5. 
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informed of the reasons for the arrest is to enable them to seek release if they believe 
that the reasons given are invalid or unfounded.”32 The significance of the right 
concerned should not be underestimated because its impact may affect the whole 
proceedings, in particular, if the case is being sent to trial.  Subsequently, a defect in 
this regard may irretrievably affect fair trial proceedings under Article 14(2) of the 
Covenant.  
 
Notifying a person of the reason for arrest need not be made in writing or by formal 
notification, so long as it is done clearly in the initial process of arrest.
33
 The HRC has 
deemed the provisions of the ICCPR to be breached when the suspect was informed 
of the reason for his arrest after a considerable time had elapsed.
34
 In Peter Grant v 
Jamaica, the HRC took the position that the one week delay in informing the 
applicant of the reality of the reasons of his arrest infringed due rights. In this case, 
the Committee provided that “the State party is not absolved from its obligation under 
article 9, paragraph 2, of the Covenant to inform someone of the reasons of his arrest 
and of the charges against him, because of the arresting officer's opinion that the 
arrested person is aware of them.”35 However, what can be derived from the HRC 
finding such as in Borisenko v Hungary is that some delay in giving such information 
may be justified under certain circumstances surrounding each case.
36
 The ECtHR 
recognised a similar finding in Murray v the United Kingdom ‘‘the period of several 
hours during which the reasons for the arrest emerged from the police questioning 
cannot be regarded as falling outside the constraints of time imposed by the notion of 
promptness.”37 
 
Let us consider the information that must be given to the arrested person. Bearing in 
mind that this is regarding the grounds for taking a person’s liberty, the question 
arises whether, in order to render a suspect safe from arbitrary arrest, it is reasonable 
                                                 
32
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33
 Peter Grant v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (597/1994) 22 March 
1996 para 8; UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para 26; Lutsenko v 
Ukraine App no 6492/11 (ECtHR, 3 July 2012), (2013) 56 EHRR 22 paras 77, 78; Lamy v Belgium 
App no 10444/83 (ECtHR, 30 March 1989), (1989) 11 EHRR 529 para 31. 
34
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35
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to demand that the arrester informs the suspect about the precise nature of the offense 
at the time of arrest. As already noted, the police may not always be able to convey a 
detailed reason, beyond the nature of the charge e.g. theft, murder etc. The most 
common reason is that the requisite data is not necessarily in the hands of the 
arresting officials, but would be possible to be provided at a later stage. The fact is 
that the international standard is flexible and is applied to the particular circumstances 
in each case. Some flexibility regarding the delay or amount of notification might be 
permissible depending on the circumstances. Consequently, it has been claimed that 
‘‘the extent of the information required will depend on the circumstances.”38 Yet, the 
abiding rule is that, as soon as possible according to the circumstances, a suspect 
should be informed in broad terms about the legal and actual reason for the 
deprivation of his liberty.
39
 Further, for the purpose of this right, an interpreter should 
be provided immediately when the suspect does not speak the language of the 
arrester.
40
 
 
Accordingly, under the practice of the HRC a period of a few hours between the arrest 
and providing the reasons for arrest did not violate the right of a suspect to be 
informed of the reasons for his arrest promptly.
41
 Bearing in mind, the amount of 
information in this regard must be sufficient. The HRC recognised that “it was not 
sufficient simply to inform the authors [arrestees] that they were being arrested for 
breach of State security, without any indication of the substance of the complaint 
against them.”42 The ECtHR also held that it is not enough to comply with the 
requirements of the right in the event of the applicants simply only being told that 
they must surrender to arrest on suspicion of being terrorists.
43
  
 
It seems that flexibility is applicable whenever the reasons behind the arrest and 
detention of the suspect are for emergency or security reasons. It may be sufficient for 
                                                 
38
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the purposes of informing the suspect about the reality of his arrest to merely inform 
him about the section of the act under which he has been arrested as long as 
adequately notified the facts of the alleged offences promptly in police station.
44
 The 
case of Fox, Campbell and Hartley showed that being questioned in relation to 
specific named allegations was enough to comply with the requirement that people 
should be informed promptly.
45
 Similarly, in Murray v the United Kingdom it was 
held that a period of a few hours between the arrest and providing the reasons for the 
arrest was not an infringement of the right concerned, as long as the suspect was 
subsequently informed sufficiently of such reasons during interrogation at the place of 
detention.
46
 
 
Some academic research argues that the flexibility of procedural safeguards in this 
regards adversely influences the right to liberty. It “encourages the police to arrest 
individuals on vague personal suspicion, not knowing the precise offence of which 
they are suspected, but hoping to obtain evidence about the commission of offence by 
asking questions.”47 The present author takes the position that the international rules 
and case law have clearly indicated that the arrested person must be promptly and 
sufficiently informed of the reasons for deprivation of liberty during the limited time 
at the beginning of the arrest proceedings. Thus, even if there is a specific view 
regarding the right concerned in exceptional situations, this does not mean giving 
undesirable restriction to the suspect’s rights. In any case, even though the standard is 
flexible according to surrounding circumstances, the breach of the right is prohibited 
under international law. The flexibility regarding urgent or exceptional situations 
must not be exaggerated and it must be consistent with the factual requirements of the 
situation and the safeguards which exist.  
 
4.1.3. Right to be brought promptly before a judge  
 
Article 9(3) of the ICCPR provides that “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
                                                 
44
 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK, ibid, para 41. 
45
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46
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exercise judicial power...” 48 This Article stipulates the fundamental obligation, on the 
state to bring the detained suspect before a judge or other officer who is authorised by 
law to exercise judicial power promptly. The goal of this obligation is the right to 
liberty of persons to be free from any wrong interference from the official authority. 
This cannot be achieved without considering the person’s case by an independent, 
objective and impartial authority. In the view of the HRC police custody creates “too 
great a risk of ill-treatment.”49 Thus, the right under consideration makes clear that 
detention, after arrest, can only be ordered by and under the control of the judicial 
authority. It has been held that “judicial control of interference by the executive with 
the individual’s right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee […] which is 
intended to minimize the risk of arbitrariness.”50  
 
It is worthy to mention here that the right under consideration does not prevent pre-
trial detention altogether, and nobody can deny the significance of detention in 
relation to a criminal investigation but this must be done in accordance with the law 
and the rights of individuals. In any case, the detention must not be for the purpose of 
hidden punishment.  Detention is sometimes indispensable in the interest of society 
and “the effective operation of criminal justice system.”51 Thus, it must be reasonable, 
justified, and under the supervision of the competent authority.
52
 For this purpose, the 
person arrested should be provided with sufficient safeguards. Having been brought 
into the police station, he has to be brought before a judge or judicial authority 
promptly.
53
 Such procedures must be undertaken at an early stage, regardless of 
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whether the suspect has applied for redress or not.
54
 At the same time, this is not an 
alternative for the potential release of the suspect without judicial review.
55
  
 
Having been brought physically before the judicial authority, the arrested person must 
be given the opportunity to present his defence against alleged offences and to state 
mistreatment in custody.
56
 The hearing, according to the right under consideration, 
includes reviewing the legal basis for the arrest to decide whether the arrested person 
should be released or detention is necessary.
57
  
 
Regarding the notion of promptness, the question that arises is whether there is any 
specific time by which the promptness can be satisfied. It is important to note that, in 
some countries domestic laws fix specific time limits; mostly no more than forty-eight 
hours.
58
 However, the specific time is not laid down by the rules of international law 
under the ICCPR, but is interpreted and determined on a case-by-case basis. The HRC 
makes clear that the official must bring an arrested person before a judicial authority 
within a few days, but there is no unified time because this relies on the specific 
circumstances of each case. For instance, on one occasion, it was found that a delay of 
three days before bringing the suspect in front of a judicial authority, without the 
account from the side of State was a violation of the right concerned.
59
 Whilst, in 
another case, McLawrence v Jamaica, it was found that the delay in bringing the 
suspect before the judge for one week was a violation of the right concerned.
60
 In its 
observations on the periodic report of Gabon, the HRC stated that later than a two day 
period is not permissible.
61
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In consequence, it can be observed that a specific time has not been set and therefore 
there is a margin of discretionary power according to the circumstances of each case 
separately. In this regard, one notable issue needs to be taken into account by an 
official authority that “… the scope for flexibility in interpreting and applying the 
notion of ‘promptness’ is very limited”62 and so the mentioned discretion must be no 
more than a few days to be in compliance with the sense of international due process. 
For instance, the HRC has upheld that “the term promptly in Article 9, paragraph 3, 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis … delays should not exceed a few 
days.”63 What can be drawn from the above is that extraordinary circumstances in the 
particular case particularly in serious crimes may justify delay. Otherwise, the HRC 
recognised that an arrested person must be brought before the judicial authority 
without any unjustified delay.
64
  
 
Similarly, under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in cases involving exceptional 
circumstances, especially terrorist activities, the domestic authority may be given a 
degree of flexibility in bringing the suspect before a judicial authority. However, 
consideration should be given that the assertions of involving terrorist activities do not 
mean that the investigation authorities in the process of questioning are free from 
effective control by the domestic courts or supervisory institutions.
65
 In some cases, 
even in terrorist cases, the ECtHR found the promptness, which is stipulated by 
Article 5(3) of the ECHR, should not be stretched over a period of four days.
66
   
  
It follows from the foregoing that, with regard to the scope of flexibility in 
interpreting and applying the notion of promptness, the jurisprudence of the 
international treaty bodies abstained from fixing precise time for bringing arrested 
people before judges. This rational for this is that the requirements of each case’s 
circumstances are the most important factor in assessing the situation. In addition, 
delay in bringing the arrested person before the judicial authority is justified under 
                                                 
62
 Brogan v the United Kingdom, (n 27) paras 59, 62. 
63
 McLawrence v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee, (n 54 ) para 5.6. 
64
 Levinov v Belarus UN Human Rights Committee Communication (1812/ 2008) 26 July 2011 para 
7.5; UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 34. 
65
 Nuray Sen v Turkey App no 41478/98 (ECtHR, 17 June 2003) para 23; see also Daniel Moeckli, 
Human Rights and Non-discrimination in the ‘War on Terror’ (2008, Oxford University Press) 85.  
66
 Brogan v the United Kingdom, (n 27) para 62. 
 137 
 
specific circumstances, otherwise any unjustified delay may conflict with the present 
right under international rules.
67
  
 
4.1.4. Right to review the legality of detention (Habeas Corpus) 
 
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR provides that “anyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the 
court may decide without delay the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if 
the detention is not lawful.”68 This right is separate from the duty on the state to bring 
the arrested person before the judge and is considered one of the most effective means 
of inhibiting arbitrary detention. It is rightly stated that it must not be suspended or 
rendered impracticable under all circumstance even in states of emergency.
69
 
 
By virtue of this right, a detained individual can apply to the court at any stage of pre-
trial detention to examine the lawfulness of detention and to order prompt release in 
the event of the detention being illegal. When the application is considered by the 
judicial authority, the evidence upon which an individual has lost his liberty must be 
examined. In this context, the domestic court must obtain any relevant information to 
decide whether the detention was justified or not.
70
 It seems that as long as the aim of 
habeas corpus is to protect a suspect against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, this ends 
once the police release the suspect from detention, and thereafter the rules of this right 
are no longer applicable.  
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This right has been confirmed by case law. In this context, three requirements can be 
suggested that need to be considered by a domestic court during its review of the 
application for habeas corpus in order to satisfy international rules.
71
 Firstly, the 
review must be by a court that embraces the essential components of a fair hearing, in 
particular it must be “independent of the executive and of the parties to the case.’’72 In 
addition, it is important that the domestic court within the meaning of international 
rules must not have merely advisory functions, but must have the competence to 
decide the lawfulness and to order release if the detention is deemed unlawful.
73
 
Consequently, there is an obligation on the domestic court to carry out all substantive 
requirements of international rules in order that the lawful detention or release of the 
suspect can be decided.  
 
Secondly, the ambit of this review in respect of habeas corpus is deemed deficient 
unless the suspect is adequately afforded relevant procedural rights that are available 
under international and domestic law. For instance, the failure to provide access to 
legal assistance and reasons for detention may negatively affect the effectiveness of a 
habeas corpus application.
74
 It must be mentioned that, reviewing the lawfulness of 
detention is not a trial yet it requires hearing the person accused in person with legal 
assistance on his behalf and then for the state to justify detention. Therefore, it is 
rightly stated that “habeas corpus is closely linked to the right of access to legal 
counsel and effective legal assistance.”75 In Sanchez-Reiss v Switzerland it has been 
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indicated that the possibility of submitting written comments would have been an 
appropriate procedure in proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of detention.
76
 It 
seems that the right allows a detainee to express himself and a court must take that 
into account when determining its decision.  
 
Thirdly, the judicial review of detention should be done in speedy fashion.
77
 While 
this is not strictly designed for applications of habeas corpus, expeditiousness applies 
to all proceedings. The HRC makes clear that “persons deprived of liberty are entitle 
not merely to take proceedings, but to receive a decision, and without delay.”78 In this 
regard, from various cases it can be noted that the reasonable speed in which the 
process of habeas corpus must be carried out may rely on the circumstances.
79
 It must 
be born in mind that undue delay, even in exceptional situations does not absolve the 
domestic authority from its obligation to respect the right of having the legality of 
detention promptly reviewed.
80
 In a similar vein, the right is a continuous one. In 
other words a detainee can demand to review the legality of his detention many times. 
However, it may be reasonable to disallow this until a reasonable time has elapsed 
between previous review and the new request, and to require the application to be 
based on different grounds than those submitted at previous review. In case the court 
decides that the detention is lawful, and the suspect is not to be released from 
detention, this does not bar a further challenge, but it has to be on new grounds.  
 
In light of the aforesaid, the object of the right to bring the person before a judge after 
arrest is to review the legality of his detention, and the state is obliged to provide a 
detainee with such right. In addition, it is important that when the continued detention 
is necessary, regular periodic review of detention must take place regardless of the 
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option of the person under detention whether requests this review or not. For example, 
the ECtHR held that “monthly review of detention was regarded as reasonable.”81 
  
Conversely, the process of habeas corpus to be carried out relies on the claim of 
detainees that the detention is not lawful. In case this claim takes place by a detainee 
the state is then obliged to bring him before a court in order to review the legality of 
detention. In other words, the person who has been deprived of his liberty needs to 
invoke the right concerned to initiate proceedings of a habeas corpus himself, or by 
another person on his behalf such as friends, a relative or a lawyer. Accordingly, it has 
been held that “where there was no evidence that either the author [detainee] or his 
legal representative applied for such a writ; the Committee was unable to conclude 
that the former was denied the opportunity to have the lawfulness of his detention 
reviewed in court without delay.” What follows is the holding of the suspect in 
detention with the denial of his right to communicate is a violation of the right 
concerned.
82
  
 
As a result, one of the implications of the right to have a review of the legality of 
detention is that it is established by virtue of a detainee’s claim. Also, it is a 
mandatory right i.e. the official authority should bring the case before the competent 
court to review the lawfulness of detention during a reasonable period. The HRC 
deemed the provision of Article 9(4) to be violated if detainees have not been granted 
the right concerned during due time.
83
 As a result, either the detainee or another on his 
behalf can invoke this right. It is one of the notable safeguards that belongs to the 
suspect that may well help him to be protected against arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
and needs to be conducted without unreasonable delay. 
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4.1.5. Right to release on bail 
 
The ICCPR, in Article 9(3) also deals with the right of a suspect who is under 
detention to be released with or without bail pending trial. It provides that “... It shall 
not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the 
judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.”  
 
It seems that the default position will always be liberty but this position can be 
overridden. If detention is sought, the onus is on the state to show that it is clearly 
justified.
84
 From the HRC’s point of view,85 and similarly jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, the reasons which can justify the denial of bail to a suspect are the following 
grounds: 
a. The risk that the suspect will fail to appear again.   
b. The risk that the suspect may interfere with the course of justice; for 
example destroys evidence or threatens witnesses and victim. 
c. The risk of further offences that may be committed by the suspect. 
d. The preservation of public order.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Accordingly, the right to bail is deemed to be a notable application of the presumption 
of innocence. In this regard, case law mentioned that a detainee “ must be presumed 
innocent and the purpose of the provision … is essential to require his provisional 
release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable.”86 According to the 
practice of the HRC, a suspect shall normally not be detained unless there are 
acceptable reasons, as discussed above. Mere suspicion or doing more investigations 
shall not justify continuing detention. The HRC held that. 
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 “Pre-trial detention should be the exception, and bail should be granted, except 
in situations where the likelihood exists that the accused would abscond or 
destroy evidence, influence witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction of the State 
party.”87  
 
The HRC in Barroso v Panama makes clear that denying bail must be based on 
proper weighting.
88
 Accordingly, when challenging a bail request, the judicial 
authority has to explicitly explain the main reasons behind such a decision. Bearing in 
mind that detention and denying a bail may be reasonable at the beginning but it may 
later become unjustified.
89
 Thus, releasing the detainee must take place without delay 
when reasons that are attributable to refuse the bail no longer exist.
90
  
 
Moreover, ongoing detention must be avoided as much as possible.
91
 For this purpose, 
the judicial authority should consider other alternatives to detention to release people 
from custody. It must be noted that releasing detainees is a general rule and imposing 
suitable guarantees of appearance is only required if necessary in a particular case to 
secure the appearance of a suspect at any stage of proceedings. Alternatives to 
detention are favourable due to the fact that avoiding the caveats indicated above (a, 
b, c, and d) is possible when the release of persons from detention can be exchanged 
for other guarantees of appearance, such as bail, electronic bracelets.
92
 Other 
conditions of release such as the suspect being held within a limited area, submit the 
appropriate documents, and under the supervision of official authority. As a result, the 
tendency of case law is greatly in favour of alternatives to detention.
93
 What follows 
is that the conditions imposed to release the detainee on bail must be proportionate to 
                                                 
87
 Juan Peirano Basso v Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1887/2009) 19 
October 2010 para 10.2; Michael and Brian Hill v Spain UN Human Rights Committee, (n 41) para 
12.3; see also UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’ 
(A/HRC/10/21, 16 February 2009) para. 75. 
88
 Barroso v Panama UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (473/1991) 19 July 1995 para 
8.2; Levinţa v Moldova (no 2) App no 50717/09 (ECtHR, 17 January 2012) para 40. 
89
 Neumeister v Austria, (n 86).  
90
 Gilles Dutertre,  Key Cases- Law Extracts, European Court of Human Rights (3
rd 
ed., 2003, Council 
of Europe Publishing) 137; see also Juan Peirano Basso v Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee, (n 
87); Michael and Brian Hill v Spain UN Human Rights Committee, (n 41). 
91
 Taright et al. v Algeria UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1085/2002) 15 March 
2006 para 8.3; UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 38. 
92
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations: Argentina’ (Ninety-eighth session, 31 
March 2010) CCPR/ C/ARG/CO/4, para. 16; Smantser v Belarus UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (1178/2003) 3 October 2008 para 10.3; UN Human Rights Committee, Draft 
General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 39. 
93
 Castravet v Moldova App no 23393/05 (ECtHR, 13 March 2007) para 30. 
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the public interest in order to balance the public interest and that person to be released 
from detention. 
4.1.6. Right to trial within a reasonable time  
 
The ICCPR, in Article 9 (3) provides that “anyone arrested or detained ... shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.”94 According to this right, the 
person who is charged with a criminal offence; whether free on condition or under 
detention, must be either tried or released without undue delay. In this context, it must 
be taken into consideration that, the right to release a suspect on bail pending trial 
does not extinguish the right to trial within a reasonable time. One can also argue that 
the position of the detainee being deprived of liberty is more serious and may require 
even greater expeditiousness. The main concern in this regard is about the 
expeditiousness of the proceedings because the ICCPR mentions neither the precise 
length of period of pre-trial proceedings nor factors in the assessment of the 
reasonableness of this period and therefore, its account is a critical point. An 
observation of case law reveals that on the whole, the factors for reasonableness 
encompass the seriousness of the alleged offences, the performed proceedings by 
state, and the conduct of the suspect during investigation. In its General Comment and 
case-law, the HRC has reiterated that: 
 
“All stages of the judicial proceedings should take place without undue delay, 
and concludes that a lapse of 30 months between arrest, and the start of the trial 
constituted in itself undue delay, and cannot be deemed compatible with the 
provisions of article 9, paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant, in 
the absence of any explanation from the State party justifying the delay or as to 
why the pre-trial investigations could not have been concluded earlier.”95 
 
From the perspective of case law, these factors can be adopted for determining 
whether any delay is justified or not and also whether conducting of proceedings were 
                                                 
94
 Similarly the Body of Principles states that “A person detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled 
to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.” UN General Assembly, the Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, (n 56) 
principle 38; also ECHR, Article 5(3) states that “everyone arrested or detained ... shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release.” 
95
 Eustace Henry and Everald Douglas v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(571/1994) 25 July 1996 para 9(3); Dermit and Hugo Haroldo Dermit Barbato v Uruguay UN Human 
Rights Committee, (n 77) para 10; McLawrence v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee, (n 54) para 
5.11; Taright et al. v Algeria UN Human Rights Committee, (n 91) paras 8.2, 8.4; UN Human Rights 
Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) 38 para. 38.  
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done by the state expeditiously.
96
 What follows is that the circumstances of each case 
need to be considered separately as has been indicated, “What constitutes ‘reasonable 
time’ is a matter of assessment for each particular case.”97 In light of above 
considerations, it may be safe to submit that the absence of clear guidance in human 
rights rules and case law makes it hard to determine the precise time of proceedings to 
be expeditious and what are acceptable grounds for any delay. However, what is more 
encouraging is that under human rights law, as Meester et al.,
 state “there is an 
unconditional entitlement to release in case there is no trial within reasonable period 
of time.”98 As a result, under intentional rules it has been made clear that without 
undue delay, the outcome of criminal proceedings against a person under 
investigation should be determined through a trial or he should be released 
immediately.   
                                                 
96
 McKay v the United Kingdom, (n 50) para 44. 
97
 Nicole Fillastre v Bolivia UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (336/1988) 5 
November 1991 para 6.5; see also UN Office of High Commissioner for Human rights and UN 
International Bar Association, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human 
Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers (New York and Geneva, 2003) 191; see also Roza Pati, 
Due Process and International Terrorism: An International Legal Analysis (2009, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers) 47. 
98
 Karel de Meester et al., “Chapter 3, Investigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest, and Surrender” in 
Goran Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure Principles and Rules (1
st
 ed., 2013, Oxford) 
343. 
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4.2. Iraqi rules and practice 
 
According to reputable international reports, it is clear that the rights of accused 
persons were massively violated during the Saddam Hussein era.
99
 Since 2003, to 
move away from the past violence, the reform of the post-Saddam Iraqi criminal 
justice system has seen some significant changes for prohibiting the unlawful 
deprivation of liberty in law and practice. As was described in chapter two, many 
programs have been implemented to train State agents. Further, the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance was 
ratified on 23 November 2010.
100
 The numerous pieces of legislation under which the 
administrative officials had been given the power of arrest and detention were 
abolished. Furthermore, the constitutional court that is called the Iraqi Federal 
Supreme Court (AlMahkamah AlAthadia AlUlya) was established, one of whose 
functions is to prevent the violation of the liberties of the new democratic order. One 
encouraging improvement is that many unconstitutional provisions have been ruled as 
invalid by this court.
101
 The most important improvement is that, as elaborated further 
under the new Constitution, there are special provisions by which these rights for 
anyone who is arrested or detained are further articulated.  
 
This section is devoted to highlighting the Iraqi reformed criminal justice system and 
how it protects the right to liberty during arrest and detention in order to know 
whether the system is actually compliant with Iraq’s international obligations.  
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 See the Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iraq dating to between 
1991 and 15 March 2002, established in UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1991/74 of 6 
March 1991, e.g., United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), ‘Report on the situation of 
human rights in Iraq, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel’ (15 February 1995) 
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Observations/Comments: Iraq’ (Sixty-first session, 19/11/1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.84, para. 8. 
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year 2011 March and April) 16.  }ايلعلا ةيداحتلاا ةمكحملا{ In this case, some provisions on deprivations of 
liberty ruled as invalid by the Court. 
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4.2.1. Rights in relation to an arrest  
 
An arrest is a deprivation of liberty and confines a person’s freedom of movement for 
a period of time.
102
 On one hand, it may be viewed as a prejudicial action, that is, in a 
way, an assault on personal freedom and human rights. On the other hand, the right to 
liberty is not an absolute one and the arrest may be required during criminal 
proceedings to protect society and fight crimes. Therefore, for a deprivation of liberty 
to be really legitimate, there are extensive duties on the state and a person facing the 
criminal justice system should benefit from many safeguards. For the purpose of 
examining these safeguards in the new Iraqi criminal justice system, the following 
issues, which are of particular importance, have to be considered: 
 
4.2.1.1. Lawful grounds for arrest 
 
The prohibition of unlawful deprivation of liberty in post-Saddam Iraq is 
constitutionally enshrined. The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005 provides that: 
 
 “Every individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty. Deprivation or 
restriction of these rights is prohibited except in accordance with the law and 
based on a decision issued by a competent judicial authority.”103  
 
“A. Unlawful detention shall be prohibited. B. Imprisonment or detention shall 
be prohibited in places not designed for these purposes, pursuant to prison laws 
covering health and social care, and subject to the authorities of the State.”104  
 
“No person may be kept in custody or investigated except according to a judicial 
decision”105 
 
  
Taking this principle into practical effect, the ICCP articulates and circumscribes the 
circumstances and procedures of the deprivation of freedom. There are two legal 
                                                 
102
 Miguel Gonzalez del Rio v Peru UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (263/1987) 28 
October 1992 para 5.1. 
103
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 15. The official translation in English is available 
online at the homepage of the Iraqi government at <http://www.cabinet.iq/default.aspx> accessed 20 
November 2013. 
 نم رداص رارق ىلع ًءانبو ،نوناقلل ًاقفو لاإ اهدييقت وأ قوقحلا هذه نم نامرحلا زوجيلاو ،ةيرحلاو نملأاو ةايحلا يف قحلا درف لكل{
}ةصتخم ةيئاضق ةهج 
104
 Ibid, Article 19(12). 
جسلا نيناوقل اقفو كلذل ةصصخملا نكاملاا ريغ يف فيقوتلا وأ سبحلا زوجي لا ـ ب .زجحلا رظحي ـأ{ ةيحصلا ةياعرلاب ةلومشملا نو
}ةلودلا تاطلسل ةعضاخلاو ةيعامتجلااو 
105
 Ibid, Article 37.  {زوجي لا يئاضق رارق بجومب لاا هعم قيقحتلا وأ دحا فيقوت}  
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grounds allowing for arrest. First, an arrest must be pursuant to a warrant issued by 
the judicial authority according to the circumstances prescribed in the law. Second, 
the law provides for the specific situations where the arrest can be carried out without 
a warrant from the judicial authority.  
 
4.2.1.1.1. Arrest with a warrant from judicial authority 
 
The ICCP states “Arrest or apprehension of a person is permitted only in accordance 
with a warrant issued by a judge or court or in other cases as stipulated by the law.”106 
For the purpose of this provision, the first type of arrest can only be carried out on the 
basis of a warrant issued by the judge. The warrant of arrest is an order, which 
empowers the law enforcement officials to whom it has been directed, to deprive the 
named person of his liberty. Otherwise, if the warrant is defective, the arrest would be 
unlawful.
107
 The warrant should identify the person against whom the authority is 
ordered to arrest. In addition, it contains other relevant information.
108
 The ICCP 
states that,  
“The arrest warrant should contain the full name of the accused, with his identity 
card details and physical description if these are known, as well as his place of 
residence, his profession, and the type of offence to which the warrant relates, 
the legal provision which applies and the date of the warrant. It should be signed 
and stamped by the court. In addition to the details given, the warrant should 
contain an instruction to members of the police force to arrest the accused, by 
force if he will not come voluntarily.”109 
 
Furthermore, the ICCP identifies the situations whereby investigating judges can issue 
a warrant of arrest. According to Article 99, investigating judges are authorized to 
order a warrant of arrest in the offence punishable by imprisonment for a period 
exceeding one year.
110
 In these sorts of crimes, ordering the warrant of arrest by a 
judge is optional except for an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment. In 
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 ICCP Article 92. 
 زيجي يتلا لاوحلاا يف وا ةمكحم وا يضاق نم رداص رما ىضتقمب لاا هفيقوت وا صخش يا ىلع ضبقلا زوجي لا{}كلذ نوناقلا اهيف  
107
 Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (74) 585; Helen Fenwick, Civil 
Liberties and Human Rights (n 20) 1143. 
108
 ICCP, Article 93. 
109
 ICCP, Article 93. 
 ةدامو هيلا ةدنسملا ةميرجلا عونو هتنهمو هتماقا لحمو ةفورعم تناك نا هفاصواو هتيوهو هبقلو مهتملا مسا ىلع ضبقلاب رملاا لمتشي{
ما لمتشي نا ةمدقتملا تانايبلا ىلا ةفاضا بجيو ةمكحملا متخو هردصا نم عيقوتو رملاا خيراتو اهيلع ةقبطنملا نوناقلا ىلع ضبقلا ر
}اعوط كلذ ضفر اذا لاحلا يف روضحلا ىلع هماغراو مهتملا ىلع ضبقلاب ةطرشلا دارفاو يئاضقلا طبضلا ءاضعا فيلكت 
110
 ICCP, Article 99. 
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offences punishable by death or life imprisonment ordering the warrant of arrest 
against an accused person is mandatory.   
 
The investigating judges before ordering an arrest warrant against a person must take 
into account whether there is a fear of escape, interference with the course of the 
investigation or a wanted person has no certain place of residence.
111
 The 
investigating judge, also, is entitled to issue an arrest warrant against a person who 
has previously failed to appear for questioning by summons without lawful excuse.
112
 
Further, in accordance with the provisions of the ICCP, a judge is entitled to order the 
arrest of any person who has committed a crime in his presence.
113
 Apparently, 
empowering to order the arrest in this exceptional situation is necessary to maintain 
available evidence in the case and this may be necessary for the effectiveness of 
subsequent investigations.   
 
The above mentioned rules have given logical discretion to the judicial authority 
regarding the issuance of an arrest warrant whereby the freedom of individuals can be 
protected against the risk of violation. It seems clear that the arrest warrant may only 
be issued by a court or investigating judge and only be ordered in significant 
crimes.
114
 Therefore, it can be submitted that the explicit provisions in the new 
Constitution and law in accordance with which the decision to deprive liberty should 
be based on the approval of the judicial authority, is significant progress to improve 
justice in post-Saddam Iraq, moving further foreword establishing the UN’s definition 
of the rule of law.
115
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 ICCP Article (97) states, “If the person does not attend after being summoned, without a legal 
excuse, or if there is a fear that he will abscond or influence the investigation, or if he does not have a 
specific place of residence, the judge may issue a warrant for his arrest.” 
112
 ICCP, Article (97). 
 اذا وا عورشم رذع نود روضحلاب فيلكتلا ةقروب هغيلبت دعب صخشلا رضحي مل اذا{ وا هبره فيخهريثأت  نكي مل وا قيقحتلا ريس ىلع
}هيلع ضبقلاب ارما ردصي نا يضاقلل زاج نيعم ىنكس لحم هل 
113
 ICCP Article (98) states that “Any judge may issue an arrest warrant against any person who has 
committed an offence in his presence.” 
 نا يضاق لكل{رمأي اب }هروضح يف ةميرج بكترا صخش يا ىلع ضبقل  
114
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high. Otherwise, in England and Wales the arrest with warrant is less resorted to, whereas the arrest 
without warrant is widely used there. See Article 127 of Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure; see also 
Egyptian Court of Cassation on 31/12/1987 AD, set of provisions established by the Egyptian Court of 
Cessation, Q 29, No. 206, 993; regarding English law see Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, (n 74) 
585; Helen Fenwick, (n 20 ) 1143. 
115
 Regarding the UN’s definition of the rule of law, see Chapter Two.  
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However, the Iraqi community has been subjected to tough security challenges, which 
have adversely impacted on judicial practice with regard to ordering mass arrests of 
individuals in relation to offences under Article 47(2) of the ICCP.
116
 Over the last 
decade, an arrest warrant has become a simple measure in judicial practice.
117
 It is 
quite common that the arrest warrant can be determined merely on the basis of the 
report against a person even from a so-called “secret informant”.118 The problem here 
is relevant with a lack of verification of information provided by secret informants in 
the Iraqi criminal justice system. The investigating authority still deems the “secret 
informant” as a basis for establishing harsh criminal procedures such as issuing the 
warrant of arrest. This view does not only belong to the present author but also 
reputable reports from many resources have confirmed this defect.
119
 Over the last ten 
years, the frequent failure of the judiciary to verify information on the use of “secret 
informants” has been recognised by international and national human rights reports.120   
 
Reports from Human Rights Watch have pointed to the risks surrounding the use of 
“secret informants” who may intervene in a notable role in the arrest decisions.121 
Human Rights reports deemed that the “secret informant” has a massive adverse 
effect on the integrity of the proceedings and violates individual human rights.
122
 
There is evidence that a lack of verification means false information provided by 
                                                 
116
 ICCP, Article 47(2) states “If the complaint is about offences against the internal or external 
security of the state, crimes of economic sabotage and other crimes punishable by death, life 
imprisonment or temporary imprisonment and the informant asks to remain anonymous, and not to be a 
witness, the judge has to register this with the notification in a special record prepared for this purpose, 
and conduct the investigation according to the rules, considering the information included in the 
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ولاا}ةيقيقحتلا قار  
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 The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 2010) 77. 
يونسلا ريرقتلا{ زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ- }ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو  
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Court (2008, Human Right Watch, US) 30. 
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secret informants has adversely impacted the new Iraqi justice system.
123
 It has been 
repeatedly reported, “The use of informants became widespread leading to 
accusations that many people had been detained solely on the basis of false 
information provided by secret informants.”124  
 
Therefore, for the purpose of protecting innocent people, investigating judges in 
actual practice should adequately review available information and take the 
circumstances of a case into account before ordering a warrant of arrest. The secret 
informant that can be used as a base for arrest and detention must be limited. Any 
reports or complaints that can be used as a basis for issuing an arrest warrant against 
persons needs to be duly verified in a timely manner before any action could take 
place against liberties of individuals.  
 
Iraqi law provides fundamental rights for a person under investigation, in line with 
what is enshrined in the international human rights instruments. However, those 
standards are not maintained by giving wide discretion or excessive warrant of arrest 
under Article 47(2) of the ICCP. There is evidence that such power of arrest has been 
abused in practice. Some orders of arrest, as the human rights reports mentioned did 
not comply with a procedure prescribed under Article 93 of the ICCP regarding that 
the arrest warrant should fully identify the accused person, which resulted in massive 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty against innocent people. One of the Annual Reports of 
the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights recognised that some of these arrests, as the report 
observed, were as a result of a lack of identifying wanted persons under the issued 
warrants.
125
 According to the Ministry of Human Rights, in 2010-2011 there were 
14231 cases of arrest which included persons who were either innocent or released 
without charge and without any further action. The obvious shortcoming behind 
conducting these wrong arrests belongs to the lack of verification of information 
provided by secret informants.
126
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Therefore, it must be emphasised that people as mentioned under the above provisions 
of the ICCP and international law must not be arrested simply for questioning without 
a reliable information and evidence that establish reasonable suspicion against a 
person arrested. As such, the defective lines have affected the right to liberty in post-
Saddam Iraq and must be sufficiently dealt with in implementation. It has been argued 
that under international rules for the purpose of legitimate grounds of deprivation of 
liberty, national authorities must satisfy sufficient evidence about a person who 
commits the crime for which he can be deprived of his liberty. It is suggested that the 
system needs to meet the principle known in international human rights law in order 
to provide sufficient protection to the innocent and that the deprivation of liberty must 
be “lawful” and carried out “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”  
 
4.2.1.1.2. Arrest without a warrant 
 
The provisions of Iraqi law provide relevant officials and even a private citizen, in 
specific circumstances, with the power to arrest persons for a necessary reason such as 
protecting society from crimes.
127
 What is notable in these provisions is the amount of 
discretion given to the members of official authority with regard to using their power 
of arrest. Two observations may be recognised. On one hand, the power of arrest 
without warrant is only empowered in limited cases under certain conditions. In this 
regard, the ICCP provides that:  
 
“(a) any person may arrest any other person accused of a felony or 
misdemeanour without an order from the authorities concerned, in any of the 
following cases:  
i. If the offence was committed in front of witnesses.  
ii. If the person to be arrested has escaped after being arrested legally.  
iii. If he has been sentenced in his absence of a penalty restricting his freedom.  
(b) Any person may, without an order from the authorities concerned, arrest any 
other found in a public place who is in a clear state of intoxication or confusion 
and is a juvenile or has lost his reason.”128  
 
In the same vein, any policeman or civilian support staff may arrest 
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 ICCP Articles 102,103, 41. 
128
 ICCP, Article 102.  
أ{- : ةيتلاا تلااحلا ىدحا يف ةحنج وا ةيانجب مهتم يا ىلع ضبقي نا ةصتخملا تاطلسلا نم رما ريغب ولو صخش لكل-  
0 –  ةدوهشم ةميرجلا تناك اذا4 – ضعب رف دق ناك اذا انوناق هيلع ضبقلا3 –  ب ةيرحلل ةديقم ةبوقعب ابايغ هيلع مكح دق ناك اذا-  لكل
 ناك وا ابغش ثدحاو للاتخاو نيب ركس ةلاح يف ماع لحم يف دجو نم لك ىلع ضبقي نا ةصتخملا تاطلسلا نم رما ريغب ولو صخش
} هباوص ادقاف 
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 “Any person thought, based on reasonable grounds, to have deliberately 
committed a felony or misdemeanour and who has no particular place of 
residence; … any person carrying arms, whether openly or concealed, violating 
the provisions of law.”129 
 
An analysis of these provisions may illustrate that the power of arrest without warrant 
is prescribed not only in cases of flagrante delicto (caught committing an offence) but 
also, there are particular situations exclusively cited by the Code allowing any person 
even other than the police member to arrest a person, even without the warrant issued 
by the competent authorities for a felony and misdemeanour offences in limited 
circumstances. These conditions are when the committed offence is a flagrante delicto 
type; the accused person has escaped after being arrested according to the law; and the 
accused has been sentenced with imprisonment in absentia. In addition, anyone, even 
without an order issued by the competent judicial authority is able to arrest a person 
who is found in the public place in a clear state of intoxication or confusion and who 
has lost his awareness in order to bring him to the nearest police station. Lastly, the 
Code includes that even without an order from the competent judicial authority; any 
member of police or civilian support staff is empowered to arrest persons who are 
found in some certain situations carrying weapons.  
 
It may be argued whether some of these provisions breach the right of liberty when 
they go beyond a flagrante delicto to grant a wide power of arrest to law enforcement 
officials and citizens. In this respect, it is apparent from reviewing these provisions 
that these certain situations under which deprivation of liberty can arise are 
considered logical justification for making arrests. The requirement of arresting 
persons under these provisions is to protect public interest and individuals. For 
example, there is a public interest to arrest someone who has lost his reason in the 
street in order to protect the public including the arrested person, and their property 
against an unconscious risk.  
 
With regard to arresting a person who has no particular place of residence, the image 
is relatively clear. The provisions make clear that the individual must not be simply 
arrested unless there are reasonable grounds, to have deliberately committed a 
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 ICCP, Article 103. 
وضع وا ةطرشلا دارفا نم درف لك ىلع{  : مهنايب يتلاا صاخشلاا نم يا ىلع ضبقي نا يئاضقلا طبضلا ءاضعا نم-  
 نظ صخش لكبابسلأ  وا ارهاظ احلاس لاماح ناك نم لك .نيعم ةماقا لحم هل نكي ملو ةيدمع ةحنج وا ةيانج بكترا هنا ةلوقعمأبخم 
 افلاخماكحلأ }نوناقلا  
 153 
 
criminal offence. In this situation it seems that first of all, a person must be asked to 
provide his address. Giving particular place of residence means that the person can be 
summoned to the investigating authority without being arrested, otherwise, the arrest 
will be unlawful.  A failure to provide their address is a lawful reason for the arrest. 
 
What may be drawn from the above provisions is that, Iraqi law is among those 
legislations in which a police officer or any person is empowered with a limited 
discretion to conduct an arrest without a warrant against individuals, and that the 
entitled power of the arrest must be based on reasonable grounds.
130
 These provisions 
show that Iraqi law makes a distinction between both the conducting of the arrest 
according to the judicial warrant and the arrest occurring according to the general 
power of policemen and civilian support staff. It attempts to restrict the latter category 
by rendering such arrest to be not permitted without an approval from a judge except 
in the above mentioned situations.  
 
These rules may be deemed a good indication in the right direction for securing an 
individual’s right to liberty. This is in compliance with international human rights 
standards which require an exercise of any compulsory measure in the restriction of 
an individual’s liberty to be based on lawful grounds; reasonable, predictable and 
appropriate.
131
 It may be rightly considered that these rules might not be only enacted 
for protecting an individual’s rights and liberties but also necessary to protect the 
persons who exercise the arrest power against any allegation of violence to the right 
of liberty of arrested persons.  
 
On the other hand, Article 41 and the second part of Article 103 of the ICCP contains 
some problematic provisions, which provide that  
 
                                                 
130
 For example, French and German laws specify the power of arrest without warrant only in limited 
cases under certain conditions. French Criminal Procedure Code, Article 73 provides that “In the event 
of a flagrant felony or of a flagrant misdemeanour punished by a penalty of imprisonment, any person 
is entitled to arrest the perpetrator and to bring him before the nearest judicial police officer.” The 
German Constitution, Article 104(1) provides that “deprivations of liberty may be imposed only on the 
basis of a specific enabling statute that also must include procedural rules.” Similarly see German Code 
of Criminal Procedure 1987, Article 114. 
131
 Article 9(3) of the ICCPR. 
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 “Investigating officers are authorized within their areas … to apprehend those 
who committed the offences and to deliver them to the appropriate authorities”132 
 
 “Any policeman or civilian support staff may arrest any person in the event of 
whom impedes a member of the court or public official from carrying out his 
duty.”133 
 
These provisions go beyond flagrante delicto to empower police officers and 
members of support staff to apprehend persons without an order from the competent 
judicial authority.  
 
In the view of the present author, in spite of the fact that many countries around the 
world give such power to the police such as in England and Wales, the Iraqi situation 
is unusual.
134
 Giving broad power of arrest to unqualified and unlimited agencies of 
law enforcement officials has adversely impacted the right to liberty that is enshrined 
in the new Iraqi Permanent Constitution. It is important to mention that the new 
Constitution makes clear that a judge is the only authorized authority to deprive the 
right to liberty of individuals.
135
 In addition, the provisions of the ICCP, as explained 
above, have shown the extent to which the officials have the power to deal with the 
right to liberty of individuals without an order from the judges.  
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 ICCP, Article 41. 
}ةصتخملا تاطلسلا ىلا مهميلستو اهيبكترم طبضو ... مئارجلا نع يرحتلاب مهصاصتخا تاهج يف نوفلكم يئاضقلا طبضلا ءاضعا{ 
133
 ICCP, Article 103. 
}هبجاو ءادا يف ةماع ةمدخب فلكم يا وا يئاضقلا طبضلا ءاضعا دحلا ضرعت نم لك{ 
134
 In England and Wales, the police have a different role that police have in Iraq. They have much 
more autonomy in action under strict regulations.  The powers of arrest without a warrant are mostly 
enacted under PACE that has been amended by Section 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police 
Act 2005 (SOCPA). Police officers have general powers of arrest in relation to any offence. They have 
the power for arresting any person solely with two broad requirements that need to be satisfied. These 
are that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offence. Or a police officer 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit 
an offence. In accordance with these current changes on the power of arrest, it is apparent that the 
difference between arrestable and non-arrestable offences has been abolished, because all offences 
have become arrestable. This means that someone who has committed a trivial offence could be 
arrested if the officer deemed it necessary. Moreover, it could be going further to submit that, 
unsurprisingly, if an officer may be able to arrest on a ‘hunch’ which likely turns out to be justified. 
Therefore, such amendments have broadened the ambit of police power and oppositely decreased 
safeguards for arrestees. Thus, the constable’s discretion is wide and the exercise of such discretion 
may be negatively effecting practice due to the arrest, which could be used disproportionately against 
the individual's rights. See Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System (10
th 
ed., 2009, 
Routledge-Cavendish) 431; see also Helen Fenwick, (n 20) 1144; Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, 
(n 74) 586; Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, English Legal System (10
th 
ed., 2009, Pearson 
Longman) 377. 
135
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Articles 15, 37. 
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However, the power of arrest that arises under the provisions of the Article 41 and the 
second part of Article 103 of the ICCP, which empower deprivation of liberty outside 
the scope of flagrante delicto offences is not in line with the value of the right to 
liberty under the Constitution. This is due to the fact that according to these 
provisions, law enforcement officials have given broad power to conduct an arrest and 
that adversely affect the rights of individuals in actual practice.  
 
It is important to support this argument by mentioning that Egyptian law includes 
similar provisions under the Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 35, which 
were countered by most Egyptian Scholars.
136
 As a result, the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation pursuant to its duty to review unconstitutional legal texts, decided in favour 
of the same argument. The Court deemed this sort of measure, even temporary arrest, 
outside the scope of flagrante delicto is contrary to the Article 41 of the Egyptian 
Constitution and hence these provisions are unconstitutional.
137
 The Court states that 
these provisions authorizing law enforcement officials to apprehend those against 
whom there are reasonable grounds, to have deliberately committed a felony or 
misdemeanour or those who impede a member of the court or public official from 
carrying out his duty, these provisions are unconstitutional.
138
 
 
Over the last ten years, reliable reports from national and international resources still 
reveal serious concerns about violence in conjunction with deprivation of liberty in 
Iraq.
139
 The apprehension of a person’s freedom for many hours or days, to only say 
to him at the end “you are free to go” is quite common. This widespread phenomenon 
has badly affected human rights protection and all aspects of personal and societal life 
even in financial aspects when paralyzing a person from doing his job due to the 
wrong discretion from the side of members of the official authority.  According to 
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 Ahmad Lutfi Alsaid, Procedural Legitimacy and Human Rights (2004, Law School, University of 
Mansoura) 114. 
 ةروصنملا ةعماج  قوقحلا ةيلك( ناسنلاا قوقحو ةيئارجلاا ةيعرشلا ,ديسلا يفطل دمحأ{4002 ص )002}  
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 The Egyptian Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Niked), Case number 3294/63 on 15 February 
1995; Ahmad Lutfi Alsaid, Procedural Legitimacy and Human Rights, ibid, 114. 
{  ةروصنملا ةعماج  قوقحلا ةيلك( ناسنلاا قوقحو ةيئارجلاا ةيعرشلا ,ديسلا يفطل دمحأ4002 ص )002 }   
138
 The Egyptian Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Niked), Case number 3294/63 on 15 February 1995. 
139
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Reports (Baghdad, 2005-2013); see also The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human 
Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Rights Reports (Baghdad, 2007-
2012). 
و نوجسلا عاضولأ يونسلا ريرقتلا{زاجتحلاا زكارم- }ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو  
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these reports, it is usual that members of the law enforcement agencies, without the 
minimum legal knowledge, resort to arresting persons with no need for earlier 
approval to be issued by the competent judicial authority and this prejudices the 
Iraqis’ human rights protection and personal liberty.  
 
As a result, the system is still struggling with protection of the right to liberty. Clearly, 
one has to strike a balance between the interests of society as represented by the 
police powers on the one hand, and the rights and liberties of the individual on the 
other. As will be seen in chapter seven of this research, many holistic suggestions will 
be proposed to resolve the problems of the post-Saddam Iraqi criminal justice system. 
One of the important aspects of the reform suggests that police must not abuse their 
power and improvement in this respect needs to be made in law and practice.  
 
4.2.1.2. Right of the arrested person to be informed of the reasons for the arrest 
 
According to this right, the arrested person must be notified of the reasons for his 
arrest so that he can defend himself against an alleged offence.
140
 As elaborated 
earlier, the arrest of a person without informing him about the alleged offence for 
which he has been arrested is flawed under international standards. It can however be 
fixed within a reasonable time following the moment of an arrest. This guarantee is 
important because it affords the first opportunity for a person arrested to challenge the 
allegation against him.141   
 
a. Arrest with a warrant  
 
Under Iraqi law, the norm is for arrest to be authorized through the issuing of a 
warrant of arrest. Article 93 of the ICCP requires that a warrant of arrest from the 
investigating judge must include the name of the accused, surname, identity and 
description, place of residence, occupation and alleged offence attributed to him and 
the legal provision applicable on such offence. Furthermore, Article 94(b) of the ICCP 
                                                 
140
 The ICCPR, Article 9(2); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article (9/2). 
141
 Drescher Caldas v Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee, (n 30) para 13.2; Campbell v Jamaica 
UN Human Rights Committee, (n 32) para 6.3; see also UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General 
Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 26. 
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provides that “the wanted person must be informed of the warrant which has been 
issued for his arrest and be brought before the authority which issued the warrant.” In 
examining these provisions it is safe to conclude that officials who conduct the arrest 
must at the very least notify the person about the warrant and what it says.
142
  
 
However, one of the limitations with these provisions is that it explains neither when 
nor how an arrested person is notified with reasons of an arrest. There is no obligation 
laid down on the official who conducts the arrest to provide a copy of the warrant to 
the arrested person. There is evidence that this lack of provisions has adversely 
impacted practice. In 2011, Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights reported that a lack of 
identifying wanted persons under the issued warrants resulted in many cases of 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty against innocent people.
143
 Providing a copy of the 
warrant to the arrested person is useful to fully identify the wanted person. Identifying 
the wanted person is a significant means to avoid any misconduct that could arise 
from unsatisfactory information prescribed by the order of arrest. 
    
According to numerous reliable reports, these legal provisions under Articles 93 and 
94 of the ICCP are routinely overlooked in practice.
144
 These reports repeatedly raise 
concern about the failure to inform the wanted person about reasons of arrest in 
practice.
145
  
      
As a result, the suggestion is that the ICCP must include clear text in which at the 
outset of proceedings, an arrestee should be orally notified by the arresting officer 
about reasons of arrest and also provided with the copy of the warrant. 
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 ICCP, Article 94(b). 
143
 The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 2011) 62. 
يونسلا ريرقتلا{ زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ- }ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو  
144
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, January 2012) 11; ibid 2011, 23; see also The Annual Reports of the Iraqi 
Ministry of Human Rights, and international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International dating to between 2004 and 2012. 
145
 Ibid. 
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b. Arrest without a warrant  
 
In a case of arrest without a warrant, there is no warrant about which to inform the 
person. It is noteworthy that there are no provisions under the ICCP about an 
important procedural safeguard that is reasons of an arrest must be made clear to the 
person arrested by the arresting officer. Therefore, the suggestions are that the 
member of law enforcement officials whilst conducting an arrest without order from 
judges must inform the person arrested about reasons for the arrest.
146
 An explicit text 
in the Code should be also enacted including that the arresting officer should orally 
put the reasons of arrest before a person arrested at the outset of proceedings.
147
 The 
omission of such duty must be not allowed even if the reason of arrest is clear.
148
  
 
In Iraqi law, however, under Article 123 of the ICCP, the earlier failings can be 
corrected when arrested persons either under arrest with or without warrant, are 
informed about reasons for their arrest during interrogation. According to the 
international standards, earlier failing can be corrected by giving enough information 
about the reason of arrest when an accused person is questioned about the alleged 
offence at a later time following the initial arrest.
149
 It is important to mention that 
when arrested persons are taken to the police station, their arrest must be brought to 
knowledge of investigating judges within 24 hours amenable to be renewed for 
additional day.
150
 The case of arrest then needs to be approved by the judges. In case 
the arrest was unlawful the investigating judge orders to release the person arrested 
immediately. However, over the last years, the failure to meet the provisions of law in 
practice has contravened the human rights of persons during an arrest and 
investigation.
151
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 As mentioned under the ICCP, an arrest without a warrant can be made in certain situations by law 
enforcement officials and citizens in limited circumstances. Thus it is safe to allude here that it is not 
practicable to suggest such important safeguard during a private person’s arrest.      
147
 Comparatively, see MCCP, 170(2).  
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 UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 26. 
149
 See Fox, Campbell and Hartley v the United Kingdom, (n 17) paras 40, 41; UN Human Rights 
Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) 31. 
150
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 19(13). 
151
 Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (n 124). 
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4.2.1.3. Detention following arrest 
 
Having been deprived of his liberty it is essential that an arrested person must not be 
held under restriction for longer than is necessary.
152
 Therefore, laws in most 
countries in order to protect personal liberty against the abuse of official authorities 
fixed a short period of time during which the arrested person must be brought before 
the “judge or other officer authorised by law.”153 This period between the first 
moments of an arrest and bringing persons before a judicial authority was not clear 
under Iraqi law. This could be attributed to the policy of the legislature at that time to 
provide more power to the official authority at the expense of due process. It was 
problematic that Iraqi law does not specify this period and as a result an arrested 
person when transferred from a long distance may have spent many days under arrest 
before being brought to a police station or a judiciary authority.  
 
Comparatively, most legislations around the world agree that where a suspect has 
been arrested, he must be brought to a designated place of detention and to be before a 
judge without delay, and prescribed shorter than forty-eight hours for this purpose. 
Under German Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 115 states that “the court shall 
examine the accused concerning the subject of the accusation without delay following 
the arrest and not later than on the following day.” Then, an investigating authority 
must question the suspect who is arrested and taken into custody during this period.
154
 
 
In reviewing the developments of Iraqi law it can be deduced that the ICCP does not 
fix the length of the period in which an arrested person must be promptly brought 
before a judicial authority. In 2005, the redress was made by the Iraqi Permanent 
Constitution in this regard. Therefore, in order to assess the factual situation of Iraqi 
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 The right to be brought promptly before a judge, ICCPR, 9(3). 
153
 See UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 34. 
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 German Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 115; Under French Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Article 63 states that “The person so placed in custody may not be held for more than twenty-four 
hours. However, the detention may be extended for a further period of up to twenty-four hours on the 
written authorisation of the district prosecutor”; In English law the general rule is that a suspect has the 
right to be not held in police detention without charge for more than a limited time of 24 hours whether 
the alleged offence is indictable or not. Under PACE Act 1984, the suspect can be held in the first 
instance for up to 24 hours from the relevant time if the offence is not an indictable one. Then the 
suspect may be detained without charge from 24 hours to 96 hours from the relevant time if the 
detention is still necessary and an alleged offence is an indictable one such as murder, rape, and 
complex fraud, which is investigated by police sufficiently. Thereafter, the decision of remand against 
a person who has been charged will convert to be taken by a competent court at later stage of 
proceedings.   
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law, the provisions of the ICCP and the Constitution must be analysed to determine 
whether or not current provisions comply with minimum requirements of the human 
rights standards.  
 
Article 123 of the ICCP stipulates that  
 
“The investigative judge or [judicial) investigator must question the accused 
within twenty-four hours of his attendance, after proving his identity and 
informing him of the offence of which he is accused. His statements on this 
should be recorded, with a statement of evidence in his favour. The accused 
should be questioned again if necessary to establish the truth.”155 
 
This Article sets out provisions upon which the person arrested shall be brought 
before the judicial authority for investigation and to confirm the arrest or release the 
arrested person if the arrest was unlawful. The provisions of Article, however, do not 
explain what the upper limit of time during which a person arrested must be brought 
before the judicial authority. The shortcomings in these provisions stem from the fact 
that when Article 123 of the ICCP stated “the suspect within twenty-four hours of his 
attendance” does not make clear what the “attendance” is. It is ambiguous whether the 
time of attendance runs to start from the initiation of an arrest when the wanted person 
was apprehended by the arresting officer, or from attendance at a police station where 
he is caught, or from attendance in police custody where he was sought or from the 
attendance of the arrested person into custody of the Investigation Court. 
 
In practice, the situation was that the police having controlled a person arrested they 
take him into police custody. From the initiation of a deprivation of liberty until 
bringing the arrested person under the control of judicial authority, the fact is that 
police need time during the collecting evidence stage and for bringing this person to 
the police custody where they were sought. For this reason the person under arrest 
may spend excessive periods of time in attendance before the judicial authority. In 
particular, where the arrest is conducted in the area far away from the place where the 
arrested person was sought. This means that detention after arrest likely takes several 
days before involving judicial authority.  
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 ICCP, Article 123. 
 املع هتطاحاو هتيصخش نم تبثتلا دعب هروضح نم ةعاس نيرشعو عبرا للاخ مهتملا بوجتسي نا ققحملا وا قيقحتلا مكاح ىلع{
سلا امزلا هاري اميف مهتملا باوجتسا ديعي نا هلو هنع اهيفنل ةلدا نم هيدل ام نايب عم اهنأشب هلاوقا نوديو .هيلا ةبوسنملا ةميرجلاب ءلاجت
}ةقيقحلا 
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Afterward, a police officer, without upper limited time, can bring the case of arrest 
before the investigating judge who orders to bring the arrested person within the 
period of twenty-four hours. As a result, in practice, the period of 24 hours indicated 
in the provisions of Article 123 of the ICCP namely starts to run, without addressing 
previous periods under arrest, from the moment of reading the case file by the 
investigating judge until personal attendance of the arrested person before the 
Investigating Court.  
 
This understanding of the legal provision under Article 123 was a shortcoming in the 
Iraqi legal system which in contrast with international human right standards resulted 
in massive violation of the right to liberty when persons under arrest could spend long 
period of time in custody before the judicial authority were involved. Here, it must be 
also born in mind that the relevant case-law of the HRC shows that the time is 
contextualised, i.e. there is no hard and fast rule and it is determined on a case-by-case 
verdicts.
156
 However, it is clear that the authorities have to act as expeditiously as 
possible.
157
 It should also be made clear that even if the initiation of an arrest lawfully 
takes place the subsequent deprivation of liberty following the initial arrest can be 
unlawful unless it is reasonable.
158
  
 
During the recent reform, other provisions have been enacted to correct the indicated 
shortcoming in the Iraqi criminal justice system. The new Constitution in Article 
19(13) states that 
 “The preliminary investigative documents shall be submitted to the competent 
judge in a period not to exceed twenty-four hours from the time of the arrest of 
the accused, which may be extended only once and for the same period.”159 
 
These new provisions, addressed the period that could be spent by an arrested person 
in custody before being brought before the judicial authority. According to the new 
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 See section one of this chapter, McLawrence v Jamaica UN Human right Committee 
Communication, (n 54) para 5.6; Kovaleva and Kozyar v Belarus UN Human right Committee 
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 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 19(13). 
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provisions, the detention after arrest or the period between the first moments of an 
arrest and bringing the wanted person before a judicial authority becomes clear under 
Iraqi law. Article 19(13) of the Constitution sets forty-eight hours of the initiation of a 
deprivation of liberty as the upper limit, during which the case of an arrest must be 
submitted to the investigating judge. Then, according to the provision of Article 123 
of the ICCP the investigating judge can order to bring the arrested person to the 
Investigation Court (office of investigating judge) for judicial interrogation within 
twenty-four hours, which start from the engagement of investigation judge by reading 
the case file.  
 
This time limit of detention following arrest is deemed a step in the right direction. 
Towards bringing the right to liberty in line with the international human rights norm 
and inspires the authorities to act as expeditiously as possible. But, this constitutional 
provision does not fully solve the problem. The fact is that the detention time 
following an arrest is still long, namely (72 hours), particularly in cases where an 
arrest takes place at weekends or holidays due to the initial hearing by investigating 
judge can only be made during the official working hours. Therefore, the ICCP should 
be revised to include that reviewing of legality of arrest by judicial authority could 
take place every day even during weekends and holidays.  The author of this research 
proposes that the arrested person has to be brought before the judge to conduct the 
initial hearing within 48 hours of the time of his arrest. 
 
Another defective line is that, the new reform does not clarify in detail the due 
proceedings that must be followed throughout the period of arrest until arriving at the 
police station.
160
 In this regard, the suggestion is that further legal reform requires to 
                                                 
160
 English law clearly elaborates the proceedings that must be followed throughout the period of arrest 
detention and its extensions. As the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 refers that the period of 
detention is usually calculated from the ''relevant time''. Such time starts on arrival at the first police 
station to which the suspect is taken after being arrested. If the suspect has been voluntarily at a police 
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sought, if the suspect is questioned about the offence, the time starts from the first arrival at a police 
station. If the suspect is not questioned about the alleged offence for which the arrest was made, then 
the relevant time starts from when the suspect first arrives at a police station where the arrest was 
sought, or if the suspect is not taken to such police station in the same situation mentioned above, the 
time starts directly after arrest occurred. The reason behind such rule may be to avoid any lateness of 
suspect inside detention. In addition, to put pressure on police to achieve their task at limited time 
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be made by which the efficient procedures have to be elaborated so that the period 
between the moment of arrest until bringing the suspect in the police station is to be 
adjusted. 
 
Furthermore, it is evident that there are cases in which provisions of the ICCP and the 
Constitution have been subjected to violation in practice, namely arrested persons 
spending long periods of time without being brought before the judges.
161
 
 
4.2.2. Rights in relation to detention  
 
 “Detention”162 can be understood as the period of time in which the suspect is held in 
police custody between arrest and judgment following trial and no matter how 
justified, places the individual in a very vulnerable position. Since the suspect retains 
the “presumption of innocence”, the restriction of his freedom must only be resorted 
under the right conditions. This sub-section is devoted to highlighting the Iraqi 
reformed criminal justice system and how it regulates detention. 
 
4.2.2.1. Detention is only to be ordered by the competent authority 
 
As long as an accused person is innocent until proven guilty by a fair hearing, the 
order of detention should be issued from the competent authority in precise legal 
                                                                                                                                            
especially when the suspect is released on bail and thereafter directly rearrested for another offence (the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s. 41). For more details see David Feldman, “Regulating 
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 ed., 2007, Cambridge University Press) 209; Michael Zander, the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (5
th
 ed., 2005, Sweet & Maxwell) 167. 
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 Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Tamyeez AlAthadia), Case number 505, General Commission on 
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Tamyeez), Case number 641/Cassation/ 78 on 30/5/1978.  }زييمتلا ةمكحم{ ; Court of Cassation (Mahkamat 
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 See, the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
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NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International dating to between 2004 and 2013. 
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that remand in custody during pre-trial investigation stage until the trial.” Ahmed Fathi Sorour, 
Mediator in the Code of Criminal Procedure (1986, Cairo, Dar Al Nahda Al-Arabiya) 637. 
رورس يحتف دمحا{,  ,ةيبرعلا ةضهنلا راد ,ةرهاقلا( ةيئانجلا تاءارجلاا نوناق يف طيسولا0981)133}  
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terms in order to protect innocent individuals against unlawful deprivation of liberty. 
There has been a major reform of the Iraqi justice system in this area. Only judges 
now order the pre-trial detention. Article 37(b) of the Iraq Permanent Constitution 
2005 confirms that “No person may be kept in custody or investigated except 
according to a judicial decision.”163 This is also affirmed in Article 15: “Every 
individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty. Deprivation or restriction of 
these rights is prohibited except in accordance with the law and based on a decision 
issued by a competent judicial authority.”164 
    
It follows that after arrest, no authority other than the judges can order the detention 
of a suspect under any circumstance. In addition, neither the “judicial investigators” 
nor the “police officers” whom the law may empower to conduct the investigation, 
have any authority to order detention without authorization from the judge. 
Consequently, it can be submitted that, from the viewpoint of due process rights, the 
new constitutional reform gives a person under investigation an important safeguard. 
The only judges who would be engaged at this stage would be investigating judge. 
Nonetheless, lack of respect for this development can be noted under both the existing 
legal framework regulating the pre-trial detention and in practice. This failure has 
negatively affected the right to be free from arbitrary detention.   
 
Persons could be detained under some provisions of Iraq law but these provisions do 
not accord with Article 37(c) and 15 of the Iraqi Permanent Constitution. 
Inconsistency with the Constitution arises due to the Executive branch still has the 
power of detention under many pieces of legislation. For example, the Customs Act 
No. 23 of 1984 provides Customs Officials with the power to detain persons instead 
of a competent judge.
165
 The jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court has 
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 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 37. 
{}يئاضق رارق بجومب لاا هعم قيقحتلا وأ دحا فيقوت زوجي لا  
164
 The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 15. 
ل{ نم رداص رارق ىلع ًءانبو ،نوناقلل ًاقفو لاإ اهدييقت وأ قوقحلا هذه نم نامرحلا زوجي لاو ،ةيرحلاو نملأاو ةايحلا يف قحلا درف لك
}ةصتخم ةيئاضق ةهج 
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 Article (237) (a) of the Customs Act No. 23 of 1984, provides that the detention is prohibited, 
except in the following cases: an offense of smuggling … a decision of detention can be issued by the 
Director-General. An unofficial translation in English is provided by the present author; similarly 
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No. 169 of 1997 which is still in force, published in 
the Official Gazette, issue 3696 of 17 November 1997. 
 فوقوملا مدقيو كلذب هلوخي نم وا ماعلا ريدملا نم فيقوتلا رارق ردصي  ... بيرهتلا مرج : ةيتلاا تلااحلا يف لاا فيقوتلا زوجي لا {
 ةمكحملا ىلاةيكرمجلا }هفيقوت خيرات نم مايا ةثلاث للاخ  
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recognised such problems and determined some provisions that give the Customs 
Officials power of detention under the Customs Act No. 23 of 1984 to be 
unconstitutional.
166
 Despite this, the offending provisions continue to remain in force, 
highlighting another problem of non-compliance with constitutional court decisions. 
Another example is that under the ICCP, the investigators rather than the judges have 
been given the power of detention in some circumstances.
167
 So this is 
unconstitutional, clearly inconsistent with Article 15 and 37 of the Permanent 
Constitution. As a matter of law, detentions carried out in accordance with 
unconstitutional provisions are unlawful, thus those provisions are inconsistent. 
 
Furthermore, practice is also problematic. Reputable reports from national and 
international human rights organizations continue to report repeated violations in this 
regard. UN human rights teams operating in Iraq have, during visits to places of 
detention, observed many instances in which the detainees seemed to be held in 
detention without any judicial orders. In 2010, a United Nations report stated that “in 
practice, it is difficult to ascertain whether warrants and detention orders are issued as 
required by the relevant laws, since accused persons are not usually furnished with 
copies.”168  
 
The suggestion is that the Federal Supreme Court needs to review unconstitutional 
laws. It has to repeal the unconstitutional laws and introduce new laws. The system 
must provide remedies for those who are unlawfully detained persons. Finally, no less 
importantly, sanctions for holding persons unlawfully in detention must take place. 
These proposals are necessary for the system to be consistent with the binding 
obligation under international human rights standards. 
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 Federal Supreme Court (AlMahkamah AlAthadia AlUlya), Case number 15 /2011 on 22 February 
2011 published in the High Judicial Council, The Judicial Bulletin (No. 17, the fourth year 2011 March 
and April) 16. 
 }ايلعلا ةيداحتلاا ةمكحملا{  
167
 ICCP, Article 112. 
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 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, 2010) 23; the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 2012) 12, 13; see also Amnesty International, New 
Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (n 124) 18, 29. 
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4.2.2.2. Detention must be exceptional 
 
As observed in the first section of this chapter, international rules require that 
resorting to detention must only take place in exceptional circumstances.
169
 In Iraq, 
detention is only possible for specific serious offences.
170
 In this context, the offences 
have been divided by the ICCP into three categories.  
 
In case the alleged offence is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding three 
years or life
171
, here the rule is that the investigating judge may detain the accused 
person, unless releasing from detention will not lead to his escape and will not 
prejudice the investigation. 
 
In case the alleged offence is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years the basic rule is that releasing the accused person on bail or 
without bail is mandatory unless this leads to an escape or harm to the investigation, 
i.e. Iraqi law imposes upon investigating judge to release the accused person on bail 
or without bail. In this case, as a result, releasing the accused person, like the 
international law, is the default position or general rule and the detention is 
exceptional. 
 
Lastly, in case the alleged offence either is punishable by death or lies in a limited 
category of offences, the investigating judge has no choice to determine the release 
either with or without bail at all pre-trial processes, i.e. the detention is mandatory.
172
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 The ICCPR, Article 9 (3); the HRC states that “pre-trial detention ... be an exception and as short as 
possible.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8, (n 15). 
170
 For minor offences, detention is permissible if the suspect has no place of residence; ICCP, Article 
110 (b) states, “If the person arrested is accused of an infraction, he may not be held in detention unless 
he has no particular place of residence.”  
}نيعم ةماقا لحم هل نكي مل اذا لاا هفيقوت زوجي لاف ةفلاخمب امهتم هيلع ضوبقملا ناك اذا{ 
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 The imprisonment for life is defined in Article 87 of Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 to mean “20 years 
in prison rather than life which means life” 
172
 ICCP, Article (109) states that: 
“a. If the person arrested is accused of an offence punishable by a period of detention exceeding 3 years 
or by imprisonment for a term of years or life imprisonment, the judge may order that he be held for a 
period of no more 15 days on each occasion or order his release on a pledge with or without bail from a 
guarantor, and that he attend then requested if the judge rules that release of the accused will not lead to 
his escape and will not prejudice the investigation. 
b. If the person arrested is accused of an offence punishable by death the period stipulated in sub-
paragraph A may be extended for as long as necessary for the investigation to proceed until the 
investigative judge or criminal court issues a decision on the case on completion of the preliminary or 
judicial investigation or the trial.” 
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These offences include, for example, murder and knowingly handling stolen goods or 
handling a vehicle derived from a felony. In these alleged crimes, the accused person 
must be detained without being released on bail until the investigation of his case is 
complete.
173
 It is apparent from these provisions that investigating judges have been 
given excessive power of detention where they can keep an accused person in 
detention on the mere fact that he is under suspicion of committing a serious crime. 
Denying bail in these non-bailable offences on this basis along with a lack of legal 
provisions with regard to elaborate alternatives to detention is a notable cause for 
concern, which adversely impacts the right to liberty under which the detention 
should be an exceptional measure.  
 
Furthermore, practice is also problematic. Excessively resorting to detention during 
the pre-trial investigation stage has been recognised by domestic and international 
reputable organizations. In 2010, as noted by the Ministry of Human Rights, 75% of 
persons (14231) who were under detention were released without charge or any 
further action.
174
 It can be deduced that investigating judges deem detention as an 
easy action which they can frequently order during the pre-trial investigation. While 
under international standards detention must be the last resort. 
 
Many causes underlie excessive resorting to detention including that notion that the 
system still adopts old traditional methods of criminal investigation, hence systemic 
failure to establish modern development measures to deal with serious crimes provide 
                                                                                                                                            
 ا{–  دبؤملا وا تقؤملا نجسلاب وا تاونس ثلاث ىلع ديزت ةدم سبحلاب اهيلع بقاعم ةميرجب امهتم هيلع ضوبقملا صخشلا ناك اذا
 صخش ةلافكب نورقم دهعتب هحارس قلاطا ررقي وا ةرم لكي ف اموي رشع ةسمخ ىلع ديزت لا ةدم هفيقوتب رمأي نا يضاقللف
نم بلط ىتم رضحي ناب اهنودب وا نماض ريسب رضي لاو هبوره ىلا يدؤي لا مهتملا حارس قلاطا نا يضاقلا دجو اذا كلذ ه
 ب .قيقحتلا–  ةرورض كلذ تضتقا املك هفيقوت ديدمتو مادعلإاب اهيلع بقاعم ةميرجب امهتم ناك اذا هيلع ضوبقملا فيقوت بجي
ب لصاف رارق ردصي ىتح ا ةرقفلا يف اهيلع صوصنملا ةدملا ةاعارم عم قيقحتلا دعب ةيئازجلا ةمكحملا وا قيقحتلا مكاح نم هنأش
}ةمكاحملا وا يئاضقلا وا يئادتبلاا قيقحتلا ءاهتنا 
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 The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 2010) 77. 
يونسلا ريرقتلا{ زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ- ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو}  
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a notable reason to keep persons under detention.
175
 Investigating judges widely use 
detention for the purpose of protecting persons under investigation from the reprisal 
of individuals or victims of crimes. Cultural norms and traditions pose a real 
challenge on the legal system measures because investigating judges are usually under 
indirect pressure to use harsh measures in dealing with accused persons under 
investigation in serious crimes, particularly with regard to investigations against 
terrorism and other national security crimes. 
 
UNAMI continues to find after many years of inspection that there is a notable 
preference to hold people in detention.
176
 As a result, the author’s research proposes 
further reform in which the criminal justice system must adopt appropriate non-
custodial measures as an alternative to keep persons accused under detention. 
 
4.2.2.3. Period of detention 
 
As has been repeatedly emphasized, detention places a person in position of great 
vulnerability to abuse. Accordingly, even if there are genuine suspicions, it should not 
be automatic for a person to be deprived of liberty or simply for no purpose of 
conducting an investigation. This brings us to urge that if detention is necessary it has 
to be an exceptional measure and hence its period has to be restricted to the minimum 
level.
177
  
 
Under Iraqi law, the order of detention takes place, after a judicial investigating 
review, only under necessary reasons. The ICCP in Article 109 (c) states that:  
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 The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 2010) 87;  
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this chapter. 
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“The total period of detention should not exceed one quarter of the maximum 
permissible sentence for the offence with which the arrested person is charged 
and should not, in any case, exceed 6 months. If it is necessary to increase the 
period of detention to more than 6 months, the judge must submit the case to the 
criminal court to seek permission for an appropriate extension, which must not 
itself exceed one quarter of maximum permissible sentence, or he should order 
his release, with or without bail.”178 
 
Analysis of this Article deduces that as a general rule, Iraqi law provides upper limits 
for the period of detention. In addition, this Article prescribes the procedures followed 
in order to extend the detention. Most importantly, a judicial periodic review must 
take place every 15 days.  
 
However, almost all international and national human rights organisations are still 
continuing to report their deep concern with regard to on-going aggressive practice of 
prolonged periods of pre-trial detention in the post-Saddam justice system.
179
 It is 
common that “suspects are frequently arrested and detained without warrants and that 
detainees are often held for prolonged periods without charge or trial.”180 The UN 
experts throughout the eighteen public reports over the last ten years substantiated that 
a considerable number of detainees may spend long periods of detention without 
being brought before an investigating judge.
181
 For instance, in May 2012 UNAMI 
reported that “pretrial detention periods frequently exceed what is reasonable.”182 
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 ICCP, 109(c). 
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accessed 14 September 2012.  
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 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, May 2012) 11. 
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Recently, in 2013 UNAMI noted that prolonged periods in pre-trial detention are 
common across Iraq.
183
 
 
Furthermore, the Minister for the Ministry of Human Rights, during a television 
interview, confirmed these reports and further admitted that there are detainees who 
have spent five years under pre-trial detention without their case having been 
terminated yet.
184
 
 
It is important to be noted that UNAMI and the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights 
regularly reported figures and statistics, which provided by Iraqi government illustrate 
the total number of detainees but their reports do not include statistics about the length 
of detention. Although there is a lack of statistics about the length of detention, it is 
evident that excessive pre-trial detention is common in Iraq. It appears that many 
factors underlie length of detention.  
 
In the view of the present author, a key contributing factor is the lack of 
accountability to those who are responsible for the excessive custody time limits. The 
legal responsibility may be split between different agencies and thus it seems not clear 
who is responsible for holding accused persons in the excessive pre-trial detention. 
However, it is obvious that investigating judges are not doing their job in this regard 
properly, particularly under the provision of the ICCP the investigation is carried out 
directly under their control.
185
 In consequence, reform is urgent to address this 
problem by enacting provisions, which remove such lack of clarity and by which 
those who are responsible for excessive pre-trial detention must be held accountable.  
 
In addition, the Iraqi legal system does not make clear the consequences of excessive 
pre-trial detention. Thus, reform is urgent to address this issue by prescribing strict 
proceedings that should be followed after prolonging the period of detention; 
particularly the system must properly identify those excessively detained and provide 
remedies. 
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 See Chapter Three; Article 51 of the ICCP. 
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Let us turn to consider legal framework. As mentioned above, the ICCP provides the 
general rule about the upper limits of the detention period. However, the legal 
framework opens the way to the excessive use of pre-trial detention. In offences 
punishable by death or placed in a limited category, as mentioned above, the pre-trial 
release with or without bail is not possible until the investigating judge or court ends 
the case.
186
   
 
Iraqi law provides that before the accused person is referred to the competent court at 
the end of pre-trial investigation stage, the investigating judge can prolong the length 
of detention many times. The detention must be reviewed every fifteen days. At the 
end, the total extended period must not exceed a quarter of the maximum penalty for 
the alleged offence and that in any event, the length of detention should not exceed six 
months.  
 
The cause for concern is that the ICCP after placing the upper limits on the period of 
detention in Article 109(c), the second part of these legal provisions left the upper 
limits to open the way for a long time of the detention that can be decided under the 
discretion of the judge. It is problematic that an extension of detention for more than 
six months is possible. In this instance, the investigating judge only needs permission 
from the Felony Court to authorize a further extension for an appropriate new period 
of the detention.
187
 This period is not mentioned in the ICCP. The Code only mentions 
that it should not exceed a quarter of the maximum penalty listed in the Penal Code 
for the alleged offence. Hence, Iraqi law does not set out the clear maximum period 
for pre-trial detention and gives wide discretion to the judge in this regard. In some 
countries such as in the Philippines, the legal provisions provide for a maximum of 11 
months between arrest and promulgation of the decision of the court.
188
 Thus, like the 
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case in these countries it is necessary for the Iraqi justice system to provide a limited 
period of pre-trial detention not to be exceeded. 
 
Similarly, inadequate review of orders and periods of detention is another factor 
which may contribute in causing excessive pre-trial detention; particularly such 
reviews are, under the Iraqi legal system, usually conducted by judges without 
personal attendance of the accused before the court. 
 
When the detention takes place the period of detention will be amenable to being 
extended. In the meantime, it is important to note that it is possible for the 
investigating judge to review the legality of detention in each time the extension of 
detention takes place; namely every fifteen days. In addition, it is possible to review 
the legality of detention and applying with a release via an application that can be 
submitted by the accused person, or his lawyer on his behalf. Therefore, it may be 
possible to say that this is consistent with international rules. However, it is 
problematic that the review of the legality of detention can be carried out without the 
personal attendance of detainees. Iraqi law does not provide any legal basis on which 
detainees must appear before the competent authority while doing such a review, nor 
that their lawyer can represent them, and such reviews are only carried out on paper. 
This may be exacerbated by the systematic denial of other rights; for example the 
failure to inform detainees about their rights, denial of access to legal assistance and 
communication with others severely impacted on the right of review of an order of 
detention.  
 
It seems also that there is a problem about the independence and impartiality of the 
authority that conducts the review of the legality of detention. The judicial authority, 
according to the Iraqi legal system, supervises the deprivation of liberty and so the 
investigating judge, who is the leader of the investigation, is entitled both functions; 
to determine the detention in the first place and also to periodically review the legality 
of detention at later time during the pre-trial detention stage. 
 
Therefore, it is usual practice that, when the investigating judge decides the detention 
or the extension of a detention period in the first place, he is going to refuse any 
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application regarding a review of such detention later.
189
 Such extension to the 
detention time automatically occurs on the case file during periodic reviews every 
fifteen days. What makes the problem worse is that even when the detainee or his 
legal representative appeals the decision, this is likely to take a long time and may be 
more than the period of detention itself. In addition, the appeal procedures will be 
done only on paper without the presence of the detainee or the representative on his 
behalf. 
 
As a result, urgent improvement needs to be made. The suggestion for this purpose is 
that, the new reform needs to set up the maximum period of detention. The main 
argument in favour of the limited time of detention is that it would hopefully inspire 
the investigation authority to carry out their task properly and also protects a person 
under investigation against unlawful detention. It is right to submit that the short time 
of detention may enforce the investigation authority to achieve its task and complete 
the investigation at a reasonable time. At the same time, it is necessary that the 
implementation must be adjusted to be consistent with the provisions of law. 
 
4.3. Evaluation under international human rights law 
 
It has been previously shown that Iraqi law does regulate the procedure for 
deprivation of liberty. This of course is one of the most important requirements of 
international rules that impose obligation on a State to elaborate the substantive and 
procedural rules upon which a person could be deprived of his liberty. However, it 
seems that in the Iraqi justice system, the right of liberty is less valued than under 
international rules. We have seen this from the proceeding scrutiny of verity aspects 
in law and practice.  
 
It is problematic in the Iraqi legal system that arrest with a lack of reviewing available 
information could be conducted against the liberty of individuals. As outlined above, 
in actual practice high number of persons were unnecessarily arrested and detained. 
Over the last decade, there were a significant proportion of detainees who were never 
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 174 
 
charged or released without further action as a result of a lack of evidence.
190
 This 
violates the right to liberty of persons and the principle of presumption of innocence 
recognised under international human rights law. It is important to note that arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty arises not just from a flawed legal regime but also from 
implementation. Hence, arrest and detention must not be simply for questioning 
without a reliable information and evidence that establish reasonable suspicion against 
a person arrested. In the same vein, “arrest first, investigative late” is usual practice 
and thus reduction of the use of pre-trial detention before investigation is very 
important.   
 
A flawed legal regime is a notable part of the problem as well. The amount of 
discretion given to the members of official authority to use the power of arrest plays 
an important role against liberty of persons. Some of the provisions of Iraqi law, as 
have been previously discussed, authorising police with the power to arrest without a 
warrant and outside the scope of flagrante delicto, particularly the provisions of the 
Article 41 and the second part of Article 103 of the ICCP. Empowering deprivation of 
liberty under these provisions outside the scope of flagrante delicto offences is not in 
line with the value of the right to liberty under the international human rights law. In 
the view of the present author, these provisions inconsistent with international 
standard because lead to arbitrary arrest and detention.
191
 As a result, the suggestion is 
that the police power should be reduced to minimum and Iraqi legislature should 
rigorously limit the wide power of arrest without order by judges. The judicial 
authority must also provide effective control on law enforcement officials to protect 
individuals against their excessive powers in practice.   
 
Furthermore it can be suggested that, the dictatorship having been removed, the right 
to liberty is enshrined in the Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005. The Federal Supreme 
Court (Almahkama Al-Itahadiya Al-Olya) has been convened, and one of its tasks is to 
                                                 
190
 The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 2010) 76, 77. 
يونسلا ريرقتلا{ زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ-  }ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو  
191
 HRC recognised that “When private individuals or entities are authorized by a State party to 
exercise powers of arrest or detention, the State party remains responsible for adherence to article 9. It 
must rigorously limit those powers and must provide strict and effective control to ensure that those 
powers are not misused, and do not lead to arbitrary or unlawful arrest or detention.” UN Human 
Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 10. 
 175 
 
consider the constitutionality of laws.
192
 Therefore, individuals, civil-society and 
human rights organisations could challenge these defective rules. It may be well to 
follow proceedings against any legal rules that are in contradiction with the 
Constitution in order to obtain a decision in which the Federal Supreme Court can 
declare the unconstitutionality of such rules. Even though it has not been active 
enough due to the fact that it relies on cases being brought before it the present 
research draws attention to the possibility of improving little by little.  
 
The aforesaid brings us to an important note that the protection of the right to liberty 
should be secured to move further and further away from the time of the Ba’ath 
regime. It goes without saying that, in the former era, the brutal violence to liberty 
was a systemic phenomenon in law and in practice. The difference at the present time 
is that even though the arbitrary deprivation of liberty widely happens, addressing 
these defective issues is possible and the constitutional review is one of the attempts 
to do so. Consequently, it can be suggested that even though this approach is not part 
of the Iraqi culture, the constitutional review needs to be activated in order to 
challenge any unconstitutional rules that may violate the right to liberty of Iraqis. In 
order to enable people to do this of course efficient guidance and support in how to do 
it must be provided.         
 
As elaborated above there are no provisions under the ICCP that impose a duty upon 
the arresting officer to notify reasons of an arrest for a person under arrest. Failure to 
inform the reasons for arrest would violate international rules under Article 9(2) of the 
ICCPR. Bearing in mind that this flaw can be fixed when arrested persons either 
under arrest with or without warrant, under provisions of the Article 123 of the ICCP, 
must be informed about the reasons for their arrest during judicial interrogation after 
police investigations. The shortcoming, however, is that the notifying, when it takes 
place might be too late after a noticeable period has elapsed. It is better for Iraqi law 
to make clear that notifying the arrested person the reason for arrest must be provided 
upon arrest. 
 
                                                 
192
 See Article 93 of the Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005. 
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It is problematic that persons arrested could spend a long time in police custody 
before they are brought before the judicial authority. In post-Saddam reform, an 
attempt to correct the indicated shortcomings in the Iraqi criminal justice system is 
made by the new Iraqi Permanent Constitution.  According to Article 19(13) of the 
Constitution police have duties to bring the case of an arrest before the investigating 
judge within forty-eight hours as the upper limit from time of an arrest. Then, 
according to the provision of Article 123 of the ICCP the investigating judge can 
order to bring the arrested person to the Investigation Court (office of investigating 
judge) for interrogation within twenty-four hours, which start from his reading the 
case file.  
 
The author of this research proposes that further legal reforms are required to be 
made. Like the case under practice of international bodies and many countries around 
the world the arrested person has to be brought before the judge to conduct the initial 
hearing within 48 hours of the time of the arrest even during weekends and holidays.   
 
The right to liberty seems also negatively affected by the fact that the investigating 
judge, who controls investigations, is entitled both functions to determine the 
detention in the first place and subsequently to review the legality of detention at the 
pre-trial investigation stage as well. In addition, when detention takes place the 
investing judge has a duty to conduct fortnightly review of it. It is likely that, when 
the investigating judge decides detention in the first place or continued detention 
period, he is going to refuse any application regarding a review of such detention 
later. This could affect independence and impartiality of the authority that conducts 
the review of the legality of detention. 
 
In addition, Iraqi law does not provide any legal basis on which a detainee could 
physically appear before the competent authority while doing such reviews of 
detention, nor that his lawyer can represent him, i.e. such review is only done on 
paper. Furthermore, the systematic denial of other rights severely impacts judicial 
review of detentions; particularly denial of access to legal assistance or 
communication with others. Above all, it is obvious that violation of this right is usual 
practice. Consequently, these shortcomings are inconsistent with the protection of 
human rights enshrined in international rules under Article 9(4) of the ICCPR and 
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hence it can be proposed that the post-Saddam system needs further reform to 
improve the right under consideration by identifying clear procedural safeguards for a 
proper judicial review of detentions.  
 
The reformed criminal justice system in Iraq includes in law and implementation 
complex measures that may frustrate the release of the detainee on bail. As discussed 
above, reliable reports have illustrated the concern regarding vast number of detainees 
whose rights to release on bail have been extensively overlooked. UNAMI has 
consistently reported that “a reluctance to utilise bail provisions where appropriate” 
results in excessive delays for persons in pre-trial detention.
193
  
 
The presumption of innocence is breached in a number of offences, which have been 
deemed non-bailable offences. On the contrary, the practice of the HRC makes clear 
that “there should not be any offences for which pre-trial detention is obligatory.”194 
Pre-trial detention should not be ordered solely on the basis of the severity of the 
potential sentence.
195
 The HRC states that “the Committee considers it a matter of 
concern that the duration of pre-trial detention is determined by reference to the 
possible length of sentence following conviction rather than the need to bring the 
detainee before the courts.”196 “Detention must be based on an individualized 
determination that it is reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances.”197 
Moreover, according to the HRC other measures could be taken other than detention 
to prevent the possibility of trying to abscond.
198
  
 
As a result, it is recommended that the presumption must always be in favour of 
release and detention must be the exception.
199
 For this purpose, these legal provisions 
                                                 
193
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, January 2011) 23 and (Baghdad, June 2013) 7. 
194
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations: Panama’ (Ninety-second session, 17 
April 2008) CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3, para. 12; UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations: 
Argentina’ (Seventieth session, 15 November 2000) CCPR/CO/70/ARG, para. 10. 
195
 UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 39; see also practice of 
ECtHR in Letellier v France App no 12369/86 (ECtHR, 26 June 1991), (1992) 14 EHRR 83 para 43. 
196
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations: Argentina’ (n 194) para. 10. 
197
 UN Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 39;   
198
 Eligio Cedeño v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela UN Human Rights Committee Communication 
(1940/2010) 29 October 2012 para 7.10.  
199
 Juan Peirano Basso v Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee, (n 87) para 10.2; Michael and Brian 
Hill v Spain UN Human Rights Committee, (n 41) para 12.3; See also Castravet v Moldova (n 93) para 
30. 
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in violation of obligations under Article 9(3) of the ICCPR must be repealed, and that 
Article 109 of the ICCP must be redrafted. In addition legal provisions with regard to 
elaborate alternatives to detention are also important. It may well be that the release of 
persons from detention can be subjected to any other guarantees of appearance. In this 
respect, interesting alternatives of detention established by various regional and 
international documents can be adopted in the national justice systems. These 
alternatives include for example methods “based on new technology, such as 
electronic monitoring, making use of a GPS system.”200 By the same token, an 
observation of practice by the international human rights bodies and the rules of 
international criminal tribunals could also illustrate some interesting alternatives to 
detention.
201
 These are electronic bracelets ‘tags’ and other conditions such as a 
suspect being held at a limited area or put under the supervision of official 
authority.
202
  
 
Finally, Iraqi law does not establish the clear maximum length of pre-trial detention. 
As outlined above, over the last ten years, the Iraqi system has fallen short of these 
mentioned international rules under which the accused person has to be either released 
and his case to be closed or referred to trial. Consequently, the suggestion for the Iraqi 
justice system to be in line with international due process regarding the right to trial 
within a reasonable time under Article 9(3) of the ICCPR is that Iraqi law should set 
out maximum length of detention for persons detained pending trial.
203
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 Karel de Meester et al., “Chapter 3, Investigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest, and Surrender” (n 98) 
346. 
201
 See the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 119; see also ibid.  
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 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations: Argentina’ (n 92) CCPR/ C/ARG/CO/4 
para. 16; UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations, Panama’ (n 194) para. 12; 
Smantser v Belarus UN Human Rights Committee, (n 92) para 10.3; UN Human Rights Committee, 
Draft General Comment No 35, (n 2) para. 39. 
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 It also may be important that the periods of detention which may be spent during other stages of 
proceedings such as these which may be spent during the trial stage until the final verdict is decided, 
are of particular importance to be within a scope of a limited period.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THIRD PARTY ACCESS RIGHTS IN THE REFORMED IRAQI 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
The third party access rights that includes the rights of access to a lawyer and an 
interpreter, is crucial in criminal proceedings. For the purposes of this chapter, these 
two guarantees of persons accused during the pre-trial investigation stage are of 
particular significance. The chapter endeavours to identify and discuss these rights in 
order to ascertain the extent to which the post-Saddam justice system in Iraq is 
compliant with international standards.  
 
The question to be addressed is whether post-Saddam reform fully brings the 
contemporary legal system in line with the international due process in relation to 
third party access rights or still falls short of international rules. The answer needs 
analysis and identifying the issues in the law and practice for redressing any 
weaknesses and fault lines.  
 
A claim that could be asserted here is that in post-Saddam Iraq, the situation regarding 
the right of access to a third party at the pre-trial stage is still non-compliant with 
international human right rules. In order to test the correctness of this claim, the 
chapter is divided in the following three sections. The first one considers the 
protection of the right as it exists under international law. The second section, 
considers present Iraqi law and practice, and a third section considers this new Iraqi 
system in light of international rules.  
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5.1. International rules 
 
5.1.1. Right of access to a lawyer 
 
A person under investigation is usually in a vulnerable position at the outset of the 
proceedings.
1
 The risk of mistreatment in custody at this stage is usually more likely 
and thus the right to prompt legal assistance is of crucial importance. At this stage a 
suspect may not know the accusation against him and be under grave danger of 
making irreparable confession resulting from great emotional pressure. For these 
reasons, denying legal assistance at this stage might mean a notable violation of the 
rights of persons under criminal investigation, especially the protection against self-
incrimination. It is certainly correct to presume that a suspect who is provided with 
the legal assistance promptly at the outset of the proceedings, immediately before any 
interrogation taking place, would be less likely to be a victim of invalid confession or 
improper interrogation.
2
 
 
The presence of a lawyer during questioning not only provides a suspect with much-
needed advice, but also helps to minimize the risk of oppressive interrogation. 
Otherwise, preventing a person under investigation from access to a lawyer in this 
stage of proceedings may result in an unreliable confession, a wrong conviction and a 
miscarriage of justice. Thus, the safeguards for persons under investigation can only 
be properly secured after he has received legal assistance. What follows is that 
denying the present right at the initial stage of the police interrogation can lead to 
breach other rights of the accused person.
3
 A further issue is that denying such a right 
at this stage of the proceedings would be contrary to international rules, as upheld by 
relevant international bodies such as the HRC and ECtHR.  
 
The right to legal assistance has been recognized under provisions of a fair trial in 
accordance with Article 14 paragraph (3) of the ICCPR which states that: 
                                                 
1
 Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008), (2009) 49 EHRR 19 para 54; Layla 
Skinns, “I’m a Detainee; Get Me Out of Here” (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 412. 
2
 Columbia Law Review Association, “The Right to Non-Legal Counsel during Police Interrogation 
Source” (1970) 70, Columbia Law Review 758 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1121313> accessed 
18/06/2012. 
3
 Ed Cape, Improving Pretrial Justice: The Roles of Lawyers and Paralegals (2012, Open Society 
Foundations) 14. 
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 “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled (b) [...] to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; [...] (d) to be 
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance 
of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this 
right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.”4  
 
The guarantees that underlie this Article require the following to be discussed: 
 
5.1.1.1. Right to legal assistance from the outset of the proceedings 
 
From the Article indicated above, the right of access to a lawyer is protected by 
international rules, and it is considered a fundamental right. However, the wording of 
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR does not guarantee this right from the beginning of 
proceedings at the pre-trial stage but explicitly guarantees this right for a person under 
criminal charge. Hence the question, first of all, is whether the suspect’s right of 
defending himself through legal assistance is available only at trial or at all stages of 
criminal proceedings. In this regard, it can be assumed that like other rights of a 
suspect having been given under international rules in the context of fair trial, the 
right to the counsel has not been exactly mentioned in the pre-trial investigation stage 
from the outset of criminal proceedings. Yet, it is certainly incorrect to claim that the 
right to legal assistance may solely be relevant to the accused at trial stage.
5
  
 
It can be argued that the right to a lawyer under the provision of a fair hearing applies 
from the outset of criminal proceedings being taken place by the police. The argument 
can be evidenced from the jurisprudence of the HRC. The HRC makes it clear that the 
                                                 
4
 Similarly see, ECHR, Article 6(3) which states that “everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights: ... (c) To defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require...”. 
5
 In G v UK (1983) 35 DR 75, the UK government adopted this view. According to Starmer (former 
UK Director of Public Prosecutions): the UK government argued that Article 6(3) (c) should only 
apply when it is clear that a trial would take place. However, that position is no longer sustainable, G v 
UK  held that the right to legal assistance is relevant to the accused person at the outset of proceedings 
in police custody; Keir Starmer, European Human Rights Law (1999, Legal Action Group) 245. 
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accused person should be granted prompt access to a lawyer because this right can be 
applied at all stage of criminal proceedings.
6
  
The HRC held that the right of access to counsel under Article 14, paragraph 3 (b), 
was breached after the request for this right had been ignored by police throughout 
five days from the time of arrest.
7
 In another decision, it found that “the denial of 
access to a lawyer of choice until the trial stage constitutes a violation … of the 
Covenant.”8 What is more, in the view of the HRC, a state party must ensure that a 
suspect has access to a lawyer from the start of his detention.
9
 This makes clear that 
the right to legal assistance is applicable to a suspect at the pre-trial stage once he is 
arrested and taken to a police station for questioning.  
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is also illustrative of the right. There is no express 
right of access to a lawyer at pre-trial stage enshrined in the ECHR. However, in the 
case of Salduz v Turkey the Grand Chamber of European Court of the Human Rights 
unanimously held that: 
‘‘The safeguards of art. 6 apply not merely to the criminal trial but also to the 
pre-trial procedures that have a bearing on the trial. In particular, early access to 
a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards stemming from the privilege against 
self-incrimination. The investigation stage is important for the preparation of 
criminal proceedings, and … an accused often finds himself in a particularly 
vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is 
amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become 
increasingly complex … In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be 
properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer.”10  
 
                                                 
6
 Eustace Henry and Everald Douglas v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(571/1994) 25 July 1996; Panovits v Cyprus App no 4268/04 (ECtHR, 11 December 2008) paras 6.3, 
9.2; Borisenko v Hungary UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (852/1999) 14 October 
2002 para 7.5 which states that “the Committee has made it clear that it is incumbent upon the State 
party to ensure that legal representation provided by the State guarantees effective representation … 
legal assistance should be available at all stages of criminal proceedings.” 
7
 Paul Anthony Kelly v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (537/1993) 15 
February 1993 para 9.2; Gridin v Russian Federation UN Human Rights Committee Communication 
No (770/1997) 20 July 2000 para 8.5, in both of these two cases the HRC deemed that the right of 
access to a lawyer was violated when the police had failed to provide a lawyer for five days from the 
time of arrest. 
8
 Sandzhar Ismailov v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1769/2008) 25 
March 2011 para 7.4. 
9
 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observation: Gabon’ (10/11/2000) CCPR/CO/70/GAB, 
para.13.  
10
 Salduz v Turkey (n 1) paras 50-63. For comment on this case see Andrew J. Ashworth “Right to Fair 
Trial” (2010) Criminal Law Review 421; similarly see Plonka v Poland App no 20310/02 (ECtHR, 31 
March 2009) para 35; Shabelnik v Ukraine App no 16404/03 (ECtHR, 19 February 2009) paras 52, 53. 
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The duty of providing a lawyer to a suspect at the police station after arrest is very 
important and can only be subject to restriction for good cause. Thus, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR rightly stated that:  
 
“The legal principle to be derived from the judgment is therefore that, normally 
and apart from exceptional limitations, an accused person in custody is entitled, 
right from the beginning of police custody or the pre-trial detention, to be visited 
by defence counsel to discuss everything concerning his defence and his 
legitimate needs.”11 
Similarly, Ashworth points out that 
“A suspect should be granted access to legal advice from the moment he is taken 
into police custody or the pre-trial detention. It would be regrettable if the 
impression were to be left by the judgment that no issue could arise under Art. 6 
as long as a suspect was given access to a lawyer at the point when his 
interrogation began or that Art. 6 was engaged only where the denial of access 
affects the fairness of the interrogation of the suspect.”12   
 
It seems to be that the reason behind recognizing this safeguard for a suspect at the 
outset of deprivation of liberty in a police station, is concern to protect fundamental 
rights. Access to a lawyer prepares the defence and also deters abuse. Safferling 
asserts that  
“The whole inquiry is intended to determine the legal and factual basis for trial 
by obtaining evidence and preparing court procedure. The foundations for 
potential conviction are being laid here. It is a crucial stage for the suspect ... 
Therefore, already at this stage the suspect must be assisted by legal counsel.”13  
 
In light of the above, the legal assistance of the accused person has been rightly 
deemed one of the most significant rights during the pre-trial stage and police 
investigatory process. Beyond this, it is not surprising that treaties do not lay down 
limits within which a person must have access to a lawyer; these are a matter for 
domestic laws. Nevertheless, as noted, there is a clear demand from the HRC and the 
ECtHR that access to a lawyer must be “prompt” and automatically follows the 
deprivation of liberty. The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers is relevant as 
best practice.
14
 It provides that persons deprived of liberty must have legal assistance 
                                                 
11
 Salduz v Turkey (n 1). 
12
 Andrew J. Ashworth “Right to Fair Trial” (n 10) 421. 
13
 Christoph Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (2001, Oxford University Press) 
106. 
14
 Principle 1 provides that “All persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their 
choice to protect and establish their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings.” 
The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 
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of their own choice upon arrest.
15
 According to principle 7 a State must ensure 
“prompt access to a lawyer and in any case not later than forty-eight hours from the 
time of arrest or detention.”16 Also, in 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
suggested a 24 hour limit to be given access to a lawyer.
17
  
 
In Chikunova v Uzbekistan, the HRC found that the delay in providing the suspect 
with a lawyer within two days after his arrest was a violation of the concerned right.
18
 
The HRC in the case of Kasimov v Uzbekistan, deemed Article 14(3)(d) to be violated 
when legal representation had not been provided to the accused for ten days from 
arrest.
19
 Similarly, the HRC in the case of Kandarov v Tajikistan, upheld that the right 
was violated when legal representation was not provided to the accused for thirteen 
days after the time of arrest.
20
 In light of such jurisprudence, the conclusion is that the 
assistance of a lawyer should be provided promptly at the outset of proceedings and 
any reason for delay should be avoided.        
In light of the above considerations, the present author is of the view that, the 
international rules and their application by international bodies make it clear that there 
is a right to prompt legal assistance, and that right is triggered from the moment a 
person is deprived of liberty.    
 
                                                                                                                                            
1990); see also UN General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (9 December 1988) principle 17 states that “A 
detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel.”   
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 Ibid, principle 5. 
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 Ibid, principle 7. 
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 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, 
Theo van Boven, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 2002/38 Addendum E/CN.4/2003/68/ 
Add.1, February 27, 2003, para. 26(g), at <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=3360> 
accessed 19 January 2014. 
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 Chikunova v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1043/2002) 16 March 
2007 para 7.4; see also UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observation: Gabon’ (10/11/2000) 
(n 9) para.13.  
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 Kasimov v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1378/2005) 30 July 2009 
para 9.6. 
20
 Iskandarov v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1499/2006) 30 March 
2011 para 6.1; see also Borisenko v Hungary UN Human Rights Committee, (n 6) para 7.5. 
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5.1.1.2. Right of notification to access legal assistance 
 
As demonstrated above, the right of access to a lawyer has to be provided at all stages 
of criminal procedures. For this to be effective, the accused needs to be notified about 
availability of this guarantee at an early stage of proceedings. In this respect, the Open 
Society Justice Initiative asserts that the travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR 
demonstrate that “the right to be informed of the right to legal assistance is ‘self-
evident’. The person should be informed promptly about this right upon arrest.”21 The 
UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers provides that the responsibility of a State 
in criminal justice matters is not only to provide an accused with this safeguard but 
also to notify him about the right of access to a lawyer promptly at the outset of the 
proceedings.
22
  
 
The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, also, provides that “he shall be informed of his right by 
the competent authority promptly after arrest and shall be provided with reasonable 
facilities for exercising it.”23 The HRC, therefore, upheld the view that it was a 
violation of Article 14(3) (d), when the suspect had not informed of his right to legal 
representation and this right should be available throughout the stages of proceedings 
“also to any preliminary hearing relating to the case.”24 Similarly, in the case of 
Andrei Khoroshenko v Russian Federation, the Committee also found a violation of 
the Covenant in the event of the accused not being informed of his right to have a 
lawyer at the initial stage of the process of arrest.
25
   
 
What is more, it is important that the accused person must be informed of the right to 
be freely assisted by a legal representative at the initial phase of the proceedings 
                                                 
21
 Open Society Justice Initiative, Case Digests: International Standards on Criminal Defence Rights 
(April 2013) 11, at < http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org> accessed 21 January 2014. 
22
 The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, (n 14 ) principles 5, 8. 
23
 See UN General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (n 14) Principle 17. 
24
 Barno Saidova v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (964/2001) 8 July 
2004 para 6.8; Clarence Marshall v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(730/1996) 3 November 1998 para 6.2.  
25
 Andrei Khoroshenko v Russian Federation UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(1304/2004) 29 March 2011 para 9.8; see also Pagdayawon Rolando v the Philippines UN Human 
Rights Committee Communication No (1110/2002) 3 November 2004 para 5.6; Valichon Aliboev v 
Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (985/2001) 18 October 2005 para 6.4. 
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where he cannot afford to pay for a lawyer and whenever the interest of justice so 
requires.
26
 In Johnson v Jamaica, the HRC affirmed that this right is not only relevant 
to the trial but also to any preliminary investigation stage and that “the investigation 
magistrate was required to inform the author [suspect] of his right to have legal 
representation and to ensure legal representation for the author [suspect], if he so 
wished.”27 
 
In view of the above, violation of Article 14(3) of the ICCPR may occur where a 
person has not been informed at the initial stage of the proceedings i.e. when he is 
deprived of his liberty about his right to have a lawyer, even if he is indigent (unable 
to pay for those costs).  
 
5.1.1.3. Meaningful access 
 
5.1.1.3.1. Meaningful access: Role of right to a lawyer in protecting the right to silence 
and to be free from self-incrimination28 
 
It is widely accepted that the presence and assistance of a lawyer plays a vital role in 
protecting other rights. Most importantly, the right provides a strong guarantee of the 
presumption of innocence, which manifests itself through the right to silence. These 
findings are derived from the jurisprudence of international instruments’ bodies. It 
seems that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is illustrative and it is more helpful to 
interpret the international rules by determining the direct effect of the right to legal 
assistance on the right to remain silent. For instance, in Murray v the United 
Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court observed that even though domestic law may give the 
silence of the suspect during questioning incriminating inferences in certain 
                                                 
26
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, (CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007) “Right 
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 Johnson v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (592/1994) 25 November 
1998 para 10.2; Levy v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (719/1996) 
November 1998 para 7.7; Krasnova v Kyrgyzstan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(1402/2005) 29 March 2011 para 8.6; see also Till Gut et al., “Chapter 9: Defence Issues” in Goran 
Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure Principles and Rules (1
st
 ed., 2013, Oxford) 1210. 
28
 Highlighting the role of lawyer in this regard is necessary for paving the way to consider some 
relevant details in the next chapter. 
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circumstances, drawing adverse inferences from silence are prohibited unless the right 
of access to a lawyer has been guaranteed at the beginning of the proceedings.
29
 
The same reasoning was followed in the Court’s judgment in the case of the Averill v 
the United Kingdom.
30
 In this case, access to a solicitor had been denied during the 
first 24 hours of police interrogation, and then access was later allowed. During 
subsequent interviews, the police did not allow the solicitor to be present. At trial, 
adverse inference was drawn from the suspect’s silence. The court found that the right 
to a fair trial was violated on the basis that the adverse inference was drawn from the 
silence of the suspect. The drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence is 
only possible when providing the right of access to a lawyer at the initial stages of 
police interrogation.
31
  
Similar findings can be found in the decisions of the HRC, with regard to the role of a 
lawyer in protecting the right to be free from self-incrimination. In the case of 
Mukhammadruzi Iskandarov v Tajikistan, for example, the HRC considered that the 
obtained confession in the absence of a lawyer is not admissible.
32
 
One can therefore conclude that, the interpretation of international rules by 
international bodies and case law reveals that, no adverse inference may be drawn 
unless legal advice is offered or made available from the initial stage of interrogation. 
The right to access legal assistance from the initial stage of proceedings is a critical 
tool for protecting other rights including presumption of innocence.  
 
 
                                                 
29
 Murray v the United Kingdom App no 18731/91 (ECtHR, 8 February 1996), (1996) 22 EHRR 29 
para 59. Para 66 states that “…under the Order [Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988], at 
the beginning of police interrogation, an accused is confronted with a fundamental dilemma relating to 
his defence. If he chooses to remain silent, adverse inferences may be drawn against him in accordance 
with the provisions of the Order. On the other hand, if the accused opts to break his silence during the 
course of interrogation, he runs the risk of prejudicing his defence without necessarily removing the 
possibility of inferences being drawn against him. Under such conditions, the concept of fairness 
enshrined in Article 6 requires that the accused has the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at 
the initial stages of police interrogation. To deny access to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of police 
interrogation, in a situation where the rights of the defence may well be irretrievably prejudiced, is - 
whatever the justification for such denial - incompatible with the rights of the accused under Article 6.” 
30
 Averill v the United Kingdom App no 36408/97 (ECtHR, 6 June 2000), (2001) 31 EHRR 36 para 60. 
31
 Ibid, para 59. 
32
 Iskandarov v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 20) para 6.6. 
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5.1.1.3.2. Meaningful access: Right to have effective legal assistance 
 
As discussed earlier, international bodies and case law have consistently held that the 
right of access to legal assistance must be guaranteed from the pre-trial stage of 
criminal proceedings.  At the same time, an accused person from the outset of the 
investigation has right of free access to legal assistance where he cannot afford to pay 
for a lawyer and whenever the interest of justice so require.
33
 Obviously, if this right 
is to be at all effective due account should be given to the quality of the legal 
assistance.
34
 Having an incompetent lawyer can be ever worse than having no lawyer. 
The wording of the ICCPR does not consider explicitly the raised issue but 
effectiveness of assistance is supported by relevant case law. One could say that the 
right under consideration does not only need to be enshrined in domestic legislations, 
but also has to be practical and effective as well, so the right is not solely theoretical 
one.  
 
According to the jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies, where there 
is an entitlement to free access to a lawyer, the State has to provide the suspects with 
effective legal assistance. This argument has been substantiated by the jurisprudence 
of the HRC.
35
 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is consistent.
36
 The HRC upholds that 
“the State had to take the steps to ensure that a lawyer, once assigned, provides 
effective representation in the interest of justice.”37  
 
In view of the foresaid, the State has to be held responsible for providing effective 
legal assistance for an accused person when the person cannot afford it or when it is in 
                                                 
33
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, “Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to A Fair Trial (Article 14)” (n 26) para. 38; see also Johnson v Jamaica UN Human 
Rights Committee, (n 27) para 10.2; Levy v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee, (n 27) para 7.7; 
Krasnova v Kyrgyzstan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 27 ) para 8.6. 
34
 See for example Barno Saidova v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 24) para 6.8; Paul 
Anthony Kelly v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee, (n 7) para 9.3; see also UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 32, “Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to A Fair 
Trial (Article 14)” (n 26) para. 38. 
35
 Lawrence Chan v Guyana UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (913/2000) 31 October 
2005 para 6.2; Makhmadim Karimov and Amon Nursatov v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (1108 & 1121/2002) 27 March 2007 para 7.5; Alive v Ukraine UN Human Rights 
Committee Communication (781/1979) 7 August 2003 para 7.2; Butovenko v Ukraine UN Human 
Rights Committee Communication No (1412/2005) 19 July 2011 para 7.8. 
36
 Daud v Portugal App no 22600/93 (ECtHR, 21 April 1998) paras 36, 42; Kamasinski v Austria App 
no 9783/82 (ECtHR, 19 December 1989), (1991) 13 EHRR 36 para 65.  
37
 Barno Saidova v Tajikistan Human Rights Committee, (n 24) para 6.8. 
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the interest of justice. Nevertheless, the State party cannot be held responsible for 
every shortcoming of the legal aid lawyer. In the case of Imbrioscia v Switzerland, the 
ECtHR held that “Art.6 applied to the pre-trial proceedings […] but a state could not 
be held responsible for all the inadequacies of an accused’s counsel.”38 The court 
added that,  
 
“the State could not be held responsible for every shortcoming of the legal aid 
lawyer […] the competent national authorities are required to intervene only if a 
failure by legal aid counsel to provide effective representation is manifest or 
sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way [...] both before and 
during the trial at first instance.”39 
 
This right to effective legal representation only applies when the lawyer is supplied by 
the State. When a suspect seeks a private lawyer, the State is not responsible for that 
lawyer’s failures.40 The HRC therefore observed in HC v Jamaica that “the author's 
lawyer was privately retained and that his alleged failure to properly represent the 
author cannot be attributed to the State party.”41 
 
In light of the practice of the HRC, the state is not responsible for fault when legal 
representation is privately retained. In addition, the conduct of a defence lawyer may 
be deemed inadequate only if a domestic court finds it incompatible with the interests 
of justice. For instance in the case of Fazal Hussain v Mauritius, the Committee held 
that “a State party cannot be held responsible for the conduct of a defence lawyer, 
unless it was or should have been manifest to the judge that the lawyer’s behaviour 
was incompatible with the interests of justice.”42  
 
One of the important components of the adequacy of the given legal assistance is that 
the opportunity to contact a lawyer should be given with enough time and facilities.
43
 
                                                 
38
 Imbrioscia v Switzerland App no 13972/88 (ECtHR, 24 November 1993), (1994) 17 EHRR 441 para 
41; Kamasinski v Austria, (n 36) para 65. 
39
 Imbrioscia v Switzerland ibid; see also Kamasinski v Austria ibid. 
40
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, “Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to A Fair Trial (Article 14)” (n 26) para. 38. 
41
 HC v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (383/1989) 28 July 1992 para 6.3. 
42
 Fazal Hussain v Mauritius UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (980/2001) 18 March 
2003 para 6.3; see also the Committee's decisions in the cases of Campbell v Jamaica UN Human 
Rights Committee Communication No (248/1987) 30 March 1992 para 7.3; Francis Peter Perera v 
Australia UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (536/1993) 28 March 1995 para 3.2. 
43
 ICCPR 14(3) states that “(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence 
and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing”; UN Human Rights Committee, General 
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The lack of time and facilities to meet with a lawyer means restriction on the right to 
defence and could prejudice the overall fairness of proceedings.
44
 In the case of 
Andrei Khoroshenko v Russian Federation, the HRC held that the State party should 
give the accused person “adequate time and facilities … have the opportunity to 
always freely and privately meet with his lawyer during the pre-trial proceedings.”45  
 
Similarly, the HRC decided in Pierre v Cameroon that the conduct of authorities had 
breached the rights of the accused person under Article 14(3) of the ICCPR because 
his efforts to communicate with his lawyers faced considerable obstacles where the 
authorities prevented them from travelling to assist their client.
46
 In the view of the 
Committee in Kasimov v Uzbekistan, significant obstacles to private communication 
between the accused person and his lawyer at the early stage of arrest constituted a 
violation to the right to be assisted by a lawyer under the ICCPR.
47
  
 
Another relevant issue that may affect receiving effective legal representation is about 
confidentiality of lawyer-client communication in person or meeting. The 
effectiveness of legal assistance and its usefulness may be adversely influenced where 
breach of this confidentially takes place. In the case of Chikunova v Uzbekistan, the 
HRC provided clear statement that in the case of the meeting between the suspect and 
lawyer is subjected to the presence of the investigator, this leads to a violation the 
right of access to a lawyer and adversely affects fair trial.
48
 
      
To sum up, meaningful access to legal assistance is essential for safeguarding other 
rights including the presumption of innocence, and depends on a variety of factors, 
including the adequacy of a presented lawyer. In addition, a person under preliminary 
                                                                                                                                            
Comment No. 32, “Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to A Fair Trial (Article 14)” (n 
26) para. 32. 
44
 Annemarieke Beijer, “False Confession During Police Interrogation And Measures To Prevent 
Them” (2010)18 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 336.  
45
 Andrei Khoroshenko v Russian Federation UN Human Rights Committee, (n 25); see also, Marlem 
Carranza Alegre v Peru UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1126/2002) 28 October 
2005 para 7.5. 
46
 Pierre v Cameroon UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1397/ 2005) 22 July 2009 
para 7.8. 
47
 Kasimov v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 19) para 9.6. 
48
 Chikunova v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 18) para 7.4; see also Sirageva v 
Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (907/2000) 18 November 2005 para 6.3. 
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investigation has the right to communicate with his defence lawyer in private and in 
conditions that fully respect confidentiality.  
 
5.1.2. Right of access to an interpreter 
 
The ICCPR’s Article 14(3) states that  
 
“In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality... (f) to have the 
free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language 
used in court”.49 
 
Accordingly, where an accused person cannot understand or use the language in court, 
the State is obliged to provide him with the interpreter to assist him understand and 
communicate during criminal proceedings. It has been stated that this safeguard exists 
to provide the accused person with the full ability to defend himself despite any 
linguistic disadvantage.
50
 The protection of the right under international rules requires 
considering following issues: 
 
5.1.2.1. Scope of the interpretation service  
 
One major argument with the texts of the international rules is that textually, the 
relevant provisions seem to apply to criminal proceedings in “court”.  It can be argued 
that despite the ICCPR’s use of the word “court”, this right also applies to the pre-trial 
stage of criminal proceedings.
51
 In other words, this right arises from the moment in 
which the suspect cannot understand or speak the language used in criminal 
proceedings at the preliminary phases of the investigation. The reasoning is that it 
would otherwise destroy the objective of the right.
52
 The body of Principles states that 
 
                                                 
49
 Similarly ECHR, Article 6(3) stipulated that: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
following minimum rights... (e) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court.” 
50
 Arthur Henry Robertson & J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in Europe (4
th
 ed., 2001, Manchester 
University Press) 131. 
51
  See Article 14(3) (f) of the ICCPR; see also Chapter One, particularly the page that is relevant to the 
notion of the criminal charge under international law. 
52
 Stefan Trechsel & Sarah J. Summers, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2006, Oxford 
University Press) 32 & 337. 
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 “A person who does not adequately understand or speak the language used by 
the authorities responsible for his arrest, detention or imprisonment is entitled … 
to have the assistance, free of charge, if necessary, of an interpreter in connection 
with legal proceedings subsequent to his arrest.”53 
 
More importantly, case law on many occasions has deemed many fair trial rights are 
also applicable at the pre-trial stage. The HRC, for example, regarding the 
applicability of the right to an interpreter clearly upheld that “this right arises at all 
stages of the oral proceedings. It applies to aliens as well as to nationals”54 In Sobhraj 
v Nepal, the HRC considered the provisions of 14, paragraph 3 (f) of the ICCPR were 
violated as a result of a lack of access to an interpreter from the time of arrest.
55
 
 
Hence, the ICCPR explicitly confirms the right to interpretation for a suspect who 
cannot speak or understand the language of proceedings. The right to an interpreter is 
no less important than other rights, and absolutely applies at the pre-trial investigation 
stages, which occupies a direct impact on the outcome of the proceedings at the trial 
stage. The approach of ECtHR is illustrative in this regard. The Court in Cuscani v the 
United Kingdom, considered that “the lack of an interpreter at the trial was of much 
less significance than it was at the earlier stage”56 As a result, during police 
questioning, the suspect has to be provided with the service of an interpreter at the 
outset of proceedings following arrest.
57
  
 
The interpretation should cover all the exchanged communication between the suspect 
who is under investigation and the public authority. Likewise, it should cover all 
communications that may occur between the suspect and the State provided lawyer. 
Conversely, where the suspect chooses his lawyer, he needs to bear the cost of an 
interpreter, if one is needed.
58
 Under the practice of the ECtHR, the suspect, even if 
he has a lawyer who understands the language of the police, should be assisted to 
                                                 
53
 UN General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (n 14) principle 14. 
54
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, “Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to A Fair Trial (Article 14)” (n 26) para. 40. 
55
 Sobhraj v Nepal UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1870/2009) 11 August 2010 
para 7.2. 
56
 Cuscani v the United Kingdom App no 32771/96 (ECtHR, 24 September 2002), (2003) 36 EHRR 2 
para 27. 
57
 Kamasinski v Austria, (n 36) para 74; see also David Harris et al., The Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2
nd
 ed., 2010, Oxford University Press) 327. 
58
 Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (2
nd 
ed., 2009, Oxford) 890.  
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understand the language in which the proceedings are conducted. In addition, a 
suspect not only has the right to interpretation of oral proceedings but also a 
translation of relevant documentations.
59
 This does not, however, require that the 
suspect must be given a translation of all documents but no less than the necessary 
communication or enough that needs to be done to enable him to understand what is 
going on with regard to the case.
60
 
 
5.1.2.2. Free interpretation  
 
There is some serious ambiguity in the ICCPR regarding the term “free assistance of 
an interpreter.” The text suggests the costs are to be borne by the state where the 
person cannot speak or understand the language of proceedings. The question to be 
asked in this respect is whether this extends to the suspect who has the means to pay 
and is it regardless of the proceedings’ outcome. The ICCPR does not deal plainly 
with these details. The practice of ECtHR makes clear that under Article 6(3) (e) of 
the ECHR,
61
 the State has to pay the cost of an interpreter regardless of whether the 
accused person can afford it or not.
62
  
 
In Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v Germany, the ECtHR has held that the present right 
“entails for anyone who cannot speak or understand the language used in a court, the 
right to receive the free assistance of an interpreter, without subsequently having 
claimed back from him payment of costs thereby incurred.”63 The finding of that case 
was further affirmed by the ECtHR in the case of Ozturk v Germany. In this case the 
court decided that the State party is under an obligation to compensate the applicant 
for paying the cost of an interpreter fees.
64
 In this case, it deemed that the State 
forcing the accused person to pay the costs of interpreter service violated the right of 
                                                 
59
 Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v Germany App no 6210/73; 6877/75; 7132/75 (ECtHR, 28 November 
1978), (1979-80) 2 EHRR 149 para 48. 
60
 Kamasinski v Austria, (n 36) para 74; see also Pieter Van Dijk et al., Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (3
rd
 ed., 1998, Kluwer Law International) 478. 
61
 It should be taken into consideration that 6 (3)(e) of the ECHR corresponds to the meaning of Article 
14(3) of the ICCPR. 
62
 ECHR, Article 6 (3) (n 49 ) 
63
 Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v Germany, (n 59) para 46. 
64
 Ozturk v Germany App no 8544/79 (ECtHR, 21 February 1984), (1984) 6 EHRR 409 para 58; see 
Alastair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights (2
nd
 ed., 2007, 
Oxford University Press) 369; See also Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc v Germany, (n 59) para 40. 
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accused to have a fair trial and that the person was entitled to be compensated for the 
interpretation costs. 
 
5.1.2.3. Competent interpretation assistance 
 
It appears obvious that an interpreter has to be competent, if the right is to be 
actualized. The competence of interpretation comprises many elements such as 
expertise or knowledge, and also the ability to work in an impartial manner. The HRC 
has affirmed that even if it is not expressly stated, Article 14 of the ICCPR requires 
that the interpreter is linguistically proficient.
65
 A similar approach is taken by the 
ECtHR. In the case of Cuscani v the United Kingdom, the Court makes clear that 
interpretation service must be adequate and rely on the tested language skills of the 
interpreter.
66
  
 
Consequently, the appointment of an interpreter is not enough to satisfy the need for 
interpreter services unless it is effective and does not breach fairness of proceedings. 
 
5.2. Iraqi rules and practice  
 
5.2.1. Right of access to a lawyer  
 
Iraq is one of the state parties to the ICCPR. This means that it is obliged to ensure its 
criminal justice system is consistent with an international fair trial regime as set out in 
the convention.  Accordingly, a person who is facing criminal proceedings has the 
right, inter alia, to a lawyer to defend himself, as has already been elaborated. As is 
well known, in the era of Saddam’s Iraq, subject to a major human rights violation, a 
person under investigation was not afforded access to legal assistance.  
 
                                                 
65
 Geral John Griffin v Spain UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (493/1992) 5 April 
1995 para 9.5; Abduali Ismatovich Kurbanov v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (1096/2002) 6 November 2003 para 6.6; Valichon Aliboev v Tajikistan UN Human 
Rights Committee, (n 25) para 5.3; Michael and Brian Hill v Spain UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (526/1993) 2 April 1997, para 14.4. 
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 Cuscani v the United Kingdom (n 56) para 27.  
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Throughout this era, no mention was made in the context of the ICCP regarding this 
right, whether before the police interrogator or the investigating judge. International 
reports recognized such a default trend of Iraqi law and its non-compliance with 
Iraq’s obligations under international law. For example, in the last periodic report of 
Iraq under the ICCPR (1997) the HRC criticized Iraqi legislature for failing to protect 
basic human rights and justice: the Committee also recommended that the law be 
amended.
67
 
 
 As has been discussed, the post 2003 reforms addressed problematic criminal 
procedure. Among other things, the right of access to a lawyer throughout 
proceedings (including the pre-trial stage) has been guaranteed in order to ensure the 
law is human rights compliant. The reform was first made by establishing the right to 
a lawyer. This amendment to the ICCP was done by Memorandum 3 of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority. 
68 New provisions of Article 123 of the ICCP now state that  
 
“… (b) Before questioning the accused the investigative judge must inform the 
accused that: […] he or she has the right to be represented by an attorney, and if 
he or she is not able to afford representation, the court will provide an attorney at 
no expense to the accused”69 
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 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations/Comments: Iraq’ (Sixty-first session, 
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Max van der Stoel’ (4 September 1995) E/CN.4/1996; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(CHR), ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. 
Max van der Stoel’   (10 March 1998) E/CN.4/1998/67; United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
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E/CN.4/2002/44; United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), ‘Situation of Human Rights in 
Iraq’ (18 April 2000) E/CN.4/RES/2000/17; United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 
‘Situation of human rights in Iraq’ (18 April 2001) E/CN.4/RES/2001/14; see also Law Library of 
Congress <http://www. loc.gov /law/ help /guide /nations /iraq.php> accessed 10 September 2011. 
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 The Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No 3 Criminal Procedures [Iraq] 18 - June -2003, 
published in the Official Gazette, issue 3978 August 2003. The original text is in the English language, 
and the official translation in Arabic is available in the Official Gazette, issue 3978 of 17 August 2003.     
69
 Article 123 of the ICCP in the official English translation that is available online at the homepage of 
the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> 
accessed 28 January 2014. 
لا تامكاحملا لوصا نوناق{( مقر ةيئازج43 ةنسل )0930  ةداملا043ب :-  قيقحتلا يضاق ىلع بجي مهتملا عم قيقحتلا ءارجا لبق
يماحم نييعتب ةمكحملا موقت يماحم ليكوت ىلع ةردقلا هل نكت مل ناو ،يماحم لبق نم هليثمت متي نا يف قحلا هل نا :يلي ام مهتملا ملاعا 
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In addition, CPA’s Memorandum 3, which was enacted in the time of the interim 
administration post-2003 but remains in force, requires that the accused person must 
be informed about the ability to have a lawyer. Section five of the Memorandum 
provides that “at the time an Iraqi law enforcement officer arrests any person, the 
officer shall inform that person of his or her right […] to consult an attorney.”70 It 
should be noted here that section five is unlike other sections of the CPA’s 
Memorandum 3 has not amended the ICCP. 
 
Moreover, the Iraqi Permanent Constitution reinforces the significance of this 
safeguard, and states that the right to defend is sacred and should be guaranteed at all 
stages of the criminal proceedings.
71
 It, also, states that “the court shall appoint a 
lawyer at the expense of the state for an accused of a felony or misdemeanour who 
does not have a defence lawyer.”72  
 
With these amendments, some say that the justice system in post-Saddam Iraqi is fully 
compliant with the right to legal assistance under international rules and modern 
procedural safeguards around the world.
73
 Is this really so? What follows is an attempt 
to explore this matter.  
 
5.2.1.1. Right of access to a lawyer from the outset of the proceedings 
 
Despite the importance of legal assistance for ensuring justice, national legislations 
have varied in approaching this right at the preliminary investigation stage.
74
 Many 
states around the world such as France and the UK guarantee this right throughout the 
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 See previous pages in 5.1.1. 
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pre-trial criminal proceedings, whereas in others there are no satisfactory legal 
provisions put in place.
75
 Against this backdrop, it would be appropriate to assess the 
protection of the right, in the post-Saddam legal system, with reference to France and 
the UK.
76
  
 
The right to have a lawyer from the beginning of the police custody is expressly laid 
out in the French Criminal Procedure Code which provides that:  
 
“At the beginning of police detention, and again after twenty hours have elapsed, 
the person may request to talk to an advocate. Where he is not in a position to 
choose one, or if the advocate chosen cannot be reached, he may request an 
advocate to be appointed to him officially by the president of the bar. The 
president of the bar is informed of such a request forthwith and by any means 
available.”77 
 
In French law, considerable reform in police custody has been introduced in order to 
be fully compliant with the context of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, particularly in light 
of cases such as Salduz v Turkey and Brusco v France.
78
 In the case of Brusco v 
France, it has been held that “any persons detained in police custody had the right to 
benefit from the effective assistance of a lawyer from the very start, and throughout, 
the custody phase.”79 Correspondingly, the right to a lawyer for a suspect is given at 
beginning of police custody.
80
  
 
English law in turn provides that the suspect in detention, whether at a police station 
or elsewhere, has the statutory right to consult a solicitor in private and free of charge 
at any time.
81
 The Code of Practice states that information must be given about the 
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suspect’s right to independent legal advice, and the fact that such advice is available 
free of charge when he is taken to a police station under arrest or having attended 
voluntarily.
82
 He must be informed that he can access this advice immediately before 
the beginning or re-commencement of any interview at the police station or other 
authorised place of detention,
83
 before a review of detention is conducted,
84
 after he 
has been charged or informed that he may be prosecuted, if the police wish to bring to 
his attention any statement or the content of an interview, or where they wish to re-
interview,
85
 before being asked to provide an intimate sample,
86
 and before an 
identification parade, or group or video identification occurs.
87
 
 
In Iraq, there is a different approach taken regarding the securing of this right at the 
initial stage of investigation. The question then arises as to how the new change 
protects the right to a lawyer. It is possible to claim that despite the changes, the 
protection of the right remains contended. The new provisions of the ICCP and the 
Iraqi Permanent Constitution that are relevant to the right to a lawyer suffer from 
some flaws. The new provisions of Article 123 of the ICCP which provide this right 
during the pre-trial stage are reliant on whether the interrogation is conducted by the 
police interrogator or investigating judge. This is to say that the reform overlooked 
police custody interrogation, and Article 123 only guarantees access to a lawyer at 
later stages of investigation during judicial process when the accused person is to be 
brought before the investigating judge. Besides, the protection of this right under the 
provisions of the Constitution suffers from some flaws. Unlike the right to a lawyer in 
the trial stage, which is explicitly entrenched in Article 19(11), the Constitution does 
not explicitly determine that the right to have a lawyer must be guaranteed from the 
beginning of the police custody and at all stages of criminal proceedings.
88
 The 
Constitution determines the necessity of the right in the general context under the 
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term of the right to defence (of which the right of legal assistance is one of the most 
important of its pillars at all stages of criminal proceedings). 
  
What follows is that even though Article 19(4) of the Iraqi Permanent Constitution 
2005 appears to secure such right throughout proceedings starting from the pre-trial 
stage, the ICCP takes the position that this right does not apply at the initial stage of 
the police investigation.
89
 Therefore, in view of the present author, this approach of 
the ICCP represents an antithetical position not only to the obligatory application 
under international due process, but also a notable contradiction with the text of the 
Iraqi Permanent Constitution. This is because the Constitution explicitly determines 
the necessity of the right to a defence. It is important that the new amendment must be 
interpreted in light of the right to defence in the new Constitution. Hence the right to a 
lawyer must extend to encompass all stages of criminal proceedings even during 
police investigation.  
 
However, the current approach of the reformed system and law enforcement officials 
are of the opposite view. This seems due to the fact that the wording of the Article 
19(4) of the Constitution does not explicitly say that the person under investigation 
has a right to a lawyer in police station. In addition, the wording of Article 123 of the 
ICCP only provides the right to a lawyer before the investigating judge. Besides, 
19(11) of the Constitution, without addressing the right to a lawyer before police, 
explicitly says that a person who is accused of a felony or misdemeanour and who 
does not have a defence lawyer before the court that court shall appoint a lawyer for 
him at the expense of the state.
90
 
 
The fact is that providing a lawyer in the early stages of police investigation is critical 
for pre-trial justice. Nonetheless, the right to a lawyer is often omitted in practice. 
Law enforcement officials despite the changes remain refuting that the right to a 
lawyer in criminal proceedings arises front of police interrogations.
91
 They assert that 
the right to a lawyer is not given to a person under initial police interrogation because 
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these changes only referred to the right to a lawyer before the investigating judge and 
trial. What follows is, the post-Saddam amendments, even though deemed 
progressive, leave a remarkable gap with binding international due process. The 
reformed Iraqi system, unlike these binding obligations under international standards, 
does regrettably not provide the right of access to a lawyer from the outset of 
proceedings at the initial stage of the police custody. As a result, the present right has 
been violated in the post-Saddam criminal justice system both in law and in practice.  
 
The International Community has serious concerns regarding such defects in the new 
Iraqi criminal justice system. For instance, international experts, during observation of 
the human rights situation in the Iraq criminal justice system, reported their concern 
regarding “prolonged periods of detention without charge or access to legal 
counsel.”92 By the same token, UNAMI indicated that “some detainees had been held 
for long periods of time … without access to family members, lawyers ... only after 
all investigations are completed and that the participation of attorneys, when present, 
is largely nominal.”93 In May 2012, it was reported that, “UNAMI monitoring from a 
variety of sources substantiated claims that detainees suffer from lack of regular or 
meaningful access to legal counsel.”94 
 
What compounds the situation is that law enforcement officers are afforded broad 
powers during pre-trial criminal investigation stage.
95
 Thus, until the judge is 
involved with proceedings and such time to be emanated, a person without lawyer 
could be exhausted in police custody and submit irreparable confessions. In general, 
nothing in the law forbids them to interrogate the suspect and this is usually what 
happens in practice. Once made, a confession during the police custody stage 
becomes the basis for conviction at the outcome of proceedings,
96
 as nothing in the 
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law prevents from using such admission at trial, even if extracted by police without 
the presence of a lawyer. This is completely contrary to international human rights 
standards. It seems that the reason for this lies in part in weaknesses in the legal 
regime, as discussed earlier. Therefore the lack of enshrining the right in legal 
framework combines with wide ranging police power to exploit improper confessions 
from un-witnessed interrogations pre-trial.   
 
Although, as the Ministry of Human Rights has observed, such a duty flows directly 
from the Constitution, law enforcement officials are reluctant to uphold it. One may 
argue that unless these provisions are adequately regulated in the ICCP, being the 
competent law regulating all criminal proceedings, law enforcement officials will 
continue to understand the legal right of access to a lawyer in a limited way.
97
 They 
clearly deem the law only to require providing of a lawyer before investigating 
judges, but not during police investigations.
98
  
 
In view of the aforesaid, Iraqi legislature needs to fill the indicated gap by enacting 
new provisions in the ICCP that expressly provide for automatic legal access, to 
enable persons under investigation to have a lawyer at the beginning of the 
proceedings and at the police station. This is most important in order to bring Iraqi 
law forward with the modern developments of procedural safeguards and international 
standard of human rights, particularly the ICCPR which is binding on Iraq.
99
 For 
instance, if reforms are to work, the legislature must impose a system of 
accountability in which deterrent sanctions may be imposed on every person who in 
authority would prevent or obstruct the person accused from having legal assistance. 
The law must also deem any confession obtained in the absence of a lawyer 
inadmissible. 
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The present author will conclude this thesis with some reform proposals. At this stage, 
it is important to underscore that this is not about piece-meal reform, but holistic and 
cross-cutting changes.  
 
5.2.1.2. Right of notification to access legal assistance 
 
As has been examined, the right to access legal assistance is of no use if the person 
needing it does not know his entitlements. Many national systems entrench this right 
in law, others do so, through practice.
100
 French law, for example, requires that this 
right should be brought to the knowledge of an accused at the beginning of police 
custody.
101
 In England and Wales, if a suspect is arrested by the police or comes 
voluntarily and is then arrested, he must be informed of the right of access to free 
legal advice both orally and in writing.
102
 The custody officer must record every step 
of this request in the custody record. Once the request is made, a solicitor must be 
contacted as soon as practical.
103
 Indeed, such right is still not complete unless a 
person under investigation comprehensively understands that the access to advice is 
available to him in confidence and free of charge at the first moment of detention 
before any questioning.  
 
In Iraq, the key issue of concern is that the reform of the post-Saddam system does 
not specify in the appropriate place, that is, in the ICCP, a text in which the police at 
police custody are obliged to inform a person under investigation about his right of 
access to legal assistance before questioning. Rather, according to the ICCP the 
mandatory notification does not arise until a later time, when the person under 
investigation is brought for judicial interrogation.
104
 
 
However, the CPA’s Memorandum 3 stated that an arrested person must be informed 
about the ability to have a lawyer.
105
 This was a step towards bridging the gap 
between the system and due process regarding the right of access to a lawyer. 
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Nonetheless, many limitations make implementation difficult. These provisions have 
not been formulated in a more accessible way. The new provisions independently 
stand in the Memorandum 3 without being incorporated into the ICCP. Thus, due to 
the fact that the rights of persons under criminal proceedings are primarily found in 
the ICCP providing some unobserved pieces of provisions in other different places 
may pose difficulties to trace or follow these provisions by law enforcement officials. 
While, the legal provisions that include rights of individuals must be established in a 
clear form which can be accessible by everybody in a society.
106
  
 
Furthermore, regarding these provisions in the CPA’s Memorandum 3, the 
introduction of official English language translation of the ICCP mentioned that, 
“CPA Memorandum 3, which amends a number of provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, exists in two versions – the version signed on 18 June 2003 and 
published in the Official Gazette, issue 3978 of 17 August 2003 and a revised 
version, signed on 27 June 2004, which was never published in the Official 
Gazette. There is also a different numbering scheme between the two versions 
and Iraqi Arabic texts and commentaries do not follow the revised version.”
107
 
 
The implication of these particular circumstances, according to the introduction, is 
that some anomalies remain regarding the provisions given under CPA’s 
Memorandum 3 and this minimizes the effect of these provisions in practice.  
 
It should be mentioned that the new procedural safeguards established by 
Memorandum 3 are incorporated into the ICCP by amending the relevant provisions 
in it. Conversely, caution of an accused person regarding the right of access to a 
lawyer has not been placed in the Code yet. What follows is if that reform is to be 
actualized and taken seriously it must be incorporated in the Code in order to the law 
enforcement officers observe their duty and normal individuals understand their rights 
during an arrest. Years have elapsed since that reform was cited in the Memorandum 
and it is still not to be found in the provisions of the ICCP. As a result, it must be 
admitted that, inappropriate place of new provisions adversely impacts the duty to 
inform a person under arrest about his right to lawyer in practice. In particular, the 
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post 2003 procedural safeguards established by this Memorandum are seen by 
officials as not meriting protection.
108
 The reason is that they have been imposed from 
the outside and do not respond to the local requirements regarding crime control. 
 
In view of the present author, Section 5 of Memorandum 3 which provides that “at the 
time an Iraqi law enforcement officer arrests any person, the officer shall inform that 
person of his or her right … to consult an attorney” is inadequate.109 It is short and it 
does not make clear whether this right is available free of charge or in what stage of 
proceedings such right is available. It is ambiguous when it does not clarify whether 
providing a lawyer comes before the police and judicial interrogator or both. 
Furthermore, the key issue of concern is that it does not require the police interrogator 
to inform an accused person at the outset of the police interrogation, his right of 
access to a lawyer. Thus, notification of this right needs to be adequately prescribed in 
the ICCP, addressing issues such as timing and legal aid.  
 
In England and Wales, as an example of best practice, a detainee, who has had a 
solicitor, should be allowed to specify that solicitor to give advice at police station.
110
 
If the detainee does not have a solicitor, he must be told of the availability of a duty 
solicitor scheme and to be shown a list of the duty solicitors. If the duty solicitor who 
is available is unacceptable to the suspect, he can request two further selections of 
solicitors from the list. Further attempts may be permitted to be made by the custody 
officer relying on his discretion. In this regard, it seems to be more appropriate, if the 
suspect can be entitled to select as his legal advisor, somebody in whom he has 
confidence because the legal assistance of a suspect’s choice is deemed an essential 
right not only in the interest of the suspect, but also in the whole fairness of the 
criminal justice system. 
  
After a solicitor has been chosen, the custody officer must act without delay to secure 
the advice by making contact with him. At once a solicitor, who arrives at a police 
station to see the suspect, must first be informed of the nature of the accusation and 
general evidence against him and should be able to access any interviews with his 
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client. It should be noted that, the suspect must be informed of the solicitor’s arrival, 
even if he is being interviewed at this time.
111
 At the end in case he declines using this 
right, the reasons behind such refusal must be examined by the custody officer.
112
 In 
Iraq, such clear proceedings as already mentioned are not available under the new 
reform and hence it can be suggested that the Iraqi post conflict justice is still in its 
infancy regarding supplement right to legal advice and needs more steps to be 
compatible with genuine need of pre-trial justice.    
 
Therefore, the suggestion for the ICCP to be in line with modern procedural 
safeguards and international human rights standards is that the accused person, from 
the start of any criminal proceedings i.e. arrest, must be informed about the right to 
have a lawyer and that there is an entitlement to legal assistance free of charge. This 
author believes that best practice should also require that the person be given a written 
copy of the warning and form to sign.
113
 What should follow is that the accused 
person when invoking his right to have a lawyer should see them directly without 
delay, prior any questioning, a lawyer must be available, and that the lawyer in this 
case must act urgently to read and understand the file of the case and be given enough 
time before attendance at the interrogation.
114
  
 
This paper has already discussed the problem of law and practice in Iraq in relation to 
provision of legal access before the matter reaches the investigating judge.
115
 Let us 
turn to consider the procedures under Article 123 of the ICCP by which accused 
persons can be notified about their right of access to a lawyer in the front of the 
investigating judge to know whether it is adequately stipulated and given in practice 
or not. In this regard, there are no clear procedures that can be followed for 
sufficiently informing the accused person of his right to legal assistance. It must be 
admitted that through the new changes under Article 123 of the ICCP with regard to 
the present right, on the one hand, much attention has been given to the inquiry by the 
investigating judge but there has been clear negligence for the inquiry of the police. 
On the other hand, even with regard to giving the right to an accused person in the 
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front of the investigating judge, this Article during this stage of judicial questioning 
has not elaborated any specific details except the short ambiguous sentence that 
includes this right. 
  
The lack of legal framework under Memorandum 3 and Article 123 of the ICCP along 
with abuse of due process in practice, over the last ten years, means that the post-
Saddam reform has failed to provide this right for an accused person in the pre-trial 
investigation stage. According to interviews with defence lawyers by Human Rights 
Watch, the right to a lawyer before being brought before the investigating judges is 
significantly diminished in practice.
116
 In 2013, Amnesty International reported that in 
some cases, violations of detainees’ human rights have taken place under the 
observation of investigating judges.
117
 
 
In light of the aforesaid, the Iraqi legal system in law and practice is unlike other 
professional systems. It does not elaborate efficient procedures that can be followed in 
order to ensure effective right to a lawyer for persons facing pre-trial criminal 
proceedings. Hence, as outlined above it is of particular importance to provide clear 
procedures regarding this right. 
 
5.2.1.3. Guaranteeing high-quality legal assistance   
 
Access to legal advice is considered a significant right for a person under 
investigation but that is not complete in itself, because if the lawyer’s advice is 
subsequently criticised by the court, then the question arises whether the adviser’s 
performance could affect the outcome of the case against the accused person at trial or 
not. In this regard, the adequacy of legal assistance has a vital role in determining the 
destiny of persons under criminal proceedings. Previous studies indicate that the 
fairness of proceedings and trial may be breached in cases where the advice given at 
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the pre-trial stage was inadequate.
118
 These deficiencies of the lawyer’s assistance 
should be considered manifest or so blatant as to be obvious, which is the requirement 
of international human right law as well. For that reason, an active vetting mechanism 
as Gut et al proposed can be useful “in assessing the objective qualification of 
counsel.”119 
 
Some criticisms have reported that “legal advisers are largely passive and non-
interventionist in police interrogations. The self-perceived role of many is to act 
purely as a witness to the proceedings.”120 Another criticism reported that “advice… 
little impact on police practice.”121 Thus, a lawyer has to undergo extensive training to 
be admitted and to keep their skills sharp and up to date through continuous 
education. Professional bodies regulate competence. The importance of practical 
experience within the training programmes also needs to be emphasised. As Hodgson 
has pointed out, “In order to advise the client effectively, the lawyer herself must first 
have a clear understanding of the issues involved and the consequences of adopting 
various courses of action.”122 
 
In post-Saddam Iraq, the quality of legal advice remains a major issue.
123
 It is rightly 
stated that “while, on paper, an accused enjoys a robust right to counsel, the reality is 
that right has been significantly diminished by an overloaded system, a culture of 
submissive defence lawyers, and inadequate judicial oversight.”124 In this regard 
UNAMI has also consistently criticised the role of appointed legal counsels in 
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criminal justice system because in many instances their role were passive and 
unhelpful.
125
 
 
It can be said that, the legal assistance that is available in the reformed Iraqi criminal 
justice system may be less valuable than that provided in many legal systems and 
jurisdictions around the world. For example, regarding France as Dorange and Field 
suggest, the most important aspect of the right to immediate access to a lawyer is that 
the duty lawyers must be experienced specialists and therefore, the right to legal 
assistance “must be accompanied by reorganisation of the provision of duty legal 
advice to favour specialisation and continuity of representation.”126 In England and 
Wales, for instance, the suspect has the right not only to legal advice but also the 
advice must be adequate.
127
  
 
In the UK, there have been a number of cases where the evidence obtained from 
police interrogations has been excluded under section 78 of the PACE on the grounds 
that incompetent or inadequate legal advice to the accused at the police station had 
compromised fairness.
128
 In the UK, at trial, the jury could draw adverse inference 
from the refusal to answer questions during former police interviews.
129
 However, 
inferences must not be drawn if the accused had followed the poor and wrong advice 
from his solicitor to remain silent.
130
 A notable result of this trend is that a court 
cannot draw adverse inference from a suspect’s silence during questioning by police 
unless having requested the provision of proper legal advice has been made for the 
suspect during investigation.  
 
In contrast, in the reformed Iraqi justice system there is no way that inadequate advice 
can be overcome. Iraqi law provides no remedy to a person who suffers detriment 
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because of inadequate advice. There is a real and very serious problem with 
professional standards in Iraq. Consequently, it is problematic that slight attention is 
paid to the lack of legal counsel during the investigation stage. Such claim can be 
simply sustained by the fact that a person can be registered in the Iraq Bar Association 
to be a ‘lawyer’ by merely graduating from schools of law. Lawyers who have no 
quality training can handle the criminal cases for people under pre-trial criminal 
investigation.  Conversely, lawyers need advanced training to be eligible to represent 
a client before courts during trial stage.
131
 This underscores a systemic failure to 
recognise the fundamental importance of the pre-trial stage in ensuring a fair and 
reliable criminal justice system. 
 
This is a critical situation in the eyes of due process rights and in the view of the 
international standards. The ECtHR has held “the competent national authorities are 
required to intervene if a failure by legal aid counsel to provide effective 
representation ... both before and during the trial at first instance.”132 In the same case, 
the court held that “[…] the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.”133 Therefore, the 
fairness of criminal proceedings is not solely affected by denial of legal advice to the 
accused persons but also by the quality of such representation. 
 
Several reports issued by institutions and international organizations have indicated 
that detainees in Iraq are exposed to serious danger inside places of detention and 
police stations. Human Rights Watch monitored many investigation processes, and 
found that in Iraq a person under criminal proceedings has “ineffectual legal counsel” 
and hence recommended to the international donor community to “support the Iraqi 
Bar Association and other legal organizations that provide free legal representation 
for defendants in the criminal justice system.”134 
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issue 0403 of 22 December 1956. 
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133
 Kamasinski v Austria, (n 36) para 53. 
134
 Joseph Logan, (n 116) 5 and 36; The similar observation reported by the Annual Report of the Iraqi 
Ministry of Human Rights, The Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Rights Reports 
(Baghdad, 2009) 80; also see ibid (2010) 76. 
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While Iraqi law now requires access to a lawyer during questioning by the 
investigating judge, reports suggest this is not followed in reality.
135
 The lawyer has 
no vital role, and is unable to prevent an accused person from incriminating himself 
for two reasons. Firstly, the accused person undergoes major investigation during 
police custody, a time when there is no right of access to a lawyer. By the time that 
person gets to the investigating judge, he may have already incriminated himself and 
there is little that a lawyer can do.
136
  
 
Secondly, observers of the Iraqi system note that legal assistance is given a limited 
role during the judicial interrogation stage. In 2012, the Iraq Ministry of Human 
Rights criticised that in many cases the lack of legal counsel during the judicial 
investigation stage is still a critical problem in the Iraqi criminal justice system.
137
 In 
2013, UNAMI observed that the role of lawyers in many cases were passive and 
unhelpful.
138
 It embodies solely observing the proceedings without intervention 
whether directing or answering or objecting to the questions or talking with client or 
speaking on his behalf.
139
 The fact is that the investigator has power over the lawyer 
by virtue of Article 57 of the ICCP. These provisions suggest that the investigation 
authority can prevent a lawyer from attending the investigation “if the matter had in 
hand so required”.140 It can be observed that the existing limits have not been clearly 
circumscribed. It has been not made clear that always the prevented lawyer must be 
allowed as soon as the justifications of prohibition cease to exist during reasonable 
                                                 
135
 The Annual Report of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, The Conditions of Prisons and Detention 
Centres, Human Rights Reports (Baghdad, 2012) 68, 73; see also ibid. 
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 Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights 
Report (Baghdad, June 2013) 14. 
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 Christopher J. Costantint, (n 124) 558. 
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law for the actions of the accused and their representatives may attend the investigation while it is in 
progress. The judge or the [judicial] investigator may prohibit their attending if the matter in hand so 
requires, for reasons that he shall enter in the record, with the proviso that they shall be granted access 
to the investigation as soon as the need to prohibit their attendance ceases and that they shall not have 
the right to speak unless permitted to do so and that if permission is withheld a note to that effect shall 
he entered in the record of the investigation.” The official translation in English is available online at 
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time. Hence the right to legal assistance, which is enshrined in abiding international 
rules, is extremely undermined. This is contrary to the right given to legal assistance 
and therefore, the legislature must provide the legal advisers with adequate privileges 
by which their task can be achieved in consistent with international due process and 
recent development of procedural safeguards. 
 
Accordingly, it is critical that for the right to access legal assistance to be meaningful 
it must be notified at an early stage of proceedings in police custody and provided as 
requested. The right creates obligations upon the public authority to protect members 
of the community against the abuse of investigators and protection a person facing 
criminal justice system from self-incrimination. In summation, mere access to a 
lawyer is not enough unless the legal assistance is professionally adequate. This is a 
critical lesson for Iraq in taking its criminal justice system forward. 
 
 5.2.1.4. Confidentiality of the client-legal adviser communications 
 
As noted previously, the jurisprudence of the international bodies has highlighted that 
communications between an adviser and his client must be in private. The State is 
obliged to enable such contact either via direct or indirect means, inter alia, such as 
telephone, email, letters and other such means. It can extend to the assistance of an 
interpreter. The authorities have to enable a lawyer and his client effective 
communication in accordance with the circumstances. The authorities must not deny 
communication unless there are valid reasons for a short time “in order to protect the 
interests of justice”.141 The HRC has emphasised that  
 
“The right to communicate with counsel requires that the accused is granted 
prompt access to counsel. Counsel should be able to meet their clients in private 
and to communicate with the accused in conditions that fully respect the 
confidentiality of their communications.”142  
 
                                                 
141
 Alexander Doyle Birtles, ‘The Standards Developed by the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (DPhil thesis, the University of 
Nottingham, October 2000) 86. 
142
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, “Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to A Fair Trial (Article 14)” (n 54) para. 34; see also, Khomidova v Tajikistan UN 
Human Rights Committee Communication No (1117/2002) 29 July 2004 para 6.4; Sirageva v 
Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 48) para 6.3; Gridin v Russian Federation UN Human 
Rights Committee, (n 7) para 8.5. 
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Privacy of conversation does not mean providing the meeting away from the view of 
official authority, but means that they must not be able to hear these discussions.
143
 
Obviously, for there to be confidentiality, there must also be no surveillance devices 
enabling the authorities to “listen in”. Both the lawyer and the accused person should 
not be subsequently asked to disclose their previous conducted communications 
between them.
144
 This is known as legal professional privilege.   
  
The foregoing is recognised as part of the international due process.
145
 Regrettably, 
the post-Saddam reformed Iraqi system operates differently. There are no rules, 
governing the nature of access or the conditions of confidentially. Recent reports 
claimed that in practice the right concerned is breached in different ways. For 
instance, the lawyer-client meeting could be refused or controlled, with or without 
reason. Frequently there is no independent room which can be found for this 
purpose.
146
 Consequently, the communication between the suspect and his lawyer 
cannot be conducted privately without any interception or eavesdropping from a third 
person. This situation could be avoided through the adoption of a legalization 
framework enabling the detainee to have confidential contact with a lawyer. The law 
should also specify the duty to facilitate lawyer-client access and describe specific 
circumstances where this could be curtailed. 
                                                 
143
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Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and 
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 Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v The Netherlands UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(903/2000) 1 November 2004 para 7, 6; see also Vivienne O’Connor & Colette Rausch (eds.), Model 
Code of Criminal Procedure Vol. II (2008, United States, Institute of Peace Press) 129. 
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Centres, Human Rights Report (2009, Baghdad) 80; ibid (2010) 76 
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5.2.2. Right of access to an interpreter 
 
In a globalized world, there will always be instances where foreigners come into 
contact with the law and issues of language arise. Iraq is a multicultural and 
multilingual nation. In addition, tourism is one of the tributaries of Iraq’s economy 
due to the daily presence of a huge number of tourists there. There are shrines of 
Imams of Shiite and Sunni Muslims, various monuments and archaeological sites, and 
other beautiful tourist sites. As a result, the situation infrequently arises where 
communication is a problem when a person suspected of involvement in criminal 
activity interpretation becomes critical and for communication. For example, in the 
case of French journalist Nader Tendon who was arrested in Baghdad on 23 January 
2012 the French authorities called on Iraqi authorities either to charge him formally or 
to be immediately released. According to the official spokesman of the Iraqi 
government, the lack of interpreter service in this case was behind the prolonged 
detention for several days.
147
 
 
As previously discussed, according to international standards (e.g. Article 14(3) of the 
ICCPR), there is a right of persons, who are facing criminal justice system and cannot 
understand or speak the language of the proceedings, to be provided with the service 
of an interpreter. Under practice of international bodies, a person under investigation 
has the right not only to interpretation of oral proceedings but also translation of 
documents that are relevant to the proceedings. He has to receive in his own language 
a written statement in which information about the reasons for his arrest, the time and 
place where he will be before an investigating judge, efficiently disclosed. In addition, 
through an understandable language authorities must make clear to him what rights he 
has and how these rights are exercised, the reasons behind the arrest or detention, and 
clarify any charge against him.  
 
In Iraq, the Judicial Organization Law stipulates that the court may hear the 
statements of parties, witnesses or experts who are ignorant of the language of the 
                                                 
147
 T.V Interview with the official spokesman of the Iraqi government, the interview was broadcasted 
on the screen of the “Al-Faiha", a satellite T.V station in Iraq on 22/01/2013; Amnesty International, 
Iraq: Independent Journalist Detained in Baghdad: Nadir Dendoune, 8 February 2013, UA: 32/13 
Index: MDE 14/002/2013, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/511a04803a.html> accessed 9 
May 2013. 
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court through an interpreter.
148
 Likewise, the ICCP stipulates that if the witness does 
not understand the language of investigation or is deaf or mute, an interpreter shall be 
appointed to translate his words or signs, having sworn that the translation is going to 
be done with honesty and integrity.
149
 
 
The analyses of aforementioned texts reveal that at best, one can say these provisions 
have only set general circumstances of when an interpreter is to be provided. These 
circumstances whereby the court is entitled to use the service of an interpreter are that 
if a witness does not understand the language in which the investigation is being 
conducted. If an expert does not understand the language in which a trial is being 
conducted; and if accused persons or/and victims do not speak the language of the 
Court in order to that Court can understand saying of litigations.
150
  
 
It could be argued that these provisions are not clearly about rights of a person facing 
criminal justice system, but they are for the communications of the courts and 
authorities i.e. interpreters are that to help the authorities do their job. What follows is 
that it is problematic that Iraq law does not set out clear provisions by which a duty 
could be imposed on authorities to provide access to an interpreter at the initial stage 
of the proceedings for a person facing criminal investigations and cannot speak or 
understand the language of proceedings. Admittedly, this approach does not meet 
Iraqi obligation under Article 14(3) (f), as interpreted by the HRC. 
                                                 
148
 Article 4 provides that “Firstly-The Arabic language shall be the language of the Courts unless the 
law provides otherwise. Secondly- The Court shall hear the saying of litigations, witness or experts 
who ignore the language of the Court through a translator after his administering an oath.”  The 
Judicial Organization Law No.160 of 1979, published in the Official Gazette, issue 2746 of 17 
December 1979. The official English translation is available online at the homepage of the Global 
Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed18 
January 2014. 
{ لاوا– ن اذا لاا مكاحملا ةغل ةيبرعلا ةغللا نوكت ايناث .كلذ فلاخ ىلع نوناقلا ص–  وا دوهشلا وا موصخلا لاوقا ةمكحملا عمست
}نيميلا هفلح دعب مجرتم ةطساوب ،ةمكحملا ةغل نولهجي نيذلا ءاربخلا 
149
 Article 61 of the ICCP states that : 
“B. Any person who is unable to speak may give his evidence in writing or in conventional sign 
language if he is unable to write.  
C. If a witness does not understand the language in which the investigation is being conducted, or is 
deaf or dumb, a person may be appointed to translate what the witness says, or interpret the witness's 
sign language, after taking an oath that he will translate or interpret truthfully and faithfully.”  The 
official translation in English is available online at the homepage of the Global Justice Project: Iraq 
(GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 28 January 2014. 
 ب{–  .ةباتكلا عيطتسي لا ناك نا ةدوهعملا ةراشلإاب وا ةباتك هتداهشب يلدي نا ملاكلا ىلع هل ةردق لا نمل  
 ـج- تلا ةغللا مهفي لا دهاشلا ناك اذا نيميلا هفيلحت دعب هتاراشا وا هلاوقا مجرتي نم نييعت زاج مكبا وا مصا ناك وا قيقحتلا اهب ىرجي ي  
 }ةناماو قدصب مجرتي ناب 
150
 See ICCP Article 61; the Judicial Organization Law Article 4. 
 215 
 
The existing problem is that the texts of Iraqi law do not secure proper access to the 
service of the interpreter or translator for the person facing the criminal justice 
system. The lack of provisions with regard to providing the right of access to an 
interpreter leads to that respecting this right for a person under investigation relies on 
the discretion of authorities of investigation while protection this right should directly 
stem from legal rules. The fact is still that there are many defective areas which need 
to be considered in the words of these legal texts. The problem in these provisions is 
that they do not establish clear duty on authorities to provide access to an interpreter 
for a person under investigation who does not speak or understand Arabic. They do 
not explicitly clarify the suitable details or place the clear obligation to provide this 
right during the outset of the proceedings.  
 
It is important to note that Iraq is a civil law country where the laws must cover every 
situation, and there is no scope for judges to fill gaps. Consequently, lack of clarity of 
some existing rules is one of the serious weaknesses in the post-Saddam justice 
system. With regard to the present right, these inadequate rules result in the public 
authority naming exclusive discretion to decide whether the service of an interpreter is 
to be afforded to the person accused or not. Such a wide power of discretion, which is 
much higher than human rights protection, may adversely affect the present right. 
   
Although the right to interpretation for a person entitled is necessary and should take 
place in practice it must be given a legal basis. It is rightly stated that “The creation of 
an express legal guarantee of a right is, it believes, ‘an absolute necessity’. Merely 
respecting the right in practice, in the absence of a guarantee in law, would appear, 
therefore, to be insufficient.”151 Consequently, the proposal lays upon the legislature 
the duty to enact logical texts, which encompass all necessary aspects of this right. 
The reform appears very necessary for the two following aspects:  
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5.2.2.1. Scope of the right to interpretation   
 
As discussed earlier, under Iraqi law there is a lack of provisions regarding the right 
of access to an interpreter. It does not clarify whether the right is only confined to the 
trial stage or extends to the pre-trial investigation stage. Likewise, it is not clear 
whether this right extends throughout the pre-trial phase or solely arises for the 
accused person before the investigating judge.  
 
Some comparative analysis will be very helpful for illuminating best practice that 
could guide Iraq. In England and Wales, for example, the suspect who cannot speak 
English is not interrogated unless there is a qualified interpreter present. Code of 
Practice states: “Chief officers are responsible for making sure appropriate 
arrangements are in place for provision of suitably qualified interpreters for people 
who are deaf or do not understand English.”152 It also sets out the instances that 
require providing an interpreter.
153
 It emphasises that a suspect where is entitled must 
be provided with an interpreter as soon as practicable.
154
 
 
English law guarantees that foreign persons who do not speak or understand English 
and those who suffer a physical disability have the right to communicate through an 
interpreter. Importantly, English law obliges the State to provide the service of an 
interpreter from the initial investigation stage all the way to the end of the proceedings 
and also specifies the circumstance in which a duty arises. The interpreter is not only 
for dealing with police and Magistrate questioning but also for client–lawyer 
communications.
155
 What follows is that any failure to satisfy this safeguard would 
breach the provisions of law and undermines any evidence against the defendant from 
the period of detention.
156
  
 
In Iraq, the current structure of texts in relation to this right does not clarify details 
with regard to providing the service of an interpreter at the pre-trial stage. Therefore, 
in line with the aforesaid, the texts must clearly elaborate such right and stipulate that 
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 Ibid, Section 13(1). 
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156
 Ibid, Section 3(12). 
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during police questioning the entitled person should be provided with the service of 
an interpreter following arrest.
157
 Also, an interpreter should be appointed as soon as 
it becomes apparent that the accused person cannot speak or understand the used 
language. What is more is that Iraqi law must clarify the ambit of assistance to 
interpretation during the pre-trial investigation. In this context, it could be said that, 
the interpretation should include translation and cover all communications occurring 
between the person who is under investigation and the public authority. 
  
Moreover, interpretation should cover all communications that occur between the 
accused person and his lawyer who is chosen from the legal aid scheme. If the lawyer 
is privately retained, the accused person must bear the cost of an interpreter if one is 
needed.
158
 It should be noted that even though the accused person has a lawyer who 
understands the language of the proceedings, that person must personally be enabled 
to understand the language in which the proceedings are conducted so as to enable 
him to defend himself properly. This does not mean that accused persons must be 
given a translation of all documents or proceedings but no less than the necessary 
communication that could enable them to understand what is going on regarding the 
case against them.
159
 
 
5.2.2.2. Competent interpretation assistance 
 
The quality of the interpretation must be fit for purpose. There are examples of how 
national jurisdictions ensure this. In the Czech Republic, to be a person who is 
considered competent to work as interpreter, that person must have a Master’s degree 
in language(s) at issue; must pass foreign language proficiency examination; and must 
have at least five years of experience as an interpreter.
160
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In England and Wales, the officer in charge of the police station is responsible for 
providing the suspect who does not understand the English language or who is deaf, a 
suitably qualified interpreter. Such a person must be registered with the National 
Register of Public Service Interpreters (NRPSI) which requires language proficiency 
evidenced by the requisite level of formal qualification. The interpreter shall take an 
oath to ensure true and impartial interpretation.
161
 In addition, according to the PACE, 
it is mandatory that all communications with a suspect during interviews are recorded, 
and this clearly facilitates a high quality of interpretation.
162
 Tape-recording provides 
a faithful copy of what exactly happened during interrogation.
163
 
 
Consequently, mistakes or errors that arise due to the interpreter could be identified 
by examining the conduct of the process of interpretation and its surrounding 
circumstances and then the validity of the interview can be determined. Hence, tape 
recording could protect a person under investigation. At the same time, the 
proceedings can be protected, given that “Some defendants seek to discredit the 
interview interpreter as a way of denying the validity of the interview, and claims of 
not having understood the interpreter are common.”164 
 
From the discussion above, it is obvious that, in order to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice, the competence of interpretation must be taken seriously. The suggestion for 
Iraqi legislature is that whether he requests it or not, the eligible person under criminal 
proceedings is not just entitled to an interpreter, but to a competent one. The law 
needs to regulate who can be an interpreter during pre-trial, trial and appeal, in 
relation to qualifications. Many further aspects should also be covered in this regard 
such as regulating oath and required impartiality.  
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5.3. Evaluation under international human rights law 
 
5.3.1. Right of access to a lawyer 
 
One would reasonably expect reforms to the criminal justice system in Iraq to have 
adequately covered the right to legal assistance. Nonetheless, the reality is that over 
the last ten years, it has been, as was in the past, inconsistent with the due process 
required by international law. The above examination leads the author to the clear 
conclusion that the reformed criminal justice system has not fully protected the right 
in both the law and implementation. These failings lead to a violation of international 
standards and urgently need to be redressed. Regrettably, the system has failed to 
provide the right of a person accused to a lawyer from the start of proceedings, i.e. the 
start of police custody. In addition, there is a chronic failure to ensure that an accused 
person be notified of the right without delay at the initial stage of proceedings and at 
the initial stage of questioning during the police custody phase.  
 
Furthermore, the post-Saddam legal system provides the right to a lawyer for an 
accused person before investigating judge. However, there are problems in law and 
practice. In addition, there is a lack of guarantee to high-quality advice during pre-
trial stage. The norm is to interrogate without a lawyer being prevented. According to 
the practice of the HRC, if a suspect demands legal advice then makes an admission 
during an interview without getting it, the court may exclude this confession.
165
 
However, Iraqi law does not include any provisions by which one can clearly identify 
what the appropriate implications can take place if the present right is breached. In 
particular the confession, which may be attributed to an accused person without the 
attendance of a lawyer, must be not accepted.  
 
In consequence, post-Saddam legislature has not exercised statutory powers in a way 
by which the new system can attain a level of modern procedural rights or to be in 
line with the mandatory minimum standard of international law as interpreted by the 
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HRC. Thus, efficient measures and further provisions are urgently required to bring 
the right in the line with international due process.  
 
The proposal for the new Iraqi justice system is to reform the indicated defects in law 
and practice. The explicit texts, which pay great attention to all provisions indicated 
by the international standards, must be enacted in the ICCP. For further reform, there 
is logic in making legislation as comprehensive as possible. Taking lessons from 
around the world is illustrative in this respect. For example, the English legal system 
seeks to ensure that those who entering custody are informed that free legal assistance 
is available to them.
166
 
 
In England and Wales, a number of previous studies carried out via different periods 
and places illustrate that the rate of making requests to legal advice is on the 
increase.
167
 Recent studies during (2009) (2011) have shown that the proportion 
requesting advice during the police custody stage has reached about 60 per cent of 
suspects, 80 per cent of which were provided to consult with a solicitor.
168
 In contrast 
with previous studies which indicated much less than this rate.
169
 That is to say that it 
seems right that utmost reasons behind such a rise in the rate of suspects making the 
requests for legal advice belong to the Codes of Practice. The review of the provisions 
of the PACE, demonstrates that it is comprehensive. In light of this, there is much that 
the Iraqi system can learn from considering the experiences of other countries' 
legislations enshrining and safeguarding this right. 
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5.3.2. Right of access to an interpreter 
 
The Iraqi criminal justice system is inconsistent with international rules which entitle 
an accused person who cannot understand or speak the language of proceedings, an 
opportunity to receive the service of an interpreter to protect the interests of justice. It 
must be admitted that, there is a lack of the legal texts in this regard because generally 
there is no explicit statutory rule to secure accessing of an interpreter for a person who 
cannot speak or understand the language of proceedings.  
 
It is apparent that the lack of clear, enforceable provisions, adversely affects the rights 
of a person under criminal investigation. As a result, tackling this problem, first of all, 
requires that the current Iraqi criminal justice system in order to be in line with 
international due process must give the protection to this right in law.  
 
From the above highlighted problems in Iraqi law the duty is laid down upon the 
legislature to provide clear competent legal provisions in which all details concerning 
providing and protecting this right can be elaborated consistently with international 
standards. This may well give this right a legal basis, as well as to place a limit 
against all improper discretion in daily practice when the required details are to be 
efficiently mentioned. Bearing in mind that in a post conflict society like Iraq, which 
has not known the rule of law or experienced good practice in criminal justice, there is 
logic in making legislation as comprehensive as possible. Of course the authorities 
will fail to meet the exceptionally high (unattainable) demands, but there must be 
something to work towards. Admittedly, it means that the law will keep being broken 
because the system is just not up to these unrealistic demands at this point in time.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION IN THE 
REFORMED IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
 Aspects of the post-Saddam overhaul of the criminal justice system have sought to 
promote, protect and improve the rights of accused persons against all forms of self-
incrimination. Despite the changes, however, the protection of the right remains 
precarious. This chapter endeavours to assess and discuss the contemporary Iraqi 
criminal justice system in relation to the protection of the right against self-
incrimination. It will explore whether this aspect of the justice system in post-Saddam 
Iraq is fully compliant with international standards.  
 
The chapter discusses the elements of the right against self-incrimination - the right to 
silence, the right to be free from all forms of improper pressure and ill-treatment, and 
the right to make a voluntary confession. Essentially, these components, which are 
connected and overlap with each other, safeguard the rights of persons under criminal 
proceedings.
1
 The chapter is divided into three sections. Section One examines the 
international standard. Section Two is devoted to highlighting the provisions of Iraqi 
law and practice. Section Three considers this new Iraqi system in the light of 
international rules to clarify any lack of compliance with international human rights 
law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Robin C A White & Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5
th
 ed., Oxford 
University Press) 393; Nicolas A.J. Croquet, “The Right of Silence and Not to Self-Incriminate under 
the European Convention on Human Rights: To What Extent Are They Qualified?” (2008) Cambridge 
Student Law Review 215; Vivienne O’Connor & Colette Rausch (eds.), Model Code for Post-Conflict 
Criminal Justice, Model Code of Criminal Procedure Vol. II (2008, United States, Institute of Peace 
Press) 108, 109. 
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6.1. International rules 
 
6.1.1. The right to silence 
 
This section assesses whether the right to silence of an accused person is enshrined in 
international rules from the outset of criminal proceedings or only during the trial 
stage. It also examines whether silence adversely impacts the position of the person 
accused during criminal proceedings.  
 
6.1.1.1. The right to silence during the pre-trial investigation stage 
 
The right to silence during the pre-trial stage is not enshrined under the provisions of 
the ICCPR. Nevertheless, according to the practice of the HRC, a suspect must enjoy 
the right during the pre-trial investigation phase. This can be deduced from examining 
the relevant case-law, which reveals that the suspect’s right to silence and right not to 
incriminate himself are enshrined in the right to a “fair hearing.”2 The HRC states that 
“The presumption of innocence imposes the burden of proving a charge on the 
prosecution.”3 The HRC deems the right to remain silent useless if the refusal to make 
a statement or answer questionings during investigation could be held against persons 
accused and contributes to their conviction.
4
 Interestingly, it has been recognized that 
“an accused person can stay mute without reacting to the allegation.”5 
 
A similar view is held by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. There is no express 
                                                 
2
 The ICCPR, Article 14(3) states that, “in the determination of any criminal charges against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality… (g) not to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”; similarly the ECHR, Article 6(1) states that 
“In the determination… of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to affair… 
hearing…by a…tribunal…”  
3
  J.O. v France UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1620/2007) 23 March 2011 para 
9.6; Gridin v Russian Federation UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (770/1997) 20 
July 2000 para 8.3. 
4
 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (27 July 1995) CCPR/C/79/Add 55, para. 4; see also 
Eileen Skinnider & Frances Gordon, The Right to Silence – International Norms and Domestic 
Realities,  Paper presented to the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice 
Policy (2001) 4, at 
 <http://icclr.law.ubc.ca/sites/icclr.law.ubc.ca/files/publications/pdfs/Paper1_0.PDF> accessed 2 
February 2014.  
5
 Karel de Meester et al., “Chapter 3. Investigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest, and Surrender” in 
Goran Sluiter et al (eds.), International Criminal Procedure Principles and Rules (1
st
 ed., 2013, Oxford) 
226. 
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entitlement to remain silent under the ECHR, but it is regarded as a part of the 
essentials of a fair trial and due criminal justice system. The Court clarified that the 
right to silence lies “at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure.”6 In the same vein, 
the prevailing view among scholars is that the right to remain silent forms part of the 
right to a fair trial.
7
 Hence, even though the right is not explicitly guaranteed in the 
wording of the ICCPR and the ECHR, this has not deterred international human rights 
bodies from concluding that this right is applicable during both the pre-trial 
investigation and trial stages.
8
   
 
It is very important, if the right to silence is to be effective, that a suspect should be 
notified about this right in sufficient terms.
9
 The caution must be in a proper form, 
which can make clear to a suspect that he has the choice of speaking or keeping silent. 
In fact, the form of the warning is not mentioned under binding human rights law. 
However, guidance can be derived from international documents and case law, even 
though these are not binding on Iraq. For example, rules governing the conduct of 
interrogation under international criminal procedure in the ICTY RPE, ICTR RPE and 
the ICC Statute have emphasized that a suspect must be cautioned about the right to 
remain silent clearly and in a language that he understands.
10
 The case-law of 
international criminal trials has gone further in upholding that the statement of a 
suspect must not be introduced before the court if he had not been properly warned 
about his right to remain silent, the rationale being that the use of such statements 
would be unfair to the accused.
11
 It would follow that a person under investigation 
                                                 
6
 Murray v the United Kingdom App no 18731/91 (EHRR, 8 February 1996), (1996) 22 EHRR 29 para 
45; see also Saunders v the United Kingdom App no 19187/91 (ECHR, 17 December 1996) (1997) 23 
EHRR 313 paras 68-75; Funke v France App no 10828/84 (ECtHR, 25 February 1993), (1993) 16 
EHRR 297 para 44. 
7
 See Karel de Meester et al., (n 5) 245.  
8
 Mark Berger, “Self-incrimination and the European Court of Human Rights: Procedural Issues in the 
Enforcement of the Right to Silence” (2007) (5) European Human Rights Law Review 516; see also 
Ben Emmerson & Andrew Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (1
st
 ed., 2010, London 
Sweet & Maxwell) 446.  
9
 Soft law provides certain guideline that “Any person shall, at the moment of arrest … be provided by 
the authority responsible for his arrest respectively with information on and an explanation of his rights 
and how to avail himself of such rights.” UN General Assembly Res 43/173 ‘The Body of Principles 
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment’ (9 December 1988) 
principle 31. 
10
 Rule 42 (A) (iii) ICTY RPE, Rule 42 (A) ICTR RPE, SCSL RPE (42) (iii) and Article 55 (2)(b) of 
the ICC Statute; see also Karel de Meester et al., (n 5) 225. 
11
 Prosecutor v Sefer Halilovic, ICTY, Case No. IT-01-48-AR73.2, AC, 19 August 2005, para. 15; 
Prosecutor v Blagojevic and Jokic, ICTY, Case No. IT-02-60-T, T, TC I Section A, 18 September 
2003, para.19; see also Karel de Meester et al., (n 5) 225. 
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needs to be properly told about the right to remain silent before submitting statements. 
Otherwise, out of regard the fairness of proceedings the statements should inadmissible 
at trial on the grounds that they undermine the voluntariness of interrogation. 
 
6.1.1.2. Drawing an adverse inference from the silence of the accused   
  
International standards place an obligation upon the authorities to respect the right to 
silence during criminal proceedings. The obligation upon the authorities to respect the 
right to silence stems from the principles of freedom against self-incrimination and 
the presumption of innocence. As Berger states, international human rights bodies 
have been systematically attempting to “forge a mature right to silence that permits 
individuals to resist State compulsion to provide self-incriminatory information.”12 
However, one may wonder whether an implication of guilt can be drawn from silence. 
In this regard, fair trial and due process standards often require an attempt to strike a 
balance between individual liberty and the exercise of state authority.
13 
Thus, the right 
to silence of a suspect must be guaranteed, yet its extent and application might vary 
according to the different circumstances, i.e., it is not an absolute right.  In other 
words, a court at any subsequent trial could draw adverse inferences from a suspect‘s 
silence in particular situations. 
 
Adverse inferences can be drawn only in certain situations, employing a considerable 
amount of caution and in accordance with the circumstances of each case. In addition, 
due attention has to be given by the authorities to providing suspects with all the 
required procedural safeguards. Unless these safeguards are satisfied, such adverse 
inference must not take place, in particular with regard to the provision of legal 
assistance, as mentioned in the previous chapter.  
 
In view of the above, a process that is fair by international standards enables a 
suspect, in principle, to keep silent when questioned. It is certainly correct that neither 
                                                 
12
 Mark Berger, (n 8) 515. 
13
 Tim Ward & Piers Gardner, “The Privilege against Self-Incrimination: In Search of Legal Certainty” 
(2003) (4) European Human Rights Law Review 389; see also Murray v United Kingdom, (n 6) para 
47; Condron v the United Kingdom App no 35718/97 (ECtHR, 2 May 2000) , (2001) 31 EHRR 1 para 
55; Boyle and David Ford v the United Kingdom App nos. 29949/07 and 33213/07 (ECtHR, 22 June 
2010) para 37; Beckles v the United Kingdom App no 44652/98 (ECtHR, 8 October 2002) (2003), 36 
EHRR 13 paras 57 and 59; Mark Berger, (n 8) 517. 
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a mere silence nor a refusal to co-operate with an investigation should be, in itself, 
regarded as an indication of guilt or a basis for criminal liability and conviction.
14
 
However, in situations, which clearly call for an explanation from the suspect, the 
silence may be taken into account in order to assess the persuasiveness of the 
evidence adduced by the prosecution, and a court may be entitled to draw adverse 
inferences.
15
 Inference from silence may be reasonable as long as it is not the only 
grounds for guilt and that other evidence is available, which requires an explanation 
from the suspect, who unreasonably remains silent. It must be borne in mind that the 
inference still provides only a supporting role in particular issues, and adequate 
safeguards must be given to the suspect in such cases, particularly in warning the 
suspect regarding possibility of using such silence against him at trial and in 
providing legal assistance at the outset of proceedings. 
 
The fact is that a range of considerations need to be taken into account if a court is to 
make any inference from silence. The most important of these considerations are the 
interests of individuals facing the criminal justice system and the requirements of 
justice. What follows is that the outcome of each case may differ according to the 
circumstances.
16
 In any case, the most widely accepted view seems to be that the 
decision as to whether a fair hearing may be violated due to the drawing of adverse 
inferences from the accused’s silence relies on the following factors: 17  
 
1- The nature and degree of the compulsion used for obtaining the evidence, for 
instance, whether persistence in maintaining silence is deemed an offence in domestic 
law or not. 
                                                 
14
 Funke v France, (n 6); Saunders v United Kingdom, (n 6); Murray v United Kingdom, (n 6). 
15
 Murray v United Kingdom, (n 6) para 47. In this case the applicant had remained silent during police 
questioning and in the national court, then failed to account for his presence at the scene of the alleged 
crime. The ECtHR in this case allowed the drawing of common sense inferences from silence. In this 
case, the ECtHR had taken account of the entire circumstances including that the independent evidence 
of guilt was strong, and that the Northern Ireland legislation incorporated a number of safeguards: in 
particular, the adverse inferences had been drawn by a judge sitting without a jury, and his decision 
was recorded in a reasoned judgment which was susceptible to scrutiny on appeal. 
16
 The ECtHR stated that ‘‘On the one hand, it is self -evident that it is incompatible with the 
immunities under consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a 
refusal to answer questions or to give evidences himself. On the other hand, the Court deems it equally 
obvious that these immunities cannot and should not prevent that the accused’s silence, in situations 
which clearly call for an explanation from him, be taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of 
the evidence adduced by the prosecution.’’ Murray v United Kingdom, (n 6) para 47. 
17
 Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (2
nd 
ed., 2009, Oxford) 865; Nicolas 
A.J. Croquet, (n 1) 223; Mark Berger, (n 8) 519. 
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2- The scope of the community’s interest with regard to the offence occurred and the 
conviction of the offender.  
3- The way in which the warning is conveyed to the suspect about the effect of silence 
on the future of his case, and whether it is adequately put in place or not.  
4- It is important to consider whether the suspect is given all due process guarantees 
and safeguards before drawing any adverse inference from silence. These inferences 
must not be drawn at a subsequent trial unless there were sufficient safeguards during 
the investigation stage to secure the right to silence and the non-incrimination of self. 
 
International cases, as one would expect, exhibit examples of domestic courts being 
found at fault for having drawn adverse inferences from a suspect’s silence,18 and 
there are also cases where complaints against drawn adverse inferences from silence 
have been rejected on the basis that the procedures required for a fair hearing have not 
been breached.
19
  
 
To sum up, in the context of criminal proceedings the right to silence is one of the 
paramount procedural safeguards for a person facing compulsion from the authorities 
to provide self-incriminatory information.
20
 Simultaneously, the drawing of adverse 
inference from silence might be possible in narrow circumstances and when important 
requirements are satisfied.  
 
6.1.2. Unfairly obtained confession evidence and ill treatment  
 
Article 14 (3) (g) of the ICCPR states that a person may not “be compelled to testify 
against himself or to confess guilt.”21 Accordingly, the right not to be compelled to 
confess guilt is enshrined in international rules as a major component of the right to 
freedom from self-incrimination. It embodies the right to a fair hearing by protecting 
                                                 
18
 Condron v the United Kingdom, (n 13) para 61; Beckles v the United Kingdom, (n 13) para 48. 
19
 Adetoro v the United Kingdom App no. 46834/06 (ECtHR, 20 April 2010) paras 57, 58; see also 
Rosemary Pattenden, “Adverse Inference from Silence: European Court of Human Rights” (2010) 
International Journal of Evidence & Proof 272; Shukla v the United Kingdom App no 2526/07 
(ECtHR, 16/06/2009).  
20
 Saunders v United Kingdom, (n 6) para 68; Funke v France, (n 6) para 44; see also Karel de Meester 
et al., (n 5) 226. 
21
 In addition, Article 15 of the UN CAT provides that “Each State Party shall ensure that any 
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence 
in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was 
made.” 
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an accused person from confessing guilt, or from the admissibility at trial of a 
confession that has been improperly obtained during the course of the investigation. 
In the discussion which follows, aspects of these rights will be explored. 
 
6.1.2.1. Confessions improperly extracted by ill treatment 
 
One significant problem is that a suspect might be subjected to police coercion and 
violence in order to extract information or a confession. Such practice represents a 
serious breach of international human rights standards. Article 7 of the ICCPR 
provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”22 A considerable responsibility is placed on State 
organizations in responding to the explicit and implicit obligations contained in this 
Article. One aspect of the obligations imposed by these provisions pertains to 
confessions. Confessions are habitually extracted in criminal investigations by 
improper pressure and torture, practices against which these provisions provide 
important safeguards during the period of pre-trial detention.    
 
The protection of a suspect against maltreatment is deemed an absolute right under 
international human rights law, and evidence obtained in contravention of article 7 of 
the ICCPR may be inadmissible. The HRC states that “it is unacceptable to treat an 
accused person in a manner contrary to article 7 of the Covenant in order to extract a 
confession.”23  
 
In the light of these provisions in international rules, whenever a confession is made 
by an accused person during the course of the pre-trial investigation, the question 
arises as to whether it was properly obtained. By answering this question, it might be 
possible to determine the admissibility of a confession in the subsequent proceedings 
at the trial stage. 
                                                 
22
 Similarly ECHR, Article (3) states that: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
23
 Sandzhar Ismailov v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1769/2008) 25 
March 2011 para 7.6; see also the UN Body of Principle for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, (n 9) principle 1: “All persons under any form of detention or 
imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person.” Also Principle 6: “No person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. No circumstance 
whatever may be invoked as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” 
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The question to be asked here is: what kind of action falls within the scope of the 
prohibition and could thus violate the integrity of the proceedings? Basically, the 
ICCPR bans all kinds of actions by which a suspect could be subjected to abuse, 
either physical or mental. The practice of the HRC clarifies that the ill-treatment 
“relates not only to acts that causes physical pain, but also to acts that cause mental 
suffering to the victim.”24 Thus, all types of misconduct, such as torture and other 
forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment are prohibited.
25
 However, it should 
be noted that distinctions have been made between different levels of inflicted harm 
and misconduct. Such distinctions raise important issues regarding the remedies that 
could be subsequently provided to the victim. Of particular relevance is the question 
of what means of misconduct would damage the reliability of proceedings to an extent 
that would justify the exclusion of evidence obtained by those means.
26
 In this regard, 
torture has been recognized as the most serious degree of violation that casts 
substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence in criminal proceedings. 
27
 
 
The definition of torture is not contained in the ICCPR. Nonetheless, it can be 
observed that the act of torture necessarily involves a certain degree of brutality with a 
high level of pain inflicted, while the other forms of ill treatment may cause less 
severe pain. It has been described that “Torture constitutes an aggravated and 
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”28 
According to Nowak “Torture most serious violation of the human right to personal 
integrity and dignity ... it presupposes a situation where the victim is powerless i.e. is 
                                                 
24
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, (Forty-fourth session, 1992) “Replaces 
General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Article 
7)” adopted on 10 March1992, para. 5. 
25
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, Ibid, para.4; see also Manfred Nowak, UN 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary (2
nd
 ed., 2005, N.P. Engel Publisher) 161. 
26
 The distinction is also necessary because the forbidden actions, in order to be under the ambit of 
Article 7 of the ICCPR, have to reach a certain threshold of torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment. Otherwise, the violation even if does not reach “the minimum level of the threshold of 
Article 7”, it is still not allowed, but perhaps lies within the scope of Article 10 of the ICCPR, which 
bans inhumane treatment. See Suzanne Egan, “the necessary elements of torture: a consideration of the 
views of the Human Rights Committee in Giri v Nepal” (2012) Dublin University Law Journal 302. 
27
 UN CAT 15; The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, (n 9) principle 27;  UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 1990, adopted by the 
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990, 
Guideline 16.   
28
 UN General Assembly Res 30/3452 ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (9 December 
1975) Article 1.   
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under the total control of another person.”29 In any case, torture is comprised of the 
following main elements:
30
  
 
1. Mental or/and physical suffering inflicted on the detainee: this element includes a 
large number of acts and omissions. It is important to mention here that the practice of 
international bodies regarding where accidents could be torture extends also to such 
cases of prolonged solitary confinement, that is, detention “incommunicado” and 
complete isolation of the victim, without communication with close family members 
and friends for a long period.
31
 Moreover, in some cases adequate conditions of 
detention and medical care for detainees can be also amount of torture.
32
  
2. The suffering must have been inflicted intentionally.  
3. The suffering must have been inflicted for a purpose: in an overwhelming number 
of cases torture occurs in order to obtain a confession or information from a suspect. 
At the same time, torture could take place for reasons other than extracting 
information, such as: intimidation, the extortion of money or on the basis of 
discrimination of some kind.
33
  
                                                 
29
 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak, E/CN.4/2006/6, para. 39; similarly see the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 3452 (XXX) (thirteen session on 9 December 
1975) Article 1(2); Ireland v the United Kingdom App no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 18 January 1978) (1979-
80), 2 EHRR 25 para 167; see also Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR 
Commentary, (n 25) 161. 
30
 See Article 1 of the UN CAT “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
31
 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee 
against Torture: Japan, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/JPN/CO/1, para. 18; UN Committee against Torture, 
Summary account of the results of the proceedings concerning the inquiry on Peru, UN Doc. A/56/44, 
2001,186, at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/46cee6ac2.html > accessed 16 April 2014; UN 
Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Resolution 2005/39: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (19 April 2005) E/CN.4/RES/2005/39, para. 9; see also 
Aboussedra v Libyan Arab Jamahirya UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1751/2008) 
25 October 2010 para 7.4; see also Laureano v Peru UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(540/1993) 25 March 1996 para 8.5; see also El-Megreisi v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya UN Human Rights 
Committee Communication No (440/1990) 23 March 1994 para 5.4. 
32
 Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Torture in Healthcare Settings: Reflections on the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture’s 2013 Thematic Report (American University, Washington College of 
law 2013 ) 7 & 20, at <http://antitorture.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/PDF_ Torture_in_ Healthcare 
_Publication.pdf> accessed 26 May 2014. 
33
 Moritz Birk, Julia Kozma, Roland Schmidt and other, Pre-trial Detention and Torture: Why Pre-trial 
Detainees Face the Greatest Risk (2011 Open Society Foundations) 30; Prisoners Abroad, Torture, 
Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment (January 2008) 2 at 
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Bearing in mind that torture is not solely intended to compel persons under 
investigation to confess their guilt. Thus, statements gained from a person under 
investigation by law enforcement officials through torture or other forms of 
compulsion must be inadmissible in evidence at trial. The Body of Principles provides 
that “No detained person while being interrogated shall be subject to violence, threats 
or methods of interrogation which impair his capacity of decision or his judgement.”34 
Examples of such prohibited interrogation methods can be found in a range of case 
law and practice of international bodies.
35
 The HRC states that “It is important for the 
discouragement of violations under article 7 that the law must prohibit the use of 
admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through 
torture or other prohibited treatment”36 
 
The HRC, on many occasions has affirmed that the reliability and credibility of a 
confession depends on how it is obtained. It has stated that that “The wording of 
article 14(3)(g) of the Covenant must be understood in terms of the absence of any 
direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the investigating authorities 
on the accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt.”37 
 
The HRC has interpreted the provisions of the ICCPR to mean that obtaining 
evidence during an investigation by any form of coercion would derail the whole 
proceedings. Thus, evidence elicited from a suspect by invalid means should be 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.prisonersabroad.org.uk/uploads/documents/prisoners/Torture.pdf> accessed 8 March 
2013; see also Denizci and others v Cyprus App nos 2531625321/94 and 27207195 (ECtHR, 23 May 
2001); Egmez v Cyprus App no 30873/96 (ECtHR, 21 December 2000). 
34
 The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, (n 9) principle 21; see also UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of 
the HRC: Georgia, UN Doc: CCPR/C/79/Add.75 at para.26 (5 May 1997). 
35
 Saunders v United Kingdom, (n 6) para 71; Funke v France, (n 6); Jalloh v Germany App no 
54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006), (2007) 44 EHRR 667. 
36
 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, (n 24) para. 12; see also The Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, (n 9) 
principle 27.  
37
 Sandzhar Ismailov v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 23) para 7.6; Dmitry Koreba v 
Belarus UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1390/2005) 25 October 2010, para 7.3; 
Berry v Jamaica UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (330/1988) 4 July 1994 para 11.7; 
Nallaratnam Singarasa v Sri Lanka UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (1033/2001) 21 
July 2004, para 7.4; Deolall v Guyana UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (912/2000) 1 
November 2004 para 5.1; Kurbonov v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 
(1208/2003) 16 March 2006 paras 6.3, 6.4; Zulfia Idieva v Tajikstan UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (127/2004) March 2009 para 9.3. 
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inadmissible.
38
 The HRC also recognised that fair trial under Article 14(1) of the 
ICCPR could be violated if a conviction is based either on improper confession 
extracted from a defendant by investigating authorities, or on testimony against the 
defendant improperly extracted from other persons.
39
 This practice of the HRC means 
that statements obtained as a consequence of torture inflicted on any person should 
not be used in proceedings to implicating another person in a crime. 
 
The HRC deems exclusion of evidence elicited by coercion to be among the effective 
safeguards for making control effective.
40
 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is 
illustrative of the position of the HRC. In the case of Levinta v Moldova, the ECtHR 
took the position that ‘‘the use of such evidence, obtained as a result of a violation of 
one of the core rights guaranteed by the Convention, always raises serious issues as to 
the fairness of the proceedings … regardless of whether the courts also relied on other 
evidence.”41 In the case of Gafgen v Germany, the verdict of the ECtHR contained the 
statement that all confessions obtained from the accused as a result of a violation of 
the convention during the pre-trial investigations must be excluded from the trial.
42
  
 
The ECtHR in Gafgen clarifies that “As to the use during the trial of real evidence 
recovered as a direct result of ill-treatment … should never be relied on a proof of the 
victim’s guilt.”43 Reliance on evidence obtained by improper means, contrary to the 
rights enshrined within human rights rules, could render the proceedings unfair.  
 
Case law has on many occasions asserted that a confession that has been obtained by 
police through invalid methods, or contrary to the requirements of humane treatment, 
should be excluded in order to secure the fairness of the whole proceedings.
44
 A 
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confession extracted in breach of the rights of the convention during the pre-trial stage 
may not only render the proceedings unfair, but may also entail redress for the alleged 
violence. The redress could include three actions: bringing the perpetrator to justice, 
inadmissibility of the evidence, and compensation for the alleged victim.
45
  
 
It follows that the general approach under international standards is that evidence 
under torture is never admitted at trial and that a statement made by the accused must 
be given voluntarily.
46
 Moreover, some international institutions have been gone 
further to prohibit the admission not only of evidence extracted as a result of torture 
but also that evidence obtained by other forms of ill-treatment even cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment.
47
    
 
However, case law provides guidance on when evidence obtained under compulsion 
may be used.  In Saunders v United Kingdom, for example, the ECtHR deemed that 
information which could have been obtained coercively is not covered by the right not 
to incriminate oneself if obtained independently of the will of the person under 
investigation, such as when information or documents are obtained by a search carried 
out according to a warrant issued by a court.
48
  
        
It should be further added that, according to international standards, there is an 
additional requirement to be taken into account in order for the confession to be 
admissible as valid evidence against a person under criminal proceedings. The person 
accused must be granted all safeguards under internal and international law to deal 
with the accusation against him. As discussed in an earlier chapter, a State party 
should ensure that there is proper legal representation during the pre-trial 
investigation process. The HRC on many occasions has held that the denial of a 
suspect’s right to access to a lawyer during questioning would render the given 
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confession unreliable.
49
 Under the jurisprudence of the Committee, any exception 
applied in this regard must be for a good cause whereby restriction on the right of 
access to legal assistance can be justified. In Kasimov v Uzbekistan, the applicant 
claimed that his incriminating statement during interrogation had been made under 
duress and that his right of access to a lawyer had been denied. In these 
circumstances, the HRC found that using such an incriminating statement as evidence 
against the accused would be in breach of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) of the ICCPR.
50
  
 
Similarly, under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, a confession would be inadmissible 
unless a national court made sure that an accused person had been given adequate 
safeguards during police questioning. In this connection, the court in the case of 
Jalloh v Germany stated that “In order to determine whether the applicant’s right not 
to incriminate himself has been violated, the Court will have regard to ... the existence 
of any relevant safeguards in the procedure; and the use to which any material so 
obtained is put.”51 By the same token, in the case of Salduz v Turkey, it was held that 
using an incriminating admission was a violation of the right to a fair hearing, since it 
was obtained in the absence of access to legal assistance from the time of the first 
interview, with no exceptional circumstance that might allow such a restriction.
52
  
 
Having regard to the foregoing, it can be concluded that if a detainee is forced or 
improperly pressured to confess guilt, or is intentionally or negligently deprived of 
adequate safeguards given under international human rights legislation, and makes a 
confession, that confession may not be used. It may also be that, dependent on the 
facts, the State party could be obliged to provide an adequate remedy. 
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6.1.2.2. Proving alleged torture in order to exclude invalid confessions  
 
In practice, proving incidents of torture is critical so that confessions extracted by 
torture being excluded from evidence placed before courts. States such as Iraq might 
apply the rule of inadmissibility of these invalid confessions, but this requires proof 
that torture had been perpetrated. The issue arises as to what means could be used to 
prove that confessions had been obtained by invalid means. In this regard, 
international rules place a fundamental obligation on national authorities, by which a 
person under criminal proceedings should be protected against any form of ill-
treatment.
53
 It is a significant obligation that protects individuals from prohibited 
treatment and should be fulfilled through positive action.
54
 In the view of international 
law, this obligation requires the State parties not only to enact sufficient provisions for 
prohibiting all forms of abuse against the person accused, but also to act properly to 
achieve the task of protection in practice.
55
  
 
What follows is that one of the most important measures of protection that the State 
parties must provide is a proper investigation with regard to any allegation of torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment. Of course, the remedy for any violation of the right 
under consideration cannot be provided without satisfactory investigation. The 
investigation should be operated effectively. According to this vital guarantee and in 
the view of the HRC, a State party must conduct the investigation concerning 
allegations of ill treatment promptly and impartially.
56
 Likewise, the state must not be 
allowed to evade responsibility for maltreatment on the grounds that the maltreatment 
emanated from the personal behaviour and conduct of those in positions of 
authority.
57
  
 
It must be admitted that at the heart of the problem is the difficulty of proof in 
verifying the oppressive acts of officials. Accordingly, the perpetrators may deny the 
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infliction of ill-treatment, and complaints of violations may be useless unless 
supported with substantiated evidence.
58
 The allegation requires to be corroborated, 
for example, by independent medical documents or photographs, or eyewitness or 
other available evidence, so that the onus may be on the state to prove that the alleged 
case is unreliable. In countries such as Iraq, courts look at truth but the difficulties of 
proof of torture is a notable reason why the exclusion of confessions obtained through 
torture during investigations does not take place in practice.
59
 By contrast, under the 
practice of the HRC, once the allegation of ill-treatment is made, the accused person 
who is allegedly subjected to the violence should be immediately provided with a 
medical examination.
60
 
 
It can be observed that the practice of the HRC could be interpreted to mean that, if a 
confession is contested on the basis that it has been extracted by torture, the burden of 
proof of torture should not be on the accused person and instead the burden should be 
on the state to disprove the allegation of torture.  In other words, according to the 
jurisprudence of the HRC there should be simplicity of proof of the existence of 
torture. On many occasions, the Committee has rightly stressed that “where an 
individual deprived of liberty receives injuries in detention, it is incumbent on the 
State party to provide a plausible explanation of how these injuries occurred and to 
produce evidence refuting these allegations.”61 A similar view has been upheld by the 
ECtHR. The Court recognised that “where an individual is taken into police custody 
in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent upon 
the state to provide a plausible explanation of how these injuries were caused.”62 It 
was further held that, where an individual is injured by police at the time of arrest, 
                                                 
58
 Vadim Stolyar v Russian Federation UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (996/2001) 
31 October 2006 para 8.8; Dikme v Turkey App no 20869/92 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000) para 73. 
59
 Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (March 2013) Index: MDE 14/001/2013, 41. 
60
 Kasimov v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee, (n 49) para 9.3; Dmitry Koreba v Belarus UN 
Human Rights Committee, (n 37) para 2.3; Sattorov v Tajikistan UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (1200/2003) 30 March 2009 para 8.3.  
61
 Zheikov v Russian Federation UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (889/1999) 17 
March 2006, para 7.2; see also, Siragev v Uzbekistan UN Human Rights Committee Communication 
No (907/2000) 1 November 2005 para 6.2; Bleier v Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No (30/1978) 24 March 1980 para 13.3; Dermit and Hugo Haroldo Dermit Barbato v 
Uruguay UN Human Rights Committee Communication No (84/1981) 21 October 1982 para 9.6. 
62
 Selmouni v France App no 25803/94 (ECtHR, 28 July1999), (2000) 29 EHRR 403 para 87; see also 
Colibaba v Moldova App no 29089/06 (ECtHR, 23October 2007), (2009) 49 EHRR 44 para 43. 
 237 
 
“the burden rests on the Government to demonstrate with convincing arguments that 
the use of force was not excessive.”63  
 
In General Comments No. 31 and No. 20 the HRC has stressed that complaints 
against violation by a person under criminal proceedings raises the obligation on a 
State party to conduct the investigation “promptly, thoroughly and effectively through 
independent and impartial bodies.”64 In the same way, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has stated 
that: “Where allegations of torture or other forms of ill treatment are raised by a 
defendant during trial, the burden of proof should shift to the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was not obtained by unlawful means, 
including torture and similar ill-treatment.”65 
 
In the light of the above, international standards, either in the context of treaties, “soft 
law” and case law, have elaborated in absolute terms the effective protection against 
all kinds of violation, and due consideration is given to the obligation of a State party 
to provide the person who is under criminal proceedings with adequate protection 
against ill-treatment at all times. For this purpose, the domestic criminal proceedings 
must include adequate details of the means by which the redress of the allegations of 
ill-treatment, particularly the exclusion of invalid confessions, can be advanced 
adequately to the affected person.  
 
6.2. Iraqi rules and practice 
 
6.2.1. The right to silence 
 
In the Iraqi criminal justice system during the Saddam era, the right of an accused 
person to remain silent was non-existent in practice. Contrary to international rules, 
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the system was heavily reliant on confessions extracted by police interrogators to 
convict persons on trial.
66
 At the same time, the right was not fully respected in law.
67
 
Iraqi law had taken the position that, even though the ICCP strictly prohibited abusing 
a person under investigation and had provided that “the accused does not have to 
answer any of the questions he is asked,”68 nonetheless there were some provisions by 
which the protection granted was seriously undermined. A salient problem was that 
implicit messages were sent to officials to force an accused person to speak against 
his will: the ICCP stated that “if the confession is corroborated by other evidence 
which convinces the court that it is true or which has led to uncovering a certain truth, 
then the court may accept it.”69 In addition, there was no reference in the ICCP to 
notifying a person under investigation about the right to silence, either at the initial 
investigation before the police or before the investigating judge. Moreover, there were 
wide rules of immunity from criminal proceedings for officials, such as Article 136 of 
the ICCP and decrees of the Revolutionary Command Council.
70
 
 
After 2003, as already discussed, reform of the ICCP did address the right to keep 
silent for a person under investigation during questioning at the pre-trial stage. Article 
123 was amended by the Coalition Provisional Authority:
71
  
 
                                                 
66
 Michael M. Farhang, “Reconstructing Justice: The Coalition Provisional Authority took Giant Steps 
to Guarantee Iraq a Functioning Criminal Justice System” (2004) Los Angeles Lawyer 46; Joseph T. 
Thai, “Constitution Excluded Confessions: Applying America’s Lessons to a Democratic Iraq” (2005) 
Oklahoma Law Review 39; Daniel L. Rubini, Justice in Waiting: Developing Rule of Law in Iraq 
(National Security Report, July 2009) 46 available at  
<http://www.roa.org/site/DocServer/0907_NSR.pdf?docID=17781> accessed 2 April 2011. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 ICCP Article 026. The official English translation is available online at the homepage of the Global 
Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 3 
January 2014. 
{ ةداملا041 ب :– }هيلا هجوت يتلا ةلئسلاا ىلع ةباجلاا ىلع مهتملا ربجي لا  
69
 ICCP Article 218. The official English translation is available online at the homepage of the Global 
Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 3 
January 2014. 
 ةداملا{408 وا عقاولل هتقباطم ةحصب ةمكحملا اهعم عنتقت ىرخا ةلدأب ديا دق رارقلاا ناك وا رارقلاا نيبو اهنيب ةيببسلا ةطبار تفتنا اذا :
قيقح فاشتكا ىلا ىدا}هب ذخأت نا ةمكحملل زاج ام ة  
70
 Article 136 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure }يقارعلا ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{; Decrees of 
the Revolutionary Command Council No 453, published in the Official Gazette, issue 2991 of 30 April 
1984; No 1042, published in the Official Gazette, issue 2727 of 27 August 1979; No 749, published in 
the Official Gazette, issue 3117 of 29 September 1986.  {لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم تارارق ضعب ىلا ةراشا}  
71
 The Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No (3) Criminal Procedures [Iraq] 18 - June -
2003, published in the Official Gazette, issue 3978 August 2003.The original text is in the English 
language, and the official translation into Arabic is available in the Official Gazette, issue 3978 of 17 
August 2003.   
 239 
 
“… (b) Before questioning the accused the investigative judge must inform the 
accused that: […] he or she has the right to remain silent and no adverse 
inference may be drawn from the accused’s decision to exercise that right.”72  
 
In a similar vein, Section Five of the CPA’s Memorandum 3, without amendment of 
the ICCP, states that an apprehended person has the right to be informed about his 
right to remain silent. 
 
The Iraqi Permanent Constitution of 2005 also provides that the right to a defence is 
sacred and guaranteed at all stages of the criminal proceedings.
73
 Following these 
amendments, it was hoped that Iraqi law would come fully into line with international 
standards.
74
 However, the present author believes that it is essential to examine 
whether the formal changes to Article 123 have made a difference. 
 
6.2.1.1. Notification of the right to silence  
 
The person accused must be adequately informed about the right to remain silent in 
order to take advantage of it. As already illustrated, a person under investigation 
should not be forced to speak under any circumstances, and international due process 
secures the right to silence from the outset of criminal proceedings. Moreover, 
international due process requires a duty of the person who conducts the arrest to 
notify the suspect about his right to keep silent. Under international standards, to 
ensure full respect for the fairness of proceedings, statements obtained from a suspect 
before notification of the right to silence should inadmissible at trial as having 
undermined the voluntary nature of the interrogation.  
 
This right is guaranteed in many legal systems around the world. For example, French 
law provides that “persons in custody must be informed immediately of their right 
during the interview, after having indicated their identity, to make declarations, to 
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answer questions put to them or to remain silent.”75 Similarly, German law provides a 
suspect, whether or not under arrest, with the right to be informed about the right to 
remain silent before any interrogation takes place. Drawing adverse inferences from 
silence is not allowed at any stage of the criminal proceedings.
76
   
 
In Iraq before 2003, there was no rule in place requiring a caution in respect of 
informing a person under investigation about his right to remain silent at any stage of 
the proceedings. In the post-Saddam Iraqi legal system, it seems that at the 
commencement of arrest, according to CPA’s Memorandum 3, an apprehended 
person has right to be informed about his right to remain silent.
77
 Section Five of the 
Memorandum provides that “at the time an Iraqi law enforcement officer arrests any 
person, the officer shall inform that person of his or her right to remain silent.”78 This 
was a step towards bridging the gap between the system and due process. However, a 
closer look at the new reform reveals certain limitations that could minimize its effect 
and render its implementation difficult.  
 
 The key issue of concern is that the new reform does not specify in the appropriate 
place, that is, in the ICCP, a text in which the police are obliged to inform a person 
under investigation about his right to remain silent before questioning. Rather, 
according to the ICCP, the mandatory notification does not arise until a later time, 
when the person under investigation is brought for judicial interrogation.
79
 As has 
been mentioned previously, most provisions of the CPA’s Memorandum 3 are 
inserted as amendments to provisions of the ICCP, particularly in Article 123. 
However, it is problematic that the provisions under consideration in the CPA’s 
Memorandum 3, regarding notification of the right to silence, have not yet been 
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inserted in the Code. The implication is that some anomalies remain, and this in turn 
minimizes the effect of these provisions in practice.
80
 In other words, as long as these 
provisions stand independently in the Memorandum without being incorporated into 
the ICCP, they remain inaccessible, whereas legal provisions dealing with the rights 
of individuals should be established in a clear form, accessible to everybody in a 
society.
81
 In addition, the process of enactment of these provisions by the occupying 
power and translations from the English to the Arabic language has some negative 
implications with regard to their intelligibility, clarity and predictability. In contrast, 
the United Nation’s definition of the rule of law requires, as already mentioned, that 
“the law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear and 
predictable.”82  In the view of the foregoing it is apparent that, this changes made in 
the transitional period post-2003 was temporary and one of interim measures 
appropriate to that time but it is still in force. Years have elapsed since that reform 
was cited in the Memorandum and it is still not to be found in the provisions of the 
Code. If that reform is to be actualized and taken seriously, it must be incorporated in 
the ICCP.   
 
Another problem with the new reform is that the phrase employed in notifying the 
right during a process of arrest is inadequate. It is short and it does not make clear 
whether this right is available without adverse inference at a later stage of 
proceedings. In the same way, the phrase employed in notifying the right during 
judicial interrogations in the pre-trial stage is also inadequate. It is short and it does 
not make clear whether this right is available without adverse inference at a later stage 
of proceedings. A key issue of concern is that it only refers to the investigating 
judge’s questioning of the accused person while, as has previously been shown, 
investigations in Iraq actually come before that stage. Thus it appears that the right to 
silence does not apply to police questioning.    
 
The author’s research suggests that it would be appropriate for the Iraqi legislature to 
intervene. The law needs to protect the right to silence at all stages, and to impose 
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obligations of notification throughout. It must stipulate a clear provision, whereby a 
duty rests upon the police interrogator to caution the suspect by adequate means about 
his choice to remain silent, and to inform him that such a silence does not adversely 
affect his position, and that only his answers may be given as evidence. The 
notification should be given in both oral and written forms at the outset of the 
proceedings, and again prior to answering any questioning following a break in the 
proceedings. It is most important for an accused person to be fully informed about the 
freedom to keep silent, and what the consequences may be of answering any 
questions. Therefore, a further reform needs to come soon. Alternatively, the 
legislature may enact clear provisions to be inserted at an appropriate place in the 
ICCP, by which the questioning of the person accused can only be conducted by the 
judicial authority.  
 
Another cause for concern is that the analysis of the reform of the text reveals that no 
obvious consequences follow from breaching the right concerned. In other words, 
according to the reformed Iraqi law, the proceedings are still valid, even when this 
right is abused. Consequently, the reform must include a stipulation that statements 
given by a person under investigation should not be acceptable unless he or she has 
been fully informed of the right to silence. For this purpose, the caution must be 
worded in the ICCP in such a way as to inform the accused person in understandable 
phrases. In addition, this notification should be deemed unsatisfactory unless it is 
signed by the accused person in the record of the interrogation.  
 
These proposals, in the view of the author of the present research, represent not only 
protection for the accused person from undue pressure, but are also beneficial to the 
officials for the purpose of contesting assertions that the statements might have been 
obtained by invalid means. Furthermore, they are an incentive to proper interrogation, 
whereby the statements of an accused person are not the sole source of information 
and evidence. In reality, the conclusion is that even though the current reform seeks to 
provide the right to silence, it is not workable because the person accused cannot be 
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expected to take advantage of the right unless he is properly informed about it at the 
outset of police questioning.
83
 
   
6.2.1.2. Adverse inference from remaining silent   
 
Under international standards, as a derivative from the presumption of innocence and 
the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, the State is under an obligation to 
provide the suspect with the right to remain silent during the authorities’ questioning 
from the outset of pre-trial investigations.
84
 The practice of drawing inferences from 
silence is only allowed in particular circumstances. Procedural safeguards have to be 
in place at the same time, particularly the right of access to a lawyer. Otherwise, any 
adverse inference drawn from silence is impermissible. It is rightly stated, “Allowing 
adverse inference means that the silence of person is taken as an admission of guilt 
and thus the person’s right to the presumption of innocence is violated.”85  
 
Before examining the post-Saddam reformed justice system, it would be instructive to 
look at some domestic jurisdictions elsewhere in the world in order to understand how 
they have dealt with the compromise between two conflicting interests. These are the 
right of a suspect to keep silent and the authorities’ need to obtain information in 
order to hold the offender and to fight crime.  
 
In some jurisdictions, a person under investigation can remain silent without adverse 
inferences being invoked from that silence.
86 
In other jurisdictions, such as those of 
England and Northern Ireland, adverse inferences can be derived from the suspect 
remaining silent in specific situations,
87
 although it must be borne in mind that, in 
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 In English law and Northern Ireland the right to silence is not an absolute right. In Northern Ireland, 
the right to silence has been being restrained since 1988 by the enactment of the Criminal Evidence 
Order, which allows the court to draw proper inferences from the accused’s silence in some situations. 
In English law, the situation became somewhat similar when the right to silence was curtailed or 
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these jurisdictions, this right is an essential element of a suspect’s right to refuse to 
answer police questions. However, a suspect’s refusal to answer questions put to him 
by interrogators may enable him to evade evidence against him, and thus the drawing 
of adverse inference is sometimes permissible in order to assist the competent 
authority to achieve their legitimate objectives and bring an offender to justice. This 
interpretation meets with international standards and has avoided the criticism of the 
ECtHR on many occasions.
88
 It complies with international standards for several 
reasons. The most important reason is that, even though a negative inference could be 
drawn from silence, a conviction would not be mainly or solely based on inferences 
drawn from the accused’s silence.89 In addition, this practice of inferences drawn from 
the silence is only justified in particular circumstances.
90
 Other procedural safeguards 
also have to be put in place, particularly the right of access to a lawyer, and a person 
under investigation should receive a warning from the police that an inference could 
possibly be drawn from his silence.
91
 
 
In post-Saddam Iraq, the reform of this right in compliance with international human 
rights standards ensures that the drawing of adverse inference from silence is 
prohibited in absolute terms. The new provisions explicitly state that  
 
“… (b) Before questioning the accused the investigative judge must inform the 
accused that: […] he or she has the right to remain silent and no adverse 
inference may be drawn from the accused’s decision to exercise that right.”92 
 
However, these provisions are undermined in many aspects during criminal 
proceedings. Iraqi trial judges, either a single judge in misdemeanour courts or three 
                                                                                                                                            
undermined by the enactment of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. By virtue of new 
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judges in felony courts, traditionally have discretion to determine the conviction in the 
light of the discovered facts. By virtue of so-called “inner belief,” judges are free to 
evaluate the merits of the evidence in order to sustain a conviction. Thus, silence may 
be given an evidentiary value in strengthening the prosecution and determining the 
conviction. Consequently, it can be said that the reformed provisions have not laid 
down any limitation against inference being drawn against accused persons in case of 
their remaining silent. It must be admitted that even if adverse inferences from silence 
are prohibited, they are likely to be exploited to the detriment of the accused person 
and deemed to be incriminating evidence against him. Silence in combination with 
other weak evidence may suffice to sustain a conviction whereas, in other cases where 
the evidence is weak, the defendant’s spoken denial of the accusation rather than his 
invocation of the right to silence is more likely to achieve an acquittal.  
 
In a situation where a person under investigation has the opportunity to mention a fact 
but does not do so, the investigating authority will tend to assume the refusal to 
answer questions means that the person has something to hide regarding the alleged 
offence. In such a situation, the interrogators could try to exert improper pressure on 
that person to incriminate himself. In practice, the exertion of the interrogators’ power 
over the detainee is a systemic problem,
93
 made worse by the fact that the proceedings 
of interrogation, contrary to international due process, have not been adequately 
regulated in Iraqi law.
94
 In other words, the questioning procedure is within the 
discretion of the interrogator, because there are no relevant provisions for organizing 
an interrogation or regulating its conduct, such as time limits, rest breaks, and audio 
or video records to prevent improper tactics. Thereafter, even if a person under 
investigation does not wish to speak, the questioning may continue for a long time 
under improper compulsion in the hope of obtaining a confession, and a person under 
investigation could be interviewed many times over a long period.
95
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The approach of the reformed Iraqi justice system regarding right to silence is unlike 
those jurisdictions elsewhere in which there is no limitation on the right.  It is also 
unlike those jurisdictions in which the drawing of inferences from silence is allowed.  
The dissimilarity takes two forms. On the one hand, in those jurisdictions that permit 
adverse inference to be drawn from a suspect’s silence, such an inference is not 
allowed unless there are safeguards entirely available to the suspect; for example, 
negative inferences should not be drawn if there has been deviation from due 
process.
96
 In particular, legal assistance is guaranteed, and any incriminating 
statements made without a lawyer in attendance would not be admissible. In Iraqi law, 
however, there is no mention of such a provision.  
 
On the other hand, in contrast to Iraqi law, in those jurisdictions in which no inference 
is permissible, the provision regarding the right to silence without adverse effects has 
been respected.
97
 In the reformed post-Saddam justice system, a failure of legal 
reform is not the end of the story: what makes the failure worse is that the right to 
remain silent is routinely breached.
98
 Therefore, it is very rare to find cases in which 
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an accused person has invoked the right to remain silent. As will be elaborated in the 
forthcoming pages, the accused person’s right to silence is, despite the legal 
requirement, no more than ink on paper. Solving a crime under the post-Saddam 
justice system, as in the past, is reliant on forcing the person accused to answer 
questions and to confess guilt.
99
   
    
Reputable reports confirm the lack of respect for the human rights of persons in 
detention and the reliance on self-incrimination for securing convictions. These 
reports clearly reveal the reality of the reformed Iraqi system with regard to adverse 
inferences drawn from the silence of the accused.
100
 The issue of concern is that the 
right to silence is not only inadequately articulated in law by the new provisions, but 
that even these meagre and unsatisfactory provisions are not respected in practice.  
 
From the above discussion, it is important to state that further reform is necessary to 
address the shortcomings in law and practice. In order to strength the right to silence it 
should be noted that securing rights within the law is not sufficient. These rights 
should be properly prescribed. Attention also needs to be given to accountability and 
to promoting effective practical measures, such as training courses, monitoring, 
discipline, supervision, and the videotaping of interrogations.
101
 The Iraqi legislature 
should learn from other legal systems, such as those of England and France, that the 
cautioning of a suspect about his right to silence has to be done at the outset of the 
proceedings in police custody, before any questioning takes place. The caution must 
be given in such a way that the suspect can know whether his silence will have 
adverse results. At the same time, the caution should prevent any contradiction 
between theory and practice since, although in theory no adverse inference should be 
derived from silence, in practice this is not the case. Also, in other jurisdictions, such 
as those of England and Wales, a suspect has the right to be reminded of the right to 
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silence by the interrogator at the beginning of each interrogation and after each break, 
and it would be preferable if the Iraqi legislature adopted this practice. What is more, 
as in English law, a record of caution should be recorded by the interviewer to make 
clear whether the statements have been given voluntarily by the suspect.
102
  
 
To sum up, the conclusion is that the pre-trial right to silence in the Iraqi criminal 
justice system falls short of international standards and further reform is required. 
 
6.2.2. Unfairly obtained confession evidence and ill treatment  
 
As mentioned above, international law protects the person accused against 
involuntary confession. In fact, the pre-Saddam Iraqi criminal justice contained a 
legal framework to respect the right to be free from ill-treatment under the ICCP.
103
 
However, as has been noted, a systemic problem with the Iraqi justice system during 
Saddam’s rule was that the confessions were extracted by invalid means at the 
investigation stage and were then admissible at trial, leading regularly to 
conviction.
104
 One previous study in England and Wales revealed that many refugees 
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confession such as mistreatment, threats, injury, enticement, promises, psychological influence or use 
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from Iraq who suffer from trauma have been physically tortured during detention at 
the hands of the Iraqi official authorities.
105
  
 
There were no satisfactory legal provisions and in practice accused persons were 
under the risk of a coerced confession. The ICCP in Article 218 stated that: 
 
 “… Whether it be physical or moral, a promise or a threat. Nevertheless, if there 
is no causal link between the coercion and the confession or if the confession is 
corroborated by other evidence which convinces the court that it is true or which 
has led to uncovering a certain truth, then the court may accept it.”106 
 
Thai states that the law provides “without limitation that statements of the defendant 
are [to be] heard at trial… these laws lacked enforcement under the Saddam regime, 
which made torture an essential tool of interrogation.”107 Thomas also suggested that,  
 
“The criminal practice code in effect at the time sanctioned torture and permitted 
coerced confessions that were supported by other evidence. As a result, 
confessions obtained through torture were routinely admitted in court. Another 
fundamental deficiency was that the criminal code then in effect did not clearly 
provide for the right of an accused person to remain silent.”108 
 
Therefore the new Iraq criminal justice system shows a real need for reform in order 
to move away from any kind of ill-treatment against persons accused during 
detention. Once the dictatorship was removed, some of those deficiencies were 
overhauled to improve the situation and to comply with the international human rights 
obligations to which Iraq had committed itself. Other provisions were incorporated in 
the ICCP. The aim of these legal provisions is to promote, protect and improve the 
right of the accused person against all forms of self-incrimination. Article 218 of the 
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ICCP was re-articulated in the following terms “a confession must not have been 
extracted by coercion.”109 According to this revision, a confession obtained by 
coercive means was prohibited. By the same token, under Article (37) of the Iraqi 
Permanent Constitution, reliance on invalid types of confession is prohibited. It states 
that “Any confession made under force, threat, or torture shall not be relied on.”110 
 
Furthermore, “the use of restraints, such as handcuffs, irons and strait jackets” as 
punishment against a person who is under criminal proceedings is prohibited.
111
 By 
the same token, the right not to be subject to ill-treatment has become embodied in the 
constitution: “All forms of psychological and physical torture and inhumane treatment 
are prohibited”.112 Additionally, “Every person shall have the right to be treated with 
justice in judicial and administrative proceedings.”113 A further important step was 
recently taken when the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 was approved and ratified by 
the Iraqi government on 7 July 2011.
114
 
 
However, the system still struggles with the problem of ill-treatment of the accused 
person. There is strong evidence that the reformed system has not changed much in 
this regard. Ill-treatment of detainees and torture is still a problem in Iraq.
115
 Thus, 
there is an urgent need to improve the criminal justice to eradicate a systemic lack of 
protection for persons in detention through “a combination of various legislative, 
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administrative, judicial and other measures.”116 In the view of the author, the failure 
of the Iraqi criminal justice system and its reforms to protect a person under 
investigation from being compelled to confess guilt during the pre-trial investigation 
stage is embodied in the following problematic issues:  
 
6.2.2.1. Failure to fulfill the obligations under the rules of the UN Covenant against 
torture  
 
Although wide reforms need to be carried out to adjust the post-Saddam justice 
system terms of the obligations embodied in this treaty, it seems that no steps have 
been taken to implement the rules of the Covenant. For example, there is no statute 
within the framework of Iraqi law which satisfies the obligations of the Covenant. 
Needless to say, priority must be given to ratifying the Optional Protocol of the UN 
Convention against Torture, in accordance with which the Subcommittee for the 
Prevention of Torture (SPT) can conduct regular inspection inside the country. This is 
of crucial significance in order to monitor and prevent torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
Consequently, in order to accelerate the end of systemic abuse of human rights in 
criminal proceedings, a way must be found to fulfil the obligations under the UN 
CAT.  
6.2.2.2. Continued widespread mistreatment and the lack of prohibition 
 
In post-Saddam Iraq, after the Ba’ath regime was toppled in 2003, the leaders from all 
political parties pledged that priority would be given to civil liberties and the 
protection of human rights, and that tough measures would be taken against those who 
violated these rights in criminal processes.
117
 However, the research tells a different 
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story. It remains a systemic problem that there is little protection from self-
incrimination, because a person under investigation can still be subjected to both 
physical and mental harm to confess guilt. Amnesty International alleges that torture 
and other forms of ill-treatment frequently occur, since obtaining a confession is 
considered to be the main aim throughout the detention period.
118
 The justification 
used for such abuse is that government agencies are operating in an environment of 
rising civil disorder, including terrorism and organized crime.
119
 This justification is, 
of course, in contradiction to international rules that protect the right to be free from 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment in absolute terms.
120
 This right is applied to 
any conditions and circumstances, even in a time of emergency, as the HRC states 
that this right “allows of no limitation.”121 In a similar vein, the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR has clearly held that ill-treatment must not be allowed under any pretext, such 
as the prevention of organized crime or terrorism.
122
    
 
A report recently released by the UN disclosed multiple failures to protect the right in 
Iraq and highlights the fact that: 
 
 “There is significant evidence of continued widespread mistreatment and abuse, 
on occasion amounting to torture, of persons in detention centres and prison 
facilities in Iraq ... From information gathered by UNAMI, it appears that 
different methods of physical and psychological coercion were used during 
interrogation in order to obtain confessions and to extract information. In some 
instances detainees had not been permitted to read or have read to them 
confessions before they signed ... UNAMI strongly condemns the torture or ill-
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August 1992) para 115. 
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treatment of detainees in Iraq and urges the Government of Iraq to take urgent 
steps to respect its international and constitutional legal obligations and to bring 
this situation to an end.”123 
 
The Table below, created by the author, is configured on the basis of publicly 
available official information that shows  deaths as a result of torture during detention 
and also registered complaints alleging torture in the years 2006 to 2012 Claims 
regarding continued torture in the post-Saddam criminal system can hereby be 
substantiated.
124
 It is evident that a disturbing number of detainees have died as a 
result of torture during interrogations. 
 
Table 1: the review of cases of death as a result of torture and registered cases of 
torture  
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
1 Death as a result 
of torture 
 ---    1   ---    4    9    3    20   37 
2 Registered cases 
of torture  
 109  122  307  574  653  467  593 2825 
 
 
It is clear that, despite the reforms of the post-Saddam criminal justice system, torture 
and other ill-treatment of detainees remain commonly employed methods of 
extracting confessions. The outdated provisions that are still enforced in the post-
Saddam system permit judges to consider that “the confession is the king of 
evidence,” and it can still be the main basis for a conviction. According to the ICCP, 
“the court’s verdict in a case is based on the extent to which it is satisfied by the 
evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing.”125 However, even 
if a confession is the sole evidence in a case, the court can accept it as evidence of 
defendant’s guilt “if it is satisfied with it.”126  
 
In 2013, UNAMI’s experts observing the practice of Iraqi courts reported that in some 
instances “persons were convicted on capital charges and sentenced to death based 
solely on a confession– even where it was alleged by the accused that the confession 
                                                 
123
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report: 2011 (Baghdad, May 2012)16, 18. 
124
 See the Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, The Conditions of Prisons and 
Detention Centres, Human Rights Reports (Baghdad 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012).  
يونسلا ريرقتلا{ زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ- يقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو}ة  
125
 ICCP, Article 213(a).   
126
 ICCP, Article 213(c). }هيلا تنأمطا ام اذا هدحو رارقلإاب ذخأت نا ةمكحملل{ 
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had been obtained through duress.”127 Then, in its comments on this report provided 
to UNAMI 23 May 2013, Iraqi government responded that “Article 213(c) of the Iraqi 
Criminal Procedure Code is problematic in that where allegations of torture are made 
before the court the court may still proceed with the case and convict a suspect based 
on a confession.”128 
  
In the light of the above, it is suggested that the present provisions must be reformed 
in line with international due process, to the effect that the court cannot accept a 
confession unless there is sufficient evidence to prove the case without it. 
 
Furthermore, contrary to international due procedures, there is a lack of legal 
provisions regarding the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by coercive means 
during the investigation.
129
 It can be submitted that the scope of protection of the right 
in the reformed justice system is narrower than that provided under international 
rules.
130
 Thus, some rules in this regard still need further improvement if they are to 
meet obligations under international law. 
 
Consequently, in addition to the requirement of reforming practice, legislative 
intervention is necessary to address these shortcomings. Evidence obtained by torture 
and other unlawful coercive means must not be used against the accused person at any 
stage of the criminal proceedings. In this connection, useful guidance can be derived 
from international practice. For example, the rules governing the conduct of 
interrogation under international criminal procedure outline several safeguards to be 
provided to the accused person and they also provide that evidence obtained without 
                                                 
127
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, June 2013) 12. 
128
 Ibid. 
129
 UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors state that “When prosecutors come into possession of 
evidence against suspects that they know or believe on reasonable grounds was obtained through 
recourse to unlawful methods, which constitute a grave violation of the suspect's human rights, 
especially involving torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or other abuses of 
human rights, they shall refuse to use such evidence against anyone other than those who used such 
methods, or inform the Court accordingly, and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that those 
responsible for using such methods are brought to justice.”  UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, 
(n 27) Guideline 16. 
130
 Ibid; see also UN CAT, Article 15 states “each State Party shall ensure that any statement…” (n 21); 
The Iraqi Permanent Constitution 2005, Article 37(C) states that “Any confession made under force, 
threat, or torture shall not be relied on.” (n 112).  
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respect for these minimum rights can be excluded at trial.
131
 Similar protection may 
exist under the national laws of different countries.
132
 The obligation of the Iraqi 
criminal justice system is to combat all torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Most 
importantly, the legal requirement in the light of the obligations under the provisions 
of the ICCPR and UN CAT is that a new statutory law should be adopted as a part of 
the national legislation by which the provisions for the elimination of all forms of 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment against the person accused can be regulated.  
 
6.2.2.3. Failure to criminalize and penalize some forms of torture 
 
The IPC prohibits torture and ill-treatment, criminalizes the offence of torture, and 
sets out the punishment.
133
 However, it must be admitted that, although torture is 
forbidden under the provisions of this Code, it is dealt with in a narrow ambit. A 
considerable number of acts that constitute torture and ill-treatment have been 
overlooked. For example, the practice of international bodies has deemed that an 
extreme regime of solitary confinement facilitates torture and other ill-treatment and, 
                                                 
131
 These are: “(1) the right to be assisted by counsel, (2) the right to the free assistance of an 
interpreter, and (3) the right to remain silent and to be cautioned” Rule 42 (A) ICTY RPE, ICTR RPE, 
and SCSL RPE; Article 18 (3) ICTY Statute and Article 17(3) ICTR Statute; for the detail see Karel de 
Meester et al., (n 5) 220; M. Cherif  Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2
nd
 ed., 
2013, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 810.    
132
 Under French law, for example, there must be a rest between questioning, the period of questioning 
must not be lengthy, and the right to a lawyer, a medical examination and other rights must be allowed 
to accused persons in accordance with the ECHR (see John Bell, Sophie Boyron, and Simon Whittaker, 
Principles of French Law (2
nd
 ed., 2008, Oxford University Press) 135. Similarly, in the UK’s PACE in 
s.39 (1) and COP (Code of Practice) the custody officer is responsible for all matters of the suspect’s 
welfare throughout the detention. PACE, inter alia, makes clear that the custody officer is responsible 
for protecting the physical and mental safety of the detainee, who must be free from “torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment and use or threat of violence.” According to s.134 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 (c.33) para. (1) “A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever his 
nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally 
inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of his official 
duties.”     
133
 IPC, Article 333 “Any public official or agent who tortures or orders the torture of an accused, 
witness or informant in order to compel him to confess to the commission of an offence or to make a 
statement or provide information about such offence or to withhold information or to give a particular 
opinion in respect of it is punishable by imprisonment or by penal servitude. Torture shall include the 
use of force or menaces”; 
 ةميرجب فارتعلاا ىلع هلمحل ريبخ وا دهاش وا مهتم بيذعتب رما وا بذع ةماع ةمدخب فلكم وا فظوم لك سبحلا وا نجسلاب بقاعي{
علإ وا روملاا نم رما نامتكل وا اهنأشب تامولعم وا لاوقأب ءلادلأل وا وا ةوقلا لامعتسا بيذعتلا مكحب نوكيو .اهنأشب نيعم يار ءاط
}ديدهتلا 
 See also Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Tamyeez), Case number 14 / General Commission / 1980 
published in the Ministry of Justice, “Judicial Judgments” (1980) Journal of Judicial Judgments 67. 
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in a recent approach, can even amount to torture.
134
 It has been stated that “prolonged 
incommunicado detention or detention in secret places may facilitate the perpetration 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and can in 
itself constitute a form of such treatment.”135 
 
Although over the last ten years detainees in Iraq may have spent long periods in 
solitary pre-trial detention, this does not amount to torture in the eyes of the Iraq legal 
system. In 2013, Amnesty International acknowledged that courts have accepted 
confessions presented during pre-trial as evidence of a defendant’s guilt, even if that 
detention continued for many month or even years.
136
 The most common purpose of 
excessive length of detention is to extract confessions and information. It is self-
evident that excessive periods of detention along with the granted of an unfettered 
discretion to the authorities in their treatment of a detainee during interrogation could 
result in involuntary confessions. Thus, it is right to propose that such conditions 
amount to torture and that confessions obtained by such means should not be accepted 
as evidence of a defendant’s guilt. 
 
Article 333 of the IPC, which criminalizes the act of torture, is narrower in scope than 
the standard adopted under international human rights law.
137
 Article 333 has been 
                                                 
134
 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Resolution 2005/39: Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (n 31) para. 9; the practice of the Committee Against 
Torture also states that the solitary confinement regime, which included “sensorial deprivation and the 
almost total prohibition of communication cause[d] persistent and unjustified suffering which 
amount[ed] to torture … the Committee recommended that the State party not only amend its 
legislation, but also to consider systematically reviewing all cases of prolonged solitary confinement, 
through a specialized psychological and psychiatric evaluation, with a view to releasing those where 
the detention can be considered in violation on the Convention.” UN Committee Against Torture 
(CAT), Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Japan, (n 31) para 18; 
UN Committee against Torture, Summary account of the results of the proceedings concerning the 
inquiry on Peru, (n 31); see also the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), Torture in 
international law (2008, SRO-Kundig, Geneva) 42, 43. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Amnesty International reported that “throughout the past 10 years, these have been marked by 
flagrant violations of human rights and the rule of law, with the authorities subjecting suspects to: 
arrest without warrant and prolonged detention without charge or trial, often incommunicado and in 
secret, unacknowledged places of detention, and without effective remedy; trials that have been grossly 
unfair and conducted before courts that based their guilty verdicts on contested confessions, even in 
capital cases; torture and other ill-treatment committed with impunity; and the death penalty and 
execution… [Detainees] are entirely under the control of their interrogators and held in conditions that 
are widely known to facilitate, even invite, torture and other ill-treatment.” Amnesty International, 
Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (n 59) Index: MDE 14/001/2013, 28 & 32; see also Chapter Four regarding 
detail on excessive period of detention.  
137
 See the definition of torture in Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture; see also the practice 
of international bodies (n 134). 
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criticized on the grounds that it does not include torture used for purposes other than 
extracting information during criminal proceedings, whereas a wider protection is 
required in the binding international rules.
138
 In addition, the provisions do not 
criminalize all kinds of ill-treatment, and no suitable punishments are prescribed for 
the perpetrators.
139
 This is, of course, contrary to binding obligations of Iraq under 
Article 4 of the UN CAT.
140
 Human rights reports recognize this problem. For 
example, the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights in 2008 called for the system to be 
reformed in this regard; however, until the present time this has not taken place.
141
 
 
In addition to inadequate prohibition, the state’s obligation under international law to 
investigate and prosecute these violations is regularly disregarded in practice, and 
where steps have been taken the violations have been dealt with leniently.
142
 The fact 
remains that, over the last ten years, the system has tolerated violence during 
detention. There have been impunity of perpetrators from punishment and a lack of 
accountability.
143
 Thus it can be said that ill-treatment is a widespread phenomenon 
which has been routine over the last ten years in the post-Saddam justice system.  
                                                 
138
 Iraqi law does not deem the act as torture unless it is committed for the purpose of extracting 
information from an accused person by official authority. In contrast, the purpose of torture under 
binding obligations of the UN Convention against Torture encompasses a wide scope, and even for 
reasons other than extracting information. Prisoners Abroad, Torture, Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading 
Treatment, (n 33) 2; Redress, Reparation for Torture in Iraq in the Context of Transitional Justice, 
Discussion Paper (February 2004) 25 at <http://www. mide as tin fo .com / 
documents/Iraq_reparations_en.pdf> accessed 22 October 2011; see also the comment on the approach 
of international rules by Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR 
Commentary, (n 25) 161.  
139
 IPC Article 332 states “Any public official or agent who cruelly treats a person in the course of his 
duties thereby causing him to suffer a loss of esteem or dignity or physical pain is punishable by a 
period of detention [imprisonment] not exceeding 1 year plus a fine not exceeding 100 dinars, or by 
one of those penalties but without prejudice to any greater penalty stipulated by law.” In this regard it 
can be seen how the punishment under Article 332 is mild compared to the punishment under Article 
333.    
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 UN CAT, Article 4 states that “ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law” the 
HRC went further by places positive obligation on the States parties to protect any person against 
public and private torture; see Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR 
Commentary , (n 25) 161, 182.  
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 Amnesty International,  Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (n 59); The Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry 
of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Rights Report (Baghdad, 
2008) 76. 
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 IPC, Article 332 (n 139).  
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 See the General Amnesty Law no 19 of 2008, published in the Official Gazette, issue 3938 of 17 
March 2008; see also Article 136 (b) of the ICCP stated that “The transfer of the accused for trial in an 
offence committed during performance of an official duty, or as a consequence of performance of this 
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For the above-mentioned reasons, the author concludes that Iraq’s reformed criminal 
justice system has failed to comply with its obligations under the UN ICCPR and UN 
CAT. The provisions of human rights law prohibit all kinds of ill-treatment under 
their scope in absolute terms, and any allegation of violation has to be adequately 
investigated. Further reform is necessary to meet international standards in both law 
and practice, and all acts of ill-treatment should be criminalized with adequate and 
deterrent punishments. 
 
6.2.2.4. The disconnection between law and practice 
 
It has been already shown that Iraqi law contains some of most important safeguards 
against self-incrimination. Iraqi law stipulates that using any illegal means to put 
influence on a person under investigation to obtain a confession is prohibited,
144
 and a 
person under investigation must not be forced to answer any questions against his 
will.
145
 In addition, Iraqi law provides that any employee or member of the public 
authority would be punished by imprisonment if he tortures or orders torture of a 
person so as to extract a confession.
146
 Under Iraqi law, a confession obtained under 
duress is deemed invalid. The ICCP states that “the use of any illegal method to 
influence the accused and extract an admission is not permitted. Mistreatment, threats, 
injury, enticement, promises, psychological influence or use of drugs or intoxicants 
are considered illegal methods.”147 
 
On the basis of these provisions, the reformed criminal justice system seems to 
provide necessary safeguards against forced confession. However, it must be admitted 
that there is a disconnection between law and practice. Over the last years, it has been 
a systemic problem that the provisions of law regarding the prohibition against 
                                                                                                                                            
duty is possible only with permission of the minister responsible, in accordance with the stipulations of 
other codes.” The official translation into English is available online at the homepage of the Global 
Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> accessed 28 
January 2014. 
 ةداملا ,يقارعلا ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{031  :)ب(زوجت لا  ءانثا تبكترا ةميرج يف ةمكاحملا ىلع مهتملا ةلاحاةيدأت 
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 ICCP, Article 127 (n 103). 
145
 ICCP, Article 126 (b) (n 68). 
146
 IPC, Article 333 (n 103). 
147
 ICCP, Article 127 (n 103); Bearing in mind that binding international rules do not explicitly prohibit 
using deception during criminal interrogation, while Iraqi law does so. See Karel de Meester et al., (n 
5) 250. 
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compelling a person under investigation to confess guilt have been overlooked in 
practice. These rules to protect accused persons against being forced to confess guilt 
against their will during the course of investigation appear to be ineffective. 
According to reliable reports over the last ten years, violations against detainees for 
the purpose of extracting confessions have continued to take place.
148
 The basic 
problem is that the practice is still far removed from these stated provisions of human 
rights. One observer notes that “the Iraqi experience to date amply illustrates the 
potential gulf between laws on paper and actual practice.”149 
 
The practice reveals that the system is still widely reliant on confessions for the 
convictions. UNAMI’s reports sustain such a claim by observing that  
 
“Criminal trials falling short of international standards ... trials were often brief, 
and consisted of the judge merely certifying confessions which often were 
obtained before the accused was brought to court and often under duress ... and 
the reliance of the courts on confessions obtained under duress and with 
unreliable forensic evidence.”150  
 
In 2013, Amnesty International also reported that  
 
“[it] has examined numerous verdicts by Iraqi criminal courts where a withdrawn 
confession constituted a/or the crucial piece of evidence for a conviction”151 
 
These allegations can also be corroborated from the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Cassation (Mahkamat Al-Tamyeez AlAthadia) which, as in the past, takes the view 
that a conviction can be based on the basis of a confession of the accused, as long as it 
includes sufficient details.
152
 The court also upheld the view that, even if the 
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 Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq 
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confession is involuntary it could still be relied upon. Retraction by the accused 
person makes no different if it results in obtaining evidence that confirms it.
153
  
   
The growing concern amongst experts is that the judicial authority still has no faith in 
the new procedures and, in practice, violates international standards. In 2013, 
international experts remarked that “courts frequently rely solely on confessions to 
found convictions – often without any corroborating evidence. These factors 
contribute to an environment where violations, including abuse, torture and corruption 
can, and do, take place.”154 It has been further added that 
  
“UNAMI continues to have serious reservations about the integrity of the 
criminal justice system in Iraq, including with regard to abuses of due process, 
convictions based on forced confessions, a weak judiciary, corruption, and trial 
proceedings that fall short of international standards. No legal system can be 
guaranteed to be free of error, and in Iraq few convictions for serious offenses 
can be considered safe.”155 
 
Analysis of the problem reveals that two completely different approaches have been 
adopted by the new Iraqi criminal justice system. In the first approach, as stated in the 
reforms, the confession is inadmissible and the court cannot rely on it if it was 
obtained by invalid means or was given involuntarily by an accused person.
156
 In the 
second approach, the judgment of the courts and the Court of Cassation imply that, 
even if the admission has been obtained by invalid means and then retracted, it can be 
relied on as long as it is “elaborate and detailed.”157 While, Article 15 of the UN CAT 
to which Iraq is a State party provides that: “Each State Party shall ensure that any 
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be 
invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as 
evidence that the statement was made.” 
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}ةيزكرملا ةيئانجلا ةمكحملا{  
 261 
 
Accordingly, the conclusion is that the basic principles of the right of an accused 
person to be free from involuntary confession are overlooked as a result of reliance on 
confessions improperly obtained in practice.
158
 There is therefore a disconnection 
between international standards and practice. Under international standards, a 
confession should not be accepted at any stage of criminal proceedings unless it is 
voluntarily given by a person under investigation. In the same vein, since a person 
under investigation should be dealt with according to the principle of presumed 
innocence, his confessions should not be granted any evidential weight or deemed 
valid unless these confessions are sufficiently combined with due rights during 
interrogation. It has already been stated that these guarantees, covering the entire 
criminal proceedings, have not yet been given their rightful place in the Iraqi system. 
 
6.3. Evaluation under international human rights law 
 
 
As indicated earlier, international standards with regard to the pre-trial stage require 
the right to silence to be notified to a suspect before any questioning takes place, and 
also require the suspect to be reminded of the right at the outset of every new 
interrogation and after each break in the questioning. However, the new provisions are 
not compliant with these requirements, due to their failure to provide such guarantees 
for an accused person during police questioning at the pre-trial investigation stage. 
 
Moreover, these provisions are not respected in practice, and this due particularly to 
procedural contradictions that exist in relation to investigations. On the one hand, the 
police in Iraq are authorized to conduct questioning. Almost all confessions take place 
during this stage of proceedings and, as stated earlier, the courts rely on these 
confessions, which are widely obtained “under duress.”159 The accused person has no 
right to a lawyer during police investigations in order to protect him from improper 
interrogation techniques and as a result, no sufficient legal protection of the right to 
silence exists at this crucial stage of the proceedings. This means that an accused 
person subjected to improper pressure can be made to speak against his will during 
police questioning.  
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These legal loopholes may give law enforcement officials further power over the 
person accused. By the same token, there is no relevant guide to the organisation of 
the interrogation or to the regulation of its conduct in terms of its timing and intervals 
of rest, or the use of audio or video records to prevent improper tactics. Such 
deficiencies send a covert message to law enforcement officials to manipulate the 
proceedings in order to strengthen the allegation. By international standards of human 
rights, such practices clearly undermine the presumption of innocence and adversely 
affect the fairness of the proceedings, and they can in themselves involve human 
rights violations, for example torture. International human rights observers continue to 
highlight major problems in this area. What is more, the silence of accused persons 
could result in them being subjected to cruel official practices, and it may also play a 
role in sustaining deficient evidence against a defendant during a trial.  
 
This right to be free from ill-treatment is of particular importance in protecting a 
person under investigation from a confession of guilt and it is given protection under 
international due process. However, an examination of the new Iraqi criminal justice 
system indicates that the system has failed to meet these abiding obligations fully in 
terms of both legislation and implementation. The reasons for this failure will be 
further elaborated during the next chapter.  
 
As shown above, Iraq has failed to fully implement its commitments under the UN 
CAT. As yet, no law for preventing any kind of torture or ill-treatment has been 
adopted. In addition, there is no competent mechanism for the effective investigation 
of allegations of ill-treatment. International standards provide guidance about the 
conditions of detention and describe the kinds of treatment which are violations of 
human rights and could result in involuntary confessions. These invalid means, which 
are recognised under international rules and the practice of international bodies, have 
not yet been considered in the new Iraqi justice system and they need to be adequately 
criminalized. Responsibility for any kind of ill-treatment and torture, other than 
serious bodily damage or death, has not yet been established in Iraqi law,
160
 whereas 
under the provisions of many treaties, improper methods such as solitary confinement 
of a detainee for long periods of time, amount to torture and are totally prohibited 
during the course of an investigation. 
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For those who suffer violations, the means of redress are lacking in both the 
legislative framework and in practice, particularly in relation to bringing the 
perpetrators to justice. As will be shown in the next chapter, serious violations have 
been inflicted by the justice system through the provision of impunity and amnesties 
that have been granted even to officials who have committed torture. As a result, and 
contrary to international rules, the mistreatment of the person accused is still a 
widespread phenomenon during the pre-trial investigation stage.  
 
A case that goes to trial based on evidence obtained by invalid methods determinately 
affects the possibility of a fair trial. Thus, this chapter has repeatedly asserted that if a 
suspect makes a confession during an investigation, it cannot be relied upon unless the 
person who confesses has been given full due process rights, particularly that of 
access to a lawyer. Even so, the preceding discussion has shown that a major 
shortcoming in the reformed post-Saddam justice system is that it is widely reliant on 
confessions to secure convictions at trial, even if it is extracted without sufficient 
procedural safeguards and that this trend has adversely affected the new reform. It is 
problematic that statements obtained during the investigation by invalid means have 
been widely used during criminal proceedings to secure a conviction.  
 
In the light of these considerations, it is suggested that a confession may be used in 
evidence at trial only when two requirements have been achieved: first, the statement 
should be obtained from a person under investigation through valid means and, 
secondly, this person must be guaranteed full due process rights. Any confession that 
is obtained otherwise should be completely excluded. Ultimately, it must be 
emphasised that in the case where a suspect is sent to trial, the conviction must not be 
on the basis of his statements, particularly when the accused has spent a long period    
of pre-trial detention under unsatisfactory conditions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISPELLING THE MYTH OF A SUCCESSFUL REFORM OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN IRAQ AND PROPOSALS FOR 
FURTHER IMPROVEMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
The failure of the Iraqi criminal justice system to carry out reforms to protect the 
human rights of persons at the pre-trial investigation stage has been shown in the 
previous analysis. It is now ten years since the totalitarian regime was removed, but 
the new justice system has not yet managed to eradicate abuses of the three identified 
rights. The criminal justice system still struggles with multiple problems that limit the 
rights of a person subject to criminal proceedings. The weaknesses having been 
previously identified, this chapter endeavours to analyse why reform of the criminal 
justice system has not worked sufficiently, why abuses of human rights in criminal 
proceedings still exist, and what further steps have to be taken to achieve wider 
conformity with international human rights law. Accordingly, this chapter consists of 
two sections. The first section considers the many reasons for the failure to eliminate 
violations of the rights of an accused person, and each of these reasons will be 
examined in turn. The second section contains concrete proposals for further work to 
be carried out in order to enable the Iraqi criminal justice system to meet the objective 
standards of human rights protection under modern standards of justice and binding 
international standards. 
 
7.1. Shattering the myth of the successful reform of criminal procedure in Iraq 
 
Iraqi law and practice have failed to achieve full compatibility with international 
human rights rules. The disparity between Iraqi law and international standards has 
been demonstrated by substantial evidence and studies conducted by national and 
international bodies and NGOs. The failure relates to the three identified rights and to 
other procedural safeguards that are not included within the scope of the present 
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research. There are many reasons for the failure to eliminate the violation of the rights 
of the accused person and it is necessary to examine each of them in turn. 
 
7.1.1 Failure to meet due process standards in both theory and practice 
 
The criminal justice system was administered with cruelty throughout the era of the 
totalitarian regime. After the regime fell, the belief was that the repression would end. 
Regrettably, despite the efforts made to provide Iraq with a new justice system with 
full regard for human rights, the fact is that major problems have continued until the 
present time. The criminal justice system has not succeeded either in protecting the 
community against crime or in respecting the rights of a person under criminal 
proceedings. The current failings of the criminal justice system should not be 
underestimated. 
 
Firstly, there is a gap between the law and due process rights because of legislative 
failure to provide all the minimum procedural guarantees under binding international 
law.
1
 The legislative framework requires much more reform in order to be in line with 
the standards of due process and to offer the protection of basic international human 
rights.  
 
There is a significant gap between the legislative framework and daily practice, and 
the extreme threat to the freedom and liberty of Iraqis is due to both the weakness of 
the legislative provisions and mistreatment of individuals by law enforcement 
officials during daily working practice. The new criminal justice system therefore 
needs to redress the failure in both theory and practice on issues related to criminal 
proceedings. 
 
7.1.2. Continuing weaknesses in the investigation system 
 
It has been previously indicated that neither the rules of criminal procedure nor their 
reform have eradicated the existing flaws within the Iraqi investigative system. It 
seems problematic that the investigative function is entrusted to several parties rather 
                                                 
1
  The absent guarantees have been described in three previous chapters of the thesis. 
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than solely to the investigating judge during the preliminary investigation phase. This 
adversely affects due rights standards, particularly because, in the Iraqi legal system, 
the investigation is a judicial function and needs to be conducted by an agency that 
behaves in a way that is consistent with the requirements of impartiality, 
independence and competence.   
 
However, it is problematic that nothing in the law prohibits the division of labour 
among several parties that may not have these features. In the view of the author, 
entrusting the task of investigation to parties other than the judicial investigating 
authority has generated problems in the investigative system.2 The main cause for 
concern is that the role of the judicial investigating authority is curtailed as a result of 
the practice of allowing law enforcement officials to conduct investigations at the 
outset of proceedings, before the accused person is brought before the judicial 
authority. As mentioned earlier, criminal investigations are supposed to be brought 
under the control of an investigating judge at the earliest opportunity.
3
 The Iraqi 
justice system has been involved in a long-term struggle regarding the protection of 
human rights during the police investigation stage due to the lack of supervision and 
control of judicial authority on police investigations in actual practice. As a result, it is 
quite usual for incriminating evidence to be obtained coercively by the police.4  It is 
commonplace for a law enforcement official to force the accused person to confess 
guilt. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Six, an interrogator in Iraq will often employ various 
coercive methods, using force or brutality to extract a confession. We have seen how 
these methods play a role in securing a conviction against the accused at a later stage 
during the trial.
5
 In 2013 the UNAMI was still reporting “reliance by the courts on 
                                                 
2
 Chapter Three of this thesis. 
3
 Chapter Three of this thesis. 
4
 The Reports of Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI); 
Reports of International NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; the Annual 
Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, 
Human Rights Report - dated between 2004 and 2013. 
{يونسلا ريرقتلا ةيقارعلا ناسنلاا قوقح ةرازو زاجتحلاا زكارمو نوجسلا عاضولأ}  
5
 See the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report, Bagdad  June 2013; May 2012; 1 January - 31 December 2011; 1 January - 31 
December 2010; 1 July - 31 December 2009; 1 January – 30 June 2009; 1 July – 31 December 2008; 1 
January – 30 June 2008;1July – 31 December 2007; 1 April – 30 June 2007; 1 January – 31 March 
2007; 1 November - 31 December 2006; 1 September - 31 October 2006; 1 July – 31 August 2006; 1 
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confessions also contributes to a culture where torture and abuse of detainees are seen 
by some officials as legitimate means to secure convictions.”6 The report added that 
“courts frequently rely solely on confessions to find convictions- often without any 
corroborating evidence. These factors contribute to an environment where violations, 
including abuse, torture and corruption can, and do, take place.”7 Similarly, “there is 
significant evidence that mistreatment, abuse and torture of persons in detention are 
widespread in Iraq.”8 This creates serious problems for Iraq’s obligations under 
international human rights law, particularly the binding obligations of the ICCPR and 
the UN CAT. 
 
The fact is that police power is a key element in the management of the proceedings. 
The task of the police in the current system extends beyond the detection of crimes 
and the gathering of evidence to include investigation and questioning. The most 
critical issue here, as has been amply demonstrated, is the lack of checks and balances 
with regard to police activity. From information collected by the UNAMI, it appears 
that “a magistrate is not generally present during the taking of statements by accused 
persons, and that different methods of physical and psychological methods of 
coercion are brought to bear on accused persons by interrogators to obtain confessions 
and to extract information.”9 The weakness in the investigative system is that it grants 
the police wide powers but it fails to ensure that, as a matter of law, they operate in 
accordance with due process.10 
 
7.1.3. Failure to modernize procedural safeguards to meet minimum international 
standards of due process binding on Iraq. 
 
The current law of criminal procedure is still the one that was current during the 
totalitarian regime. Due to the absence of a holistic vision of reform in the period 
following the fall of the regime, the procedural amendments made did not amount to a 
new alternative code by which the level of protection of human rights could reach 
                                                                                                                                            
May – 30 June 2006; 1 March– 30 April 2006; 1 January– 28 February 2006; 1 November– 31 
December 2005; 1 September – 31 October 2005; 1 July – 31 August 2005. 
6
 Ibid (Bagdad, June 2013) 7. 
7
 Ibid 12. 
8
 Ibid (Bagdad, January 2011) 18. 
9
 Ibid (Bagdad, January 2011) 18; see also Chapters Three and Four. 
10
 Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six. 
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minimum international standards. As a result, there has been a failure to attain full 
compliance with the broad UN definition of the rule of law, and Iraq has failed to 
meet its international obligations, particularly the commitments made to uphold the 
standards of the ICCPR and the UN CAT; whereas the broad UN definition of the rule 
of law requires legislation in which the rules should provide full compliance with 
international human rights standards.11   
 
With regard to the UN CAT, Iraqi has so far failed to implement its rules. There is 
neither a specific law addressing torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, nor have appropriate rules been inserted into the 
ICCP. This generates a notable gap between Iraqi law and Iraq’s obligations. 
Similarly, the fundamental guarantees cited in the new Constitution of 2005 (the Iraqi 
Permanent Constitution), have not yet been reflected in the ICCP. 
 
It is worth mentioning that one way to challenge this situation would be a resort to the 
Federal Supreme Court (Almahkama Al-Itahadiya Al-Olya) and thereby to invoke 
constitutional human rights. But this court has played a passive role and relies on the 
cases brought before it, and obtaining redress by this means would require an 
exceptional effort to be made by the plaintiff. The contribution of the Federal 
Supreme Court to reform has been meagre because few cases involving the defence of 
the rights of due process have been brought before it. 
 
Another issue of concern is that Iraqis lack opportunities to complain at the 
international level. Engagement with international mechanisms that allow a 
complainant to petition the Human Rights and Torture Committees has not yet taken 
place in Iraq. No one can say how long it will take to engage with these international 
mechanisms, but undoubtedly it will not be in the near future. It has been rightly 
stated that “The ability of individuals to complain about the violation of their rights in 
an international arena brings real meaning to the rights contained in the human rights 
treaties.”12 Consequently, although engagement with these international mechanisms 
                                                 
11
 Chapter Two. 
12
 UN human rights, Office of the Higher Commissioner of Human Rights, International Ireaty Bodies-
Complaints Procedures at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx > access 17 May 2014. 
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is optional, not obligatory, they could enhance a culture of lawfulness and respect for 
human rights if adopted by Iraq.  
 
7.1.4. A lack of independence of the actors in the justice system  
 
It is problematic that participants in the criminal justice system are continually subject 
to political influence, and this negatively impacts on the respect for the rule of law 
throughout the criminal proceedings.
13
 The system suffers from corruption and poor 
training of criminal justice personnel. Reputable international reports have indicated a 
deficiency in this area, stating that “there have been some encouraging signs of 
growing independence in the Iraqi judiciary … however they still lack capacity in 
some areas, including a shortage of trained judges, and vulnerability to political 
influence.”14  
 
Clearly, due process rights are likely to be violated if members of the justice system 
and law enforcement officials have been corrupted or threatened or intimidated. In 
2012, for example the Geneva International Centre for Justice sent an appeal to the 
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and to the Office of 
the High Commissioner urging them “to take the necessary measures to protect 
lawyers working in Iraq and pressure the authorities to release those who have been 
detained for defending suspects before Iraqi courts.”15 
 
It must be said that neglecting to address the aggravating circumstances and the 
unsuitable environment of judges, lawyers and other members of the justice system in 
Iraq is contrary to the requirement of the UN Conventions and serves to undermine 
the rule of law in Iraq.   
 
                                                 
13
 The United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Annual Report on Human Rights 2008 - 
Iraq (26 March 2009) available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49ce361a2d.html> accessed 
5 August 2012. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Geneva International Centre for Justice, Iraq - Continuous interference of the executive in the 
judiciary (2012) at  
<http://www.gicj.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=116&Itemid=52> accessed 18 
May 2014. 
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7.1.5. The continuing culture of abuse  
 
Many amendments to Iraqi law, including those affording more protection to human 
rights in criminal procedures, have been proposed by foreign experts and passed by 
the Iraq Parliament. Of course, these amendments are steps in the right direction for 
the development of the Iraqi criminal justice system. However, they remain to be fully 
implemented, and in some cases they are not implemented at all.  
 
It is problematic that members of the public authority and justice officials do not, as 
yet, have faith in these rights being given to an accused person. Crime-fighting is, in 
the official mind set, justification for the abuse of procedural rights during the process 
of arrest and detention. In addition, there are situations where officials do not even 
know about the law or the requirements of human rights.  Another problem is that 
these rights are little known in the community, whose members often have no 
sympathy for the person accused. 
 
In Iraq there is a lack of public education about human rights, and so that persons 
under investigation may not know that they have a right to remain silent, or a lawyer 
free of charge. Therefore, even when revisions have been made to the due process 
procedures, there remains a problem of institutional culture. These rights are likely to 
be disregarded in practice unless that aspect is addressed. The situation has been 
exacerbated by the lack of experience and education of criminal justice personnel and 
law enforcement officials. Their level of awareness has not raised sufficiently to 
ensure the applicability of the reforms in practical terms. 
 
As a result of these shortcomings, the reforms have not been effective. The evidence 
presented in this research shows that, at present, the idea of respect for the human 
rights of a person accused of serious offences is not accepted by actors in the criminal 
justice system. Personnel within the system believe that these reforms are 
inappropriate to the Iraqi situation, and are an obstacle in a system that is mostly 
reliant on confessions as the main source of information leading to criminal 
convictions. During the past ten years, the reforms have proved to be incapable of 
preventing torture, arbitrary arrest or detention and other abuse. Fieldwork carried out 
by reliable international institutions supports this assertion, as has been seen in an 
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earlier chapter. A comment by a senior police officer during one of the interviews 
explicitly illustrates such a view. He stated that “the ratification of the Convention 
against Torture would not be helpful. How are we going to get confessions? We have 
to force the criminals to confess and how are we going to do that now?”16  
 
It is difficult to predict how long it may take to achieve a culture of human rights 
rather than a culture of abuse, particularly as the government has been slow to move 
in this direction.
17
 An overview of the process of reform in the justice system suggests 
that the protection of human rights and the implementation of international 
commitments have been side-lined in the fight against crime and the protection of 
public order.  
 
7.1.6. Lack of accountability, and a culture of impunity for officials who violate human 
rights 
 
One of the main reasons for the breach of the rights of persons facing the criminal 
justice system is impunity, meaning the absence of punishment for perpetrators. In a 
system without adequate monitoring or checks and balances, the gathering of 
evidence against an official who is involved in the violation of human rights in 
criminal proceedings is very difficult, and the culpability of individuals is impossible 
to establish unless the violation results in death or the loss of a limb. Therefore, 
although there are plenty of allegations of violation causing bodily harm, 
investigations and prosecution are rare. Over the last years, there has been 
accountability in only a few cases.18 In these cases, victims had lost limbs or died 
under torture during investigations. 
 
The case of Kata in 2008 is illustrative. The Iraqi Minister of Justice received an 
urgent letter from Amnesty International calling for an impartial investigation to be 
conducted in order to establish the reasons for this person’s death in custody. After 
more than a year, Amnesty International was informed that the death of this person 
was due to torture by officials during interrogation. However, the officials against 
                                                 
16
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, 1 July – 31 December 2008) 25. 
17
 While, under the rule of law, public protection and solving crimes are important, respecting human 
rights during criminal proceedings is equally so. 
18
 Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (Index: MDE 14/001/2013, March 2013) 62. 
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whom the investigation was conducted had been released under the amnesty law.
19
 
While, the obligation under international standards is that states should not enact 
amnesties leading to absolve for those who commit torture and they should be brought 
to justice. Torture should be not eligible for amnesty because it is a gross violation of 
human rights.
20
  
 
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that punishments, in the rare cases of 
prosecution leading to conviction, are likely to be lenient, or to be mitigated to an 
amount incommensurate with the severity of the violations committed.
21
  This 
dangerous phenomenon has attracted the concern of the international community. In 
its annual report on the human rights situation in Iraq in 2011, the UNAMI reported 
that 
“In the rare instances where investigations were carried out by the responsible 
authorities, penalties applied to perpetrators were often limited to disciplinary or 
administrative measures.”
22
 
 
Similarly, there was strong criticism that 
 “This laxity in the prosecution is contrary to the international obligations 
undertaken by Iraq … many of the sanctions imposed (salary reductions, transfer 
and dismissal) are not serious enough given the severity of abuse of human 
rights.”23  
 
Official impunity for perpetrators is a serious barrier to ensuring respect for human 
rights in the criminal justice system. The use of an official amnesty for offenders has 
frustrated justice, hindered the deterrence of these offences and increased the crime 
rate. The system provides immunity from prosecution and criminal liability unless 
                                                 
19
 Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (Index: 
MDE 14/006/2010, September 2010) 19. 
20
 Transitional Justice Institute, The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability (2013, 
Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster) at  
<http://www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/documents/TheBelfastGuidelinesonAmnestyandAccountab
ility.pdf >accessed 21 May 2014; World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (1993), Part II, section B.5. 
21
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, 1 July– 31 December 2008) 24; see also the Human Rights Office of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report (Baghdad, January 2011) 
footnote 57 on p18. 
22
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, January 2011) 19. 
23
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
Rights Report (Baghdad, 1 July– 31 December 2008) 24-26. 
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there is authorization by the executive Minister.
24
 According to the Iraqi Code of 
Criminal Procedure of the Internal Security Forces, which is the code applicable to the 
police, a law enforcement officer cannot be arrested, detained, interrogated or brought 
to trial by a non-military authority without approval from the Commander of the 
executive authority or the executive Minster. It has been stated that  
 
“It is not allowed to notify the policeman, summon or arrest him, unless pursuant 
to the approval of the minister or the person he appoints if the action was 
committed during the performance of his duty.”25 By the same token: “1. The 
Minister, by virtue of a decision containing the reasons, may not approve of 
referring the policeman to the civil criminal courts if the crime is shown to be 
resulting from or caused by fulfilling his official duty. 2. The decision taken 
according to clause (1) of this Article shall prohibit taking legal reviews against 
the policeman for that crime.”26 
 
 
These national provisions are a considerable violation of the binding provisions of 
international law that impose duties on the state to investigate any violation against 
human rights in criminal proceedings and to provide remedies. Sometimes it is an 
express duty to bring the suspect to justice. Affording immunity from prosecution 
through legislation of the kind discussed above is a clear dereliction of obligation. 
Similarly, it is a clear violation of the independence of the judicial authority that 
bringing procedures against an official requires the permission of the executive 
authority. Such legal protection for officials is an important reason for widespread 
violations of human rights, and the impact of any legislative reform is thereby 
frustrated.   
 
                                                 
24
 The Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure of the Internal Security Forces 17 of 2008, published in the 
Official Gazette, issue 4068 in 17 March 2008. }يلخادلا نملأا ىوقل ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{; also, the  
Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council No 1042 of 1979, published in the Official Gazette 
issue 2727 of 27 August 1979, which is still in force, provides officials with immunity against 
prosecution. }لحنملا ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{ 
25
 Article 111 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure of the Internal Security Forces, ibid, in an 
unofficial translation into English is available at <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/148845712/Internal-
Security-Forces-Criminal-Procedure-Law-No> accessed 11 April 2013.  
 ةداملا ,يلخادلا نملأا ىوقل ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{000  :فيلكت وأ ةطرشلا لجر غيلبت زوجي لا ضبقلا ءاقلإ وأ روضحلاب ه
 }هبجاو ءادأ ءانثأ بكترا دق لعفلا ناك اذإ هلوخي نم وأ ريزولا ةقفاوم ىلع ءانب لاإ هيلع 
26
 Ibid, Article 113. 
 { ةداملا , يلخادلا نملأا ىوقل ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق003 : ًلاوأ–  لجر ةلاحإ ىلع ةقفاوملا مدع ببسم رارقب ريزولل
ةطرشلا  يقيقحت سلجم ةيصوت ىلع ًءانبو , اهببسب وأ ةيمسرلا هتابجاوب همايق نع ةئشان ةميرجلا نأ رهظ اذإ ةيندملا ءازجلا مكاحم ىلع
. ضرغلا اذهل لكشي 
 ًايناث–  كلت نع ةطرشلا لجر قحب ةينوناقلا تابيقعتلا ذاختا نم ًاعنام ةداملا هذه نم )ًلاوأ( دنبلل ًاقفو ذختملا رارقلا نوكي }ةميرجلا  
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In addition, Article 136 of the ICCP has provided during the past ten years that “the 
transfer of the accused for trial in an offence committed during the performance of an 
official duty, or as a consequence of the performance of this duty is possible only with 
permission of the minister in charge, in accordance with the stipulations of other 
codes.”27  
 
Through these defective provisions of impunity, the independence of the judicial 
authority has been undermined: according to Article 136 of the ICCP a judge have not 
been able to bring the offender to justice in a courtroom without obtaining permission 
from the executive authority. Despite all the concerns that have been expressed, 
attempts to repeal the defective provisions in Article 136 of the ICCP have failed.  At 
the time of writing, another attempt is being made to repeal this Article, and it is to be 
hoped that it will be repealed permanently.
28
 
 
In the light of the aforementioned, it can be seen that contradictions in the provisions 
of the legislative framework are a substantial obstacle to achieving human rights in 
the criminal justice system.
29
 On the one hand, the law prevents ill-treatment against 
the person accused in absolute terms. On the other hand, a perpetrator who breaches 
the suspect’s rights is immune from prosecution unless it is authorized by the 
executive minister. In a review of Iraq’s record of human rights, published in the 
Universal Periodic Review in 2010, this impunity was described as a critical cause for 
                                                 
27
 Article 136 (b) of the ICCP. The official translation into English is available online at the homepage 
of the Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) <http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/> 
accessed 28 January 2014. 
 ةداملا ,يقارعلا ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{031  ةيدأت ءانثا تبكترا ةميرج يف ةمكاحملا ىلع مهتملا ةلاحا زوجت لا :)ب(
خي يذلا ةرازولا ليكو وا هل عباتلا ريزولا نم نذأبلاا اهببسب وا ةيمسرلا هتفيظو}هلو  
28
 Since 2003, several unsuccessful attempts at amending and repealing Article 136(b) have been made. 
For example, the CPA in Memorandum 3, section 4(d) on 18 June 2003, suspended the Article. Then 
the Iraqi Interim Government reinstated it by Order 14 of 2005, published in the Official Gazette, issue 
3995 of 3 March 2005. Once again the Article was suspended by the new elected government (led by 
Prime Minister Jaffari) and later reinstated. Subsequently, this Article was repealed on 18 September 
2007. However, the new law was not published in the Official Gazette and therefore was not effective 
and in force in accordance with Article 129 of the Constitution. Finally, after many years of  effort, 
provisions for the repeal of this Article appeared on the website of Council of Representative and later 
its repeal was contained in the Official Gazette, Issue 4193 of 13June 2011. Will the repeal be 
maintained or will there be another amendment in future in response to political demands? 
Commentary of the Iraqi Minister of justice, Al-Shimmery, broadcasted by Al-Baghdadi TV in October 
2012; see also the website of the Iraqi Council of Representative at <http://www.parliament.iq/> 
accessed 13/11/2012. 
29
 See earlier discussion in Chapter Six regarding prohibition of ill-treatment in Iraqi law. 
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concern for the Human Rights Council, and the latter’s recommendations were 
forwarded to Iraq’s leaders in an attempt to address this problem.30  
 
In view of the above, it is clear that the reformed criminal justice system has failed to 
establish effective measures to protect an accused person from abuse by public 
officials, or to constitute effective measures to detect and punish such crimes. The 
system is failing to protect accused persons against human rights violations. 
Therefore, dealing seriously with the issues raised in this study is a fundamental 
obligation if Iraq is to be restored to its place in the international community.  
 
7.1.7. A lack of capacity and resources 
 
Lack of resources has been a consistent feature to emerge from the present study. The 
administration of justice has been impacted by capacity issues, such as the number of 
investigating judges, interrogators, skilled police and sufficient gender 
representation.31 The administration of justice also suffers from a lack of both 
financial capacity and fundamental infrastructure. These deficiencies have frustrated 
the attempts of the High Commission for Human Rights to carry out its functions.32 In 
addition, the problem negatively affects the legal aid scheme and contributes to the 
undermining of the right to legal assistance for indigent persons involved in criminal 
proceedings. Furthermore, the lack of custody facilities and of access to medical 
resources at the primary investigation stage contributes to the lack of accountability 
and facilitates the abusive practices. 
 
Additionally, many criminal justice personnel have had long experience of working 
within a culture of repression and abuse, but little experience of a culture of human 
rights. The system and its personnel struggle with a low level of knowledge and 
awareness of the international law of human rights. Likewise, the education and 
                                                 
30
 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Regarding 
Iraq, submitted to the UN General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, A/HRC/14/14 on 15 March 2010, 
para 17. 
31
 According to the Iraqi Global Justice Project, the number of judges in 2009 was 881: “301 of those 
being investigative judges and 326 are prosecutors. 62 of the 1207 are women-12 judges and 50 
prosecutors.”  Clearly such numbers are not proportionate, given that the population of Iraq is about 30 
million. See Global Justice Project: Iraq (GJPI) قارعلا-   لماشلا ةلادعلا  عورشم, available at 
<http://gjpi.org/central-activities/judicial-independence/>  accessed 23 September 2013.  
32
 See Chapter Two.  
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training of criminal justice officials is of a low standard. This is one of the reasons 
why officials are failing to fulfil their duty in terms of international human rights 
obligations.  
 
The fact is that recent reforms of the system have failed to maximize the skills and 
expertise of those responsible for handling and assessing forensic evidence.33 There is 
a lack of capacity in the collection and analysis of administrative data. There is 
significant need to establish research centres, legal medical institutes and forensic 
laboratories and to develop scientific methods for dealing with criminal investigations 
and analysing relevant evidence, without resort to the old methods of investigation. 
Maximizing the skills of personnel is of great importance in dealing with crimes 
without violation of the rights of persons under criminal investigation. Of course, 
responding to such needs requires effective resources to be available, and a lack of 
adequate funding in this regard is one of the factors that contribute to the failure to 
attain a minimum level of investigative skills and techniques. 
 
7.1.8. Corruption 
 
 One of the reasons for the failure of the reformed criminal justice system to meet its 
binding obligations under international law is the corruption of government officials, 
legal authorities and the courts. Reliable reports have repeatedly alleged that 
“corruption had slowed Iraq’s reconstruction after the 2003 invasion.”34 In 2010, 
Amnesty International reported that it “is aware of a number of cases in which 
security officials have asked detainees’ families to give them money - in US dollars -
in return for either releasing their detained relatives or providing information about 
their whereabouts in detention.”35 It is apt to refer to the reports of Transparency 
International in this regard, especially its 2013 ranking of Iraq as the seventh country 
among the list of the most corrupt countries in the world.
36
  
                                                 
33
 United Nations Development Programme, Governance in Iraq: Selected Topics (2009) 22 at  
<http://www.google.co.uk/?gws_rd=cr#fp=85177d2ca4155b73&q=governance+in+iraq> accessed 13 
August 2013. 
34
 UK Border Agency, Country of Origin Information Service, Iraq (issued on 16 September 2009) 122 
at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html> accessed 22 December 2012. 
35
 Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (n 19) 16. 
36
 Transparency International, available at <http://transparency.org/cpi2012/results> accessed 27 
January 2014. 
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Regardless of the reasons for this problematic phenomenon, or of the ways it can be 
reduced or dramatically eliminated, the processes of detention and treatment of 
persons in the criminal system have been adversely affected by this major factor. As a 
result, The Working Group considers that, “among other factors, corruption is 
detrimental to the rule of law and on the effective fulfilment of human rights.”37  
 
7.1.9. Social attitudes  
   
Effective authority to implement a comprehensive reform is an important factor in 
improving human rights in the criminal justice system and in strengthening the rule of 
law. However, it seems that Iraqi politicians are insufficiently determined to 
accelerate reform. It is evident that until the present time the political groups have 
been more interested in strengthening their own power than in promoting a culture of 
lawfulness and human rights.  Iraq continues to face very serious challenges on the 
road to becoming a “normal” country in any sense, and the adverse effects of this 
situation are felt in all aspects of life. A culture of impunity and abuse continues to 
exist, as has been shown, and moreover, some individuals are awarded positions in the 
justice sector on the basis of their political loyalties rather than their personal 
qualities. The political parties concerned provide protection against all forms of 
accountability, even in cases where justice and human rights are abused during 
criminal proceedings. 
 
It should be mentioned here that for the purpose of developing the justice system, the 
engagement of international experience and skills is of importance. Knowledge, 
experience and skills need to be shared and exchanged at both the domestic and the 
international level. It has, however, been found that, although in the period 
immediately after the fall of the previous regime this issue was taken seriously, 
recently there has been a decline in enthusiasm for such programmes. For example, 
during Iraq’s attendance at the periodic review in 2010 to discuss the situation of 
human rights, the state delegation pledged to arrange a large conference in Baghdad, 
where experts from around the world could engage in dialogue. The conference has 
                                                 
37
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not yet taken place, partly because of the security situation, but also, presumably, 
because of a lack of willingness on the part of the government. 
 
Respect for the rights of citizens is essential. However, a number of reputable human 
rights reports reveal that the government is insufficiently active in protecting the 
rights of due process.
38
 Scant attention has been paid to creating a balance between 
law enforcement and human rights.39 There is inadequate political support for the 
establishment of efficient legal associations, human rights groups and a strong civil 
society. The experience of other post-conflict states has shown that the promotion of 
the rule of law and the instigation of reform are difficult to bring about in the absence 
of political will.
40
 In the view of the United Nations, a system of government that 
responds to community needs, including, inter alia, a strong civil society, professional 
associations, human rights groups and community organizations, is able significantly 
to strengthen the rule of law.
41
  
 
Mainstream culture within a society may also in some aspects negatively affect efforts 
to reform the justice system. For example, the experience of post-conflict states such 
as Kosovo, Timor, Sierra Leone and South Africa has shown that increasing the 
number of female police officers could provide a greater level of protection against 
gender-based violence during the process of arrest and detention.
42
 However, gender 
inequality is rooted in Iraq culture, and this is the underlying reason for the relatively 
small number of women serving in the Iraqi police force. There needs to be official 
encouragement of the recruitment of women to work as police officers in order for the 
entire population to benefit from equal treatment in relation to policing.  
  
                                                 
38
 Geneva International Centre for Justice, Iraq - Continuous interference of the executive in the 
judiciary (n 15 ). 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Kristi Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries (Social Development Papers, October 
2006) 7& 9 at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/WP37_web.pdf accessed 19 
May 2104> accessed 19 May 2014. 
41
 UN Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to Rule of Law Assistance: Guidance Note (April, 
2008) 7. 
42
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Practitioners (2011, Printed in Austria) 75 available at 
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Furthermore, one of the main reasons behind the failure of the new reform is that 
these developments have not been accepted by those employed in the justice system, 
who have routinely ignored these new safeguards in practice, as previous chapters 
have known. The central problem is linked to the wider issue of social attitudes. Many 
members of the public feel little sympathy towards a person involved in criminal 
proceedings and there is a widespread belief that the suppression of crime requires a 
tough legal system. There is evidence that the general public supports tough measures 
against a person accused, leading sometimes to a lack of respect for the legal rights of 
accused persons on the part of those administering the justice system, particularly 
when serious crimes have occurred.
43
 Thus, level of awareness and education 
regarding human rights and the rule of law needs to be significantly raised.  
 
7.1.10. Lack of internal and international oversight 
 
National and international observation of the human rights situation has remained 
problematic. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and United Nations Assistance Mission 
for Iraq are still struggle to gain access to criminal justice institutions, such as places 
of detention and police stations. Likewise, the engagement of the press, media, civil 
society, academics, researchers, social organisations and local non-governmental 
organisations in observing the working of the system remains at quite a low level. 
Improving the involvement of these local and international institutions in the 
observation of detention centres, pre-trial facilities and other institutions of justice is 
necessary for the protection of human rights. It is often said that one of the most 
effective instruments in the struggle against human rights violations in Iraq is the 
regular monitoring visits imposed by international human rights institutions. 
However, the government of Iraq, on various occasions, has not allowed international 
observers the opportunity to evaluate the administration of justice in Iraq. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Iraq’s continuing failure to respond to the 
                                                 
43
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HRC’s request to submit reports in recent years has been the cause of the country’s 
behind Iraq’s zero engagement with HRC since the last report in 1998.  
  
The UNAMI has reported that “the access to prisons, detention centres and other 
facilities where persons are deprived of their liberty was problematic in certain areas 
of Iraq … because access was restricted or prevented by the Government of Iraq.”44 
The obstacles put in the way of these organizations to observe the institutions of the 
justice system have severely impaired the performance of their tasks.  
 
Until now, the High Commission for Human Rights has faced obstacles to the 
fulfilment of its task. In this regard, Navi Pillay has called for further efforts to 
empower the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights by reducing interference from 
political blocs and reducing challenges to the fulfilment of its duties in practice.
45
 In 
the same way, the Ministry of Human Rights, which is a branch of the executive 
body, merely observes the human rights situation, and has no further authority to 
remedy any violations of these rights. Similarly, the Iraqi Parliament’s Human Rights 
Committee struggles against different obstacles which hinder the committee from 
carrying out its tasks. On many occasions, the Committee has been prevented from 
carrying out its supervisory role and could not access places of detention due to 
obstruction by the executive authority.
46
 For example, at the end of 2012 the 
Committee was prevented from accessing a place of detention after it received 
information about female detainees held there who had been subjected to violations 
during criminal proceedings. Due to the concerns expressed by human rights 
organizations and widespread public interest in these allegations, they were 
investigated by a committee of independent legal experts and in fact verified.47 These 
brutal violations sparked angry reactions in the streets of Iraq and there were mass 
                                                 
44
 The Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human 
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demands for action against the alleged perpetrators. Scandals of this kind indicate 
public dissatisfaction with the system and demonstrate that much more needs to be 
done to combat these violations of human rights.  
 
In the light of the above, the forthcoming pages will be devoted to proposals for the 
creation of a criminal justice system that functions well both in law and in practice.  
 
7.2. Proposals 
 
The previous pages lead to the conclusion that the rights of the accused person at the 
pre-trial stage of proceedings continue to be a serious cause for concern in Iraq. The 
flaws in both law and practice and the various reasons for them have been identified.  
The task of formulating proposals for a criminal justice system that functions well in 
law and in practice (with particular focus on the pre-trial stage) is complex and multi-
dimensional. “Legislative reform” is not enough, and the author makes a range of 
holistic suggestions that can be realistically implemented in Iraq. Although the focus 
of this work is on the pre-trial stage, the wider structural and social challenges have 
not been ignored. 
 
7.2.1. Addressing the shortcomings in national law and practice  
 
A comprehensive legal reform strategy is essential. It is necessary, inter alia, to 
address the failings of national law and practice, and to establish an appropriate legal 
framework within a legitimate legal culture. Iraq, emerging from nearly forty years of 
repression of human rights, has to find a way to change its institutional and social 
culture. At the theoretical level, it is essential to reform the criminal justice system 
and to overhaul the formal legal framework. The ICCP must comply with modern 
procedures and ensure the protection of human rights in accordance with binding legal 
obligations and the new Constitution (the Iraqi Permanent Constitution). Similarly, 
the implementation of the law has to be improved. Therefore it is essential to 
campaign against wrongful daily practice and at the same time to campaign for reform 
of the law in order to eliminate all the legal ‘loopholes’ that allow continued abuses, 
and to secure the rights of accused persons in theory and in reality, thus bridging the 
gap between law and practice.  
 282 
 
Procedural laws in Iraq have undergone various reforms in attempts to bring the 
system into line with universally accepted standards. The examination in previous 
chapters of relevant new provisions and the three identified rights suggest that an 
approach based on borrowing, transplanting, or creating new legal provisions has a 
played a positive role in improving the system only when these innovations are 
consistent with international safeguards and are holistic in character.  
 
However, an analysis of these amendments has revealed that they have been 
piecemeal and have caused significant problems in terms of human rights. There have 
been genuine attempts to modernize and improve the system, but the conclusion must 
be that the reform efforts have failed to protect and ensure full protection of human 
rights in the three areas studied.   
 
 An analysis of the work of international human rights bodies shows that pre-trial 
rights need to be adopted universally in every kind of national legal system. These 
procedural safeguards need to be adopted fully, no matter whether the basis of the 
system is adversarial or inquisitorial.  
 
To give an example: in some countries with an inquisitorial system, there is no 
established right to a lawyer during the police inquiry at the outset of proceedings. 
The French legal system, however, which is an example of the inquisitorial approach, 
has been changed to respond to international human rights standards. The French 
system has therefore amended the law to adopt an adversarial character with regard to 
the pre-trial process, which better satisfies a suspect’s right to a lawyer and the right 
to remain silent. Consequently, the system now secures for suspects a full right to be 
free from self-incrimination and the right to legal assistance from the outset of the 
proceedings. This is a deviation from the normal practice in an inquisitorial system, 
but French law has adopted an approach borrowed from the adversarial systems in 
order to be in conformity with modern legal safeguards. This illustrates how reforms 
need to consider essential features of the legal framework. At the same time, for the 
purpose of providing more protection for human rights in criminal proceedings, one 
cannot be too rigid about the common-civil law divide.    
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In the view of the author, some changes made in the post-2003 reforms were 
temporary and interim measures appropriate to the transitional period. The proposal, 
in this regard, is that Iraqis need to begin a holistic reform in the light of a 
comprehensive legal reform strategy.   
 
7.2.2. Addressing weaknesses in the investigative system  
 
The ICCP requires that proceedings at the pre-trial investigation stage should be 
conducted by investigating judges and judicial investigators.
48
 However, because of 
the legislative weaknesses already discussed, the role of the investigating judge at the 
outset of proceedings has been usurped by the police and as previously discussed that 
human rights of a person under police investigations have been violated. In order to 
bind the state to an international standard with regard to the rule of law and human 
rights, significant changes should be made. Our version of a new system contains the 
following suggestions: 
 
1. Police involvement in the investigation process needs to be minimized. It is 
not necessary for a police officer to carry out questioning at a preliminary 
stage of proceedings.  Questioning conducted by the police should have no 
evidentiary value nor should it be deemed a source of evidence or acceptable. 
In other words, the proposal requires transferring these important into the 
hands of the judicial authority and altering the role of the police to be 
compliant with its position as the executive power. The same applies to police 
power to arrest people, apart from cases of flagrante delicto. 
2. Institutions that have no formal link with the judicial authority should not be 
involved in the investigative process.  
3. There must be an efficient system of checks and balances. It is problematic 
that even if the judicial authority has control and supervision over the police 
during the preliminary criminal proceedings, that arrangement has not worked 
satisfactorily in practice. Thus, criminal proceedings conducted by the police 
should be subject to an actual and effective supervision by the judicial 
authority and the system should ensure effective principles of accountability. 
                                                 
48
 See Chapter Three. 
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The judicial authority should have the capacity to direct disciplinary or 
criminal proceedings to deter abuse.  
4.  The conduct of criminal proceedings must be entrusted only to those 
authorized by law, and to those possessing the right professional skills and full 
personal competence. 
5.  Full rights to due process for a person in police custody must be assured 
particularly free legal assistance for accused persons who have insufficient 
means to pay for a lawyer. Of course, this proposed remedy may involve the 
cost of legal and personal training programmes in the interests of achieving 
complete safeguards for the accused person guaranteed under international 
human rights law. 
6.   The limitations of police powers under the supervision of judicial authority 
during the investigation should be clear defined. Accordingly, guidelines 
should be created to define police powers in detail. In this light of this 
guideline, the power of law enforcement officials should be comprehensively 
elaborated. Any form of misconduct on the part of the police during 
proceedings should be clearly identified in the interests of curbing human 
rights violations. 
7. Discretionary activities carried out by law enforcement officials should be 
limited or subjected to accountability and scrutiny so that compliance can be 
secured between daily work practice and the wording of law. 
8. The new reform must expand judicial authority so as to cover all centres of 
detention and courts of investigation within the compass of the judicial 
investigation authority. A sufficient number of judicial investigators, who 
must be highly qualified specialists in human rights law and in the process of 
investigation, should be provided for these offices.  
 
7.2.3. Safeguards in criminal proceedings 
 
The proposed holistic reform should adopt further procedural safeguards that are 
unavailable to the accused person under current Iraqi law:  
 
1. Safeguards relevant to right to liberty:  the widespread resort to detention requires 
the creation of alternative measures that could be employed include electronic 
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tagging, restricting a suspect’s movements to a particular area or placing him under 
the supervision of an official authority. Bail should be the preferred alternative to 
detention, unless real risks are involved, as mentioned in the international standards.
49
 
In addition, measures have to be put in place to ensure that investigations take place 
within a fixed time frame. In this regard, it should be considered that speed is 
essential if the full requirements of justice are to be met.  
 
2. Safeguards relevant to the right to a lawyer: it is important for the deterrence of 
systemic abuse that a qualified lawyer should be provided to a person under 
investigation from the outset of police custody. It is necessary to establish a sufficient 
legal aid scheme. In addition, a person should not be qualified as a lawyer without 
passing the minimum trainings requirements. A confession should not be admissible 
as evidence unless a lawyer was present during questioning.
50
 
 
3. Safeguards relevant to the right to be free from self-incrimination: under all 
conditions, a confession extracted from a person accused against his will must be 
inadmissible at all criminal proceedings. Many aspects of international law are 
concerned with upholding this right by seeking to protect the accused person against 
the abuse of law enforcement officials. These safeguards should be inserted within the 
legal framework of the state. The right to examination by a doctor is particularly 
important.
51
 Access to independent medical examination is a basic protection against 
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systemic reliance on confession and the practice of obtaining convictions by means of 
abusing a person under investigation. In Iraq, confessions extracted through torture 
and coercion cannot be excluded from evidence unless there is corroborative evidence 
that these invalid means have been employed. A medical report submitted to an 
independent authority, such as a judge, is perhaps the clearest proof in this respect. 
Regular access to a doctor is seen as the best way to ensure the safety of a person 
accused against all mental or physical risk.
52
 Consequently the right of access to a 
routine medical examination is an essential measure for the purpose of preventing the 
authorities from resorting to illegal methods to extract involuntary confessions.  
 
Important advances in methodology could be made through the adoption of scientific 
methods, such as the use of a forensic DNA database (on digital computers) and DNA 
evidence in the process of investigation. It should be stressed here that over-reliance 
on these methods must be avoided: it is the totality of facts that should be central to 
criminal proceedings. In addition, it is important that expert witnesses are available 
whenever necessary.
53
 In this context, it is worth noting Lowemstein’s finding that in 
England and Wales, 15-25 % of suspects who pleaded guilty to crimes, despite being 
innocent, were later exonerated by DNA testing.
54
 Similar protection has been given 
in the USA, where Kassin et al. reported that in recent years there have been a high 
number of individuals who have been convicted and later exonerated on the basis of 
DNA evidence.
55
 
 
It is important that persons under investigation should have a right to be informed 
prior to interrogation that any statement they make may be used in evidence at trial.
56
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Furthermore, they should have a right to have the interrogation recorded using an 
audio or video system.
57
 
 
4. Safeguards relevant to the system as a whole: there are many other provisions of 
due process under various jurisdictions in the world that are not available in Iraqi law 
and which could be adopted as part of routine practice in order to provide more 
protection against abuse. One example of this would be the practice of informing 
suspects of their rights and presenting them with a review of the legal safeguards and 
a copy of the written caution.
58
 There should also be a right is to be free from 
detention ‘incommunicado’ during proceedings.59  
 
Furthermore, statements extracted under duress, and all evidence subsequently 
derived from those statements, even when they do not amount to a confession, must 
be excluded. In view of the above, it is concluded that, since the reformed justice 
system is currently inadequate with regard to these safeguards, there exists a duty to 
provide them for the people who are under criminal proceedings and to undertake the 
legislative measures that will be necessary to implement the above recommendations.  
 
It is further recommended that an independent court of human rights should be 
established. Its special functions would be to deal comprehensively with human rights 
violations; to address the issue of abuse; to determine the responsibility for the abuse 
and to provide accountability; to compensate those who have been exposed to 
violations; and to ensure that prosecution in such cases is in future made easier.  
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7.2.4. Prioritizing accountability and impunity  
 
It is absolutely vital in terms of law and public policy that allegations of violations of 
human rights during criminal proceedings should be responded to as soon as possible. 
There must be independent and impartial investigation and punishment where 
appropriate, along with remedies for victims. Domestic processes need to be 
developed and supported, and this should be done through engagement with 
international mechanisms, for example by allowing petitions to the Human Rights and 
Torture Committees, and by acceding to the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture. The system should also include adequate mechanisms for the fair 
compensation of victims. It is important here to recall that for the provision of 
effective redress for victims, the author’s research leads him to recommend the 
formulation of a specialized court of human rights to deal comprehensively with these 
cases. This would be an important step in combating the widespread practice of 
violations against the suspect at the hand of government officials. Courts must have 
the power to order remedies, for example, damages and medical care. 
 
It has been already referred to the problems caused by amnesty laws and other laws 
that prohibit legal action being taken against police officers. Government and political 
leaders from all parties in Iraq have granted amnesties even to people who have 
committed violations of human rights many times.
60
 This, in the view of the present 
author, is a serious violation of the duty of the State to bring offenders to justice and 
to deter others. The HRC takes a similar view, viz.,  
 
“Some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are 
generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to 
guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that 
they do not occur in the future. States may not deprive individuals of the right to 
an effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may 
be possible.”61  
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Furthermore, existing provisions entrenching impunity must be identified and 
immediately repealed.
62
 Regrettably, in spite of the fact that some of these 
problematic provisions have been identified not only by Iraqis, but also by the 
international community, amendment and repeal measures may be controversial and 
take a long period of time. 
 
In Iraq, a large number of perpetrators involved in abuses of human rights are 
exonerated from punishment under Article 136 (B). Over a ten year period there were 
urgent requests for its abolition, and several attempts at abolition failed.
63
 Recently, 
however, on June 13 2011, this article was repealed. There had been widespread 
criticism of this article on the grounds that it was hampering prosecutions.
64
 It has 
been observed that “in many important cases, ministers did not give […] the 
permission to take their employees to court, [and] the prime minister's office did not 
give […] permission to take ministers to court.”65 The challenge here is to change the 
mind-set of political leaders. The central problem is the political culture, and this in 
turn is linked to the wider issue of social attitudes. 
 
 It should be borne in mind that provisions explicitly aimed at preventing those guilty 
of mistreatment of detainees from being granted immunity from prosecution may be 
meaningless unless an effective, impartial, honest process of investigation is 
conducted at an early stage. Iraqi law needs to have explicit provisions on such 
important issues. It should be mentioned here that the applicable international rules 
under the UN CAT, to which Iraq is a State party, imposes the duty “to ensure that all 
torturous acts are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt 
to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or 
participation in torture.”66 In addition, it has been stated that such offences should be 
                                                 
62
 See for example, Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure of the Internal Security Forces 17 of 2008, (n 25 ) 
Article 111and 113}يلخادلا نملأا ىوقل ةيئازجلا تامكاحملا لوصأ نوناق{; also the decision of the Revolutionary 
Command Council, No 1042 of 1979, (n 24).  }ةروثلا ةدايق سلجم رارق{  
63
 An interesting commentary entitled “The many lives of Article 136(b) Criminal Procedure Code, 
Law 23 of 1971” explains the failure to deal seriously with the repeal of this Article. It can be found on 
the Global Justice Project’s website at <http://gjpi.org/2010/06/01/global-justice-project-iraq/> 
accessed 19/11/2012.  
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Christopher J. Costantini, “Criminal Investigation under the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure” 
(2010-2011) 41 Cumberland Law Review 565. 
66
 The UN CAT, Article 4(1). 
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“punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.”67 To 
enable this to be done, the provisions of the UN CAT must be reflected in the 
reformed Iraqi criminal justice system, in law and practice. A new statutory law, 
forming a part of a national legislations by which provisions for eliminating all forms 
of ill-treatment against the person accused can be regulated, has yet to be adopted.  
 
The system must increase and coordinate its efforts in a variety of ways: by raising 
the general awareness both of the rights of accused persons and of international 
standards; by the training of officials, by enhancing the human rights in criminal 
proceedings, particularly in allowing access to defence counsel, who must be of 
adequate competence; by establishing a strong mechanism of domestic oversight and 
engaging the international community in the process of monitoring. It goes without 
saying that the provision of accountability depends on violations being reported. 
Therefore, the defenders of international and national human rights have to be given 
appropriate opportunities to perform the task of defending victims of violation. In this 
respect, Iraq needs to extend a standing invitation to all Special Rapporteurs on torture 
to visit Iraq in order to examine and report on the situation of the treatment of 
suspects, taking into account the binding obligations under international law, in 
particular the ICCPR and the UN CAT, to which Iraq is a State party. It is also 
important that petitions to the CAT should be allowed,
68
 and engagement with the 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) likewise should take place.
69
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 The UN CAT, Article 4(2). 
68
 Article 22 of UN CAT states that “A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under 
this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications 
from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a 
State Party of the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee 
if it concerns a State Party to the Convention which has not made such a declaration.”  
69
 See Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Adopted on 18 December 2002 at the fifty-seventh session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations by resolution A/RES/57/199, entered into force on 22 June 2006; 
 291 
 
7.2.5. Improving the performance of the High Commission for Human Rights  
 
The creation of the High Commission for Human Rights in 2008 is considered to be 
one of the most important steps in Iraq’s journey towards the rule of law. At the time 
of writing, this essential institution has started to work.
70
 Thus, in the view of the 
present author, the accelerating pace with which it is fulfilling its duties in accordance 
with the Paris Principles on the Independence of the National Human Rights 
Institutions
71
 is one of the most important steps in the right direction for enhancing 
human rights protection in Iraq.  
 
Now that the Commission is finally working, every effort must be made to support its 
independence and to prevent it from being manipulated for political motives. The 
current study warns that the political pressure may harshly impact on its independence 
and that it would become meaningless. If it comes to represent the parties in the Iraqi 
parliament it will become a political body rather than a body of independent experts 
and this will seriously damage its integrity. There had been a notable delay in 
appointing its members due to disputes between the politicians inside the parliament 
with regard to their choices, and there is a culture of submitting to those who are in 
power. Continuing efforts to support the independence of the Commission will be 
essential for the promotion of human rights in general and particularly for the 
protection of the rights of the persons who are subject to criminal proceedings. 
  
7.2.6. Funding the overhaul of the system 
 
There is a genuine problem of lack of resources in the justice sector and this affects 
the capacity of the system to protect and ensure human rights. Iraq is not a poor 
country.
72
 The Ministry of Justice and the relevant institutions must prepare a budget 
that allows for a comprehensive reform package that makes provision for the 
strengthening of the infrastructure, human capacity and the demands of a modern 
                                                 
70
 Law of the High Commission of Human Rights No. 53 of 2008, published in the Official Gazette, 
issue 4103 of 30 December 2008.}ناسنلاا قوقحل ايلعلا ةيضوفملا نوناق{; See Chapter Two. 
71
 UN General Assembly Res 48/134 ‘Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The 
Paris Principles)’ (20 December 1993). 
72
 Iraq relies on oil exports for nearly all of its government revenue. According to the Iraqi Ministry of 
Oil, Iraq exported 75.3 million barrels in April 2014, bringing in revenues of $7.582 million. See the 
homepage of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, at <http://www.oil.gov.iq> accessed 21 May 2014. 
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criminal justice system. For example, the national budget must address, inter alia, 
institutional weaknesses, infrastructural needs, a lack of availability of employees, 
and poorly trained staff. Similarly, satisfactory financial support must be provided to 
enable modern techniques of investigation, education on human rights, and 
implementation of other necessary projects, such as free legal representation for those 
who have insufficient means to pay for a lawyer. It is important to makes provision 
for adequate devices and development materials for justice agencies, along with an 
adequate data base and statistics relevant to the administration of the justice sector. 
Efficient records must be kept, and these should include genuine information relevant 
to persons arrested and their case histories, with details of their treatment during the 
periods of investigation and detention, bailment, the invocation of the right to silence, 
access to a lawyer, the number of detainees, and records of referrals to trial or releases 
without charge.  
 
It should be emphasised here that the absence of reliable data through inadequate 
record-keeping, added to the general inaccessibility to the public, impacts on research 
and external scrutiny. The present author’s work, it is submitted, could have been 
enormously enriched if such materials and facilities had been available. It is not 
simply a question of academic research. Reliable record keeping is essential for the 
efficient and effective management of the entire justice system. In the UK, for 
example, there are expensive electronic systems for management and records, a 
database for trial evidence, together with staff trained to use the equipment. 
 
The national budget must also make provision for establishing development 
programmes to address the issues of forensic capability. Forensic laboratories and 
detention facilities require funding and the issue of overcrowding needs to be 
addressed. The provision of health services and medical care in detention is an urgent 
issue and has a notable impact on the improvement of justice. It is not surprising that 
a person accused may give an involuntary confession for the purpose of escaping the 
conditions of detention. Therefore, it must be emphasised that improving the facilities 
at detention centres is of particular significance to improving human rights and 
protecting the new system against miscarriages of justice. Significantly, due to recent 
developments in the area human rights, inadequate health care is deemed to be a kind 
of torture or ill-treatment, and the State is deemed to be responsible for the death of 
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any person during detention.
73
 In the case of Iraq, it is regrettably clear that by these 
standards the state authority is in violation of the right to life and that it is responsible 
for the loss of a large number of Iraqi lives during detention. Recent official statistics 
from the government have revealed that there are a large number of detainees who 
have lost their lives for medical reasons (although the true cause of death in some of 
these cases may well be torture).  
 
The Table below has been compiled by the author based on data from the Iraqi 
Ministry of Human Rights covering the recent past. It provides an overview of causes 
of death in cases registered during the years 2007- 2012.
74
 
 
Table 2: The review of causes of death during detention 2007-2012 
 Cause of Death Year 
2007 
Year  
2008 
Year 
2009 
Year  
2010 
Year  
2011 
Year  
2012 
Total 
1 Accident    8    9   45   ---     62 
2 Illness   25   29   43  32   17   85  231 
3 Unspecified causes    14   13    8   3    8    9  55 
4 Suicide    1    1    3   ---    2    2   9 
5 Suspected Torture    1   ---    4    9    3   20  37 
6 Fatal shooting    1   ---   ---   ---    1   ---   2 
7 Riot   ---   ---   ---    2   12   ---  14 
8 Electrical fault   ---   ---   ---    2   ---   ---   2 
9 Killing caused by 
another 
   2   ---   ---    1   ---    1   4 
10 Other reasons    16   ---   ---    6    9    ---   31 
Total    68   52   58  100   52  117  447 
 
 
The data contained in this Table may help to substantiate previous claims regarding 
the government’s responsibility for the loss in detention of a large number of Iraqi 
lives. 
 
It is also suggested that an effective institution of research does not exist at the present 
time and that one should be established at the earliest opportunity so that these 
specialist statistics and data can be analysed and published. The relevant programmes, 
                                                 
73
 See for example, Tarariyeva v Russia App on 4353/03 (ECtHR, 14 December 2006), (2009) 48 
EHRR 26 para 103.  
74
 See the Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and 
Detention Centres, Human Rights Reports (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, Baghdad). 
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academic experts, and researchers must be able to easily access this information and 
other data, such as judicial case histories and custody records, for the purpose of 
scientific research and also as a means of contributing to the resolution of particular 
problems with respect to safeguarding human rights in criminal proceedings.  
 
7.2.7. Combating corruption 
 
It has been indicated earlier in this chapter that corruption is a major problem. In 2010 
Amnesty International warned, “Corruption has been a significant factor affecting the 
pattern and process of detentions, with some people apparently being detained by 
Iraqi security forces not because they were suspected of committing offences or to 
pose a threat to security but essentially to extort money from them and their 
families.”75 
 
In light of the aforesaid, combating corruption may be seen as undoubtedly the most 
significant factor in protecting human rights and the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. The issue of concern is that despite the high rate of corruption there are few 
convictions. The recommendation regarding this issue is of “zero tolerance against 
corruption” as the sole way to combat this chronic phenomenon. Efforts to investigate 
the offences and to prosecute the offenders must be intensified. The perpetrators must 
not be granted any form of amnesty or impunity for their crimes against human rights. 
Above all, Iraq is a party to the UN Convention against Corruption and it is 
imperative that the set of measures included in this Convention should be put in place 
for the purpose of combating corruption.
76
   
 
7.2.8. Enforcing international rules domestically 
 
In Chapter Two, the author observed that the Iraqi legal system is not clear as to 
whether international agreements are a source of legal obligation or whether they can 
take priority over domestic law.
77
 International conventions have not been 
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 Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (n 19) 16.  
76
 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, entered into force 14 
December 2005). Iraq ratified the Convention on 17 March 2008.  
77
 See Chapter Two. 
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incorporated into Iraqi law. This has negatively affected the ability to use 
international human rights law at the domestic level. Iraq has recently become a State 
party to most of the international treaties on human rights, such as the UN CAT and 
the ICPPED. Nevertheless, steps have not yet been taken to implement their 
provisions within the national legal system. This needs to be addressed, for example 
by enacting new laws that correspond to the provisions of these conventions.   
 
 In the view of the author, the ideal solution for Iraq would be for the Iraqi Parliament 
to pass a law stating that conventions that are binding on Iraq are applicable before 
the domestic courts. Indeed, the ability to raise binding obligations directly before 
Iraqi courts can have, the author believes, a catalysing effect on human rights 
protection in practical terms. It would be still better if these principles were 
incorporated in the Iraqi Permanent Constitution. The effects of the transformation of 
international human rights law into a reality for the people of Iraq cannot be 
underestimated. For this purpose, it is imperative that Iraqi judges are provided with 
adequate knowledge to ensure effective interpretation of the rules in the light of 
international standards. It is also imperative that the judges have to study the case law 
of international jurisprudence, in particular the practice of the HRC and the ECtHR. 
Law enforcement officials must have a basic level of education regarding 
international standards, and these need to be adequately contained in the curriculum 
and courses of the relevant educational institutions, such as police colleges. 
  
The author also recall suggestions that those international human rights treaties not 
previously ratified by Iraq need to be reviewed again. Priority has to be given to the 
declaration under Article 22 of the UN CAT on the individual’s petitions to the 
Committee against Torture and to the ratification of the Optional Protocols of the UN 
CAT.
78
 Similarly, priority has to be given to the ratification of the Optional Protocols 
of the UN ICCPR.
79
 These would allow for redress in cases of violations of human 
                                                 
78
 The optional protocol of the UN CAT concerns regular visits undertaken by the Subcommittee for 
the Prevention of Torture (SPT) in order to inspect torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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rights. In accordance with this international mechanism the victim whose human 
rights are abused at the hands of a representative of a public authority, having 
exhausted national remedies, can resort to the HRC to redress the damage inflicted. 
Therefore, urgent steps must be taken by the government of Iraq towards accession to 
the First Optional Protocol of the UN ICCPR, so that Iraqi victims can present their 
cases before the Committee. 
 
7.2.9. Improving social attitudes and the political will to reform 
 
The government and all the leaders of the political parties of Iraq have promised 
Iraqis and International Community on many occasions to commit themselves to 
respecting human rights and to work towards a sustainable peace and the rule of 
law.
80
 However, these promises have not matched their actions, and until the present 
time, reputable international reports have described Iraq as a “highly repressive” 
country.
81
 The struggle for power among parties is a significant factor exacerbating 
the situation in Iraq. It creates or entrenches fault lines in public life in general and 
human rights in particular. Given this situation, political will is of particular 
importance for improving the justice system and for further reform in the area of 
human rights. 
 
Speaking as an Iraqi, I can say that there needs to be a major change in the mind-set 
of Iraqi people, and this applies to the public, as well as professionals working with 
criminal justice system and politicians. We all need to give thought to our past 
experience and to the task of making our future more secure. We need to appreciate 
the significance of human rights and the part they play in improving the quality of 
life. Education is critical: the level of awareness and education regarding human 
rights and rule of law needs to be raised. Human rights development should be 
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sustained through serious efforts on the part of the national government to facilitate 
the process. A holistic reform requires, inter alia, the commitment of the national 
government, law enforcement officials, judges, lawyers, court administration staff, 
justice institutions, civil society and the public. 
 
7.210. Improving public confidence in the criminal justice system 
 
Proposing methods by which Iraqis can believe that the new criminal justice system is 
moving away from past practice is of particular importance for improving criminal 
procedural safeguards. It is worthwhile to propose a measure that exists in other 
countries of the world:
82
 direct inspection of the administration of justice by the 
public might be a create step towards healing and consolidating public credibility in 
the system. In this regard, the appropriate legal framework needs to be enacted in 
order to organize all the details by which the institution of the justice can be subject to 
inspection by an Observer Group. This group can be empowered by law to carry out 
unannounced visits to institutions of justice at any time. The aim of these visits is to 
discover whether the procedural rights in criminal proceedings are being applied 
properly, and that a person under criminal proceedings is treated in line with the 
principles of human rights. 
 
To conclude this analysis, the author accepts that the Iraqi criminal justice system has 
been much improved by the post-Saddam reforms. However, modifications to the 
system have not achieved full conformity with the binding obligations of international 
human rights law. This assessment of a decade of violations of human rights of 
persons accused reveals that the legal framework remains inadequate and the system 
still has insufficient capacity to meet international human rights standards. Recent 
legislative changes regarding the three identified rights demonstrate an incomplete 
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 See for example the system of Independent Custody Visitors (ICVs) in England and Wales that has 
been established by the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by section 117 of the Coroners and 
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and inadequate reform process. In the view of the present author, even though these 
reforms are seen as a positive development it is essential to rethink the process in 
holistic terms, and this chapter has provided many specific policy recommendations. 
These, the author firmly believes, are of the utmost importance in the struggle to 
attain the rule of law in Iraq, with an attendant culture of respect for human rights and 
compliance with international obligations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 
The thesis was undertaken to test the correctness of the proposition that the reformed 
Iraqi criminal justice system accords with international standards in the area of human 
rights, and particularly the objective standards of the ICCPR, which is binding on Iraq 
as a State Party. This conclusion incorporates the final judgment of the thesis, which 
is that the new reforms have failed to achieve full compliance with Iraq’s obligations 
under international law. It contains the following sections: the main findings of the 
thesis; a summary of the research findings chapter by chapter; implications for further 
research; and a holistic summary of the key points considered.   
 
8.1. Main findings of the research  
 
Ten years has passed since the Saddam regime was removed. The end of the regime 
was one of the most striking developments in the history of modern Iraq. A 
justification for the removal of the regime was that the country would be subsequently 
transformed into a model for democracy and the protection of human rights in the 
Middle East.
1
 It follows that the reform of the criminal justice system was one of the 
most important aspects of this project. The objective of these reforms was to 
consolidate what was acceptable and to repair what was defective in order to promote 
the protection of human rights. In summation, this research has sought to examine 
whether the Iraqi criminal justice system, after ten years of reforms, has become 
compliant with the objective standards of international law.  
 
All issues raised by the reform of the Iraqi criminal justice system deserve analysis. 
However, a number of themes were excluded because a given topic of study needs to 
be covered in depth, and some issues could not be comprehensively addressed due to 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter One. 
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limitations of time and of the scope of the research.
2
 Issues unexplored in this work 
deserve further in-depth study in future.  
 
The present work focused on three rights of an accused person in the pre-trial stage of 
criminal proceedings: the right to liberty, third party access rights, and the right to be 
free from self-incrimination. The work from the outset showed that an improvement 
in the human rights of persons accused in criminal procedures is an important 
milestone in Iraq’s journey towards the rule of law in post-Saddam Iraq. However, the 
foregoing analysis of these three rights has raised concerns that, despite the efforts 
towards reform of the criminal justice system, there has been a failure to fully protect 
these three identified rights. The rights of a person under investigation in the pre-trial 
stage continue to be violated in Iraq, and a disparity between the practice of the 
system and obligations under international human rights standards has been 
established in this research by the inclusion of substantial evidence.  The research has 
identified a wide range of reasons for the failure of the post-2003 reforms to bring 
those procedural rights into full conformity with international standards, and measures 
have been proposed to redress the defective areas. 
 
It is hoped that this research will assist in the creation of guidelines for determining 
whether the justice system in post-Saddam Iraq is fully compliant with the 
international standards or whether it still falls short of the standards of international 
due process. Little research has been conducted to explore the successes and failures 
of the reforms, and the result has been a serious deficit in our understanding that 
needs to be filled. Despite the fact that little research has been conducted in this area, 
the efforts to reform the legal system in post-Saddam Iraq have attracted the curiosity 
of legal experts around the world. This study is offered as a contribution to that much-
needed research.   
 
8.2. Summary of the research findings by chapters 
 
Chapter One was an introductory chapter which mapped the route for the entire work.  
In summation, this chapter showed that the Iraqi criminal justice system during the 
                                                 
2
 See Chapter One for more detail. 
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Saddam era failed to protect the rights of a person under criminal proceedings as there 
were no satisfactory legal provisions, and, in practice, accused persons were 
defenceless.
3
 This fact was established at the outset of this thesis and then 
substantiated through a historical review of the trajectory of the disrespect for human 
rights in the criminal justice system under the Ba’ath party regime.  
 
After the fall of the Saddam regime, the Iraqi criminal justice system was overhauled 
with the goal of establishing the rule of law as well as complying with international 
human rights obligations. Of particular relevance, there were other provisions 
incorporated in the ICCP. The aim of these legal provisions is to promote, protect and 
improve human rights in the post-Saddam criminal justice system. However, the main 
argument of this thesis, which was presented in this chapter, was that the reformed 
criminal justice system has failed to fully protect the rights in the three identified 
areas and that there are deficiencies that need to be addressed in order to fully meet 
obligations under international human rights law in order to ensure the rule of law.  
 
Each subsequent chapter provided a part of the findings related to the key theme of 
the research. Answering research questions at each stage of the research process 
formed the key findings. The findings presented throughout the chapters of this thesis 
have shattered the myth of successful criminal procedure reform and have revealed a 
vital disparity between the Iraqi system and international human rights standards that 
must be filled.  
 
Chapter Two demonstrated that in the new era of post-Saddam Iraq, much progress 
has been made on a number of defective areas fronts of the past era. The ending of the 
totalitarian regime encouraged the establishment of a democratic state. Once this need 
for reform was established, the research then reviewed the reform efforts to bridge the 
gap between the system and the rule of law. The rule of law is of particular 
importance for the solution to many of Iraq’s problems. It requires the establishment 
of a new criminal justice system in line with obligations under international law and 
transition from a totalitarian regime to a democracy. That is why after Saddam’s 
regime was removed in 2003, the main focus for Iraqis and the international 
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 See Chapter One.  
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community was restoration of the rule of law. Many significant programmes of work 
have been carried out to reform the legislative framework, the judicial framework, the 
police force and other justice personnel and institutions of the criminal justice system, 
all with the aim of seeking justice in the law and practice.  
 
The chapter described this series of reforms, which were made under the assumption 
that they would foster a new era of human rights protection and with the belief that 
the reformed system would be far removed from the past era under the Ba’ath regime. 
A critical element of the new era is respect for human rights within a reformed 
criminal justice system under the democratic rule of law. Important initiatives have 
been put in place regarding Iraqi criminal law. There is a new Constitution, where 
respecting of human rights is a basic requirement, and the vision is one of democracy.  
 
Thus, it is no surprise that the Constitution sets out the basic rights of persons who are 
under criminal proceedings. Steps have been carried out to provide an independent 
judicial system. Steps have been taken to overhaul the police and other justice 
personal and institutions of the criminal justice system. Iraq became a party to a 
number of international human rights treaties, such as the UN CAT and the ICPPED. 
Several other bodies have been established with competence in human rights matters, 
such as the Ministry of Human Rights, the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission 
and the Higher Commission for Human Rights.  
 
The chapter showed that, despite having taken significant steps, many challenges 
regarding the rule of law remain in Iraq. The analysis of the steps that have been taken 
to entrench the rule of law and human rights, with a focus on the Iraqi criminal justice 
system, has demonstrated that the reform of justice in post-Saddam Iraq has not fully 
come to fruition. Two observations were presented. On the one hand, for the purpose 
of improving justice, the reform established several mechanisms for human rights 
protection; but on the other hand, they do not seem to be adequate protective 
mechanisms.  
 
Chapter Three examined the investigative system and pre-trial investigation process.  
It made clear that a full evaluation of the post-Saddam criminal justice reform must 
involve an investigation of the process as whole as well as into the details of the three 
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selected rights. Many problems related to the system were viewed in the light of 
international human rights law and the standards of due process. The outcomes of the 
chapter critiqued the myth of the competency of the Iraqi investigative system, and 
the arguments cast light on problems regarding the investigative system in the 
preliminary investigation stage and the agencies involved, such as the police, the 
public prosecution and the investigating judge.   
 
It appeared that the investigative system was a cornerstone of human rights abuse in 
the criminal justice system. One cause was the diffusion of power to many parties 
other than the investigating judge, particularly to law enforcement officers, to conduct 
criminal proceedings at the initial criminal investigation stage before the judicial 
proceedings. The chapter showed that the ICCP empowers police officers, including 
those who have no investigator qualifications, to conduct investigations in some 
instances without the need to obtain permission from the judicial investigator or the 
investigating judge or to even notify them of the matter. Law enforcement officers – 
having been given broad power – have not fully respected Iraq’s obligations under 
international human rights law in their daily practice. It has been substantiated that 
police personnel in Iraq still use coercive means to obtain incriminating statements, 
and their investigations, which play a crucial role in the overall proceedings, are 
marked by a failure to maintain even minimal standards. Despite the lack of 
procedural due process, this research notes that statements given at this stage of 
proceedings have been accepted by courts in numerous cases. 
 
In addition, the police handling criminal investigations are inadequately supervised by 
judicial authority. In spite of the fact that criminal proceedings under Iraqi law should 
be conducted under the supervision and control of judicial authority, many challenges 
exist in actual practice. In reality, despite these provisions, judicial authorities cannot 
even impose disciplinary action when police do not follow required duty or disobey 
instructions and orders given during the investigation of crimes. Consequently, 
supervision may not be adequately applicable since a disciplinary case against a 
police officer is outside the jurisdiction of judicial authority.  
 
Moreover, the role of the public prosecutors in criminal proceedings needs to be 
undergone corrective measures. This research demonstrated that the public 
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prosecutors although became enjoy the same privileges as professional judges the 
power of investigation given under the ICCP in some instances is not practical. This 
chapter showed that they should be disqualified from carrying out an investigation 
owing to a conflict of interests between the powers of accusation and those of 
investigation.  
 
Structurally, the system needs to be realigned, particularly by condensing the broad 
powers of police and recentralising investigation power in the judicial authority (the 
investigating judge and judicial investigator).   
   
This in-depth study of the Iraqi criminal justice system as a whole provided an entry 
point into the next three chapters, which focused on the three identified rights. These 
three chapters revealed many problems related to the protection of a person under pre-
trial investigation when viewed in terms of international human rights law. The 
wealth of evidence revealed during the research process suggests that the reformed 
criminal justice system, which is considered by many a cornerstone of the rule of law 
and public confidence in post-Saddam Iraq, has been overwhelmed by the day-to-day 
relating of Iraq.  
 
Chapter Four analysed the right to liberty by addressing the question about the extent 
to which the reform of law and practice during arrest and detention were in line with 
binding standards. The chapter identified various shortcomings in the legal framework 
and practice during the process of arrest and detention. Despite the formal entitlement 
to persons under arrest or detention to the right to be protected from deprivation of 
liberty, these new provisions did not fully resolve the problem. It was evident that in 
actual practice a great number of persons were unnecessarily arrested and detained. 
Carrying out arrests based on unreliable information has been a notable abuse of the 
liberty of individuals over the last several years.  
 
Furthermore, a flawed legal regime has been a significant factor in underscoring the 
loophole between the system and international standards. For example, the research 
revealed that some of the provisions of Iraqi law give police the power to arrest 
without a warrant and outside the scope of flagrante delicto. The research has shown 
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that such legal provisions must be rigorously limited because they could open the gate 
to the abuse of the right of individuals to liberty.  
 
Under the ICCP, there are no provisions that impose the duty upon the arresting 
officer to notify the arrestee of the reasons for the arrest. International human rights 
law makes clear that anyone who is under arrest shall be informed of the reasons for 
the arrest and that failure to inform the arrestee violates international rules under 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR. This chapter also makes clear that new changes have not 
fully resolved the problem that arrested persons could spend a long time in police 
custody before they are brought before the judicial authority. The research found that 
so far there are defective provisions, which remain in force have been overlooked in 
post-2003 reforms. These provisions supported the idea that modifications to the post-
Saddam criminal justice system against arbitrary arrest and detention have not 
achieved full conformity with the binding obligations of international human rights 
law. In accordance with these provisions, executive authority rather than the judges 
have been given the power of detention in some circumstances. So this is 
unconstitutional, clearly inconsistent with Article 15 and 37 of the Permanent 
Constitution. As a matter of law, detentions carried out in accordance with 
unconstitutional provisions are unlawful, thus those provisions are inconsistent with 
international standards. 
 
The chapter has revealed that when the investigating judge initially decides detention 
in the first place or to continue the detention period, he may likely later refuse any 
application regarding a review of such detention.
4
 Unlike the requirements of the 
ICCPR under Article 9(4), Iraqi law does not provide any legal basis on which a 
detainee can physically appear before the competent authority during such a review, 
nor on which his lawyer can represent him – that is, such a review is conducted only 
on paper. This flaw clearly impedes the system from ensuring the right to liberty 
under international human rights law.  
 
This chapter has also shown the complex measures in law and implementation that 
may impede the release of the detainee on bail. The human rights situation regarding 
detention has worsened due to the fact that Iraqi law has not taken into account the 
                                                 
4
 See the discussion about this issue in Chapters Three and Four.  
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clear maximum length of pre-trial detention, and no adequate provisions have been set 
out in this regard. Consequently, the evidence which has emerged from this chapter 
suggests that the protection of the right to liberty under the criminal justice system in 
post-Saddam Iraq have not been in line with the obligations of Iraq under 
international law. Compliance with international standards requires a holistic reform 
in the law and in practice. 
 
Chapter Five addressed the question of whether Iraqi law and working practice protect 
the right of access to free legal assistance and an interpreter during the pre-trial stage. 
It analysed the situation and the associated deficiencies. The research showed that the 
law now entitles an accused person to a lawyer during the pre-trial investigation stage. 
However, notable shortcomings include the absence of satisfactory provisions in the 
law and in practice.  
 
The effective right of access to a lawyer is not guaranteed from the first moment of 
arrest during pre-trial criminal proceedings. Iraqi law only guarantees access to a 
lawyer at the later stages of the investigation – during judicial process when the 
accused person is brought before the Investigating Court. There is no explicit 
provision to ensure the right of access to a lawyer for persons facing police 
investigations, whereas under international standards, the right of access to a lawyer 
should be guaranteed by sufficient due process from the outset of the criminal 
proceedings.  The right of access to a qualified lawyer should be guaranteed free of 
charge for indigent persons under criminal investigations from the outset of 
proceedings.     
 
In addition, under the interim administration post-2003, the duty of the arresting 
officer to inform the arrested person about his right to a lawyer at the time of arrest is 
not adequately stipulated. Notable shortcomings also include the absence of the duty 
to inform a person under police questioning about the right of access to a lawyer. The 
reforms made during the time of the interim administration post-2003, which were 
meant to be transitional but remain in force, have proven unsatisfactory regarding this 
right. The research has shown the weaknesses of those changes due to the fact that 
they were made in a piecemeal, non-holistic fashion. The research also led to 
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evidence that, in practice, the majority of persons facing criminal proceedings were 
not given their right to a lawyer throughout the pre-trial stage.  
 
Furthermore, the research pointed out some defective areas regarding confidential 
communication between lawyers and their clients. In addition, the research revealed 
some flaws and challenges in the system with regard to provide effective and practical 
representation. While, according to international standards a person under criminal 
proceedings should be guaranteed the right of access to a qualified legal assistance.    
 
This chapter also pointed out a critical problem with regard to the presence of an 
interpreter during the primary investigation stage. It is problematic that in the Iraqi 
criminal justice system, there are no legal provisions which give a person under 
investigation the right of access to an interpreter. In consequence, the post-Saddam 
legislature has not exercised its statutory powers in such a way that the new system 
can attain the mandatory minimum level of international standards. International 
standards entitle an accused person who cannot understand or speak the language of 
the proceedings the opportunity to receive the service of an interpreter to protect the 
interests of justice; however, the legal texts in Iraqi law generally have no explicit 
statutory rule in this regard and are therefore deficient. At the same time, as has been 
shown in this chapter, in a post-conflict society like Iraq, which has not known the 
rule of law or experienced good practice in criminal justice, there is an absence of 
logical legal provisions, leading to the abuse of individuals’ human rights in practice – 
particularly considering that Iraq is a civil law country where the laws must cover 
every situation, and there is no scope for judges to fill the gaps.  
 
Chapter Six considered the question whether post-Saddam reforms carried out in 
relation to the right of the accused person against self-incrimination do indeed bring 
that right to fully comply with international law. The answer to that question was that 
the protection of the present right still continues to fall short of international standards 
in many aspects. The chapter examined in-depth the provisions of Iraqi law and what 
has been done through the reforms with regard to this right. Most importantly, it 
discussed the possible situation in which, contrary to the due process rights norm, the 
denial of the right against self-incrimination may happen at the pre-trial investigation 
for the purpose of obtaining confessions to be used against an accused person to 
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secure a conviction at trial. The chapter verified that these aspects are in non-
compliance with binding obligations under international rules. 
 
The chapter also examined the notable elements of the rights to protection against 
involuntary confession, to the presumption of innocence and to protection from ill 
treatment. It is argued that here the reforms have not entirely failed. However, an 
assessment of the reforms in light of international due process demonstrated that there 
have been situations where the progress achieved through the reforms has been called 
into question. It was asserted that the accused person enjoys greater protection under 
international standards, therefore emphasising the importance of the need to promptly 
follow the procession of modern developments in criminal proceedings. The 
subsequent conclusion, then, was that the right of the accused person against self-
incrimination remains unfulfilled because the reformed Iraqi criminal justice system 
continues to rely heavily on confessions to secure convictions at trial.  
 
Chapter Seven asked the question: Why has the story of a successful Iraqi criminal 
justice system reform process turned out to be a myth?  
 
The discussion throughout this chapter focused on the fact that since 2003 the system 
has undergone significant measures of reform. Despite these measures, there are many 
factors underlying why the post-Saddam system is still in non-compliance with 
obligations under international standards. This chapter identified in detail these 
factors. Some of these factors are related to the legal culture and the law itself, while 
other factors involve daily working practice and social attitudes towards human rights. 
It should be conceded therefore that, in order to tackle the problematic deficiencies 
and move forward, much greater reform is still required both in law and practice. As 
explained in this chapter, the reforms to the law in the three relevant areas have not 
been enough to protect these three identified rights; a holistic reform of the system is 
particularly important to bring about the necessary change. Consequently, a series of 
reforms were proposed to be carried out in the near future in order to achieve full 
compliance with international human rights standards. The key reforms suggested in 
this chapter include the areas of law reform and the training of criminal justice 
personnel, accountability and impunity, improving the investigative system and 
procedural safeguards, improving the performance of the High Commission for 
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Human Rights, funding and resources, combating corruption, improving social 
attitudes and enforcing international rules domestically.   
 
To wrap up, some scholars have noted the Iraqi people’s pride in their judicial 
system.
5
 It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, however, that such pride is 
misplaced and that much more needs to be done to address deficiencies and to 
develop modern procedural safeguards for the international standards. The hope is 
that the main shortcomings shown through this project will generate momentum for 
reform in the near future in order to overcome transgressions against human rights for 
the good of the person who is under criminal proceedings. This thesis will be a “best 
practice” guide for the Iraqi criminal justice system in the area of pre-trial rights. It is 
the author’s plan to use this work to assist the Iraqi legislature and other criminal 
justice personnel (those in the legal profession, police, judicial officials and scholars) 
and to assist those institutions which need to explore a targeting strategy to implement 
the proposals and to win the long-term struggle for human rights in the administration 
of justice.  
 
8.3. Further suggested research 
 
In a nutshell, this work has argued that the reformed criminal justice system has failed 
to fully protect the three identified rights. It suggests that a complete overhaul of the 
Iraqi criminal justice system is needed and that the areas identified in this work are 
just the tip of the iceberg. More work is clearly needed. To this end, it is hoped that 
this discussion will create an encouraging stimulus for further research. Further 
research projects are required in the area of criminal justice system reform. Priority 
should be given to researching, for example, procedural safeguards to human rights, 
judicial capacity and the role of judges in building the post-Saddam Iraqi, police 
power, programmes to build a successful reformed prison system, corruption, the lack 
                                                 
5
 Professor Brooks indicates that “the Iraqis are extremely proud of their legal system. At our first 
meeting with Iraqi judicial officials, … their top priority was to reinforce the idea that Iraq had a good 
legal structure” Scott Carlson et al., “Establishing the Rule of Law” (2004) 33 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 119, 130; see also Travis Hall, “Address: Post-War Criminal 
Justice in Iraq” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 161.  
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of oversight in the system, impunity and accountability as obligations under 
international law, gaps in the Iraqi Permanent Constitution, etc. Such research projects 
could be embarked upon in all these different areas in light of holistic post-conflict 
measures for respecting human rights and the rule of law.   
 
Such further research can also benefit from the current study, particularly with regard 
to the limitations this research faced. It should be clear that, owing to the controversial 
and ongoing nature of this topic, reliable empirical evidence is difficult to obtain. The 
level of violation of human rights and corruption in the criminal justice system and 
the confused political landscape being as it is mean that such information is firmly in 
the grips of the incumbent authorities. As a result, most of the information relied on 
came from international and national human rights organisations. Even so, the author 
has been able to draw conclusions from these materials. That does not detract from 
fact that being said, there must be more openness and transparency to enable further 
research to be carried out. 
 
The ability to examine the criminal justice system as it works on a day-to-day basis 
would lead to a more holistic and informed understanding of all aspects of the system. 
As previously recommended in Chapter Seven, information must be collected through 
reliable means, recorded and analysed. This also requires equipment and trained staff 
to cover the system. This kind of research would enable accurate monitoring and 
interventions as necessary. It would assist with bridging the gap between the national 
system and Iraq’s international obligations.  
 
8.4. Conclusion 
 
This study has revealed major structural and system problems. Changes have been 
made in a piecemeal, non-holistic way. Changes made in the time of the interim 
administration post-2003 were meant to be transitional but remain in force. The 
reform project has stalled. The preceding chapters of this thesis have detailed the 
problems in the Iraqi criminal justice system. The system cannot operate in 
accordance with binding international standards unless the human rights of 
individuals are respected.  
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Iraq needs to promote these rights through a major overhaul of the system – in 
particular, through strengthening the pre-trial procedural safeguards for persons facing 
criminal proceedings. The author’s proposals and recommendations are of particular 
significance in regards to moving its criminal justice system forward and achieving a 
genuine commitment to the rule of law. The rule of law in the Iraqi criminal justice 
system is today a pipe dream, it need not be, and this research is an important step for 
the future.  
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